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Florida Statute 776.05 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 776.05 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 776
JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 776.05
776.05 Law enforcement officers; use of force in making an arrest.A law enforcement officer, or any person whom the officer has summoned or directed to assist him or her, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. The officer is justified in the use of any force:
(1) Which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or herself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest;
(2) When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have escaped; or
(3) When necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice. However, this subsection shall not constitute a defense in any civil action for damages brought for the wrongful use of deadly force unless the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by such flight and, when feasible, some warning had been given, and:
(a) The officer reasonably believes that the fleeing felon poses a threat of death or serious physical harm to the officer or others; or
(b) The officer reasonably believes that the fleeing felon has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm to another person.
History.s. 13, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-64; s. 1, ch. 87-147; s. 54, ch. 88-381; s. 1191, ch. 97-102.

F.S. 776.05 on Google Scholar

F.S. 776.05 on Casetext

Amendments to 776.05


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 776.05
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 776.05.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

STATE v. PERAZA,, 259 So. 3d 728 (Fla. 2018)

. . . PREVENT THE IMMINENT COMMISSION OF A FORCIBLE FELONY, IS LIMITED TO INVOKING A DEFENSE UNDER SECTION 776.05 . . . 1), Florida Statutes (2013), commonly known as Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law, and under section 776.05 . . . The State has pointed to no language from any statute, including section 776.05, that could reasonably . . . This is legally significant because section 776.05 immunity only applies when an officer is making an . . . arrest. § 776.05(1), Fla. . . .

STATE v. PERAZA,, 226 So. 3d 937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . The state reasons that law enforcement officers already are provided a defense under section 776.05(1 . . . We hold that the specific language of section 776.05, titled “Law enforcement officers; use of force . . . Therefore, the limitation on law enforcement officers to proceed under section 776.05 to the exclusion . . . According to the state, section 776.05(1) allowed the officer to assert a claim of qualified immunity . . . Additionally, because the question of whether qualified immunity pursuant to [section] 776.05[ (1) ] . . .

I. ERMINI, f k a I. v. SCOTT,, 249 F. Supp. 3d 1253 (M.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . Sanders, 672 So.2d at 47 (quoting § 776.05(1), Fla. Stat.). . . .

ESTATE OF OSORIO v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY,, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 776.05. . . .

HEILMAN, v. STATE, 135 So. 3d 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . That statute is section 776.05, and it provides that the officer “is justified in the use of any force . . . ” under specified circumstances. § 776.05, Fla. . . . Specifically, the court stated that “[bjecause sections 776.05 and 776.032 address the use of justifiable . . . The court reasoned that section 776.05 is specifically applicable to cases involving the use of force . . . by law enforcement officers in making an arrest and, therefore, section 776.05 supplied the justification . . .

STATE v. CAAMANO,, 105 So. 3d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Caamano moved to dismiss the charge, alleging immunity pursuant to section 776.05, Florida Statutes ( . . . In contrast, section 776.05, titled “Law enforcement officers; use of force in making an arrest,” provides . . . , the statute specific to law enforcement, the circuit court stripped section 776.05 of meaning. . . . Because sections 776.05 and 776.082 address the use of justifiable force in the context of a criminal . . . We hold that the specific language of section 776.05, titled “Law enforcement officers; use of force . . .

E. TERRELL, F. F. v. SMITH, a, 668 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 776.05 (“A law enforcement officer ... need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest . . .

W. LLOYD, v. TASSELL,, 384 F. App'x 960 (11th Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 776.05(1); City of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App.1996). . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 27 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 2010)

. . . . § 776.05, Fla. Stat. Give if applicable. . . .

DALRYMPLE, S. v. UNITED STATES, 460 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2006)

. . . Specifically, in his report and recommendation the magistrate judge relied on section 776.05 of the Florida . . . Stat. § 776.05 (2000). . . .

UNITED STATES v. RONDA, a. k. a. a. k. a., 455 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 776.05. . . . In relevant part, § 776.05 provides that a police officer is justified in using force against a fleeing . . . Appellants contend that § 776.05 authorizes all of the police shootings in this case, and that the lawfulness . . .

BUCHANAN, v. STATE, 927 So. 2d 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . This language closely tracks the language set forth in section 776.05 of the Florida Statutes. . . . That statute reads: 776.05. . . . harm while making the arrest; (2) When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have escaped. § 776.05 . . . However, section 776.05 did not apply to the facts presented in this case since the defendant was neither . . .

STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, 869 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2004)

. . . enforcement 3.6(h) JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER In making an arrest of a felon § 776.05 . . .

LIGHT, v. STATE, 796 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 776.05(1), (3), Fla. Stat. (1993). . . .

LANGSTON, v. STATE, 789 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force. 776.05 . . .

LEWIS, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG,, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2000)

. . . . § 776.05(1). . . . on law enforcement efforts, and would render meaningless the defense under [Florida Statute] Section 776.05 . . . Stat. § 776.05 The decision made by Officer Knight and/or Officer Minor to use deadly force against decedent . . .

BRESCHER, v. PIREZ,, 696 So. 2d 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Section 776.05, Florida Statutes (1983), provided: [A law enforcement officer] is justified in the use . . .

DENMARK, v. LEE COUNTY, J. Jr., 931 F. Supp. 831 (M.D. Fla. 1996)

. . . Furthermore, under § 776.05, Fla. . . . used the minimum amount of force necessary in this situation, his actions were justified pursuant to § 776.05 . . . believes to be necessary to defend, himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest. § 776.05 . . .

CITY OF MIAMI, v. SANDERS,, 672 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . .” § 776.05(1), Fla.Stat. (1995). . . . chilling effect on law enforcement efforts, and would render meaningless the defense under Section 776.05 . . .

HABIE, v. E. KRISCHER, C., 642 So. 2d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . Likewise, § 776.05 permits a law enforcement officer to use force when he “reasonably believes” it is . . .

COLVIN, v. J. CURTIS,, 860 F. Supp. 1503 (M.D. Fla. 1993)

. . . Fla.Stat. 776.05 provides that a law enforcement officer is justified in the use of any force which he . . .

HARRIS, v. NAVARRO,, 600 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . Sections 776.012, 776.05, 933.15, Fla.Stat. (1985). See also Tennessee v. . . .

CITY OF WINTER HAVEN, a v. ALLEN, D., 589 So. 2d 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . an instruction should be given in this case on justifiable force in making an arrest under section 776.05 . . .

LOZANO, v. STATE, 584 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . See, e.g., § 776.05, Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

H. ANSLEY, v. C. HEINRICH, E., 925 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1991)

. . . . § 776.05 which states in pertinent part: A law enforcement officer or any person whom he has summoned . . . Florida Statutes § 776.05 allows an officer to use any force reasonably necessary to defend himself or . . .

D. HAMM, H. v. A. POWELL,, 874 F.2d 766 (11th Cir. 1989)

. . . . § 776.05 that provides: "A law enforcement officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, 543 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1989)

. . . EXHIBIT 2 3.04(f) JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER In making an arrest of a felon F.S. 776.05 . . .

CITY OF WINTER HAVEN, a v. ALLEN, D., 541 So. 2d 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . appellant’s requested jury instruction regarding the justifiable use of force standard found in section 776.05 . . . to give appellant’s requested jury instruction on the justifiable use of force as defined in section 776.05 . . . defense requested jury instruction on the justifiable use of force standard established in section 776.05 . . . been instructed on the standard for determining the justifiable use of force as set forth in section 776.05 . . . This court recognized the propriety of the use in a civil case of the standard established in section 776.05 . . .

BROWN, v. CITY OF CLEWISTON, 848 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1988)

. . . Among those statutes identified by the Court as an embodiment of the common law rule was section 776.05 . . . Fla.Stat. § 776.05 (emphasis added). . . . The full text of section 776.05 provides as follows: Law enforcement officers; use of force in making . . . The amended statute, effective October 1, 1987, provides as follows: 776.05 Law enforcement officers; . . . Both parties apparently agree that the amendment to section 776.05 has no bearing on the disposition . . . Fla.Stat.Ann. sec. 776.05 (West 1976). . . . Only recently has Florida amended section 776.05. . . . Fla.Stat.Ann. sec. 776.05 (West 1976) (emphasis added). . . . No party to this appeal has relied upon the amendment to section 776.05. . . . . The amendment to section 776.05 became effective on October 1, 1987. . . .

JOHNSON, v. M. COLGATE,, 687 F. Supp. 573 (M.D. Fla. 1988)

. . . Section 776.05, Florida Statutes. . . .

FITZGERALD, v. P. McDANIEL, 833 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1987)

. . . Florida Statutes § 776.05 provides: A law enforcement officer, or any person whom he has summoned or . . . Morris’s conduct was reasonable because Morris was acting under the specific authorization of section 776.05 . . .

E. LUNDGREN, F, v. P. McDANIEL,, 814 F.2d 600 (11th Cir. 1987)

. . . Fla.Stat.Ann. sec. 776.05 (West 1976 Supp.1986). . . .

BROWN, v. CITY OF CLEWISTON, 644 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D. Fla. 1986)

. . . . § 776.05 (1979)), although, upon further questioning, he did say that the regulations and the statute . . . CITY’s liability based on PEREZ’s acts committed pursuant to the Florida Fleeing Statute, Fla.Stat. § 776.05 . . . standard of care owed by the CITY to the plaintiff must be determined with reference to Fla.Stat. § 776.05 . . . In 1979, when officer PEREZ shot the plaintiff, Fla.Stat. § 776.05 permitted a law enforcement officer . . . Stat. § 776.05 (1979) (See, D.E. 107). . . .

BROWN, v. CITY OF CLEWISTON, 644 F. Supp. 1417 (S.D. Fla. 1986)

. . . . § 776.05 (1979). . . . refrain from discharging his weapon during the attempted arrest of the plaintiff, pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 776.05 . . . regarding plaintiffs civil rights claim, the force used by Officer PEREZ was authorized by Fla.Stat. § 776.05 . . . It is stated that these regulations were much narrower than the standard set forth in Fla.Stat. § 776.05 . . .

MAZZILLI v. W. DOUD, 485 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . See § 776.05, Fla.Stat. (1979). . . .

IN RE THE MATTER OF KEITH A. ROZIER, 17 Fla. Supp. 2d 52 (Orange Cty. Ct. 1986)

. . . However, for the purposes of this Inquest, the pertinent Section is 776.05, Florida Statutes, which states . . . Stat. § 776.05, our “fleeing felon” law. . . . Pursuant to § 776.05, an officer having probable cause to believe a suspect has committed a felony, may . . . In the Nelson case, the court further noted that under § 776.05, “the fact that the person has not actually . . . Stat. 776.05, potentially subjecting him to criminal culpability under Fla. Stat. § 782.07. . . .

TENNESSEE v. GARNER, 471 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1985)

. . . . § 776.05 (1983); Idaho Code § 19-610 (1979); Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3 (1982); Kan. Stat. . . .

NELSON, a By BOWENS, v. HOWELL,, 455 So. 2d 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . enforcement officer to assist the officer in making an arrest or preventing an escape, as mentioned in § 776.05 . . .

D. COBB, v. L. WAINWRIGHT,, 666 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1982)

. . . . §§ 782.02, 776.05, or 776.07 (1975) nor excusable under Fla.Stat. § 782.-03 (1975). . . . justified in using any force which he reasonably believed necessary to defend himself, Fla.Stat. § 776.05 . . . Rehearing that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the 1974 version of Fla.Stat. § 776.05 . . . court and Florida Supreme Court, that the trial judge properly instructed the jury as to Fla.Stat. § 776.05 . . . Relevant for the purposes of this case are Fla.Stat. §§ 776.05, 776.06, and 776.07. . . .

D. COBB, v. STATE, 376 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1979)

. . . un-contradicted evidence adduced at trial establishes that Eldridge’s killing was justified, pursuant to sections 776.05 . . .

PANI, v. STATE, 361 So. 2d 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . “Further the law in 776.05: “Resisting [sic][] a law enforcement officer, or any person who[m] he has . . . retaking felons who have escaped or when necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice. “776.05 . . .

MATTIS, M. D. v. R. SCHNARR v. C. DANFORTH,, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976)

. . . . § 776.05 (Supp.1975); Idaho Code § 19-610 (1970); Ind.Code § 35-1-19-3 (Burns 1975); Iowa Code § 755.8 . . .

CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, P. C. v. REED, a Jr. E., 330 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . . § 776.05. . . . . § 776.05, as amended by Ch. 75-64. . . .

BROOKLYN SAVINGS BANK v. O NEIL, 324 U.S. 697 (U.S. 1945)

. . . Thereupon the respondent brought suit for $276.05, the balance of the statutory wages due respondent, and $776.05 . . .

JOSEFINA VEVE ET AL. v. THE FAJARDO DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 6 P.R. Fed. 52 (D.P.R. 1912)

. . . at either end with the new line as surveyed, exclusively upon the Estate Aurora, and it turned over 776.05 . . .