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Florida Statute 775.15 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 775.15 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 775
GENERAL PENALTIES; REGISTRATION OF CRIMINALS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 775.15
775.15 Time limitations; general time limitations; exceptions.
(1) A prosecution for a capital felony, a life felony, or a felony that resulted in a death may be commenced at any time. If the death penalty is held to be unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, all crimes designated as capital felonies shall be considered life felonies for the purposes of this section, and prosecution for such crimes may be commenced at any time.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods of limitation:
(a) A prosecution for a felony of the first degree must be commenced within 4 years after it is committed.
(b) A prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed.
(c) A prosecution for a misdemeanor of the first degree must be commenced within 2 years after it is committed.
(d) A prosecution for a misdemeanor of the second degree or a noncriminal violation must be commenced within 1 year after it is committed.
(3) An offense is committed either when every element has occurred or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant’s complicity therein is terminated. Time starts to run on the day after the offense is committed.
(4)(a) Prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced by the filing of an indictment, information, or other charging document.
(b) A prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has not previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay. In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant’s absence from the state shall be considered. The failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay.
(c) If, however, an indictment or information has been filed within the time period prescribed in this section and the indictment or information is dismissed or set aside because of a defect in its content or form after the time period has elapsed, the period for commencing prosecution shall be extended 3 months from the time the indictment or information is dismissed or set aside.
(5) The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state. This provision shall not extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years, but shall not be construed to limit the prosecution of a defendant who has been timely charged by indictment or information or other charging document and who has not been arrested due to his or her absence from this state or has not been extradited for prosecution from another state.
(6) A prosecution for perjury in an official proceeding that relates to the prosecution of a capital felony may be commenced at any time.
(7) A prosecution for a felony that resulted in injury to any person, when such felony arises from the use of a “destructive device,” as defined in s. 790.001, may be commenced within 10 years.
(8) A prosecution for a felony violation of chapter 517 or s. 409.920 must be commenced within 5 years after the violation is committed.
(9) A prosecution for a felony violation of chapter 403 must be commenced within 5 years after the date of discovery of the violation.
(10)(a) A prosecution for a felony violation of s. 817.5695, s. 825.102, or s. 825.103 must be commenced within 5 years after it is committed.
(b) If the period prescribed in paragraph (a) has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for any offense, a material element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation, within 5 years after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is not a party to the offense.
(11) A prosecution for a felony violation of s. 440.105 or s. 817.234 must be commenced within 5 years after the violation is committed.
(12) If the period prescribed in subsection (2), subsection (8), subsection (9), subsection (10), or subsection (11) has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for:
(a) Any offense, a material element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation, within 1 year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is himself or herself not a party to the offense, but in no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years.
(b) Any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or employee at any time when the defendant is in public office or employment, within 2 years from the time he or she leaves public office or employment, or during any time permitted by any other part of this section, whichever time is greater.
(13)(a) If the victim of a violation of s. 794.011, former s. 794.05, Florida Statutes 1995, s. 800.04, s. 826.04, or s. 847.0135(5) is under the age of 18, the applicable period of limitation, if any, does not begin to run until the victim has reached the age of 18 or the violation is reported to a law enforcement agency or other governmental agency, whichever occurs earlier. Such law enforcement agency or other governmental agency shall promptly report such allegation to the state attorney for the judicial circuit in which the alleged violation occurred. If the offense is a first or second degree felony violation of s. 794.011, and the offense is reported within 72 hours after its commission, the prosecution for such offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before December 31, 1984.
(b) If the offense is a first degree felony violation of s. 794.011 and the victim was under 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before October 1, 2003.
(c) If the offense is a violation of s. 794.011 and the victim was under 16 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before July 1, 2010.
(14)(a) A prosecution for a first or second degree felony violation of s. 794.011, if the victim is 16 years of age or older at the time of the offense and the offense is reported to a law enforcement agency within 72 hours after commission of the offense, may be commenced at any time.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (a) or paragraph (13)(b), a prosecution for a first or second degree felony violation of s. 794.011, if the victim is 16 years of age or older at the time of the offense, must be commenced within 8 years after the violation is committed. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before July 1, 2015.
(15)(a) In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for any of the following offenses may be commenced within 1 year after the date on which the identity of the accused is established, or should have been established by the exercise of due diligence, through the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused:
1. An offense of sexual battery under chapter 794.
2. A lewd or lascivious offense under s. 800.04 or s. 825.1025.
(b) This subsection applies to any offense that is not otherwise barred from prosecution between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2006.
(16)(a) In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for any of the following offenses may be commenced at any time after the date on which the identity of the accused is established, or should have been established by the exercise of due diligence, through the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused:
1. Aggravated battery or any felony battery offense under chapter 784.
2. Kidnapping under s. 787.01 or false imprisonment under s. 787.02.
3. An offense of sexual battery under chapter 794.
4. A lewd or lascivious offense under s. 800.04, s. 825.1025, or s. 847.0135(5).
5. A burglary offense under s. 810.02.
6. A robbery offense under s. 812.13, s. 812.131, or s. 812.135.
7. Carjacking under s. 812.133.
8. Aggravated child abuse under s. 827.03.
(b) This subsection applies to any offense that is not otherwise barred from prosecution on or after July 1, 2006.
(17) In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for video voyeurism in violation of s. 810.145 may be commenced within 1 year after the date on which the victim of video voyeurism obtains actual knowledge of the existence of such a recording or the date on which the recording is confiscated by a law enforcement agency, whichever occurs first. Any dissemination of such a recording before the victim obtains actual knowledge thereof or before its confiscation by a law enforcement agency does not affect any provision of this subsection.
(18) If the offense is a violation of s. 800.04(4) or (5) and the victim was under 16 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time, unless, at the time of the offense, the offender is less than 18 years of age and is no more than 4 years older than the victim. This subsection applies to an offense that is not otherwise barred from prosecution on or before October 1, 2014.
(19) A prosecution for a violation of s. 787.06 may be commenced at any time. This subsection applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before October 1, 2014.
(20) If a victim is younger than 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution for a violation of s. 794.011 may be commenced at any time. This subsection applies to an offense that is committed on or after July 1, 2020.
(21) In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for any offense under s. 827.071(2) or (3), if the offender was 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense, may be commenced at any time. This subsection applies to any offense that is not otherwise barred from prosecution on or before July 1, 2022.
History.s. 78, Feb. 10, 1832; s. 1, ch. 4915, 1901; RS 2357; GS 3181, 3182; RGS 5011, 5012; CGL 7113, 7114; s. 1, ch. 16962, 1935; s. 10, ch. 26484, 1951; s. 109, ch. 70-339; s. 10, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 76-275; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 12, ch. 78-435; s. 6, ch. 84-86; s. 1, ch. 84-550; s. 10, ch. 85-63; s. 4, ch. 89-143; s. 2, ch. 90-120; s. 2, ch. 91-258; s. 16, ch. 93-156; s. 17, ch. 95-158; s. 139, ch. 95-418; s. 1, ch. 96-145; s. 3, ch. 96-280; s. 3, ch. 96-322; s. 4, ch. 96-409; s. 1, ch. 97-36; s. 1, ch. 97-90; s. 1812, ch. 97-102; s. 1, ch. 97-104; s. 17, ch. 98-174; s. 7, ch. 99-201; s. 5, ch. 99-204; s. 3, ch. 2000-246; s. 1, ch. 2001-102; s. 1, ch. 2002-168; s. 1, ch. 2003-116; s. 1, ch. 2004-94; s. 1, ch. 2005-110; s. 1, ch. 2006-266; s. 15, ch. 2008-172; s. 2, ch. 2010-54; s. 6, ch. 2011-220; s. 2, ch. 2014-4; s. 6, ch. 2014-160; s. 2, ch. 2015-133; s. 30, ch. 2016-24; s. 2, ch. 2020-81; s. 6, ch. 2022-169; s. 1, ch. 2022-170; s. 2, ch. 2023-133.
Note.Former ss. 932.05, 932.06, 915.03, 932.465.

F.S. 775.15 on Google Scholar

F.S. 775.15 on Casetext

Amendments to 775.15


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 775.15
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 775.15.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

STATE v. ESTIME,, 259 So. 3d 884 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . We reverse, finding that section 775.15(16)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2006), extends the statute of limitations . . . An offense of sexual battery under chapter 794. § 775.15(16)(a) 3., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). . . . Thus, the SOL extension applies pursuant to section 775.15(16)(a) 3., Florida Statutes (2006). . . . In 2006, the Florida legislature amended section 775.15, adding subsection (16)(a). . . . It is clear section 775.15(16)(a) would be applicable to the present case. . . .

BORN- SUNIAGA, v. STATE, 256 So. 3d 783 (Fla. 2018)

. . . felony when, as here, it "involves the investigation or prosecution of a misdemeanor," and section 775.15 . . . This is accomplished by section 775.15(4)(b), which provides that the filing of an information only satisfies . . . capital felony, a life felony, or a felony that resulted in a death may be commenced at any time." § 775.15 . . .

STATE v. M. CHANTILOUPE,, 248 So. 3d 1191 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See, e.g. , § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (2017). . . .

C. BETTEY Jr. v. STATE, 244 So. 3d 364 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 775.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

STATE v. SMITH,, 241 So. 3d 53 (Fla. 2018)

. . . first-degree felony punishable by life, was subject to the four-year limitations period provided in section 775.15 . . . See generally § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (2017) ; § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990). . . . Although section 775.15 now contains a tolling provision for burglary cases where the defendant's identity . . . 211 So.3d at 192 n.21 (Emas, J., concurring) (citing ch. 2006-266, § 1, Laws of Fla., codified at § 775.15 . . . same burglary, but as a life felony (a crime for which there is no statute of limitations, see section 775.15 . . .

S. BROWN, v. STATE, 232 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to lewd or lascivious sexual battery (section 775.15 . . .

CURRY, v. STATE, 227 So. 3d 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . aller gation to the state attorney for the judicial circuit in which the alleged violation occurred. § 775.15 . . . Under the plain language of Section 775.15(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), the statute of limitation's . . . State, 179 So.3d 466, 469 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (explaining that, under an earlier version of section 775.15 . . . the state had notice of the molestation in November 1993 and that “all of the requirements of section 775.15 . . .

SMITH, v. STATE v. L., 213 So. 3d 722 (Fla. 2017)

. . . was not ineffective regarding the speedy trial issue; (4) the application of the amendment to section 775.15 . . . Smith contends that the application of section 775.15(2)(b), which extended the statute of limitations . . . Effective October 1, 1996, the Florida Legislature amended section 775.15 and provided that a prosecution . . . "A prosecution for a capital ... felony may be commenced at any time.” § 775.15(1), Fla. . . .

SMITH, v. STATE, 211 So. 3d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . ’s original statute of limitations, I set forth below the full text of our present statute, section 775.15 . . . , Florida Statutes (2016): 775.15. . . . not commence) until “the course of conduct or the defendant’s complicity therein is terminated.” § 775.15 . . . original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused.” § 775.15 . . . See Ch. 2006-266, § 1, Laws of Florida, codified at § 775.15(16)(a)l.-8. . . . See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1990). . . . See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1990). . . . . See § 775.15(1), Fla. . . . “A prosecution for a ... life felony ... may be commenced at any time,” § 775.15(1), Fla. . . .

GUZMAN, v. STATE, 211 So. 3d 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Based on the date of the offense in this case, April 15, 2001, section 775.15(5)(b), Florida Statutes . . . Under the three-year limitations period for commencing a second degree felony prosecution, § 775.15(2 . . . attempted felony murder, a first degree felony, which was subject to a four-year statute of limitations. § 775.15 . . . section 784.045(l)(a)l., a second degree felony, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. § 775.15 . . .

ROBINSON, v. STATE, 205 So. 3d 584 (Fla. 2016)

. . . He contended that under section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), the prosecution of any felony . . . Pursuant to section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes, (2008), the State argued, it need only prove that the . . . The trial court denied Robinson’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that “[sjection 775.15(5), Florida . . . The First District explained that its reading of section 775.15(5) in this case, as in Pearson in 2004 . . . , Florida Statutes (2008), which state: 775.15. . . .

MATHIS, v. STATE, 204 So.3d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Section - 775.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that a prosecution for a first-degree felony . . . Thus, regardless of which event occurred earlier, Count 2 was not timely charged under section 775.15 . . . The State does not argue on appeal that section 775.15(13) is applicable in this case. . . . In support of its assertion, the State relies upon section 775.15(16), Florida Statutes (2007), which . . . His appeal challenged the trial court’s construction of section 775.15(16)(a)4. . . .

CROCKETT, v. STATE, 206 So.3d 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . delay violated Defendant’s speedy trial rights—a question I would answer in the negative under section 775.15 . . . See § 775.15(5), Fla. . . .

MORELLI, v. STATE, 198 So. 3d 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . .” § 775.15(2)(c). . . . information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay. § 775.15 . . .

CEASOR, v. OCWIEJA,, 655 F. App'x 263 (6th Cir. 2016)

. . . Laws § 775.15. . . . Laws § 775.15. People v. Agar, No. 321243, 2016 WL 399933, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. . . . Laws § 775.15 or pursued any other avenues for retaining an expert. . . .

WALLACE v. STATE, 189 So. 3d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . of the same speedy trial rule and is additionally barred by the statute of limitations under section 775.15 . . .

PULIDO, v. STATE, 181 So. 3d 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . limitation period for this offense, a first-degree misdemeanor, was two years, pursuant to section 775.15 . . . Additionally, criminal mischief'is not one of the delineated offenses in' section 775.15(16), Florida . . .

R. CREWS, v. STATE, 183 So. 3d 329 (Fla. 2015)

. . . language” analysis, the majority has concluded that the statutory phrase “misconduct in office” in section 775.15 . . . See § 775.15(13)(a)-(c), (14)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . teacher who steals a $500 piece of equipment is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, see § 775.15 . . . See § 775.15(12)(b). . . . and third-degree felonies are ordinarily subject to a three-year statute of limitations under section 775.15 . . . DOES THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR “MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE” BY A PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE IN SECTION 775.15 . . . See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . was a public employee and that by committing them, he engaged in “misconduct in office” under section 775.15 . . . Section 775.15(3)(b) extended the limitation period for offenses “based .upon misconduct in office by . . . The relevant language of section 775.15(12)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), provides: (12) If the period . . .

BROWN, v. STATE, 179 So. 3d 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Section 775.15(7) provided in relevant part: If the victim of a violation of s. 794.011 ... is under . . . Because the violations were reported to DCF before the victims turned 16, pursuant to section 775.15( . . . offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before October 1, 2003. § 775.15 . . . See § 775.15(7)(b). . . . prosecution of the offense pertaining to her would .have been barred “on or before October 1, 2003.” § 775.15 . . .

NORTON, v. STATE, 173 So. 3d 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . nor served her with a summons, so it was required to timely commence prosecution pursuant to section 775.15 . . .

J. CONNOLLY, Jr. v. STATE, 172 So. 3d 893 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(a) Fla. Stat. (1982). . . . See § 775.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . . See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. . . . . § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1981). . . . See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. . . . . § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1981). . . . degree murder with a firearm is not barred by the statute of limitations because it is a life felony. § 775.15 . . . Presently, a prosecution for "a felony that resulted in a death may be commenced at any time.” § 775.15 . . .

THERLONGE, v. STATE, 184 So. 3d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . His appeal challenges the trial court’s construction of section 775.15(16)(a)4., Florida Statutes (2007 . . . Despite the time lapse, the State argued that it was permitted to continue the prosecution under section 775.15 . . . oñginal investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused [.] § 775.15 . . . Appellant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 775.15(16)(a) could not be applied to his . . . comparison against an accused and thus trigger the application of the- extension period under section 775.15 . . .

ESCALANTE, v. STATE, 165 So. 3d 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . if the State could establish it was entitled to the three-year tolling period afforded under section 775.15 . . . See § 775.15(2)(b). . . . However, section 775.15(1) provides that “[a] prosecution for a capital felony, a life felony, or a felony . . . whether Roblero Escalante’s leaving the scene of the accident “resulted in” death and whether section 775.15 . . .

STATE v. SOEBHAG,, 163 So. 3d 672 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Section 775.15(2), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that a prosecution for second- or third-degree felonies . . . information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay.” § 775.15 . . . Section 775.15(6) provides as follows: The period of limitation does not run during any time when the . . . Compare § 775.15(5)(b), (6), Fla. Stat. (1999), with § 812.035(10), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . (adding the pertinent provisions to section 775.15(5) and (6)). . . .

ROBINSON, v. STATE, 153 So. 3d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Because the running of the statute of limitations was tolled under section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes . . . Under section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), prosecution for second and third degree felonies . . . be tolled, however, for the time during which the defendant is continuously absent from the state. § 775.15 . . . Section 775.15(4)(b) provides that process must be executed without unreasonable delay and: In determining . . . Section 775.15(5) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he period of limitation does not run during any . . .

STATE v. FERNANDEZ,, 145 So. 3d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . With respect to Count I, unemployment compensation fraud, section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2012 . . .

STATE v. REYAN,, 145 So. 3d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Statutes (1987), and four years as to the offense of committing an organized scheme to defraud, section 775.15 . . .

R. CREWS, v. STATE, 130 So. 3d 698 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . for seeking dismissal of these counts was the claim the statute of limitations, as stated in section 775.15 . . . (2), Florida Statutes, had expired and that the State improperly utilized section 775.15(12)(b), to extend . . . that the time for prosecution was extended by virtue of the “misconduct in public office,” section 775.15 . . . Like the majority in La-Morte, we hold that section 775.15(3)(b) may apply to the type of offenses committed . . . As Judge Altenbernd reasoned in his dissent in LaMorte, section 775.15(12)(b), Florida Statutes does . . .

CARTAGENA, v. STATE, 125 So. 3d 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .

E. MORA, v. STATE, 110 So. 3d 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. . . . Section 775.15(4), Florida Statutes, provides: (4)(a) Prosecution on a charge on which the defendant . . .

STATE v. T. PELHAM,, 99 So. 3d 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . case naturally steers us toward an interpretation of rule 3.191 that does not interfere with sections 775.15 . . . Section 775.15(2)(b) gives the state three years following the burglary of a conveyance to file criminal . . .

HAMPTON, v. STATE, 103 So. 3d 98 (Fla. 2012)

. . . See, e.g., § 775.15(4)(a), Fla. . . . Section 775.15(1)-(16), Florida Statutes (2009) (Time limitations; general time limitations; exceptions . . . And specifically, as noted earlier, section 775.15(4)(a) — the statute of limitations applicable to Juror . . .

PERKINS, Jr. v. STATE, 84 So. 3d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . ." § 775.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .

BEYER, v. STATE, 76 So. 3d 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1987), applies to these February 1988 offenses. . . . . § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). . . . Section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: The period of limitation does not run during any . . . information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay.” § 775.15 . . . See also § 775.15(5), Fla. . . .

STATE v. TRAYLOR, 77 So. 3d 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . However, the statute of limitations for a first-degree felony is four years under section 775.15(2)(a . . .

STATE v. W. KIRCHHOF,, 75 So. 3d 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. . . .

M. GOINGS, v. STATE, 76 So. 3d 975 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. . . . Goings “without unreasonable delay.” § 775.15(5), Fla. Stat. (1993). . . . Under section 775.15(5), the state had the burden to show an “inability to locate the defendant after . . . diligent search or the defendant’s absence from the state.” § 775.15(5), Fla. . . . Section 775.15(5) does not require any other showing. . . .

STATE v. PEREZ,, 72 So. 3d 306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . The State argues that “[t]he plain language of [section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1999),] indicates that . . . See § 775.15(4); Brown, 674 So.2d at 741 (holding that the period of limitations begins to run on the . . . The capias must be executed without unreasonable delay. § 775.15(5)0»), (6), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . Section 775.15(6) provides: The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant . . . Presently numbered section 775.15(4)(b) and (5). See ch. 2005-110, § 1, at 1059-61, Laws of Fla. . . .

DIXON, v. STATE, 53 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Dixon, the prosecutors believed section 775.15(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2006) — which permits a prosecution . . . State, 51 So.3d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that subsections 775.15(15) & (16) did not apply where . . .

LAWSON, v. STATE, 51 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . See § 775.15(5)(b) (providing that commencement of prosecution depends, in part, on the filing of an . . . 2004, and June 30, 2006. § 775.15(15)(b). . . . Similarly, the limitations period was not extended under section 775.15(16)(a)(4) based upon Mr. . . . See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

CALDERON, v. STATE, 52 So. 3d 813 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). The trial court granted the motion and vacated the conviction. . . . (amending section 775.15(1) to provide that “[a] prosecution for a ... felony that resulted in a death . . . limitations period by three years due to the defendant’s continuous absence from this state, see § 775.15 . . . Ch. 96-145, § 1, at 130, Laws of Fla.; see § 775.15(l)(a), Fla. . . . We begin our analysis of section 775.15(l)(a) with consideration of its plain meaning. See Fla. . . .

HARPER, v. STATE, 43 So. 3d 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . . See § 775.15(5)-(7), Fla. Stat. (2003). The State responded that it has no such basis. . . .

COLLAZO, v. STATE, 42 So. 3d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . limitations for the charged crime is three years but urges that the tolling provision of subsection 775.15 . . .

S. BRYSON, v. STATE, 42 So. 3d 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Appellant argues that prosecution was barred by the three-year limitation imposed under section 775.15 . . . The plain language of section 775.15(16)(a) states that prosecution for attempted armed robbery “may . . . Appellant further argues that even if section 775.15(16)(a) were to apply on its face, it cannot apply . . . prosecution was not barred by section 775.15(2)(b). . . . Additionally, section 775.15(16)(b) clearly indicates it “applies to any offense that is not otherwise . . .

WADE, II, v. STATE, 40 So. 3d 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 775.15(5), Fla. Stat. (2005). We reverse Mr. . . .

DAVIS, v. STATE, 42 So. 3d 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 775.15(4)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (2007); Fleming v. . . .

STATE v. THOMAS,, 26 So. 3d 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 775.15(4), Fla. Stat. (2003). The statute of limitations began to run on April 27, 2003. . . . an information is filed, provided that the “information is executed without unreasonable delay.” § 775.15 . . . Id.; see § 775.15(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003); Williams v. . . .

STATE v. GROSSER,, 24 So. 3d 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . The State argued at the hearing that § 775.15(4)(b), Florida Statutes, provided the basis for utilizing . . . Section 775.15, however, is the statute of limitations for the prosecution of criminal charges; it has . . .

SCHUSTER, v. STATE, 21 So. 3d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . specific statute of limitations controls over the more general limitations provisions found in section 775.15 . . . when the information is filed, unless there is an “unreasonable delay” in execution of the capias. § 775.15 . . .

NAVARRO, v. STATE, 19 So. 3d 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Information, the prosecution was commenced beyond the three-year statute of limitations set forth in section 775.15 . . . applicable because it was more specific than the general three-year statute of limitations in section 775.15 . . . the Information was filed beyond the applicable three-year limitations period set forth in section 775.15 . . .

L. FRANK, v. STATE, 23 So. 3d 129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . . § 775.15(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . . See §§ 775.15(2)(a) & (7)a., Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .

McLAUGHLIN, v. STATE, 15 So. 3d 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . With respect to when prosecution is commenced, section 775.15(5) provides, in pertinent part, as follows . . . With respect to the defendant’s absence from the state, section 775.15(6) provides as follows: (6) The . . . In 1997, section 775.15 was amended to excuse the State for not extraditing or actively pursuing suspects . . . See § 775.15(6), Fla. Stat. (1997). This amendment became effective July 1, 1997. . . .

STATE v. SUAREZ,, 13 So. 3d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . .” § 775.15(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . Both sections 775.15 and 812.035, Florida Statutes (2001), provide for tolling of the statutory time . . . See §§ 775.15, 812.035(10). . . .

KIDD, v. STATE, 985 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 775.15, Florida Statutes, sets out the statutes of limitations for different degrees of criminal . . . second and third degree felonies must be commenced within three years after commission of the offense. § 775.15 . . . Section 775.15(4), Florida Statutes, provides in part: (a) Prosecution on a charge on which the defendant . . . requests notice of the prisoner’s release, is not the equivalent of the process contemplated by section 775.15 . . .

O STEWART, v. STATE, 987 So. 2d 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 775.15, Florida Statutes (2001), provides in pertinent part: (2) Except as otherwise provided . . . It is not the equivalent of the process contemplated by section 775.15(5). See Lett v. . . .

TUCKER, v. STATE, 987 So. 2d 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Although section 40.013(1) does not define the phrase “under prosecution,” Appellant argues that section 775.15 . . . jury qualification statute, this event does not occur until the citation is both served and filed. § 775.15 . . .

SOTO, v. STATE, 982 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . . § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). . . . the defendant after diligent search or the defendant’s absence from the state shall be considered. § 775.15 . . . We note that the legislature subsequently amended section 775.15(5), so that a “[p]rosecution on a charge . . . were made to locate Soto and execute the capi-as, it failed to meet its burden under former section 775.15 . . . absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state....” § 775.15 . . .

LaMORTE, v. STATE, 984 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Prosecution for a second-degree felony must be commenced within three years. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. . . . However, an extension of these statutes of limitations is found in section 775.15(3)(b) which states: . . . Statutory History Section 775.15(b)(3) was the product of a revision in the laws in 1974. . . . The subsection is now located at section 775.15(12)(b). . . . LaMorte cites to section 775.15(12)(b) throughout his argument. . . . opinion in this case because I believe that it is the result required by the plain language of section 775.15 . . . 13 (Fla.1958), the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the predecessor statute to section 775.15 . . . teacher who steals a $500 piece of equipment is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, see § 775.15 . . . See § 775.15(12)(b). . . .

STATE v. RAMOS,, 975 So. 2d 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . 812.081 may be commenced at any time within 5 years after the cause of action accrues.... ” Section 775.15 . . . filing of waiver of formal arraignment and entry of plea was sufficient “other process” under section 775.15 . . .

DAY, v. STATE, 977 So. 2d 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . There is no reference in section 106.15 to section 775.15. . . . The State responds that section 106.28 does not apply to this criminal prosecution; rather, section 775.15 . . . Section 775.15(2)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that the limitation for prosecution of first-degree . . . However, Section 775.15(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2004) contains several exceptions and tolling provisions . . . Section 775.15 is a default statute that applies where no specific statute of limitations has been made . . .

SHARP, IV, v. CITY OF PALATKA,, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2007)

. . . . § 775.15(4)(b) provides that “prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has not previously been . . .

OVERTON, v. STATE v. v. R., 976 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 2007)

. . . See § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (1991); Perez v. . . . See § 775.15(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). . . . .” § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (1991); § 775.087(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

LABRADOR, v. STATE, 13 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .

CLEMENTS, v. STATE, 979 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . that I disagree with the holding in Hemphill and would conclude that the tolling provision of section 775.15 . . . The final sentence of section 775.15(7) unequivocally provides that the tolling provision applies to . . . the crime became a part of section 794.011, it became subject to the tolling provisions of section 775.15 . . . legislature evinced a clear intent to make “any such offense” subject to the tolling provision of section 775.15 . . . In my view, Hemphill is based on a hyperformalistie reading of section 775.15(7) — a reading which is . . . Stat. (1989-1992) (proscribing the offense, a first-degree felony); § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . Section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes (1993-1997), tolls the statute of limitations for a violation of . . . the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before December 31, 1984. § 775.15 . . . (7) apply” — “[t]he tolling provisions of section 775.15(7) are not applicable to violations of section . . . The State relies on section 775.15(4), Florida Statutes (1989-1997), which provides that “[a]n offense . . .

ERICKSON, v. SECRETARY FOR DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 243 F. App'x 524 (11th Cir. 2007)

. . . . § 775.15(l)(b). . . .

TORGERSON, v. STATE, 964 So. 2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The lower court relied upon the 2001 version of section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes, which provides that . . . age of 18 or the violation is reported to a law enforcement agency ... whichever occurs earlier.” § 775.15 . . . age of 16 or the violation is reported to a law enforcement agency ... whichever occurs earlier.” § 775.15 . . . At that point in time, the applicable version of section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes, began to run when . . . prosecution by August 15, 2004, when the three-year limitations period ran out, pursuant to section 775.15 . . .

McCLISH, v. B. NUGENT,, 483 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007)

. . . . § 775.15(2)(c) (providing for a two-year statute of limitations for first-degree misdemeanors). . . .

STATE v. PEREZ,, 952 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The decision in Mack was based on that court’s interpretation of the 1981 version of section 775.15, . . . three years of the commission of the crime, section 775.15(5)(b) significantly changes the application . . . Section 775.15(6) was also significantly changed: The period of limitation does not run during any time . . . As a result, under the circumstances of this case, sections 775.15(5)(b) and (6) tolled the statute of . . . Perez argues that the 1997 version of section 775.15 does not relieve the State from having to conduct . . .

STATE v. CALDERON,, 951 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . . § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). . . . . § 775.15(6), Fla. Stat. (1991). . . . Effective October 1, 1996, the Florida Legislature amended section 775.15 and provided that a prosecution . . .

STATE v. PAULK,, 946 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Section 775.15(5)(b) provides that prosecution commences when an information is filed, “provided ... . . . Section 775.15(5)(b), on its face, addresses only when prosecution is deemed to have commenced where . . . Under the version of sections 775.15(5)(b) and 775.15(6) then in effect, a defendant’s out-of-state confinement . . . After Brown, section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes was amended to provide that failure to execute process . . . See § 775.15(5), Fla. Stat. . . .

CICILIAN, v. STATE, 945 So. 2d 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . . §§ 775.15(2)(b), (4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

BARROW, v. STATE, 940 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . . § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

LAVERDE, v. STATE, 933 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . limitation period on these third degree felonies is three years after the offense is committed, section 775.15 . . . prosecution may be commenced within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party. § 775.15 . . . breach of fiduciary obligation, within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party. § 775.15 . . .

McGREGOR, v. STATE, 933 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . . § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . See § 775.15(6), Fla. Stat. (1995); Morgan v. . . .

GAUTHIER, v. MEKUSKER,, 186 F. App'x 903 (11th Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 775.15(2)(b). . . . See Fla.Stat. § 775.15(2)(b). . . . See Fla.Stat. § 775.15(7) (1985). . . . See Fla.Stat. § 775.15(2)(b). . . . See Fla.Stat. § 775.15(2)(b). . . . .

S. LIEBLE, v. STATE, 933 So. 2d 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . . § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . Section 775.15(3) defines when a crime is committed, as follows: An offense is committed either when . . . Pursuant to the requirement in section 775.15(3) that a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing . . .

v. STATE, 929 So. 2d 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . . § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

A. BUTLER, v. STATE, 946 So. 2d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . See § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

CUNNELL, v. STATE, 920 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . . § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (2000). We agree. Because the start of Ms. . . . The statute of limitations for a first-degree misdemeanor is two years. § 775.15(2)(c). . . . Therefore, section 775.15(5)(a) is not controlling. Instead, section 775.15(5)(b) applies. . . . Subsection (5) of section 775.15 was renumbered as subsection (4) effective July 1, 2005. . . . Subsection (6) of section 775.15 has also been renumbered. . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 913 So. 2d 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . . § 775.15(5)(b), Fla. Stat. . . .

HERNANDEZ, v. STATE, 915 So. 2d 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). . . . or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.” § 775.15 . . . Pursuant to section 775.15(6), the statute of limitations may be tolled if a defendant is continuously . . . sufficient showing that would avoid the implication of the statute of limitations referenced in section 775.15 . . .

MORRIS, v. STATE, 909 So. 2d 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . . § 775.15(2)(a). Here the state alleged the burglary occurred in October 1998. . . . There is no statute of limitations defense to this charge. § 775.15(l)(a) (a prosecution for a capital . . .

C. BULGIN, v. STATE H. v. P. v., 912 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2005)

. . . . § 775.15(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . .

EHRLICK, v. STATE, 898 So. 2d 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1998). . . . See § 775.15(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1998) (emphasis added). . . . See § 775.15(6), Fla. Stat. (1998). . . . This fact has no bearing on the outcome due to a 1997 amendment to section 775.15, Florida Statutes. . . . See § 775.15(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1998); see also Lett v. . . .

V. v. STATE, 891 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. . . . Watkins, 685 So.2d 1322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); § 775.15(5)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .

MORGAN, v. STATE, 888 So. 2d 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . .” § 775.15(6), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .

STATE v. J. TOWNSEND,, 884 So. 2d 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . The order determined that the two-year statute of limitations period defined in section 775.15, Florida . . . these circumstances and the application of the two-year statute of limitations period under section 775.15 . . . See § 775.15(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999); see also State v. . . .

ABDULLAH, v. STATE, 883 So. 2d 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . prosecution for the 1993 offense had not “commenced” within the time limitations set forth in section 775.15 . . . See § 775.15(2)(c) & (d), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . . In so holding, the court apparently relied on an amended version of section 775.15, Florida Statutes . . . a summons is commenced by the filing of an indictment, information, or other charging document.” § 775.15 . . .

STATE v. TELESZ,, 873 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . The order determined that the two-year statute of limitations period defined in section 775.15, Florida . . . dismissed the information based on the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations in section 775.15 . . . Section 775.15(2)(c) provides that prosecution for a misdemeanor of the first degree must be commenced . . . On the other hand, section 775.15 must be strictly construed. § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1983).... . . . Accordingly, we do not believe the legislature has authorized the state to apply section 775.15(6) to . . .

N. PEARSON, v. STATE, 867 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . . §§ 775.15(2)(a), 812.035(10), Fla. Stat. (1993). . . . Id. § 775.15(4). . . . Id. § 775.15(5). . . . to section 775.15(6). . . . Therefore, we reject the holding in Netherly and apply section 775.15(6) as written. . . .

STATE v. PARKS, a k a a k a, 866 So. 2d 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . State, 784 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (interpreting 1995 version of section 775.15(5)); Lewis v. . . . The applicable version of section 775.15(5) provides: (a) Prosecution on a charge on which the defendant . . . Therefore, under the 1997 version of section 775.15(5), prosecution on this charge commenced when the . . . See § 775.15(5)(a); see also Starling v. . . .

DANKERT a k a a k a v. STATE, 859 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . his prosecution on these charges was barred by the three-year statute of limitations found in section 775.15 . . . In response, the State argued that the tolling provision of section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes (1993 . . . The State contends that the tolling provision of section 775.15(7) allows for this prosecution to go . . . Thus, under the plain language of section 775.15(7), the statute began to run in November 1993 with the . . . However, section 775.15(7) clearly states that law enforcement or the government agency must report “ . . .

STATE v. ROBBINS,, 863 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 2003)

. . . consolidated with felonies by not applying rule 3.191(f) as written is further in conflict with section 775.15 . . .

STATE v. SACCO,, 849 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Because there is no statute of limitations for first degree murder, see § 775.15(l)(a), Florida Statutes . . .

LETT, v. STATE, 837 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . The applicable statute of limitations, section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1979), required prosecution . . . to be commenced within three years of the commission of this second degree felony. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla . . . been extended a maximum of three years if the defendant was eontin-uously absent from the state. § 775.15 . . . or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.” § 775.15 . . . was amended to excuse the failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state. § 775.15 . . .

A. CORDES, v. STATE, 842 So. 2d 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . and 5, there was dispute as to whether the statute of limitations may have been extended by section 775.15 . . . However, section 775.15(3)(a) only permits the limitations period to extend to one year after the discovery . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 833 So. 2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 775.15(5), Fla. Stat. (1995); Fleming, 524 So.2d at 1147; Coleman v. . . .

RODRIGUEZ- CAYRO, v. STATE, 828 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . pursuant to the two-year statute of limitations for first-degree misdemeanors set forth in section 775.15 . . . Section 775.15(4), Florida Statutes (2000), provides in relevant part that “[a]n offense is committed . . .

HEMPHILL, v. STATE, 820 So. 2d 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. . . . The trial court found that the statute of limitations had been tolled pursuant to section 775.15(7), . . . The problem with this analysis is that section 775.15(7) does not and has never included section 794.041 . . . reenacted as part of section 794.011, which is a statute to which the tolling provisions of section 775.15 . . . The tolling provisions of section 775.15(7) are not applicable to violations of section 794.041 committed . . .

STATE v. K. McCUBBINS,, 817 So. 2d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (1993). . . . “Other process” sufficient to commence prosecution under section 775.15(5) occurred by the time of his . . . See § 775.15(2)(b) (establishing a three-year statute of limitation for McCubbins’s crime). . . . .” § 775.15(5). . . . Stat. (1993). .Under section 775.15(6), the statute of limitations does not run if the defendant is continuously . . .