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Florida Statute 20.201 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 20.201 Case Law from Google Scholar
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Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 20.201

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title IV
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Chapter 20
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 20.201
20.201 Department of Law Enforcement.
(1) There is created a Department of Law Enforcement. The head of the department is the Governor and Cabinet. The executive director of the department shall be appointed by the Governor subject to a majority vote of the Governor and Cabinet, with the Governor on the prevailing side. The appointment is subject to confirmation by the Senate. The executive director shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor and Cabinet. The executive director may establish a command, operational, and administrative services structure to assist, manage, and support the department in operating programs and delivering services.
(2) The following programs of the Department of Law Enforcement are established:
(a) Criminal Justice Investigations and Forensic Science Program.
(b) Criminal Justice Information Program.
(c) Criminal Justice Professionalism Program.
(d) Capitol Police.
History.ss. 3, 4, 5, 7, 12, ch. 74-386; s. 11, ch. 77-104; s. 2, ch. 77-111; s. 1, ch. 78-347; s. 19, ch. 81-24; s. 2, ch. 87-30; s. 5, ch. 89-3; s. 1, ch. 98-94; s. 1, ch. 2002-21; s. 1, ch. 2022-14.

F.S. 20.201 on Google Scholar

F.S. 20.201 on Casetext

Amendments to 20.201


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 20.201
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 20.201.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

VETERANS JUSTICE GROUP, LLC, v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, v. v., 818 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 20.201 (2014). . . . Final Rule, 79 Fed.Reg. at 57,679; see 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(1) (2015). . . . Final Rule, 79 Fed.Reg. at 57,679; see 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(1) (2015). III. . . . With respect to appeals, Petitioners challenge amended 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(1) and (a)(4), requiring . . . Id. § 20.201(a)(4). . . .

McMUNN, v. BABCOCK WILCOX POWER GENERATION GROUP, INC. v. P. v. W. v. v. v. v. L. v. v. L. D. v. v. v. v. v. S. v., 131 F. Supp. 3d 352 (W.D. Pa. 2015)

. . . . § 20.106(b)” as required by § 20.201. . . . reasonably achievable”); Adkins, 960 F.Supp.2d at 772-73 (same, also refusing to impose liability based on § 20.201 . . .

DENT, v. A. McDONALD,, 27 Vet. App. 362 (Vet. App. 2015)

. . . . § 20.201 (2015) (requiring that an NOD be written “in terms which can be reasonably construed as disagreement . . .

CHAUDHRY, v. J. ASTRUE,, 688 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 20.201. A Notice of Disagreement is required to appeal a DVA decision. . . .

R. RODRIGUEZ, v. K. SHINSEKI,, 455 F. App'x 994 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 20.201. The RO subsequently received three separate letters from the appellant. . . .

R. SHIPLEY, v. K. SHINSEKI,, 24 Vet. App. 458 (Vet. App. 2011)

. . . . § 20.201 (2010). . . . written communication expressing dissatisfaction with an “adjudicative determination.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

VETERANS FOR COMMON SENSE, a a a v. K. SHINSEKI, P. G. A. M. D. K., 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011)

. . . . §§ 20.200, 20.201. . . .

B. THOMPSON, v. K. SHINSEKI,, 24 Vet. App. 176 (Vet. App. 2010)

. . . . §§ 20.201 and 20.202 oblige the Secretary to construe arguments “in a liberal manner”), and has been . . .

E. BUIE, v. K. SHINSEKI,, 24 Vet. App. 242 (Vet. App. 2010)

. . . . § 20.201 and were therefore Notices of Disagreement. This was undoubtedly error. Each of Mr. . . .

R. LIPPMAN, v. K. SHINSEKI, C., 23 Vet. App. 243 (Vet. App. 2009)

. . . . § 20.201 (2009). . . .

D. SIMS, v. K. SHINSEKI,, 578 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 20.201. . . .

D. SIMS, v. K. SHINSEKI,, 578 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 20.201. . . .

R. YOUNG, v. K. SHINSEKI,, 22 Vet. App. 461 (Vet. App. 2009)

. . . . § 20.201 (2008). . . . See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1); Palmer, supra; 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. b. . . .

R. SHACKLEFORD, v. K. SHINSEKI,, 324 F. App'x 892 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 20.201, we affirm. BACKGROUND Mr. Shackleford served on active duty from 1960 to 1964. . . . Shackleford argues that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 by requiring that his May . . . Section 20.201 provides: A written communication ... expressing dissatisfaction or disagreement with . . . reasonably construed as disagreement with that determination and a desire for appellate review. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . , faithfully followed our guidance provided in Andre and Ledford, and correctly interpreted section 20.201 . . .

R. SHACKLEFORD, v. K. SHINSEKI,, 324 F. App'x 892 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 20.201, we affirm. BACKGROUND Mr. Shackleford served on active duty from 1960 to 1964. . . . Shackleford argues that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 by requiring that his May . . . Section 20.201 provides: A written communication ... expressing dissatisfaction or disagreement with . . . reasonably construed as disagreement with that determination and a desire for appellate review. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . , faithfully followed our guidance provided in Andre and Ledford, and correctly interpreted section 20.201 . . .

ROBINSON, v. K. SHINSEKI,, 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 20.201. . . .

ROBINSON, v. K. SHINSEKI,, 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 20.201. . . .

E. GIBSON, v. B. PEAKE, M. D., 22 Vet. App. 11 (Vet. App. 2007)

. . . . §§ 20.201, 20.300, 20.302(a) (2007); see also H.R.Rep. . . . . § 20.201 (2007) (“A written communication from a claimant ... expressing dissatisfaction or disagreement . . .

L. PALMER, v. R. NICHOLSON,, 21 Vet. App. 434 (Vet. App. 2007)

. . . Principi 283 F.3d 1309, 1313-14 (Fed.Cir.2002) (holding that VA regulation § 20.201, which was promulgated . . .

R. MARSH, v. R. NICHOLSON,, 19 Vet. App. 381 (Vet. App. 2005)

. . . . § 20.201 (2005). . . .

WASHINGTON STATE REPUBLICAN PARTY, v. LOGAN,, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907 (W.D. Wash. 2005)

. . . Rev.Code §§ 29A.20.110 — • 29A.20.201. . . . Code §§ 29A.20.110-29A.20.201. Initiative 872-, Sec. 17. . . . Code §§ 29A.20.110 through 29A.20.201. See Section VI.C, infra. . . .

L. MATTHEWS, v. R. NICHOLSON,, 19 Vet. App. 202 (Vet. App. 2005)

. . . . § 20.201 (1999); see Gallegos v. . . .

I. ANDERSON, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 18 Vet. App. 371 (Vet. App. 2004)

. . . . § 20.201 (2003); see Gallegos v. . . . reasonably construed as disagreement with that determination and a desire for appellate review.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . reasonably construed as disagreement with that determination and a desire for appellate review.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

A. ACOSTA, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 18 Vet. App. 53 (Vet. App. 2004)

. . . . § 20.201 (2003); see Roy v. . . .

E. LEONARD, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 17 Vet. App. 447 (Vet. App. 2004)

. . . . § 20.201 (2003) (NOD must “express[ ] dissatisfaction or disagreement” with an RO determination). . . .

DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,, 327 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 20.201; see Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed.Cir.1998). . . .

DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,, 327 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 20.201; see Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed.Cir.1998). . . .

GALLEGOS, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 16 Vet. App. 551 (Vet. App. 2003)

. . . . § 20.201 (2000), was invalid because it conflicted with the applicable statute, 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b) . . . (1), (b)(2), and (d), “insofar as § 20.201 may be interpreted as adding a requirement of an expression . . . the pending joint motion: The Federal Circuit held that this Court had “erred when it invalidated § 20.201 . . . Gallegos’s 1994 DAV letter constitutes a valid NOD under § 20.201.” Gallegos, 283 F.3d at 1315. . . . 2002, supplemental briefing on the issue whether the 1994 DAV letter constituted a valid NOD under § 20.201 . . . . § 20.201 (2002) for being a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) insofar as having been written “in terms which . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201; Collaro v. . . .

R. COOK, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 318 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 20.201; Collaro v. . . .

R. COOK, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 318 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 20.201; Collaro v. . . .

D. HERNDON, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 311 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 20.201 (2001) (A notice of disagreement with an agency adjudicative determination requires only a . . .

D. HERNDON, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 311 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 20.201 (2001) (A notice of disagreement with an agency adjudicative determination requires only a . . .

MAJEED, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 16 Vet. App. 421 (Vet. App. 2002)

. . . . §§ 20.201(NOD), 20.202 (Substantive Appeal) (2001). Cf. Teten v. . . .

L. JAQUAY, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 304 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 20.201 (2001). . . .

L. JAQUAY, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 304 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 20.201 (2001). . . .

GALLEGOS, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 16 Vet. App. 201 (Vet. App. 2002)

. . . .] § 20.201 [(1999)] may be interpreted as adding a requirement of an expression of a desire for BVA . . . Court’s decision; the Federal Circuit held that this Court had “erred when it invalidated [38 C.F.R.] § 20.201 . . . Gallegos’s 1994 DAV letter constitutes a valid NOD under § 20.201”. Gallegos v. . . .

GALLEGOS, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 283 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 20.201 (1998) — a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regulation setting minimum requirements for . . . In sum, Chevron deference applies to the VA’s implementation of § 7105, i.e., 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. . . . The VA promulgated § 20.201 in 1992 to expressly define a “notice of disagreement” in § 7105. . . . Section 20.201 is a reasonable and permissible construction of § 7105. . . . Gallegos’s 1994 DAV letter constitutes a valid NOD under § 20.201. . . . . § 20.201, cannot be upheld. . . . do not cover “expressing a desire for appellate review” as called for by the regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

GALLEGOS, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 283 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 20.201 (1998) — a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regulation setting minimum requirements for . . . In sum, Chevron deference applies to the VA’s implementation of § 7105, i.e., 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. . . . The VA promulgated § 20.201 in 1992 to expressly define a “notice of disagreement” in § 7105. . . . Section 20.201 is a reasonable and permissible construction of § 7105. . . . Gallegos’s 1994 DAV letter constitutes a valid NOD under § 20.201. . . . . § 20.201, cannot be upheld. . . . do not cover “expressing a desire for appellate review” as called for by the regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

V. HAYRE, v. J. PRINCIPI,, 15 Vet. App. 48 (Vet. App. 2001)

. . . . § 20.201 (2000); see Gallegos v. Gober, 14 Vet.App. 50, 57-58 (2000); see also Fenderson v. . . .

GALLEGOS, v. W. GOBER,, 14 Vet. App. 50 (Vet. App. 2000)

. . . . § 20.201 was promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to his lawful authority and its substantive terms . . . of disagreement,” the Secretary, in the exercise of this § 501(a) authority, promulgated 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . In my view, Tomlin stands only for the proposition that, to the extent that 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 may be . . . The answer is: the “desire for appellate review” provision of 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 is not unreasonable, . . . Section 20.201 is nothing more than “the formulation of policy and the making of rules” required of the . . . . § 20.201 (1999) (emphasis added). “ ‘Whether a document is an NOD is a question of law for the Court . . . In applying § 20.201 in Tomlin, this Court held that “we construe the regulation to impose no technical . . . The difficulty with § 20.201 is that it may be read as implying that a VA claimant must intend to appeal . . . As our foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Board was mistaken in its interpretation of § 20.201. . . . Therefore, insofar as § 20.201 may be interpreted as adding a requirement of an expression of a desire . . .

MAGGITT, Jr. v. D. WEST, Jr., 202 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000)

. . . . §§ 19.118 (1989), 20.201 (1997); Collaro, 136 F.3d at 1308 (disagreement between the Agency and the . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1997); Ledford v. West, 136 F.3d 776, 780 (Fed.Cir.1998). . . .

MAGGITT, Jr. v. D. WEST, Jr., 202 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000)

. . . . §§ 19.118 (1989), 20.201 (1997); Collaro, 136 F.3d at 1308 (disagreement between the Agency and the . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1997); Ledford v. West, 136 F.3d 776, 780 (Fed.Cir.1998). . . .

COLE, v. D. WEST, Jr., 13 Vet. App. 268 (Vet. App. 1999)

. . . . § 20.201, which, as we have noted, Carpenter I held includes a CUE-based “entitled to receive” theory . . .

STUCKEY, v. D. WEST, Jr., 13 Vet. App. 163 (Vet. App. 1999)

. . . . § 20.201 (1998). This Court has consistently interpreted this definition of an NOD broadly. . . .

R. MOORE, v. D. WEST, Jr., 13 Vet. App. 69 (Vet. App. 1999)

. . . . § 20.201 (1997) ..., an NOD must have indicated a disagreement with a specific determination. . . . . § 20.201 (1998), see Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet.App. 119 (1999). . . .

G. JARVIS, v. D. WEST, Jr., 12 Vet. App. 559 (Vet. App. 1999)

. . . . § 20.201 (1998); see Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet.App. 119 (1999); Jones v. . . . and “the specific determinations with which the claimant disagrees must be identified.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

R. SWANSON, v. D. WEST, Jr., 12 Vet. App. 442 (Vet. App. 1999)

. . . . § 20.201 (1998); see also Evans (Billy) v. West, 12 Vet.App. 396, 398-99 (1999); Fenderson v. . . .

D. EVANS, v. D. WEST, Jr., 12 Vet. App. 396 (Vet. App. 1999)

. . . . § 20.201 (1998); see also Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet.App. 119, 128 (1999); Buckley v. . . . disagreement with an adjudicative determination ... and a desire to contest the result”. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . VJRA § 402; 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107, 5110(a), 7104(a), (d)(1), 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.400(b)(2), (r), 20.201 . . .

D. MANLINCON, v. D. WEST, Jr., 12 Vet. App. 238 (Vet. App. 1999)

. . . . § 20.201 (1998); See Archbold v. . . .

A. VALASCO, v. D. WEST, Jr., 12 Vet. App. 172 (Vet. App. 1999)

. . . . § 20.201 (1998) (defining NOD as "[a] written communication from a claimant or his or her representative . . .

A. FENDERSON, v. D. WEST, Jr., 12 Vet. App. 119 (Vet. App. 1999)

. . . . § 20.201 (1998); see also Buckley v. West, 12 Vet.App. 76, 81-82 (1998); Beyrle v. . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (defining NOD as described above); see also Buckley and Beyrle, both supra; Tomlin . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. . . . requisite “disagreement with an adjudicative determination” and “desire for appellate review”. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . C.F.R. §§ 3.321(b)(1), 3.400, 3.500, 4.1, 4.40, 4.45, 4.71a, DC 5277, 4.71a, DC 5284, 4.124a, DC 8100, 20.201 . . .

H. JONES, v. D. WEST, Jr., 12 Vet. App. 98 (Vet. App. 1998)

. . . . § 20.201 (1997); see also Beyrle v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 24, 27 (1996); Hamilton v. . . .

L. BUCKLEY, v. D. WEST, Jr., 12 Vet. App. 76 (Vet. App. 1998)

. . . . § 20.201 (1995); see also Beyrle v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 24, 27 (1996); Hamilton v. . . . appellant’s “legal reasoning supporting such a challenge need not appear in the NOD, see 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

C. BRANNON, v. D. WEST, Jr., 12 Vet. App. 32 (Vet. App. 1998)

. . . . § 20.201 (1997). . . .

R. MARSH, v. D. WEST, Jr., 11 Vet. App. 468 (Vet. App. 1998)

. . . . § 20.201 (1997); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 535-36, and that is filed within one year after the date of . . . See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a), (d); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.103, 19.29, 20.201, 20.202, 20.700 (1997); Austin v. . . . reasons or bases, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 5107, 7104(a), (d)(1), 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.103, 19.29, 19.34, 20.101, 20.201 . . .

M. COLLARO, v. G. WEST, Jr., 136 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1998)

. . . . § 20.201 (1997). . . . This regulation equates “determination of the issue or issues” with section 20.201’s “adjudicative determination . . . legal entitlement to a particular benefit may also form the basis of a section 19.120 issue, a section 20.201 . . .

M. COLLARO, v. G. WEST, Jr., 136 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1998)

. . . . § 20.201 (1997). . . . This regulation equates “determination of the issue or issues” with section 20.201’s “adjudicative determination . . . legal entitlement to a particular benefit may also form the basis of a section 19.120 issue, a section 20.201 . . .

A. LEDFORD, v. D. WEST, Jr., 136 F.3d 776 (Fed. Cir. 1998)

. . . . § 20.201 (1997). . . . While his legal reasoning supporting such a challenge need not appear in the NOD, see 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

A. LEDFORD, v. D. WEST, Jr., 136 F.3d 776 (Fed. Cir. 1998)

. . . . § 20.201 (1997). . . . While his legal reasoning supporting such a challenge need not appear in the NOD, see 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

CHISEM, v. GOBER,, 10 Vet. App. 526 (Vet. App. 1997)

. . . . §§ 3.103, 19.29, 20.201, 20.202, 20.700 (1996); Austin v. . . .

R. DONOVAN, v. W. GOBER,, 10 Vet. App. 404 (Vet. App. 1997)

. . . . §§ 3.103, 19.29, 20.201, 20.202, 20.700 (1996); Austin v. . . . 114 F.3d 1156, 1159 (Fed.Cir.1997) (Archer, Chief Judge, concurring); 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

A. BARRERA, F. v. W. GOBER,, 122 F.3d 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1997)

. . . . § 20.201. The question then is, what “issue or issues” may a claimant appeal. . . .

A. BARRERA, F. v. W. GOBER,, 122 F.3d. 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1997)

. . . . § 20.201. The question then is, what “issue or issues” may a claimant appeal. . . .

In D. COX No. XXX XX XXXX, 10 Vet. App. 361 (Vet. App. 1997)

. . . . § 20.201 (1996). . . . that “there can be no notice of disagreement within the meaning of 38 U.S.C. § 7105 and 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

N. GRANTHAM, v. BROWN,, 114 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1997)

. . . . § 20.201 (1996). . . .

N. GRANTHAM, v. BROWN,, 114 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1997)

. . . . § 20.201 (1996). . . .

D. GARLEJO, v. BROWN,, 10 Vet. App. 229 (Vet. App. 1997)

. . . . § 20.201 (1995). . . .

SMALLWOOD, v. BROWN,, 10 Vet. App. 93 (Vet. App. 1997)

. . . . § 20.201 (1995); see also Crippen v. . . .

S. ALLIN, v. BROWN,, 10 Vet. App. 55 (Vet. App. 1997)

. . . . § 20.201; see Strott v. Derwinski 964 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (Fed.Cir.1992); Hamilton v. . . . Based upon 38 C.F.R. § 20.201, there is nothing on the form which the RO could construe as being an NOD . . .

L. PHILLIPS, v. BROWN,, 10 Vet. App. 25 (Vet. App. 1997)

. . . . § 20.201 (1995)). . . . Substantive Appeal to the BVA”, sufficiently manifested “a desire for appellate review” under 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . . § 20.201 (1995). . . . early decisions were in some unspecified way erroneous, does not meet the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

E. CRIPPEN, Jr. v. BROWN,, 9 Vet. App. 412 (Vet. App. 1996)

. . . . § 20.201 (1995) (NOD must express “disagreement with [an RO] determination and a desire for appellate . . .

V. VILLEZA, v. BROWN,, 9 Vet. App. 353 (Vet. App. 1996)

. . . . § 20.201 (1992) (as to the pertinent language, the regulation was essentially the same, but codified . . .

A. FAZON, v. BROWN,, 9 Vet. App. 319 (Vet. App. 1996)

. . . . § 20.201 (1995), and appears to render the claim still open (because the record does not contain an . . .

CORCORAN, v. NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY CORCORAN, v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP., 935 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

. . . regulations that include, but are not limited to, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 10 C.F.R. sections 20.1, 20.101, 20.103, 20.201 . . . Section 20.201 obligates licensees to conduct surveys to ensure compliance with the regulations. . . .

E. ARCHBOLD, v. BROWN,, 9 Vet. App. 124 (Vet. App. 1996)

. . . . § 20.201 (1995); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531. . . . The veteran’s July 1991 statement meets the requirements of § 20.201 and was filed well within one year . . . case may still differ” from that of VA, expressing a desire to contest the result as is required by § 20.201 . . .

R. BEYRLE, Sr. v. BROWN,, 9 Vet. App. 24 (Vet. App. 1996)

. . . . § 20.201 (1995); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531. . . . as to the May 1992 RO decision denying his CUE claim because that letter meets the requirements of § 20.201 . . . disagreement” with the May 1992 RO decision and a desire to contest the result as is required by 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . This letter also expressed a “desire for appellate review” pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.201, by requesting . . . See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a), (b)(1), (b)(2); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.201, 20.302(a). III. . . .

R. BLACKBURN, v. BROWN,, 8 Vet. App. 97 (Vet. App. 1995)

. . . . §§ 20.200, 20.201, 20.302(a) (1994); Flnker v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 296, 297 (1993). . . .

MASON, v. BROWN,, 8 Vet. App. 44 (Vet. App. 1995)

. . . . § 20.201 (1994). See generally Hamilton v. . . . veteran on February 18, 1988, depends on whether the letter satisfies the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 324, 326 (1991); 38 C.F.R. § 20.201), this letter cannot be construed as an NOD . . . denial of her claim, and did not indicate a “desire to contest the result”, as required by 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . RO denial of her claim, or to indicate a “desire to contest the result”, as required by 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

F. WEST, v. BROWN,, 7 Vet. App. 329 (Vet. App. 1995)

. . . . § 20.201 (1994). . . . express disagreement with a certain ‘“issue or issues’” (see 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1)(A); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.201 . . .

C. MINDENHALL, v. BROWN,, 7 Vet. App. 271 (Vet. App. 1994)

. . . . §§ 20.200, 20.201, 20.302(a) (1993) (“The date of mailing the letter of notification of the determination . . .

A. HAMILTON J. v. BROWN,, 39 F.3d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1994)

. . . . § 20.201 (1993). . . . Hamilton’s other point — that the Agency’s long-standing definition of a NOD embodied in 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . enacted into law, the relevant regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 19.118 (1988) (the predecessor to 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

A. HAMILTON J. v. BROWN,, 39 F.3d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1994)

. . . . § 20.201 (1993). . . . Hamilton’s other point — that the Agency’s long-standing definition of a NOD embodied in 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . enacted into law, the relevant regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 19.118 (1988) (the predecessor to 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

A. SMITH, v. BROWN,, 35 F.3d 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1994)

. . . . § 20.201 (emphasis added). . . .

A. SMITH, v. BROWN,, 35 F.3d 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1994)

. . . . § 20.201 (emphasis added). . . .

S. HAUCK, v. BROWN,, 6 Vet. App. 518 (Vet. App. 1994)

. . . . § 20.201 (1993). . . .

COUNTS, v. BROWN,, 6 Vet. App. 473 (Vet. App. 1994)

. . . . § 20.201 as imposing no technical formal requirements for a Notice of Disagreement beyond the requirements . . .

J. NACOSTE, v. BROWN,, 6 Vet. App. 439 (Vet. App. 1994)

. . . . § 20.201 (1993). . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (NOD must express written dissatisfaction “with an adjudicative determination . . .

M. FRAZER, v. BROWN,, 6 Vet. App. 19 (Vet. App. 1993)

. . . . § 20.201 (1992). . . .

S. BRESLOW, v. BROWN,, 5 Vet. App. 560 (Vet. App. 1993)

. . . . § 20.201 (1992)) would confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Whitt, supra. . . .

B. LYON, v. BROWN,, 5 Vet. App. 507 (Vet. App. 1993)

. . . . § 20.201 (1992); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531. . . . Brown, 5 Vet.App. 399, 400 (1993); 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1992); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531. . . .

DANKO, Jr. v. BROWN,, 5 Vet. App. 445 (Vet. App. 1993)

. . . . § 20.201 (1992). . . . See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(b); 38 C.F.R. § 20.201; see Zevalkink, slip op. at 7 (concluding that holding . . . neither of the former two documents could be a valid NOD under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(b)(1) and 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .

A. CATES, v. BROWN,, 5 Vet. App. 399 (Vet. App. 1993)

. . . . § 20.201 (1992); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531. . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1992); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531. . . .

L. TOMLIN, v. BROWN,, 5 Vet. App. 355 (Vet. App. 1993)

. . . . § 20.201 (1992) (as to the pertinent language, the regulation was essentially the same, but codified . . .

E. BURKE, v. BROWN,, 5 Vet. App. 180 (Vet. App. 1993)

. . . . § 20.201 (1992). . . .

F. BALANCIO, v. BROWN,, 5 Vet. App. 175 (Vet. App. 1993)

. . . . § 20.201 (1992). . . .

A. HAMILTON, A. R. v. BROWN,, 4 Vet. App. 528 (Vet. App. 1993)

. . . . § 20.201 (1992). . . . In new 38 C.F.R. § 20.201, adopted in February 1992, VA used exactly the same language found in the § . . . On the same day that it promulgated § 20.201, VA also proposed adding subsection (b) to § 20.201 (and . . . See 57 Fed.Reg. 4088, 4135 (1992) (proposed to be codified at 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(b)). . . . See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(a), (b); 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. V. . . . . § 20.201 (1992)) (emphasis in Strott). . . .

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION v. RADIATION TECHNOLOGY, INC., 519 F. Supp. 1266 (D.N.J. 1981)

. . . . § 20.201. This regulation states: (a) ... . . . RTI contends the film badge requirement is not within the survey requirement contained in 10 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . First, as mentioned above, the surveys of 10 C.F.R. § 20.201 are evaluations conducted of the potential . . . The NRC’s failure to prove radiation levels in excess of those permitted in 10 C.F.R. § 20.201(a) is . . . C.F.R. § 19.12. 10 C.F.R. § 20.202 is a regulation in Part 20 and thus within the ambit of 10 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .