Cases from cite.case.law:

HOWITT, v. STATE, 266 So. 3d 219 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . enforcement conflated the provision for securing a breath or urine test under section 316.1932 with section 316.1933 . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019)

. . . . § 316.1933, Fla. Stat. . . .

ANGUILLE, v. STATE, 243 So. 3d 410 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable . . .

GOODMAN, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT,, 238 So. 3d 102 (Fla. 2018)

. . . See §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, 316.1934, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . Stat.; § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla. Stat. . . .

A. MONTES- VALETON, v. STATE, 216 So. 3d 475 (Fla. 2017)

. . . motion to suppress because Trooper Molina lacked probable cause to extract blood from him under section 316.1933 . . . influence of alcoholic beverages before requiring him to submit to the blood draw as required by section 316.1933 . . . But because Trooper Molina lacked probable cause to require the blood draw under section 316.1933(l)( . . . The implied consent law consists of sections 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Florida Statutes (2008 . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 192 So. 3d 1190 (Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 316.1933, Fla. Stat. . . .

STATE v. F. LILES, v., 191 So. 3d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . The State argues that section 316.1933(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), is a general exception to the . . . Following McNeely, we must read section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, as. a directive to law enforcement . . . This Court and other Florida courts have consistently recognized that.section 316.1933 is part of the . . . Section 316.1933, Florida Statutes .(2011), requires a police officer to obtain a driver’s blood when . . . The mandate found in section 316.1933 is á directive to law enforcement to perform the test. . . .

STATE v. J. KLEIBER,, 175 So. 3d 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . exclude the results of his blood alcohol test based on the State’s alleged failure to comply with section 316.1933 . . . By enacting section 316.1933, the Legislature provided a statutory basis for the admission of blood alcohol . . . Section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that “a chemical analysis of a person’s blood . . . techniques . and actual testing procedures, ... shall not render the test or test results invalid.” § 316.1933 . . . Even if suppression is required under section 316.1933, the State may seek introduction of blood alcohol . . .

MONTES- VALETON, v. STATE, 141 So. 3d 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . State failed to present evidence that the blood was drawn by a qualified person pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . Because section 316.1933 includes many requirements, the lack of specificity did not put the trial court . . . alcoholic beverages before requiring the defendant to submit to the blood draw as required by section 316.1933 . . . believe the person had committed a DUI offense and therefore to request a blood test under section 316.1933 . . . Section 316.1933(2)(a) provides in relevant part: Only a physician, certified paramedic, registered nurse . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 131 So. 3d 720 (Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 316.1933, Fla. Stat. . . .

MISSOURI, v. G. McNEELY., 569 U.S. 141 (U.S. 2013)

. . . . § 316.1933(1)(a) (West 2006); Ga.Code Ann. § 40-5-67.1(d), (d.1) (2011); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 291E-15 (2009 . . .

DEPALIS- LACHAUD, v. E. NOEL, L., 505 F. App'x 864 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . (Florida Statutes § 316.1933(2)(a) allows only certain individuals, including registered nurses, to draw . . . Florida Statutes § 316.1933(l)(a) provides that, if an officer “has probable cause to believe that a . . . Section 316.1933(2)(a) then says that “[o]nly [certain individuals, such as physicians, paramedics, or . . . No party challenges the constitutionality of § 316.1933(i)(a). . See Mehl v. . . . State, 632 So.2d 593, 594-95 (Fla.1993) (recognizing that § 316.1933 is intended to allow police to collect . . .

STATE v. SALLE- GREEN,, 93 So. 3d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Legal Blood Test Results Under Section 316.1933 A law enforcement officer may request that a blood test . . . patient’s medical blood test results show a blood alcohol level that is over the legal limit, see § 316.1933 . . . comply with section 395.3025 and did not request that blood be drawn and tested pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . Under section 316.1933(2)(a)(l), Trooper Moseley would have been authorized to request a blood sample . . . Section 316.1933(2)(a)( 1) states the following: [IJf a health care provider, who is providing medical . . .

W. LINK, v. S. TUCKER,, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (N.D. Fla. 2012)

. . . of evidence that the blood sample was collected and maintained in compliance with the mandates of § 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. G. GEISS,, 70 So. 3d 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . The trial court also found that the blood draw was not authorized by section 316.1933(l)(a), which mandates . . .

STATE v. L. MURRAY L., 51 So. 3d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . of breath and urine tests, except under the circumstances described in sections 316.1932(l)(c) and 316.1933 . . . limitations on blood testing found in section 316.1932(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2007), and section 316.1933 . . . Likewise, section 316.1933(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), expressly authorizes blood tests where an . . . While Robertson involved section 316.1933(1)(a), the provisions of section 316.1932(l)(a)l.a. and (c) . . .

KURECKA, v. STATE v. J., 67 So. 3d 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Fla. Stat.; State v. . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 6 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 2009)

. . . . § 316.1933, Fla._Stat. . . .

PALAZZOTTO, v. STATE, 988 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . ruling that a law enforcement officer had probable cause to order a blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . Section 316.1933(l)(a) allows a forcible blood draw after a traffic accident with serious bodily injury . . . KELLY and WALLACE, JJ„ Concur. . 316.1933 Blood test for impairment or intoxication in cases of death . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. FALCONE,, 983 So. 2d 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

ROBINSON, v. STATE, 982 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . officers who arrested him failed to obtain blood test results, notwithstanding the duty imposed by section 316.1933 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. BOESCH,, 979 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . certainly seems to have known, the separate implied consent statute applicable to blood tests, subsection 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. BUTTOLPH,, 969 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcoholic content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. CLARK,, 974 So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . statutory provisions such as section 316.1932(l)(c) (medical condition precludes breath test) or section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. DUBIEL,, 958 So. 2d 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . use of breath and urine tests, except under circumstances described in sections 316.1932(l)(c) and 316.1933 . . .

BRUCH, v. STATE, 954 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Stat. (2006) (results of any test administered in compliance with §§ 316.1932 and 316.1933 give rise . . . the tests must comply with regulations promulgated by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. § 316.1933 . . . The blood-alcohol evidence admitted in this case complied with section 316.1933(2)(b). . . . the statutory presumption of impairment is not available when the State has not complied with section 316.1933 . . .

BELVIN, v. STATE, 922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. KUTIK,, 914 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . to review the medical records and did not request that blood be drawn and tested pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . Rather than requesting a blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933, Demeu-lenaere requested Kutik’s medical . . . Sections 395.3025 and 316.1933(2)(a) have long been Florida law, and Johnson was decided in 2002. . . . See § 316.1933(1). . . . Section 316.1933(2)(a) states that "the failure of a law enforcement officer to request the withdrawal . . .

SMALLRIDGE, v. STATE, 904 So. 2d 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . In fact, as the majority noted, a blood draw cannot be demanded under section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida . . . Although Smallridge lacked the right to refuse the test authorized by section 316.1933(l)(a), he retained . . . in addition to that administered at the direction of a law-enforcement official pursuant to section 316.1933 . . .

GURRY, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY,, 902 So. 2d 881 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 or. s. 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. SERRAGO,, 875 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . We believe that the factual circumstances here require the application of section 316.1933. . . . This placed the case squarely within the intended purview of section 316.1933(1). . . . The trial court offered two reasons that section 316.1933(1) did not apply to the instant case. . . . However, nothing in section 316.1933(1) refers to the driver’s consciousness. . . . We therefore conclude that section 316.1933 applies, that the requirements of section 316.1933 have been . . .

STATE v. BODDEN,, 877 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 2004)

. . . Finally, sections 316.1933(2)(b) and 316.1934(3) both provide that chemical analysis of a person’s blood . . . Section 316.1933 addresses the right to use reasonable force when conducting blood tests for impairment . . .

STATE v. A. EATON,, 868 So. 2d 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Evidently, there was a second blood draw taken at the request of law enforcement pursuant to section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. MONTELLO P., 867 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . (emphasis added); § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla. . . .

SCHOFIELD, v. STATE, 867 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

McGHEE, v. STATE, 847 So. 2d 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable . . .

STATE v. CATT,, 839 So. 2d 757 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . order granting Tammy Catt’s motion to suppress the results of a blood draw taken pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . child was airlifted from the scene, the police ordered blood to be drawn from Catt pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . Section 316.1933(1), which provides for compelled blood draws under certain circumstances, states in . . . Brown, 725 So.2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (noting that “under the influence” in section 316.1933 means . . . probable cause to believe that the accident had caused serious bodily injuries as defined by section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. SCHREIBER,, 835 So. 2d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . sample of her blood; however, he did not read her her rights under the Implied Consent Law, §§ 316.1932, 316.1933 . . . Furthermore, we hold Officer Seltzer lacked authority to compel Schreiber’s blood pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . operation of the motor vehicle had resulted in the “death or serious bodily injury of a human being.” § 316.1933 . . . State, 725 So.2d 393 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(compelled blood provisions of section 316.1933(1) applicable . . . or her normal faculties, the results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. E. CLARKE,, 834 So. 2d 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . expert may be admitted into evidence if the blood was drawn by a person authorized to do so by section 316.1933 . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. STATE, 837 So. 2d 478 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 316.1933(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . Probable cause for a blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933, clearly was established by the information . . .

A. THOMAS, v. STATE, 820 So. 2d 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . the course of Thomas’s treatment, instead of specifically requesting a blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . And, pursuant to section 316.1933(2)(a), “the failure of a law enforcement officer to request the withdrawal . . . concluded that the officer did not have probable cause to request a blood test pursuant to section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. LANGSFORD,, 816 So. 2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . results of a blood test conducted upon appellee without her consent on the ground it violated section 316.1933 . . . Appellee moved to suppress the blood test because it was taken in violation of section 316.1933. . . . Indeed, it is the established law of this state that Florida’s implied consent statutes [§§ 316.1932, 316.1933 . . . has done through the enactment of section 322.261, Florida Statutes (1975) [now sections 316.1932, 316.1933 . . . "F.S. 316.1932, F.S. 316.1933, F.S. 316.1934, (2000).” . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. SILVA,, 806 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . The results of breath, urine, and blood tests administered as provided in s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

S. DODGE, v. STATE, 805 So. 2d 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, Fla. Stat. (2000)(the Implied Consent Statute). . . . See § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. K. DEHART,, 799 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

TYNER, v. STATE, 805 So. 2d 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . were not obtained in accordance with the core policies of the implied consent law, sections 316.1932, 316.1933 . . .

S. SMITH, v. STATE, 793 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . influence and cause, as the result of such operation, “[sjerious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933 . . . Section 316.1933(1), in turn, provides that if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe . . . This amendment was apparently a legislative response to appellate decisions interpreting section 316.1933 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. RUSSELL,, 793 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. L. MOWRY,, 794 So. 2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

CAMERON, v. STATE, 804 So. 2d 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . Section 327.352(3) is a carbon copy of section 316.1933(4), applicable to motor vehicle operators. . . . .

TILLINGER, v. STATE, 789 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . We are unpersuaded by the state’s argument that section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, permitting an officer . . .

GALGANO A- a v. BUCHANAN,, 783 So. 2d 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . infraction which results in an accident that causes “serious bodily injury” of another as defined in s. 316.1933 . . . yield the right-of-way did not result in death or cause “serious bodily injury” as defined in section 316.1933 . . . permanent impairment, his injury did not amount to a “serious bodily injury” as defined in section 316.1933 . . . Section 316.1933(1) involves a blood test for impairment or intoxication in cases of death or serious . . .

JONES, v. STATE, 774 So. 2d 811 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Jones, the police had no probable cause on which to request a forced blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. MILES,, 775 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 2000)

. . . the law enforcement officers at the scene required him to submit to a blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . The court recognized that section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), authorizes that the FDLE approve . . . See §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, 316.1934, Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . Hence, section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes, provides: A chemical analysis of the person’s blood . . . or her normal faculties, the results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. KLIPHOUSE,, 771 So. 2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . The situation presented in this case does not fall within section 316.1933(1), because, as the parties . . . In Brown, the defendant’s blood was tested under section 316.1933(1), because" the officer believed that . . . The court stated: The purpose of the blood test taken under section 316.1933(1) is to aid in determining . . . Unlike section 316.1933(1), the section applicable to the blood draw herein, section 316.1932(l)(c), . . . Without the additional “causing serious injury” factor found in section 316.1933(1), this statute does . . . See §§ 316.1932 and 316.1933, Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . evident from a comparison of the two implied consent statutes— viz., section 316.1932(1)(c) and section 316.1933 . . . Section 316.1933(1) is the statute involved in State v. . . . Section 316.1933(1) is restricted to cases of death or serious injury and provides that an officer may . . .

STATE v. WEBB,, 753 So. 2d 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . suppressing the results of a blood alcohol test administered to the appellee motorist pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . Section 316.1933(1) provides that if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a motor . . . appel-lee’s blood alcohol test was not ordered in accordance with the statutory requirements of section 316.1933 . . .

C. BABER, III, v. STATE, 738 So. 2d 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . blood samples taken at the request of law enforcement are admissible where the requirements of section 316.1933 . . .

H. WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 731 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . evidence the results of blood tests obtained from blood drawn from the appellant in violation of section 316.1933 . . . Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1995), provides in pertinent part: [I]f a law enforcement officer . . . at the scene, at the request of Corporal Carlock, did not meet the statutory requirements of section 316.1933 . . . probable cause specifically as to appellant alone as the driver, the blood drawn pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . he was the only one who committed the crime before they could obtain his blood sample under section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. BROWN,, 725 So. 2d 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . ’s car and a bicyclist and thus Brown’s blood was not properly taken and tested pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . testimony that although he thought he had probable cause to order the blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . Section 316.1933(1) provides in pertinent part: [I]f a law enforcement officer has probable cause to . . . alcohol to be deemed “under the influence” or impaired to an appreciable degree pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . hold that the results of Brown’s blood test is and should have been admissible at trial under section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. MILES,, 732 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . “The implied consent law.consists of sections 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Florida Statutes, which . . . test results was whether the rule relating to preservation of blood samples drawn pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . ENFORCEMENT ’TO ADOPT RULES PERTAINING TO THE PRESERVATION OF BLOOD SAMPLES TAKEN PURSUANT TO SECTION 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. MANNEY,, 723 So. 2d 928 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . Pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 316.1933, I request the ORLANDO REGIONAL HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, its . . .

GERLITZ, v. STATE, 725 So. 2d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1997), permits blood to be drawn when a law enforcement officer . . . The trial court’s express findings of fact support a finding of probable cause under section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. A. HENDERSON,, 719 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1997), reads in pertinent part: 316.1933 Blood Test for Impairment . . .

EUCEDA, v. STATE, 711 So. 2d 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933, is guilty of a felony of the third degree . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 710 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . or her normal faculties, the results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. SCLAFANI,, 704 So. 2d 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . focuses on the state’s substantial compliance with HRS’ relevant regulations as adopted by section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. RUTHERFORD,, 707 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . blood tests where a DUI prosecution is involved, the majority recognizes that section 316.1932(l)(e) or 316.1933 . . . In another case, however, where section 316.1932 or 316.1933 blood samples were not obtained, the state . . . breath and requested that a blood sample be taken from him pursuant to either section 316.1932(l)(c) or 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. S. BANOUB,, 700 So. 2d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that, if a law enforcement officer has probable . . . reasoning underlying the trial court’s ruling is set out in the order as follows: Florida Statute Sec. 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. IRIZARRY,, 698 So. 2d 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. LINE,, 698 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933, is guilty of a felony of the third degree . . .

STATE v. BRIGHAM,, 694 So. 2d 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . .1988), the supreme court was concerned with the meaning of another section of the DUI statute, Section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. JOHNSON, Jr., 695 So. 2d 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Section 316.1934(2) provides that the results of blood tests performed pursuant to section 316.1933 are . . . Section 316.1933 prescribes the methods and procedures which must be followed in conducting a blood test . . . Subsection (1) of section 316.1933 provides a law enforcement officer may order or compel a blood test . . . The results of breath, urine, and blood tests administered as provided in s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. TALTY, 692 So. 2d 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . civil or criminal action_the results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. MARSHALL,, 695 So. 2d 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . The results of breath, urine, and blood tests administered as provided in s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. RIVAS- MARMOL,, 679 So. 2d 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . [I]t is the established law of this state that Florida’s implied consent statutes [Secs. 316.1932, 316.1933 . . . it has done through the enactment of section 322.261, Florida Statutes (1975) [now section 316.1932, 316.1933 . . . Where an accident has caused serious bodily injury or death, the blood test provisions of section 316.1933 . . .

L. HENNINGER, v. STATE, 667 So. 2d 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . Henninger’s blood was performed “substantially” in compliance with approved methods as required by section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. DURDEN,, 655 So. 2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . formulate the requisite probable cause to request the blood test in the first instance” under section 316.1933 . . . Probable cause to order a blood test exists under section 316.1933(1) if an officer, based upon reasonably . . . the accident, provided probable cause for the police officer to request a blood test under section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. SLANEY,, 653 So. 2d 422 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . sample (1) constitutes a violation of Florida’s implied consent law under Sections 316.1932(l)(c), 316.1933 . . . State, 521 So.2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). 2 Sections 316.1932(1)(c) and 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes . . . The other exception to the general scheme of breath and urine testing is found in section 316.1933(1) . . . Section 316.1933(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991) authorizes “[o]nly a physician, certified paramedic, . . . Gillman [390 So.2d 62 (Fla.1980) ]; § 316.1933(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .

STATE v. CESARETTI,, 632 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes. In Jackson v. . . .

A. MICHIE, v. STATE, 632 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . substantial compliance with the relevant regulations adopted by HRS pursuant to the mandate of section 316.1933 . . . Strong, 504 So.2d 758 (Fla.1987), to permit test results without regard to the requirements of section 316.1933 . . . Section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), uses the following language: A chemical analysis of . . .

MEHL, v. STATE, 632 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1993)

. . . Subsection 316.1933 (2)(b) provides: A chemical analysis of the person’s blood to determine the alcoholic . . .

STATE v. McROBERTS,, 621 So. 2d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . A sample of McRoberts’ blood was collected and analyzed pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes . . . granted the motion to suppress, apparently because the rules promulgated by HRS pursuant to section 316.1933 . . . We agree with our sister courts that the rules implementing section 316.1933(2)(b) are adequate. . . .

STATE v. HILL,, 618 So. 2d 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . not disclose an essential factual determination — that the state substantially complied with section 316.1933 . . . Therefore, in accordance with section 316.1933’s mandate, the state upon remand shall have the opportunity . . . Of course, once compliance with section 316.1933 is established, Hill is entitled to challenge the accuracy . . . Section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), contains the following language: A chemical analysis . . .

STATE v. BUCHANON,, 610 So. 2d 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . Based on this information and pursuant to section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1989), the deputy requested . . . State, 456 So.2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1st DCA1984) (“Probable cause exists under section 316.1933(1) to order . . . Blood tests ordered pursuant to section 316.1933 are available to a law enforcement officer “notwithstanding . . . provision of law pertaining to the confidentiality of hospital records or other medical records.” § 316.1933 . . . experienced with automobile accidents would seemingly justify a request for a blood test under section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. MEHL,, 602 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . .-1932(l)(f) and sections 316.1933(2)(b) and 316.1934(3) of the Florida Statutes (1989), depending on . . . rational basis to draw a distinction between blood tests in a section 316.1932 DUI case and a section 316.1933 . . . If the language in sections 316.1933(2)(b) and 316.1934(3) of “approved methods” is to be construed to . . . In order to avoid such a construction and because the provisions of section 316.1933 augment the provisions . . . Thus, appellee’s blood test results are admissible under sections 316.-1932(l)(f), 316.1933(2)(b) and . . . Section 316.1933 provides that if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor . . . Sections 316.1932 and 316.1933 have similar, but clearly independent functions and the language of the . . . Section 316.1933 does not reference or incorporate the testing provision of section 316.1932(l)(f). . . . The probable cause statute incorporates section 316.1933(2). . . . Whether the blood was drawn pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1989) has not been made an . . .

HOPKINS, Sr. v. STATE, 608 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . . § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1982 Supp.). After the state had qualified Mr. . . .

ROBERTSON, v. STATE, 604 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1992)

. . . ) May a chemical analysis performed in accordance with the approved methods contemplated by section 316.1933 . . . test results of blood samples taken at the request of law enforcement if the requirements of section 316.1933 . . . taking blood or conducting the test, can the state nonetheless rely on the provisions of section [] 316.1933 . . . Duer in this instance was not an authorized test within the meaning of subsections 316.1933(2)(b) and . . . The implied consent law consists of sections 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Florida Statutes (1987 . . .

STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS- CRIMINAL CASES NO., 603 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1992)

. . . F.S. 316.1933 “Serious bodily injury” means a physical condition that creates a substantial risk of death . . .

STATE v. E. BURKE,, 599 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . adoption of section 322.261 and section 322.262, Florida Statutes (1977) (now section 316.1932 and section 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. HOFF,, 591 So. 2d 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . evidence of blood alcohol content may still be admissible without reference to sections 316.1932 through 316.1933 . . . admissibility of blood-alcohol test evidence is determined solely by reference to sections 316.1932 and 316.1933 . . .

HOPE, v. STATE, 588 So. 2d 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933, is guilty of a felony of the third degree . . .

MILLER, v. STATE, 597 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1991)

. . . of his normal faculties, the results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . . that “[i]t is noncompliance with these proper testing procedures [required by sections 316.1932 and 316.1933 . . . admissibility of blood-alcohol test evidence is determined solely by reference to sections 316.1932 and 316.1933 . . .

STATE OF FLORIDA v. KUSIAK, 50 Fla. Supp. 2d 24 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991)

. . . Florida Statute § 316.1933(1) authorizes blood to be taken from an individual when he is involved in . . .

STATE OF FLORIDA v. OAKLEY, 49 Fla. Supp. 2d 72 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991)

. . . Florida Statutes (1987), provides that test results administered in accordance with section 316.1932 or 316.1933 . . .

STATE v. McINNIS,, 581 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1989) provides: (1) Notwithstanding any recognized ability to . . . their refusal to take the test may be used against them in the criminal trial. . §§ 316.1932(1)(c), 316.1933 . . .

KENSON, v. STATE, 577 So. 2d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . accident but who does not injure another may not be forced to submit to a blood test under section 316.1933 . . . Section 316.1933, was amended by Chapter 88-5, section 4, Laws of Florida. . . .

SANTIAGO SANCHEZ DEFUENTES, v. L. DUGGER,, 923 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1991)

. . . of his normal faculties, the results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

STATE OF FLORIDA v. PARKER, 44 Fla. Supp. 2d 38 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1990)

. . . Florida Statutes § 316.1933(2)(b) requires that chemical analysis of a person’s blood be performed substantially . . .

ROBERTSON, v. STATE, 569 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof_(empha-sis added) Subsection (2)(b) of section 316.1933 . . . are to be construed in favor of accused persons and that whether the certification requirements of 316.1933 . . . At least one other court has concluded that the requirements of section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, need . . . So.2d 758 (Fla. 1987), to hold test results admissible without regard to the requirements of section 316.1933 . . . Based on Strong and Quartararo, it appears that section 316.1933 either merely creates a convenient shorthand . . .

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. COLL,, 568 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . )(c) could not be applied because there was neither probable cause for taking the blood test, see § 316.1933 . . .