The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
|
||||||
|
. . . . § 20.201 (2014). . . . Final Rule, 79 Fed.Reg. at 57,679; see 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(1) (2015). . . . Final Rule, 79 Fed.Reg. at 57,679; see 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(1) (2015). III. . . . With respect to appeals, Petitioners challenge amended 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(1) and (a)(4), requiring . . . Id. § 20.201(a)(4). . . .
. . . . § 20.106(b)” as required by § 20.201. . . . reasonably achievable”); Adkins, 960 F.Supp.2d at 772-73 (same, also refusing to impose liability based on § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2015) (requiring that an NOD be written “in terms which can be reasonably construed as disagreement . . .
. . . . § 20.201. A Notice of Disagreement is required to appeal a DVA decision. . . .
. . . . § 20.201. The RO subsequently received three separate letters from the appellant. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2010). . . . written communication expressing dissatisfaction with an “adjudicative determination.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . §§ 20.200, 20.201. . . .
. . . . §§ 20.201 and 20.202 oblige the Secretary to construe arguments “in a liberal manner”), and has been . . .
. . . . § 20.201 and were therefore Notices of Disagreement. This was undoubtedly error. Each of Mr. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2009). . . .
. . . . § 20.201. . . .
. . . . § 20.201. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2008). . . . See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1); Palmer, supra; 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. b. . . .
. . . . § 20.201, we affirm. BACKGROUND Mr. Shackleford served on active duty from 1960 to 1964. . . . Shackleford argues that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 by requiring that his May . . . Section 20.201 provides: A written communication ... expressing dissatisfaction or disagreement with . . . reasonably construed as disagreement with that determination and a desire for appellate review. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . , faithfully followed our guidance provided in Andre and Ledford, and correctly interpreted section 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201, we affirm. BACKGROUND Mr. Shackleford served on active duty from 1960 to 1964. . . . Shackleford argues that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 by requiring that his May . . . Section 20.201 provides: A written communication ... expressing dissatisfaction or disagreement with . . . reasonably construed as disagreement with that determination and a desire for appellate review. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . , faithfully followed our guidance provided in Andre and Ledford, and correctly interpreted section 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201. . . .
. . . . § 20.201. . . .
. . . . §§ 20.201, 20.300, 20.302(a) (2007); see also H.R.Rep. . . . . § 20.201 (2007) (“A written communication from a claimant ... expressing dissatisfaction or disagreement . . .
. . . Principi 283 F.3d 1309, 1313-14 (Fed.Cir.2002) (holding that VA regulation § 20.201, which was promulgated . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2005). . . .
. . . Rev.Code §§ 29A.20.110 — • 29A.20.201. . . . Code §§ 29A.20.110-29A.20.201. Initiative 872-, Sec. 17. . . . Code §§ 29A.20.110 through 29A.20.201. See Section VI.C, infra. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1999); see Gallegos v. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2003); see Gallegos v. . . . reasonably construed as disagreement with that determination and a desire for appellate review.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . reasonably construed as disagreement with that determination and a desire for appellate review.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2003); see Roy v. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2003) (NOD must “express[ ] dissatisfaction or disagreement” with an RO determination). . . .
. . . . § 20.201; see Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed.Cir.1998). . . .
. . . . § 20.201; see Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed.Cir.1998). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2000), was invalid because it conflicted with the applicable statute, 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b) . . . (1), (b)(2), and (d), “insofar as § 20.201 may be interpreted as adding a requirement of an expression . . . the pending joint motion: The Federal Circuit held that this Court had “erred when it invalidated § 20.201 . . . Gallegos’s 1994 DAV letter constitutes a valid NOD under § 20.201.” Gallegos, 283 F.3d at 1315. . . . 2002, supplemental briefing on the issue whether the 1994 DAV letter constituted a valid NOD under § 20.201 . . . . § 20.201 (2002) for being a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) insofar as having been written “in terms which . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201; Collaro v. . . .
. . . . § 20.201; Collaro v. . . .
. . . . § 20.201; Collaro v. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2001) (A notice of disagreement with an agency adjudicative determination requires only a . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2001) (A notice of disagreement with an agency adjudicative determination requires only a . . .
. . . . §§ 20.201(NOD), 20.202 (Substantive Appeal) (2001). Cf. Teten v. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2001). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2001). . . .
. . . .] § 20.201 [(1999)] may be interpreted as adding a requirement of an expression of a desire for BVA . . . Court’s decision; the Federal Circuit held that this Court had “erred when it invalidated [38 C.F.R.] § 20.201 . . . Gallegos’s 1994 DAV letter constitutes a valid NOD under § 20.201”. Gallegos v. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1998) — a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regulation setting minimum requirements for . . . In sum, Chevron deference applies to the VA’s implementation of § 7105, i.e., 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. . . . The VA promulgated § 20.201 in 1992 to expressly define a “notice of disagreement” in § 7105. . . . Section 20.201 is a reasonable and permissible construction of § 7105. . . . Gallegos’s 1994 DAV letter constitutes a valid NOD under § 20.201. . . . . § 20.201, cannot be upheld. . . . do not cover “expressing a desire for appellate review” as called for by the regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1998) — a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regulation setting minimum requirements for . . . In sum, Chevron deference applies to the VA’s implementation of § 7105, i.e., 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. . . . The VA promulgated § 20.201 in 1992 to expressly define a “notice of disagreement” in § 7105. . . . Section 20.201 is a reasonable and permissible construction of § 7105. . . . Gallegos’s 1994 DAV letter constitutes a valid NOD under § 20.201. . . . . § 20.201, cannot be upheld. . . . do not cover “expressing a desire for appellate review” as called for by the regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (2000); see Gallegos v. Gober, 14 Vet.App. 50, 57-58 (2000); see also Fenderson v. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 was promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to his lawful authority and its substantive terms . . . of disagreement,” the Secretary, in the exercise of this § 501(a) authority, promulgated 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . In my view, Tomlin stands only for the proposition that, to the extent that 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 may be . . . The answer is: the “desire for appellate review” provision of 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 is not unreasonable, . . . Section 20.201 is nothing more than “the formulation of policy and the making of rules” required of the . . . . § 20.201 (1999) (emphasis added). “ ‘Whether a document is an NOD is a question of law for the Court . . . In applying § 20.201 in Tomlin, this Court held that “we construe the regulation to impose no technical . . . The difficulty with § 20.201 is that it may be read as implying that a VA claimant must intend to appeal . . . As our foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Board was mistaken in its interpretation of § 20.201. . . . Therefore, insofar as § 20.201 may be interpreted as adding a requirement of an expression of a desire . . .
. . . . §§ 19.118 (1989), 20.201 (1997); Collaro, 136 F.3d at 1308 (disagreement between the Agency and the . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1997); Ledford v. West, 136 F.3d 776, 780 (Fed.Cir.1998). . . .
. . . . §§ 19.118 (1989), 20.201 (1997); Collaro, 136 F.3d at 1308 (disagreement between the Agency and the . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1997); Ledford v. West, 136 F.3d 776, 780 (Fed.Cir.1998). . . .
. . . . § 20.201, which, as we have noted, Carpenter I held includes a CUE-based “entitled to receive” theory . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1998). This Court has consistently interpreted this definition of an NOD broadly. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1997) ..., an NOD must have indicated a disagreement with a specific determination. . . . . § 20.201 (1998), see Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet.App. 119 (1999). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1998); see Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet.App. 119 (1999); Jones v. . . . and “the specific determinations with which the claimant disagrees must be identified.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1998); see also Evans (Billy) v. West, 12 Vet.App. 396, 398-99 (1999); Fenderson v. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1998); see also Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet.App. 119, 128 (1999); Buckley v. . . . disagreement with an adjudicative determination ... and a desire to contest the result”. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . VJRA § 402; 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107, 5110(a), 7104(a), (d)(1), 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.400(b)(2), (r), 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1998); See Archbold v. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1998) (defining NOD as "[a] written communication from a claimant or his or her representative . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1998); see also Buckley v. West, 12 Vet.App. 76, 81-82 (1998); Beyrle v. . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (defining NOD as described above); see also Buckley and Beyrle, both supra; Tomlin . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. . . . requisite “disagreement with an adjudicative determination” and “desire for appellate review”. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . C.F.R. §§ 3.321(b)(1), 3.400, 3.500, 4.1, 4.40, 4.45, 4.71a, DC 5277, 4.71a, DC 5284, 4.124a, DC 8100, 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1997); see also Beyrle v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 24, 27 (1996); Hamilton v. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1995); see also Beyrle v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 24, 27 (1996); Hamilton v. . . . appellant’s “legal reasoning supporting such a challenge need not appear in the NOD, see 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1997). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1997); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 535-36, and that is filed within one year after the date of . . . See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a), (d); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.103, 19.29, 20.201, 20.202, 20.700 (1997); Austin v. . . . reasons or bases, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 5107, 7104(a), (d)(1), 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.103, 19.29, 19.34, 20.101, 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1997). . . . This regulation equates “determination of the issue or issues” with section 20.201’s “adjudicative determination . . . legal entitlement to a particular benefit may also form the basis of a section 19.120 issue, a section 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1997). . . . This regulation equates “determination of the issue or issues” with section 20.201’s “adjudicative determination . . . legal entitlement to a particular benefit may also form the basis of a section 19.120 issue, a section 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1997). . . . While his legal reasoning supporting such a challenge need not appear in the NOD, see 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1997). . . . While his legal reasoning supporting such a challenge need not appear in the NOD, see 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . §§ 3.103, 19.29, 20.201, 20.202, 20.700 (1996); Austin v. . . .
. . . . §§ 3.103, 19.29, 20.201, 20.202, 20.700 (1996); Austin v. . . . 114 F.3d 1156, 1159 (Fed.Cir.1997) (Archer, Chief Judge, concurring); 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201. The question then is, what “issue or issues” may a claimant appeal. . . .
. . . . § 20.201. The question then is, what “issue or issues” may a claimant appeal. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1996). . . . that “there can be no notice of disagreement within the meaning of 38 U.S.C. § 7105 and 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1996). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1996). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1995). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1995); see also Crippen v. . . .
. . . . § 20.201; see Strott v. Derwinski 964 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (Fed.Cir.1992); Hamilton v. . . . Based upon 38 C.F.R. § 20.201, there is nothing on the form which the RO could construe as being an NOD . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1995)). . . . Substantive Appeal to the BVA”, sufficiently manifested “a desire for appellate review” under 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . . § 20.201 (1995). . . . early decisions were in some unspecified way erroneous, does not meet the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1995) (NOD must express “disagreement with [an RO] determination and a desire for appellate . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1992) (as to the pertinent language, the regulation was essentially the same, but codified . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1995), and appears to render the claim still open (because the record does not contain an . . .
. . . regulations that include, but are not limited to, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 10 C.F.R. sections 20.1, 20.101, 20.103, 20.201 . . . Section 20.201 obligates licensees to conduct surveys to ensure compliance with the regulations. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1995); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531. . . . The veteran’s July 1991 statement meets the requirements of § 20.201 and was filed well within one year . . . case may still differ” from that of VA, expressing a desire to contest the result as is required by § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1995); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531. . . . as to the May 1992 RO decision denying his CUE claim because that letter meets the requirements of § 20.201 . . . disagreement” with the May 1992 RO decision and a desire to contest the result as is required by 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . This letter also expressed a “desire for appellate review” pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.201, by requesting . . . See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a), (b)(1), (b)(2); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.201, 20.302(a). III. . . .
. . . . §§ 20.200, 20.201, 20.302(a) (1994); Flnker v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 296, 297 (1993). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1994). See generally Hamilton v. . . . veteran on February 18, 1988, depends on whether the letter satisfies the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 324, 326 (1991); 38 C.F.R. § 20.201), this letter cannot be construed as an NOD . . . denial of her claim, and did not indicate a “desire to contest the result”, as required by 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . RO denial of her claim, or to indicate a “desire to contest the result”, as required by 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1994). . . . express disagreement with a certain ‘“issue or issues’” (see 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1)(A); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.201 . . .
. . . . §§ 20.200, 20.201, 20.302(a) (1993) (“The date of mailing the letter of notification of the determination . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1993). . . . Hamilton’s other point — that the Agency’s long-standing definition of a NOD embodied in 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . enacted into law, the relevant regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 19.118 (1988) (the predecessor to 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1993). . . . Hamilton’s other point — that the Agency’s long-standing definition of a NOD embodied in 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . enacted into law, the relevant regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 19.118 (1988) (the predecessor to 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (emphasis added). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (emphasis added). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1993). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 as imposing no technical formal requirements for a Notice of Disagreement beyond the requirements . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1993). . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (NOD must express written dissatisfaction “with an adjudicative determination . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1992). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1992)) would confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Whitt, supra. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1992); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531. . . . Brown, 5 Vet.App. 399, 400 (1993); 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1992); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1992). . . . See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(b); 38 C.F.R. § 20.201; see Zevalkink, slip op. at 7 (concluding that holding . . . neither of the former two documents could be a valid NOD under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(b)(1) and 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1992); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531. . . . See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1992); Hamilton, 4 Vet.App. at 531. . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1992) (as to the pertinent language, the regulation was essentially the same, but codified . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1992). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1992). . . .
. . . . § 20.201 (1992). . . . In new 38 C.F.R. § 20.201, adopted in February 1992, VA used exactly the same language found in the § . . . On the same day that it promulgated § 20.201, VA also proposed adding subsection (b) to § 20.201 (and . . . See 57 Fed.Reg. 4088, 4135 (1992) (proposed to be codified at 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(b)). . . . See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(a), (b); 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. V. . . . . § 20.201 (1992)) (emphasis in Strott). . . .
. . . . § 20.201. This regulation states: (a) ... . . . RTI contends the film badge requirement is not within the survey requirement contained in 10 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . . First, as mentioned above, the surveys of 10 C.F.R. § 20.201 are evaluations conducted of the potential . . . The NRC’s failure to prove radiation levels in excess of those permitted in 10 C.F.R. § 20.201(a) is . . . C.F.R. § 19.12. 10 C.F.R. § 20.202 is a regulation in Part 20 and thus within the ambit of 10 C.F.R. § 20.201 . . .