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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 787
KIDNAPPING; CUSTODY OFFENSES; HUMAN TRAFFICKING; AND RELATED OFFENSES
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CHAPTER 787
CHAPTER 787
KIDNAPPING; CUSTODY OFFENSES; HUMAN TRAFFICKING; AND RELATED OFFENSES
787.01 Kidnapping; kidnapping of child under age 13, aggravating circumstances.
787.02 False imprisonment; false imprisonment of child under age 13, aggravating circumstances.
787.025 Luring or enticing a child.
787.03 Interference with custody.
787.04 Removing minors from state or concealing minors contrary to state agency order or court order.
787.06 Human trafficking.
787.061 Civil actions by victims of human trafficking.
787.07 Human smuggling.
787.29 Human trafficking public awareness signs.
787.01 Kidnapping; kidnapping of child under age 13, aggravating circumstances.
(1)(a) The term “kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to:
1. Hold for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage.
2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony.
3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person.
4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function.
(b) Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against her or his will within the meaning of this subsection if such confinement is without the consent of her or his parent or legal guardian.
(2) A person who kidnaps a person is guilty of a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3)(a) A person who commits the offense of kidnapping upon a child under the age of 13 and who, in the course of committing the offense, commits one or more of the following:
1. Aggravated child abuse, as defined in s. 827.03;
2. Sexual battery, as defined in chapter 794, against the child;
3. Lewd or lascivious battery, lewd or lascivious molestation, lewd or lascivious conduct, or lewd or lascivious exhibition, in violation of s. 800.04 or s. 847.0135(5);
4. A violation of former s. 796.03 or s. 796.04, relating to prostitution, upon the child;
5. Exploitation of the child or allowing the child to be exploited, in violation of s. 450.151; or
6. A violation of s. 787.06(3)(g), relating to human trafficking,

commits a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(b) Pursuant to s. 775.021(4), nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit the imposition of separate judgments and sentences for the life felony described in paragraph (a) and for each separate offense enumerated in subparagraphs (a)1.-5.
History.s. 1, ch. 5907, 1909; RGS 5058; CGL 7160; s. 1, ch 16063, 1933; s. 784, ch. 71-136; s. 8, ch. 72-724; s. 22, ch 74-383; s. 12, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 1, ch. 84-238; s. 2, ch. 90-120; s. 2, ch. 93-227; s. 9, ch. 96-322; s. 1813, ch. 97-102; s. 4, ch. 99-201; s. 3, ch. 2000-246; s. 18, ch. 2008-172; s. 19, ch. 2014-160.
Note.Former s. 805.02.
787.02 False imprisonment; false imprisonment of child under age 13, aggravating circumstances.
(1)(a) The term “false imprisonment” means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against her or his will.
(b) Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against her or his will within the meaning of this section if such confinement is without the consent of her or his parent or legal guardian.
(2) A person who commits the offense of false imprisonment is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3)(a) A person who commits the offense of false imprisonment upon a child under the age of 13 and who, in the course of committing the offense, commits any offense enumerated in 1subparagraphs 1.-5., commits a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
1. Aggravated child abuse, as defined in s. 827.03;
2. Sexual battery, as defined in chapter 794, against the child;
3. Lewd or lascivious battery, lewd or lascivious molestation, lewd or lascivious conduct, or lewd or lascivious exhibition, in violation of s. 800.04 or s. 847.0135(5);
4. A violation of former s. 796.03 or s. 796.04, relating to prostitution, upon the child;
5. Exploitation of the child or allowing the child to be exploited, in violation of s. 450.151; or
6. A violation of s. 787.06(3)(g) relating to human trafficking.
(b) Pursuant to s. 775.021(4), nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit the imposition of separate judgments and sentences for the first degree offense described in paragraph (a) and for each separate offense enumerated in subparagraphs (a)1.-5.
History.s. 43, sub-ch. 3, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2399; GS 3225; RGS 5057; CGL 7159; s. 783, ch. 71-136; s. 23, ch. 74-383; s. 13, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 84-238; s. 2, ch. 90-120; s. 1, ch. 93-156; ss. 2, 18, ch. 93-227; s. 9, ch. 96-322; s. 1814, ch. 97-102; s. 5, ch. 99-201; s. 3, ch. 2000-246; s. 19, ch. 2008-172; s. 20, ch. 2014-160; s. 95, ch. 2015-2.
1Note.Section 20, ch. 2014-160, added subparagraph 6. to paragraph (a) but did not revise the reference to subparagraphs 1.-5.
Note.Former s. 805.01.
787.025 Luring or enticing a child.
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Structure” means a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof.
(b) “Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging together therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof.
(c) “Conveyance” means any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car.
(d) “Convicted” means a determination of guilt which is the result of a trial or the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld.
(2)(a) A person 18 years of age or older who intentionally lures or entices, or attempts to lure or entice, a child under the age of 12 into a structure, dwelling, or conveyance for other than a lawful purpose commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(b) A person 18 years of age or older who, having been previously convicted of a violation of paragraph (a), intentionally lures or entices, or attempts to lure or entice, a child under the age of 12 into a structure, dwelling, or conveyance for other than a lawful purpose commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(c) A person 18 years of age or older who, having been previously convicted of a violation of chapter 794, s. 800.04, or s. 847.0135(5), or a violation of a similar law of another jurisdiction, intentionally lures or entices, or attempts to lure or entice, a child under the age of 12 into a structure, dwelling, or conveyance for other than a lawful purpose commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that:
(a) The person reasonably believed that his or her action was necessary to prevent the child from being seriously injured.
(b) The person lured or enticed, or attempted to lure or entice, the child under the age of 12 into a structure, dwelling, or conveyance for a lawful purpose.
(c) The person’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances and the defendant did not have any intent to harm the health, safety, or welfare of the child.
History.s. 1, ch. 95-228; s. 8, ch. 99-201; s. 3, ch. 2000-246; s. 1, ch. 2006-299; s. 20, ch. 2008-172.
787.03 Interference with custody.
(1) Whoever, without lawful authority, knowingly or recklessly takes or entices, or aids, abets, hires, or otherwise procures another to take or entice, any minor or any incompetent person from the custody of the minor’s or incompetent person’s parent, his or her guardian, a public agency having the lawful charge of the minor or incompetent person, or any other lawful custodian commits the offense of interference with custody and commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) In the absence of a court order determining rights to custody or visitation with any minor or with any incompetent person, any parent of the minor or incompetent person, whether natural or adoptive, stepparent, legal guardian, or relative of the minor or incompetent person who has custody thereof and who takes, detains, conceals, or entices away that minor or incompetent person within or without the state with malicious intent to deprive another person of his or her right to custody of the minor or incompetent person commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) A subsequently obtained court order for custody or visitation does not affect application of this section.
(4) It is a defense that:
(a) The defendant had reasonable cause to believe that his or her action was necessary to preserve the minor or the incompetent person from danger to his or her welfare.
(b) The defendant was the victim of an act of domestic violence or had reasonable cause to believe that he or she was about to become the victim of an act of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28, and the defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the action was necessary in order for the defendant to escape from, or protect himself or herself from, the domestic violence or to preserve the minor or incompetent person from exposure to the domestic violence.
(c) The minor or incompetent person was taken away at his or her own instigation without enticement and without purpose to commit a criminal offense with or against the minor or incompetent person, and the defendant establishes that it was reasonable to rely on the instigating acts of the minor or incompetent person.
(5) Proof that a person has not attained the age of 18 years creates the presumption that the defendant knew the minor’s age or acted in reckless disregard thereof.
(6)(a) The offenses prescribed in subsections (1) and (2) do not apply in cases in which a person having a legal right to custody of a minor or incompetent person is the victim of any act of domestic violence, has reasonable cause to believe he or she is about to become the victim of any act of domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28, or believes that his or her action was necessary to preserve the minor or the incompetent person from danger to his or her welfare and seeks shelter from such acts or possible acts and takes with him or her the minor or incompetent person.
(b) In order to gain the exception conferred by paragraph (a), a person who takes a minor or incompetent person under this subsection must:
1. Within 10 days after taking the minor or incompetent person, make a report to the sheriff’s office or state attorney’s office for the county in which the minor or incompetent person resided at the time he or she was taken, which report must include the name of the person taking the minor or incompetent person, the current address and telephone number of the person and minor or incompetent person, and the reasons the minor or incompetent person was taken.
2. Within a reasonable time after taking a minor, commence a custody proceeding that is consistent with the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. s. 1738A, or the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, ss. 61.501-61.542.
3. Inform the sheriff’s office or state attorney’s office for the county in which the minor or incompetent person resided at the time he or she was taken of any change of address or telephone number of the person and the minor or incompetent person.
(c)1. The current address and telephone number of the person and the minor or incompetent person which are contained in the report made to a sheriff or state attorney under paragraph (b) are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution.
2. A sheriff or state attorney may allow an agency, as defined in s. 119.011, to inspect and copy records made confidential and exempt under this paragraph in the furtherance of that agency’s duties and responsibilities.
History.s. 24, ch. 74-383; s. 14, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 1, ch. 88-244; s. 25, ch. 94-134; s. 25, ch. 94-135; s. 1201, ch. 97-102; s. 1, ch. 2000-231; s. 1, ch. 2000-357; s. 157, ch. 2004-5; s. 1, ch. 2005-89; s. 1, ch. 2006-114; s. 1, ch. 2006-115; s. 1, ch. 2011-99.
787.04 Removing minors from state or concealing minors contrary to state agency order or court order.
(1) It is unlawful for any person, in violation of a court order, to lead, take, entice, or remove a minor beyond the limits of this state, or to conceal the location of a minor, with personal knowledge of the order.
(2) It is unlawful for any person, with criminal intent, to lead, take, entice, or remove a minor beyond the limits of this state, or to conceal the location of a minor, during the pendency of any action or proceeding affecting custody of the minor, after having received notice as required by law of the pendency of the action or proceeding, without the permission of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending.
(3) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly and willfully lead, take, entice, or remove a minor beyond the limits of this state, or to knowingly and willfully conceal the location of a minor, during the pendency of a dependency proceeding affecting such minor or during the pendency of any investigation, action, or proceeding concerning the alleged abuse or neglect of such minor, after having received actual or constructive notice of the pendency of such investigation, action, or proceeding and without the permission of the state agency or court in which the investigation, action, or proceeding is pending.
(4) It is unlawful for any person, who has carried beyond the limits of this state any minor whose custody is involved in any action or proceeding pending in this state pursuant to the order of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending or pursuant to the permission of the court, thereafter, to fail to produce the minor in the court or deliver the minor to the person designated by the court.
(5) It is a defense under this section that a person who leads, takes, entices, or removes a minor beyond the limits of the state reasonably believes that his or her action was necessary to protect the minor from child abuse as defined in s. 827.03.
(6) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.s. 1, ch. 29654, 1955; s. 1, ch. 57-337; s. 47, ch. 67-254; s. 785, ch. 71-136; s. 25, ch. 74-383; s. 15, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 80-102; s. 3, ch. 88-151; s. 3, ch. 96-215; s. 23, ch. 96-322; s. 1815, ch. 97-102; s. 21, ch. 2008-245.
Note.Former ss. 65.141, 805.03.
787.06 Human trafficking.
(1)(a) The Legislature finds that human trafficking is a form of modern-day slavery. Victims of human trafficking are young children, teenagers, and adults. Thousands of victims are trafficked annually across international borders worldwide. Many of these victims are trafficked into this state. Victims of human trafficking also include citizens of the United States and those persons trafficked domestically within the borders of the United States. The Legislature finds that victims of human trafficking are subjected to force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of sexual exploitation or forced labor.
(b) The Legislature finds that while many victims of human trafficking are forced to work in prostitution or the sexual entertainment industry, trafficking also occurs in forms of labor exploitation, such as domestic servitude, restaurant work, janitorial work, sweatshop factory work, and migrant agricultural work.
(c) The Legislature finds that traffickers use various techniques to instill fear in victims and to keep them enslaved. Some traffickers keep their victims under lock and key. However, the most frequently used practices are less obvious techniques that include isolating victims from the public and family members; confiscating passports, visas, or other identification documents; using or threatening to use violence toward victims or their families; telling victims that they will be imprisoned or deported for immigration violations if they contact authorities; and controlling the victims’ funds by holding the money ostensibly for safekeeping.
(d) It is the intent of the Legislature that the perpetrators of human trafficking be penalized for their illegal conduct and that the victims of trafficking be protected and assisted by this state and its agencies. In furtherance of this policy, it is the intent of the Legislature that the state Supreme Court, The Florida Bar, and relevant state agencies prepare and implement training programs in order that judges, attorneys, law enforcement personnel, investigators, and others are able to identify traffickers and victims of human trafficking and direct victims to appropriate agencies for assistance. It is the intent of the Legislature that the Department of Children and Families and other state agencies cooperate with other state and federal agencies to ensure that victims of human trafficking can access social services and benefits to alleviate their plight.
(2) As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Coercion” means:
1. Using or threatening to use physical force against any person;
2. Restraining, isolating, or confining or threatening to restrain, isolate, or confine any person without lawful authority and against her or his will;
3. Using lending or other credit methods to establish a debt by any person when labor or services are pledged as a security for the debt, if the value of the labor or services as reasonably assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt, the length and nature of the labor or services are not respectively limited and defined;
4. Destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, withholding, or possessing any actual or purported passport, visa, or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of any person;
5. Causing or threatening to cause financial harm to any person;
6. Enticing or luring any person by fraud or deceit; or
7. Providing a controlled substance as outlined in Schedule I or Schedule II of s. 893.03 to any person for the purpose of exploitation of that person.
(b) “Commercial sexual activity” means any violation of chapter 796 or an attempt to commit any such offense, and includes sexually explicit performances and the production of pornography.
(c) “Financial harm” includes extortionate extension of credit, loan sharking as defined in s. 687.071, or employment contracts that violate the statute of frauds as provided in s. 725.01.
(d) “Human trafficking” means transporting, soliciting, recruiting, harboring, providing, enticing, maintaining, purchasing, patronizing, procuring, or obtaining another person for the purpose of exploitation of that person.
(e) “Labor” means work of economic or financial value.
(f) “Maintain” means, in relation to labor or services, to secure or make possible continued performance thereof, regardless of any initial agreement on the part of the victim to perform such type service.
(g) “Obtain” means, in relation to labor, commercial sexual activity, or services, to receive, take possession of, or take custody of another person or secure performance thereof.
(h) “Services” means any act committed at the behest of, under the supervision of, or for the benefit of another. The term includes, but is not limited to, forced marriage, servitude, or the removal of organs.
(i) “Sexually explicit performance” means an act or show, whether public or private, that is live, photographed, recorded, or videotaped and intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interest.
(j) “Unauthorized alien” means an alien who is not authorized under federal law to be employed in the United States, as provided in 8 U.S.C. s. 1324a(h)(3). The term shall be interpreted consistently with that section and any applicable federal rules or regulations.
(k) “Venture” means any group of two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity.
(3) Any person who knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the facts, engages in human trafficking, or attempts to engage in human trafficking, or benefits financially by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture that has subjected a person to human trafficking:
(a)1. For labor or services of any child younger than 18 years of age or an adult believed by the person to be a child younger than 18 years of age commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
2. Using coercion for labor or services of an adult commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) Using coercion for commercial sexual activity of an adult commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(c)1. For labor or services of any child younger than 18 years of age or an adult believed by the person to be a child younger than 18 years of age who is an unauthorized alien commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
2. Using coercion for labor or services of an adult who is an unauthorized alien commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(d) Using coercion for commercial sexual activity of an adult who is an unauthorized alien commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(e)1. For labor or services who does so by the transfer or transport of any child younger than 18 years of age or an adult believed by the person to be a child younger than 18 years of age from outside this state to within this state commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
2. Using coercion for labor or services who does so by the transfer or transport of an adult from outside this state to within this state commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(f)1. For commercial sexual activity who does so by the transfer or transport of any child younger than 18 years of age or an adult believed by the person to be a child younger than 18 years of age from outside this state to within this state commits a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life, or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
2. Using coercion for commercial sexual activity who does so by the transfer or transport of an adult from outside this state to within this state commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(g) For commercial sexual activity in which any child younger than 18 years of age or an adult believed by the person to be a child younger than 18 years of age, or in which any person who is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated as those terms are defined in s. 794.011(1), is involved commits a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082(3)(a)6., s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

For each instance of human trafficking of any individual under this subsection, a separate crime is committed and a separate punishment is authorized.

(4)(a) Any parent, legal guardian, or other person having custody or control of a minor who sells or otherwise transfers custody or control of such minor, or offers to sell or otherwise transfer custody of such minor, with knowledge or in reckless disregard of the fact that, as a consequence of the sale or transfer, the minor will be subject to human trafficking commits a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) Any person who, for the purpose of committing or facilitating an offense under this section, permanently brands, or directs to be branded, a victim of an offense under this section commits a second degree felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. For purposes of this subsection, the term “permanently branded” means a mark on the individual’s body that, if it can be removed or repaired at all, can only be removed or repaired by surgical means, laser treatment, or other medical procedure.
(5) The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission shall establish standards for basic and advanced training programs for law enforcement officers in the subjects of investigating and preventing human trafficking crimes. Every basic skills course required for law enforcement officers to obtain initial certification must include training on human trafficking crime prevention and investigation.
(6) Each state attorney shall develop standards of instruction for prosecutors to receive training on the investigation and prosecution of human trafficking crimes and shall provide for periodic and timely instruction.
(7) Any real property or personal property that was used, attempted to be used, or intended to be used in violation of this section may be seized and shall be forfeited as provided by the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. After satisfying any liens on the property, the remaining proceeds from the sale of any property seized under this section and owned by a defendant convicted of a violation of this section must first be allocated to pay any order of restitution of a human trafficking victim in the criminal case for which the owner was convicted. If there are multiple human trafficking victims in the criminal case, the remaining proceeds must be allocated equally among the victims to pay restitution. If the proceeds are sufficient to pay any such order of restitution, any remaining proceeds must be disbursed as required by s. 932.7055(5)-(9).
(8) The degree of an offense shall be reclassified as follows if a person causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to another person during the commission of an offense under this section:
(a) A felony of the second degree shall be reclassified as a felony of the first degree.
(b) A felony of the first degree shall be reclassified as a life felony.
(9) In a prosecution under this section, the defendant’s ignorance of the victim’s age, the victim’s misrepresentation of his or her age, or the defendant’s bona fide belief of the victim’s age cannot be raised as a defense.
(10)(a) Information about the location of a residential facility offering services for adult victims of human trafficking involving commercial sexual activity, which is held by an agency, as defined in s. 119.011, is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution. This exemption applies to such confidential and exempt information held by an agency before, on, or after the effective date of the exemption.
(b) Information about the location of a residential facility offering services for adult victims of human trafficking involving commercial sexual activity may be provided to an agency, as defined in s. 119.011, as necessary to maintain health and safety standards and to address emergency situations in the residential facility.
(c) The exemptions from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution provided in this subsection do not apply to facilities licensed by the Agency for Health Care Administration.
(11) A victim’s lack of chastity or the willingness or consent of a victim is not a defense to prosecution under this section if the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense.
(12) The Legislature encourages each state attorney to adopt a pro-prosecution policy for human trafficking offenses, as provided in this section. After consulting the victim, or making a good faith attempt to consult the victim, the state attorney shall determine the filing, nonfiling, or diversion of criminal charges even in circumstances when there is no cooperation from a victim or over the objection of the victim, if necessary.
History.s. 2, ch. 2004-391; s. 1, ch. 2006-168; s. 5, ch. 2012-97; s. 300, ch. 2014-19; s. 7, ch. 2014-160; s. 96, ch. 2015-2; s. 2, ch. 2015-147; s. 3, ch. 2016-24; s. 25, ch. 2016-105; s. 4, ch. 2016-199; s. 2, ch. 2020-49; s. 2, ch. 2021-189; s. 3, ch. 2023-86.
787.061 Civil actions by victims of human trafficking.
(1) FINDINGS.The Legislature finds that it is necessary to provide a civil cause of action for the recovery of specified damages and costs in order to achieve the intent of the Legislature relating to human trafficking as expressed in s. 787.06(1)(d).
(2) DEFINITIONS.As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Human trafficking” has the same meaning as provided in s. 787.06(2).
(b) “Victim of human trafficking” means a person subjected to coercion, as defined in s. 787.06(2), or by any other means, for the purpose of being used in human trafficking; a child under 18 years of age subjected to human trafficking; or an individual subjected to human trafficking as defined by federal law.
(3) CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION.
(a) A victim of human trafficking has a civil cause of action against an adult theater, as defined in s. 847.001(2)(b), or an owner, an operator, or a manager of such theater, that knowingly allows a victim of human trafficking to work, perform, or dance at the adult theater. Such victim may recover damages as provided in this section.
(b) The action may be brought in any circuit court of competent jurisdiction in this state.
(c) A victim who prevails in any such action may recover economic and noneconomic damages; punitive damages, as provided in ss. 768.72, 768.725, and 768.73; reasonable attorney fees; and costs.
1. Economic damages include, but are not limited to, past and future medical and mental health expenses; repatriation expenses, when a victim elects repatriation; and all other reasonable costs and expenses incurred by the victim in the past or estimated to be incurred by the victim in the future as a result of the human trafficking.
2. Noneconomic damages are nonfinancial losses that would not have occurred but for the victimization, and include pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, and other nonfinancial losses.
(d) The civil remedies provided for in this section do not preempt any other remedy or cause of action provided by law, except that a victim may not recover against the same defendant under both this section and s. 772.104(2).
(e) If the factfinder determines a parent or legal guardian knowingly trafficked the victim, facilitated such trafficking, or otherwise participated in the human trafficking of the victim, the court may not allow such parent or legal guardian to receive any distribution of damages awarded under this section.
(f) The court shall have specific authority to consolidate civil actions for the same defendant for the purpose of case resolution and aggregate jurisdiction.
(4) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.The statute of limitations as specified in s. 95.11(7) or (9), as applicable, governs an action brought under this section.
History.s. 4, ch. 2023-86.
787.07 Human smuggling.
(1) Except as provided in subsections (3), (4), and (5), a person who knowingly and willfully transports into this state an individual whom the person knows, or reasonably should know, has entered the United States in violation of law and has not been inspected by the Federal Government since his or her unlawful entry from another country commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) A person commits a separate offense for each individual he or she transports into this state in violation of this section.
(3) A person who transports a minor into this state in violation of subsection (1) commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(4) A person who commits five or more separate offenses under this section during a single episode commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(5)(a) A person with a prior conviction under this section who commits a subsequent violation of this section commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) As used in paragraph (a), the term “conviction” means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea agreement or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld or a plea of nolo contendere is entered.
(6) Proof that a person knowingly and willfully presented false identification or gave false information to a law enforcement officer who is conducting an investigation for a violation of this section gives rise to an inference that such person was aware that the transported individual has entered the United States in violation of the law and had not been inspected by the Federal Government since his or her unlawful entry.
(7) A person who is arrested for a violation of this section must be held in custody until brought before the court for admittance to pretrial release in accordance with chapter 903.
History.s. 1, ch. 2009-160; s. 6, ch. 2012-97; s. 10, ch. 2023-40.
787.29 Human trafficking public awareness signs.
(1) The Department of Transportation shall display a public awareness sign developed under subsection (4) in every rest area, turnpike service plaza, weigh station, primary airport, passenger rail station, and welcome center in the state which is open to the public.
(2) Emergency rooms shall display a public awareness sign developed under subsection (4) in the emergency rooms at general acute care hospitals.
(3)(a) The employer at each of the following establishments shall display a public awareness sign developed under subsection (4) in a conspicuous location that is clearly visible to the public and employees of the establishment:
1. A strip club or other adult entertainment establishment.
2. A business or establishment that offers massage or bodywork services for compensation that is not owned by a health care practitioner regulated pursuant to chapter 456 and defined in s. 456.001.
(b) The county commission may adopt an ordinance to enforce this subsection. A violation of this subsection is a noncriminal violation and punishable by a fine only as provided in s. 775.083.
(4) The required public awareness sign must be at least 8.5 inches by 11 inches in size, must be printed in at least a 16-point type, and must state substantially the following in English and Spanish:

“If you or someone you know is being forced to engage in an activity and cannot leavewhether it is prostitution, housework, farm work, factory work, retail work, restaurant work, or any other activitycall the National Human Trafficking Resource Center at 1-888-373-7888 or text INFO or HELP to 233-733 to access help and services. Victims of slavery and human trafficking are protected under United States and Florida law.”

History.s. 1, ch. 2015-172; s. 87, ch. 2016-10; s. 6, ch. 2023-85.

F.S. 787 on Google Scholar

F.S. 787 on Casetext

Amendments to 787


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 787
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S787.01 1a1 - KIDNAP MINOR FOR RANSOM - OR REWARD OR SHIELD OR HOSTAGE - F: F
S787.01 1a1 - KIDNAP ADULT FOR RANSOM - OR REWARD OR SHIELD OR HOSTAGE - F: F
S787.01 1a2 - KIDNAP - COMMIT OR FACILITATE COMMISSION OF FELONY - F: F
S787.01 1a3 - KIDNAP - INFLICT BODILY HARM OR TERRORIZE VICT OR OTHER - F: F
S787.01 1a4 - KIDNAP - INTERFERE W GOVERNMENT OR POLITICAL FUNCTION - F: F
S787.01 1b - KIDNAP MINOR - CONFINE CHILD UND 13 YOA WO CONSENT OF PARENT - F: F
S787.01 2 - KIDNAP - KIDNAP ANOTHER PERSON - F: F
S787.01 3a1 - KIDNAP MINOR - UNDER 13 YEARS OF AGE COMMIT AGGRAVATED ABUSE - F: L
S787.01 3a2 - KIDNAP MINOR TO SEXUALLY ASSLT - UNDER 13 YOA SEXUAL BATTERY - F: L
S787.01 3a3 - KIDNAP MINOR - UND 13 YOA LEWD LASCIVIOUS INDECENT ASSLT ACT - F: L
S787.01 3a4 - KIDNAP MINOR - UNDER 13 YOA AND FORCE INTO PROSTITUTION - F: L
S787.01 3a5 - KIDNAP MINOR - UNDER 13 YOA AND EXPLOIT OR ALLOW EXPLOITATION - F: L
S787.02 1a - KIDNAP-FALSE IMPRISONMENT - ADULT - F: T
S787.02 1b - KIDNAP-FALSE IMPRISONMENT - CHILD UNDER 13 YEARS OF AGE - F: T
S787.02 2 - KIDNAP-FALSE IMPRISONMENT - REMOVED - F: T
S787.02 3a1 - KIDNAP-FALSE IMPRISONMENT - CHILD UNDER 13 YOA AND COMMIT AGGRAVATED ABUSE - F: F
S787.02 3a2 - KIDNAP-FALSE IMPRISONMENT - CHILD UNDER 13 YOA AND COMMIT SEXUAL BATTERY - F: F
S787.02 3a3 - KIDNAP-FALSE IMPRISONMENT - CHILD UNDR 13YOA LEWD LASC BAT MOLEST COND EXH - F: F
S787.02 3a4 - KIDNAP-FALSE IMPRISONMENT - CHILD UNDER 13 YOA FOR PROSTITUTION - F: F
S787.02 3a5 - KIDNAP-FALSE IMPRISONMENT - AND EXPLOIT CHILD UNDER 13 YOA - F: F
S787.025 2a - KIDNAP MINOR TO SEXUALLY ASSLT - RENUMBERED. SEE REC# 6157 - F: T
S787.025 2a - KIDNAP MINOR - RENUMBERED. SEE REC# 6157 - F: T
S787.025 2a - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - 18 YOA OR OLDER LURE ENTICE CHILD UNDER 12 YOA - M: F
S787.025 2b - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - 18 YOA OLDER LURE ENTICE UND 12 YOA SUBSQ OFF - F: T
S787.025 2c - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - 18 YOA OLDR PREV CONVIC LURE ENTICE UND 12 YOA - F: T
S787.03 - FAMILY OFFENSE - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8882 - F: T
S787.03 - FAMILY OFFENSE - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8883 - F: T
S787.03 1 - FAMILY OFFENSE - INTERFERE W CUSTODY OF MINOR/INCOMP PERSON - F: T
S787.03 2 - FAMILY OFFENSE - DEPRIVE CUSTODY OF MINOR INCOMPETENT PERSON - F: T
S787.04 - FAMILY OFFENSE - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8754 - F: T
S787.04 1 - FAMILY OFFENSE - VIOL COURT ORDER REM MINOR FROM STATE CONC LOC - F: T
S787.04 2 - FAMILY OFFENSE - REM MINOR FROM STATE CONC LOC PEND PROCED CUST - F: T
S787.04 3 - FAMILY OFFENSE - REM MINR FR ST CONC LOC PEND INV ALEG ABUS NEG - F: T
S787.04 4 - FAMILY OFFENSE - FAIL PROD DEL MINOR COURT DESIG PRSN PEND CUST - F: T
S787.05 1 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - REPEALED BY CH 2012-97 - F: S
S787.05 2 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - REPEALED BY CH 2012-97 - F: S
S787.05 3 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - REPEALED BY CH 2012-97 - F: S
S787.06 2 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - RENUMBERED. SEE REC# 6055 - F: S
S787.06 3a - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - PENALTY INCREASE SEE RECORD # 7273 - F: S
S787.06 3a - KIDNAP - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7754 - F: F
S787.06 3a1 - KIDNAP - ENGAGE IN HUMAN TRAFFIC SERVICES PERSON <18 - F: F
S787.06 3a2 - KIDNAP - COERCE LABOR OR SERVICES ADULT BY HUMAN TRAFF - F: F
S787.06 3b - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - REMOVE BY CH 2012-97 - F: S
S787.06 3b - KIDNAP - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7832 - F: F
S787.06 3b - KIDNAP - COERCE COMM SEX ACTIVITY ADULT FOR HUMAN TRAFF - F: F
S787.06 3c - KIDNAP - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7755 - F: F
S787.06 3c1 - KIDNAP - HUMAN TRAFFIC PERSON <18 UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN - F: F
S787.06 3c2 - KIDNAP - COERCE LABOR SERV ADULT HUM TRAFF UNAUTH ALIEN - F: F
S787.06 3d - KIDNAP - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7833 - F: F
S787.06 3d - KIDNAP - COERCE COM SEX ACT ADULT HUM TRAF UNAUTH ALIEN - F: F
S787.06 3e - KIDNAP - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7757 - F: F
S787.06 3e1 - KIDNAP - HUMAN TRAFFIC TRANSFER OUT OF STATE PERSON <18 - F: F
S787.06 3e2 - KIDNAP - HUM TRAF COERCE LABOR SERV TRANS STATE ADULT - F: F
S787.06 3f - KIDNAP - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7759 - F: F
S787.06 3f1 - KIDNAP - HUM TRAFF COM SEX ACT TRANS STATE LT 18 YOA - F: F
S787.06 3f2 - KIDNAP - COERCE COM SEX ACT TRANS STATE ADULT HUM TRAF - F: F
S787.06 3g - KIDNAP - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7834 - F: L
S787.06 3g - KIDNAP - HUM TRAF COM SEX LT 18 YOA MENT DEF MENT INCAP - F: L
S787.06 3h - KIDNAP - REMOVED - F: L
S787.06 4 - KIDNAP - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7761 - F: F
S787.06 4a - KIDNAP - SELL TRANS CUSTODY OF MINOR FOR HUMAN TRAFFIC - F: L
S787.06 4b - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - HUM TRAFF PERMANENT BRAND DIRECT TO BE BRANDED - F: S
S787.07 1 - SMUGGLING - PENALTY INCREASED SEE RECORD # 7282 - M: F
S787.07 1 - SMUGGLING - SMUGGLE ILLEGAL INDIVIDUAL INTO STATE - F: T



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

P. BARR, v. PURKEY, 140 S. Ct. 2594 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . ----, 137 S.Ct. 787, 197 L.Ed.2d 258 (2017) (opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari); Sireci . . .

B. CHIAFALO, v. WASHINGTON, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (U.S. 2020)

. . . S. 787, 829, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 192 L.Ed.2d 704 (2015) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting); cf. Scialabba v. . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Gee , 905 F.3d 787, 805, n. 53 (2018). . . . Gee , 905 F.3d 787, 812 (2018), and for this reason, the plurality does not linger on Doe 1. . . . Gee , 905 F.3d 787, 791 (CA5 2018). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, J. v., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (U.S. 2020)

. . . 134 S.Ct. 2427, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014) ( UARG ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Texas , 787 . . . United States , 787 F.3d 733, 770-776 (CA5 2015) (Higginson, J., dissenting); cf. Heckler v. . . .

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE PISTOL ASSOCIATION, INC. v. CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK,, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See id. , at 626-627, 128 S.Ct. 2783 ; see also McDonald , 561 U.S. at 787, 904, 130 S.Ct. 3020. . . .

SHULAR, v. UNITED STATES, 140 S. Ct. 779 (U.S. 2020)

. . . the rule of lenity only " 'after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction.' " Ante, at 787 . . .

ROBERTSON, v. BANNER BANK., 140 S. Ct. 1117 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 19-787 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

PATTERSON v. WALGREEN CO., 140 S. Ct. 685 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. , 575 U.S. 768, 787, n., 135 S.Ct. 2028, 192 L.Ed.2d 35 (2015) (opinion . . .

THOMPSON, v. HEBDON,, 140 S. Ct. 348 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Williams , 812 F.3d 787, 791 (C.A.10 2016) ; Alabama Democratic Conference v. . . .

EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT, v. BARR,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . United States , 787 F.3d 733, 769 (5th Cir. 2015) (refusing to narrow preliminary injunction of Deferred . . .

RAWA, A. W. Jr. v. MONSANTO COMPANY, v., 934 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Nat'l Football League , 787 F.3d 502, 508 (8th Cir. 2015). . . .

OSBORNE, v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY,, 935 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 758 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 2014) (health care provider proceeding against nongroup health insurance . . . Co. , 758 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 2014). . . .

BURKE, v. REGALADO, v., 935 F.3d 960 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc. , 787 F.3d 1297, 1313 n.12 (10th Cir. 2015) ("Our cases acknowledge that § . . .

UNITED STATES v. BEGAY,, 934 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 16 ); Gomez-Leon , 545 F.3d at 787 (holding that a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 "must require . . . force or a substantial risk that force will be intentionally used during its commission." 545 F.3d at 787 . . . Gomez-Leon , 545 F.3d at 787. . . . See, e.g. , Gomez-Leon , 545 F.3d at 787 (requiring intentional use of force for a crime of violence . . .

UNITED STATES v. STAHLMAN,, 934 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1341 (11th Cir. 2015). . . .

BENTLEY, v. AUTOZONERS, LLC, LLC,, 935 F.3d 76 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Mangia 57, Inc. , 787 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2015) ; and negligence if a co-worker who is not a supervisor . . .

UNITED STATES v. VALQUIER, 934 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hinojosa, 728 F.3d 787, 790 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). . . .

HAWKINS v. I- TV DIGITALIS TAVKOZLESI ZRT. f k a DMCC Rt. DIGI RCS RDS S. A. RCS S. A. DIGI N. V. v. i- TV f k a DMCC Rt. DIGI RCS RDS S. A. RCS S. A. DIGI N. V., 935 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 759 F.3d 787, 788 (7th Cir. 2014). . . .

UNITED STATES v. SCANZANI,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 210 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Tanguay , 787 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). . . .

UNITED STATES v. W. HARNEY,, 934 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Napier , 787 F.3d 333, 341 (6th Cir. 2015). "Suggested" and "could" are the key qualifiers. . . . Pirosko , 787 F.3d 358, 365 (6th Cir. 2015). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BLAIR,, 933 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bigelow , 787 F.3d 1269, 1280 (10th Cir. 2015) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HATAWAY,, 933 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Pulliam, 566 F.3d 784, 787-88 (8th Cir. 2009). . . .

OSBORNE, v. HALL,, 934 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . State , 955 So. 2d 787, 802-03 (Miss. 2007) (Diaz, J., concurring). . . .

ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, v. HOSPIRA, INC. v. Dr. s Dr. s, 933 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Watson Pharm., Inc. , 787 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015). . . .

IN RE PEABODY ENERGY CORPORATION Ad v. N. A. LP LP LP LLC FSB, 933 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.), 787 F.2d 1352, 1358 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1986). . . . See Acequia, 787 F.2d at 1362-63 ("[The shareholder's] position as director and officer of the Debtor . . .

TEXAS, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION EEOC P. U. S., 933 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 787 F.3d 733, 749 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). The Guidance does both. . . . Texas , 787 F.3d at 749. . . .

SANDKNOP v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS O, 932 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2015) ; Buser v. Raymond, 476 F.3d 565, 568 (8th Cir. 2007). . . .

JET MIDWEST INTERNATIONAL CO. LTD, v. JET MIDWEST GROUP, LLC, F. F. M., 932 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 759 F.3d 787, 788 (7th Cir. 2014) ; White Pearl Inversiones S.A. (Uruguay) v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. LAUREANO- SALGADO, a k a L. a k a, 933 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2015) ; Del-Valle, 566 F.3d at 38 ; Maldonado-Rivera, 489 F.3d . . . Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ); accord Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. RIVERA- CARRASQUILLO, a k a KX, a k a a k a a k a n V a k a, 933 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that a successful Brady claim "require[s] only . . . Quoting Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d at 15 - which quoted González-González, 258 F.3d at 20, which in turn . . . Peake, 874 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2017) ; Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d at 15 ; Maldonado- Rivera, 489 F.3d . . . Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ); accord Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d . . . See 787 F.3d at 8. They did not mention, let alone apply, the Wright test. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BOSYK,, 933 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lyles , 910 F.3d 787, 791 (4th Cir. 2018). A. . . . Lyles , 910 F.3d 787, 791 (4th Cir. 2018). . . .

D. LISLE, Jr. v. WELBORN,, 933 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Barnes , 787 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). . . . to present atypical and significant hardship such that it would create liberty interest); Kervin , 787 . . .

SIMMONS, v. SAFEWAY, INC. d b a a, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1305 (W.D. Wash. 2019)

. . . Of Marin, 787 F. Supp.2d 1047, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2011). . . .

UNITED STATES v. MATHIS, a k a a k a a k a D- v. a k a a k a v. a k a a k a a k a v. a k a a k a K. a k a a k a v. a k a a k a a k a v. a k a a k a a k a a k a, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 273 U.S. 583, 586, 47 S.Ct. 478, 71 L.Ed. 787 (1927) )). . . .

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . of civil liability for publishing stolen information. 532 U.S. 514, 525, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 . . .

CHRONIS, v. UNITED STATES, 932 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 761 F.3d 779, 787 (7th Cir. 2014). . . . arresting marshals, or punishment of them, or better training of marshals"); Smoke Shop , 761 F.3d at 787 . . . United States , 761 F.3d 779, 787 (7th Cir. 2014). . . .

GORSS MOTELS, INC. a a E G, a a v. SAFEMARK SYSTEMS, LP,, 931 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mediterranean Shipping Co. , 383 Ill.App.3d 149, 321 Ill.Dec. 516, 889 N.E.2d 781, 787-90 (2008) (holding . . .

DEXTER, a k a v. DEALOGIC, LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 233 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998)) (applying Massachusetts . . .

LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, a v. GOVINDARAJ, a, 931 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . North Carolina , 787 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 2015). . . .

EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT, v. BARR,, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . I.N.S. , 787 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1986) ). . . . See Damaize-Job , 787 F.2d at 1337 ("[The applicant's] failure to apply for asylum in any of the countries . . .

UNITED STATES v. LINDSAY,, 931 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Al-Maliki , 787 F.3d 784, 793-94 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding that it was likely that section 2423(c) . . .

J. UCCARDI, v. LAZER SPOT, INC., 390 F. Supp. 3d 911 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Bend, Ind. , 33 F.3d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. . . . Miller, 8 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2288 at 787 (1970) ). See also, Sambrano v. . . .

WEEKS, a. k. a. v. UNITED STATES, 930 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States, 887 F.3d 785, 787-88 (6th Cir. 2018) ; Walker v. . . .

ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. WATTLES COMPANY, a, 930 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Clements, 202 Ga. 820, 44 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1947) (observing that a "word or phrase is ambiguous only . . . Rather, the policy must be "fairly understood in more ways than one," Dorsey, 44 S.E.2d at 787 (emphasis . . .

SOUTHERN HENS, INCORPORATED, v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION R., 930 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Herman , 221 F.3d 782, 787 (5th Cir. 2000) (burns); E. Tex. Motor Freight , 671 F.2d at 849 (toes). . . .

UNITED STATES v. GUTIERREZ- RAMIREZ,, 930 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wilson , 619 F.3d 787, 791 (8th Cir. 2010). . . .

CHACOTY, v. POMPEO, U. S., 392 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Id. at 370, 82 S.Ct. 787. . . . Id. at 375, 82 S.Ct. 787. . . . Id. at 379, 82 S.Ct. 787. . . . Id. at 371, 82 S.Ct. 787. . . . Id. at 372, 82 S.Ct. 787. . . .

GRAVES, I. Y. M. Y. A. Y. v. A. LIOI L. Jr. I. Y. M. Y. A. Y. v. A. L. Jr., 930 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Town Court Nursing Ctr. , 447 U.S. 773, 787, 100 S.Ct. 2467, 65 L.Ed.2d 506 (1980) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN,, 929 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bigelow , 787 F.3d 1269, 1280 (10th Cir. 2015) (discerning a "far more reasonable interpretation" of . . .

VENCKIENE, v. UNITED STATES, 929 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ruiz , 161 U.S. 502, 511, 16 S.Ct. 689, 40 L.Ed. 787 (1896). Similarly, in Barapind v. . . .

SELLARS, v. CRST EXPEDITED, INC., 385 F. Supp. 3d 803 (N.D. Iowa 2019)

. . . Inc. , 578 F.3d 787, 802 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added)). . . .

PHILLIPS, v. V. SPENCER,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 136 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Lee , 229 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ). . . .

RIOS, v. JENKINS,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 714 (W.D. Va. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d 783, 787 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) ; see also Lopez-Lopez v. Cty. of Allegan, 321 F. . . .

INC. v. INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY, IGT, DOUBLEDOWN INTERACTIVE LLC,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Walker , 787 F.3d 433, 442 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Childress , 787 F.3d at 442. 3. . . .

BAATZ, v. COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC,, 929 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC , 814 F.3d 785, 787-88 (6th Cir. 2016). . . .

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. J. TRUMP, D. M., 930 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Clements , 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986). . . .

REINALT- THOMAS CORPORATION, d b a v. MAVIS TIRE SUPPLY, LLC,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1261 (N.D. Ga. 2019)

. . . App'x 784, 787 (11th Cir. 2015). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HASSAN- SALEH- MOHAMAD,, 930 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Crespo-Ríos, 787 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS,, 930 F.3d 44 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . McGinn , 787 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. . . .

BLAKE, E. S. T. v. ST. JOHNS RIVER POWER PARK SYSTEM EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT PLAN,, 275 So. 3d 804 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . International, Ltd. , 787 So. 2d 838, 843 (Fla. 2001). . . . G.B.V. , 787 So. 2d at 845. . . . point is a search of the record for competent substantial evidence supporting the decision."); G.B.V. , 787 . . .

ST. PAUL PARK REFINING CO. LLC, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD St. Co. LLC, v., 929 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . employee was allegedly fired, and disparate treatment of the discharged employees.' " RELCO, 734 F.3d at 787 . . .

UNITED STATES v. B. LEDBETTER A. A. L., 929 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bavers , 787 F.2d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 1985) ). . . . See id. at 787. . . .

UNITED STATES v. J. SAGUTO,, 929 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Keatings , 787 F.3d 1197, 1202 (8th Cir. 2015). . . .

MELGAR, v. T. B. BUTLER PUBLISHING COMPANY, INCORPORATED T. B. B. IV,, 931 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Auchan Hypermarket , 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that the ADA incorporates by reference . . .

COLBRUNO, v. KESSLER, a, 928 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Albuquerque , 787 F.3d 1076, 1079 n.1 (10th Cir. 2015). . . . City of Albuquerque , 787 F.3d at 1079 n.1 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.) . . .

STERNGOLD DENTAL, LLC, v. HDI GLOBAL INSURANCE COMPANY,, 929 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. of Mass., 439 Mass. 318, 787 N.E.2d 550, 553 (2003) (observing that "unambiguous language of an insurance . . .

UNITED STATES v. BELFREY, 928 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bryant, 913 F.3d 783, 787 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. . . .

CLAIBORNE, v. BLAUSER, S., 928 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hartman, , 787 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .

CLAIBORNE, v. BLAUSER, S., 934 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hartman , 904 F.3d 780, 787 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .

ESTATE OF MENDEZ, Sr. Jr. v. CITY OF CERES,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1189 (E.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . See, e.g., Rodriguez , 891 F.3d at 787 (suit brought under § 1983 and Bane Act against twenty-eight individuals . . .

IN RE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, v., 385 F. Supp. 3d 138 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . . § 787 (2008). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, v. NEW YORK,, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (U.S. 2019)

. . . See id. , at 787, 794-795. . . .

IN RE A. YERIAN, A. v. B. II,, 927 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Comm'r , 787 F.3d 1213, 1217 (8th Cir. 2015). This provision turns out to be relevant here. . . .

PENATE, v. KACZMAREK,, 928 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Maine, 787 F.2d 776, 778 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (same). . . .

S. MCGREAL, v. VILLAGE OF ORLAND PARK, P., 928 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wahl , 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1986). The test is objective. . . .

UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON, S S, 928 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Amended Order , see supra 787-88. . . .

L. KISOR, v. WILKIE,, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Rev. 787, 832 (2014) ; see Hickman & Thomson, supra , at 111 (noting a "glut of recent cases in which . . .

IN RE A. PINA,, 602 B.R. 72 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . Wahl , 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1986). . . .

KANE COUNTY, UTAH, v. UNITED STATES, 928 F.3d 877 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 787 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 2015). . . . See Stenehjem , 787 F.3d at 921. . . .

GAME AND TECHNOLOGY CO. LTD. v. ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC., 926 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Watson Pharm., Inc ., 787 F.3d 1359, 1362-64 (Fed. . . .

UNITED STATES v. FIRTASH, DF,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 872 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A. , 338 F.3d 773, 787 (7th Cir. 2003) ). . . .

FLOWERS, v. MISSISSIPPI, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Id., at 787-788. His daughter had just graduated with Bertha's grandson, and they were friends. . . .

R. WHATLEY, v. WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC AND CLASSIFICATION CENTER,, 927 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. at 787 (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067 ). . . . Ct. at 787-88 (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ). B. . . .

ACBEL POLYTECH, INC. EMC v. FAIRCHILD SEMICONDUCTOR INTERNATIONAL, INC., 928 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Corp., 438 Mass. 459, 781 N.E.2d 787, 795 (2003). . . . Corp., 438 Mass. 459, 781 N.E.2d 787, 795 (2003) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 540, 541 ). . . .

AMERICAN LEGION, v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION, v., 139 S. Ct. 2067 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Chambers , 463 U.S. 783, 787-792, 795, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983) ; Van Orden v. . . . See, e.g ., Marsh , 463 U.S. at 787-792, 795, 103 S.Ct. 3330 ; Van Orden , 545 U.S. at 686-690, 125 S.Ct . . . Id ., at 787-788, 103 S.Ct. 3330. . . .

UNITED STATES v. PERRIN,, 926 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Encarnación-Ruiz, 787 F.3d 581, 586-87 (1st Cir. 2015) (collecting cases from the First, Sixth, Seventh . . .

GARVIN, v. SOUTHWESTERN CORRECTIONAL, L. L. C., 391 F. Supp. 3d 640 (N.D. Tex. 2019)

. . . Supp. 2d 787, 806-07 (E.D. Tex. 2013). . . .

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, v. STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK, LIMITED, v. L. Jr. v. s S. s v. S. In L. L. C. v. s v. v. S. s v. S. v. v. s F. Jr. v. S., 927 F.3d 830 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co., 567 F.3d 787, 794 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Because the receivership entities all would have lacked standing . . .

R. MCCORMICK, v. SALFITY,, 274 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Int'l, Ltd. , 787 So.2d 838, 843 (Fla. 2001) ). . . .

NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORP. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD, v. v. v., 927 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States Bancorp Inves., Inc. , 787 F.3d 797, 806 (6th Cir. 2015) (adopting Sylvester applying Skidmore . . .

DEROGATIS, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF WELFARE FUND OF INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL AFL- CIO T. A., 385 F. Supp. 3d 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . on the difference: if Frank died while employed, Emily was entitled to a Preretirement Annuity of $ 787 . . . In strict accordance with the terms of the Pension Plan, Emily began receiving the lower, $ 787/month . . .

DAVINCI AIRCRAFT, INC. v. UNITED STATES S., 926 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 787 F.2d 1349, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that negligence claim was actually one . . .

D. WILLIAMS, v. UNITED STATES, 927 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 887 F.3d 785, 787 (6th Cir. 2018). "In one sense, he has it. . . . Potter , 887 F.3d at 787. . . . Nevertheless, we note that this factor also distinguishes Williams's case from Potter , 887 F.3d at 787 . . . relied only on" may appear to differ from the First and Eleventh Circuits' formulations, see 887 F.3d at 787 . . . See Potter , 887 F.3d at 787. . . .

IN RE MIRENA IUS LEVONORGESTREL- RELATED PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION NO. II, 387 F. Supp. 3d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Litig. , 858 F.3d 787, 796-800 (3d Cir. 2017) ]. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BISHOP,, 926 F.3d 621 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Buchanan , 787 F.2d 477, 483-84 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that an expert witness may testify that "a . . .

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE, v. BP P. L. C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538 (D. Md. 2019)

. . . an injury on shore" to fall within admiralty jurisdiction), cert. denied , 423 U.S. 1055, 96 S.Ct. 787 . . .

UNITED STATES v. WILLIS,, 382 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (D.N.M. 2019)

. . . United States , 378 F.Supp.3d 784, 787, 2019 WL 2067223, at *2 (W.D. Mo. May 9, 2019). . . .

CANCINO CASTELLAR v. MCALEENAN, U. S., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1218 (S.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . Bell , 430 U.S. 787, 792, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977). . . .

TRITSCHLER, v. TRITSCHLER,, 273 So. 3d 1161 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Struble, 787 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Hicks v. . . .