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Florida Statute 790.25 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 790.25 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 790
WEAPONS AND FIREARMS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 790.25
790.25 Lawful ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons.
(1) DECLARATION OF POLICY.The Legislature finds as a matter of public policy and fact that it is necessary to promote firearms safety and to curb and prevent the use of firearms and other weapons in crime and by incompetent persons without prohibiting the lawful use in defense of life, home, and property, and the use by United States or state military organizations, and as otherwise now authorized by law, including the right to use and own firearms for target practice and marksmanship on target practice ranges or other lawful places, and lawful hunting and other lawful purposes.
(2) LAWFUL USES.Notwithstanding ss. 790.01, 790.053, and 790.06, the following persons may own, possess, and lawfully use firearms and other weapons, ammunition, and supplies for lawful purposes if they are not otherwise prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm under state or federal law:
(a) Members of the Militia, National Guard, Florida State Guard, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Space Force, Coast Guard, organized reserves, and other armed forces of the state and of the United States, when on duty, when training or preparing themselves for military duty, or while subject to recall or mobilization;
(b) Citizens of this state subject to duty in the Armed Forces under s. 2, Art. X of the State Constitution, under chapters 250 and 251, and under federal laws, when on duty or when training or preparing themselves for military duty;
(c) Persons carrying out or training for emergency management duties under chapter 252;
(d) Sheriffs, marshals, prison or jail wardens, police officers, Florida highway patrol officers, game wardens, revenue officers, forest officials, special officers appointed under the provisions of chapter 354, and other peace and law enforcement officers and their deputies and assistants and full-time paid peace officers of other states and of the Federal Government who are carrying out official duties while in this state;
(e) Officers or employees of the state or United States duly authorized to carry a concealed weapon or a concealed firearm;
(f) Guards or messengers of common carriers, express companies, armored car carriers, mail carriers, banks, and other financial institutions, while actually employed in and about the shipment, transportation, or delivery of any money, treasure, bullion, bonds, or other thing of value within this state;
(g) Regularly enrolled members of any organization duly authorized to purchase or receive weapons or firearms from the United States or from this state, or regularly enrolled members of clubs organized for target, skeet, or trap shooting, while at or going to or from shooting practice; or regularly enrolled members of clubs organized for modern or antique firearms collecting, while such members are at or going to or from their collectors’ gun shows, conventions, or exhibits;
(h) A person engaged in fishing, camping, or lawful hunting or going to or returning from a fishing, camping, or lawful hunting expedition;
(i) A person engaged in the business of manufacturing, repairing, or dealing in firearms, or the agent or representative of any such person while engaged in the lawful course of such business;
(j) A person discharging a weapon or firearm for testing or target practice under safe conditions and in a safe place not prohibited by law or going to or from such place;
(k) A person discharging a weapon or firearm in a safe and secure indoor range for testing and target practice;
(l) A person traveling in a public conveyance when the weapon or firearm is securely encased and not in the person’s manual possession;
(m) A person while carrying a handgun unloaded and in a secure wrapper, concealed or otherwise, from the place of purchase to his or her home or place of business or to a place of repair or back to his or her home or place of business;
(n) A person possessing weapons or firearms at his or her home or place of business;
(o) Investigators employed by the several public defenders of the state, while actually carrying out official duties, provided such investigators:
1. Are employed full time;
2. Meet the official training standards for firearms established by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as provided in s. 943.12(5) and the requirements of ss. 493.6108(1)(a) and 943.13(1)-(4); and
3. Are individually designated by an affidavit of consent signed by the employing public defender and filed with the clerk of the circuit court in the county in which the employing public defender resides.
(p) Investigators employed by the capital collateral regional counsel, while actually carrying out official duties, provided such investigators:
1. Are employed full time;
2. Meet the official training standards for firearms as established by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as provided in s. 943.12(1) and the requirements of ss. 493.6108(1)(a) and 943.13(1)-(4); and
3. Are individually designated by an affidavit of consent signed by the capital collateral regional counsel and filed with the clerk of the circuit court in the county in which the investigator is headquartered.
(q)1. A tactical medical professional who is actively operating in direct support of a tactical operation by a law enforcement agency provided that:
a. The tactical medical professional is lawfully able to possess firearms and has an active concealed weapon or concealed firearm license issued pursuant to s. 790.06.
b. The tactical medical professional is appointed to a law enforcement tactical team of a law enforcement agency by the head of the law enforcement agency.
c. The law enforcement agency has an established policy providing for the appointment, training, and deployment of the tactical medical professional.
d. The tactical medical professional successfully completes a firearms safety training and tactical training as established or designated by the appointing law enforcement agency.
e. The law enforcement agency provides and the tactical medical professional participates in annual firearm training and tactical training.
2. While actively operating in direct support of a tactical operation by a law enforcement agency, a tactical medical professional:
a. May carry a firearm in the same manner as a law enforcement officer, as defined in s. 943.10 and, notwithstanding any other law, at any place a tactical law enforcement operation occurs.
b. Has no duty to retreat and is justified in the use of any force which he or she reasonably believes is necessary to defend himself or herself or another from bodily harm.
c. Has the same immunities and privileges as a law enforcement officer, as defined in s. 943.10, in a civil or criminal action arising out of a tactical law enforcement operation when acting within the scope of his or her official duties.
3. This paragraph may not be construed to authorize a tactical medical professional to carry, transport, or store any firearm or ammunition on any fire apparatus or EMS vehicle.
4. The appointing law enforcement agency shall issue any firearm or ammunition that the tactical medical professional carries in accordance with this paragraph.
5. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term “tactical medical professional” means a paramedic, as defined in s. 401.23, a physician, as defined in s. 458.305, or an osteopathic physician, as defined in s. 459.003, who is appointed to provide direct support to a tactical law enforcement unit by providing medical services at high-risk incidents, including, but not limited to, hostage incidents, narcotics raids, hazardous surveillance, sniper incidents, armed suicidal persons, barricaded suspects, high-risk felony warrant service, fugitives refusing to surrender, and active shooter incidents.
(3) CONSTRUCTION.This act shall be liberally construed to carry out the declaration of policy herein and in favor of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes. This act is supplemental and additional to existing rights to bear arms now guaranteed by law and decisions of the courts of Florida, and nothing herein shall impair or diminish any of such rights. This act shall supersede any law, ordinance, or regulation in conflict herewith.
(4) POSSESSION IN PRIVATE CONVEYANCE.
(a) Notwithstanding s. 790.01, a person 18 years of age or older who is in lawful possession of a handgun or other weapon may possess such a handgun or weapon within the interior of a private conveyance if the handgun or weapon is securely encased or otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use. A person who possesses a handgun or other weapon as authorized under this paragraph may not carry the handgun or weapon on his or her person.
(b) This subsection does not prohibit a person from carrying a:
1. Legal firearm other than a handgun anywhere in a private conveyance when such firearm is being carried for a lawful use; or
2. Concealed weapon or concealed firearm on his or her person while in a private conveyance if he or she is authorized to carry a concealed weapon or concealed firearm under s. 790.01(1).
(c) This subsection shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms and other weapons, including lawful self-defense as provided in s. 776.012.
History.s. 1, ch. 65-410; s. 32, ch. 69-216; s. 32, ch. 73-334; s. 2, ch. 77-302; s. 2, ch. 82-131; s. 15, ch. 83-167; ss. 45, 49, ch. 83-334; s. 32, ch. 84-258; s. 68, ch. 85-62; s. 5, ch. 85-332; s. 15, ch. 87-274; s. 2, ch. 87-537; s. 1, ch. 89-60; s. 8, ch. 90-364; s. 1, ch. 93-269; s. 7, ch. 93-416; s. 89, ch. 95-211; s. 1218, ch. 97-102; s. 110, ch. 2006-1; s. 2, ch. 2006-103; s. 1, ch. 2019-77; s. 20, ch. 2022-183; s. 14, ch. 2023-18; s. 5, ch. 2023-167.

F.S. 790.25 on Google Scholar

F.S. 790.25 on Casetext

Amendments to 790.25


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 790.25
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 790.25.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

PETERSON, v. STATE, 264 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . probable cause to search her or arrest her based on her admission that she had a weapon because section 790.25 . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 253 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2018)

. . . See See § 790.25(5), Fla. . . .

FLORIDA CARRY, INC. v. E. THRASHER, L., 248 So. 3d 253 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Id. at 977 ; see also §§ 790.06(12)(b), 790.115(2)(a) 3., & 790.25(5), Fla. Stat (2015). . . . prohibition of possession of firearms in vehicles as otherwise allowed by sections 790.115(2)(a) and 790.25 . . .

NORMAN, v. STATE, 215 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 2017)

. . . .” § 790.25(3) (h), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added); see also § 790.25(3), Fla. . . . Id. § 790.25(4). . . . As section 790.25(4) states, the provisions of chapter 790 “shall be liberally construed to carry out . . . We also do not discuss Norman's claim that the exemptions under section 790.25(3) are elements of the . . . The Legislature was aware of the Declaration of Policy contained in section 790.25 when section 790.053 . . .

BRUNSON, v. STATE, 211 So. 3d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .”§ 790.25(5), Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). . . . without a license, if the firearm or other weapon is ... not readily accessible for immediate use.” § 790.25 . . .

UNITED STATES v. SPANN,, 649 F. App'x 714 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 790.25(3). . . .

UNITED STATES v. PRESLEY,, 645 F. App'x 934 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 790.25(3)(Z). . . . Stat. § 790.25(3)(Z) does not apply to him because he was not actually “traveling” in his car at the . . . Stat. § 790.25(3)(n). . . .

J. McCARRON, DOC v. STATE, 185 So. 3d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 790.25(3)(n); Peoples v. State, 287 So.2d 63, 66-67 (Fla.1973); Santiago v. . . . See § 790.25(3)(n) (“[I]t is lawful for the following persons to own, possess, and lawfully use. . . .

FLORIDA CARRY, INC. v. UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA,, 180 So. 3d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . arms, that UF had passed rules or regulations expressly prohibited by section 790.33, that section 790.25 . . . This first issue involves the alleged conflict between section 790.25(3)(n) and section 790,115(2)(a) . . . In attempting to reconcile section 790.25(3)(n) with section 790.115(2)(a), we are guided by the fact . . . In enacting section 790.115 twenty-seven years after the enactment of section 790.25, the Legislature . . . in section 790.25(4), the exception as to vehicles in section 790.115 would have been unnecessary. . . . applicable law, the University will comply with Florida law governing firearms in vehicles under Section 790.25 . . . The addition of the word “application,” the citation to section 790.25(5), and the inclusion of the case . . . clear that “firearms are permitted” in motor vehicles on University property consistent with section 790.25 . . . In a vehicle pursuant to s. 790.25(5); except that school districts may adopt written and published policies . . . point, one of Regulation 2.001’s exceptions, set oüt in' subsection 3(a), appears to violate sections 790.25 . . . .”); § 790.25, Fla. Stat. . . .

NORMAN, v. STATE, 159 So. 3d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . In enacting section 790.25(1), Florida Statutes, the Legislature enunciated a “Declaration of Policy” . . . Section 790.25(4) addresses the construction to be given chapter 790, and provides in part as follows . . . See § 790.25(3). . . . Therefore, we hold that section 790.25 passes the intermediate scrutiny test and survives Defendant’s . . . See § 790.25(3). . . .

CURRY- PENNAMON, v. STATE, 159 So. 3d 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . , the defense argued for a judgment of acquittal on count 2 based on an argument that under section 790.25 . . . However, section 790.25(3)(n) provides an exception for persons “possessing arms at his or her home or . . . The Florida Supreme Court has held that the “place of business” exception under section 790.25(3)(n) . . . Finally, notwithstanding the unambiguous language of the statutory exception found in section 790.25( . . . 3)(n), under section 790.25(4) courts are directed to liberally construe the provisions of section 790.25 . . .

FLORIDA CARRY, INC. v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA,, 133 So. 3d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . .; see § 790.25(3)(i), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 790.25(4), Fla. Stat. . . . In doing so, however, the legislature explicitly recognized as a lawful right — one under section 790.25 . . . Chapter 65-410 created section 790.25, whose subsection three created fourteen categories of "Exceptions . . . This act shall supersede any law, ordinance, or regulation in conflict herewith. § 790.25(4), Fla. . . . school property — except as specifically allowed in chapter 790 (e.g., in a vehicle pursuant to section 790.25 . . . See § 790.25(5), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 131 So. 3d 720 (Fla. 2013)

. . . Attempt 777.04(1) 5A Comments See § 790.25(5), Fla. . . .

G. PAMPHILE, v. STATE, 110 So. 3d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Moreover, section 790.25(8), Florida Statutes (2008), provides for lawful uses of a firearm which are . . . Specifically, section 790.25(3)(m) provides for the following lawful purpose: “[a] person while carrying . . .

STATE v. LITTLE,, 104 So. 3d 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . trial court found that Little’s union hall fell within the “place of business” exception under section 790.25 . . . Section 790.25(3)(n), however, permits the lawful possession of a firearm in one’s place of business. . . . The principal case interpreting the 790.25(3)(n) exception is Peoples v. . . . (1), the Exceptions to said Section in 790.25(3)(n), and the Construction in Section 790.25(4).” . . . In section 790.25(4), the Legislature directs that we liberally construe the provisions of section 790.25 . . .

SANTIAGO, v. STATE, 77 So. 3d 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . However, section 790.25 permits the lawful possession of a firearm in one’s residence. . . . Specifically, the statute states: 790.25 Lawful ownership,, possession, and use of firearms and other . . . Legislature could not have intended a result so inconsistent with its Declaration of Policy in Section 790.25 . . . (1), the Exceptions to said Section in Section 790.25(3)(n), and the Construction in Section 790.25(4 . . .

BELCHER, v. STATE, 45 So. 3d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . In a vehicle pursuant to s. 790.25(5); except that school districts may adopt written and published policies . . . Subsection 3. provides an exception where the firearm is carried in a vehicle pursuant to section 790.25 . . . Section 790.25 concerns the “lawful ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons.” . . . possession of firearms and other weapons, including lawful self-defense as provided in s. 776.012. § 790.25 . . .

UNITED STATES v. YANCEY,, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 790.25(2)(b)(1); Ga.Code Ann. § 16—11—129(2)(f), (i), (j); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 134-7(c)(1); Idaho Code . . .

STATE v. BROWN,, 36 So. 3d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Stat. (2007); § 790.25(3), Florida Statutes (2007); § 790.053(3), Fla. . . .

L. POULAKIS, v. ROGERS,, 341 F. App'x 523 (11th Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 790.25(5). . . . Stat. § 790.25(5). . . . Section 790.25(5), however, provides this limitation to the general prohibition: [I]t is lawful and is . . . Stat. § 790.25(5). And, Fla. . . . Stat. § 790.25(5). . . . . . § 790.25(5). . . . Stat. § 790.25(5),” is irrelevant. . . . Stat. § 790.25(5) could not “clearly establish” the law pursuant to Courson because it would not involve . . . The majority speaks of a pattern of confusion over the meaning and application of § 790.25(5) arising . . . Stat. § 790.25(5). . . .

BROOK, v. STATE, 999 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . The defendant argued unsuccessfully below that subsection 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes, permits a person . . . concealed firearm on or about his or her person commits a felony of the third degree.... ” Section 790.25 . . . (2)(a), that “Subsection (3)(n) of Section 790.25 specifically exempts ‘a person possessing arms at his . . . (1), the Exceptions to said Section in Section 790.25(3)(n), and the Construction in Section 790.25(4 . . . The trial court ruled that the exemption found in subsection 790.25(3)(n) decriminalized such conduct . . .

STRIKERTAYLOR, v. STATE, 997 So. 2d 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 790.25(5) provides that it is not a violation of section 790.01(2) to possess a concealed firearm . . .

STATE v. WEYANT,, 990 So. 2d 675 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . As the majority recognizes, section 790.25(5) does not directly address the situation in which an unloaded . . . and used as easily and quickly as if carried on the person.’ ” Ashley, 619 So.2d at 296 (quoting § 790.25 . . . While this court is required to liberally construe section 790.25(5) in favor of the lawful use, ownership . . . Section 790.25(5) specifically provides an exception for “securely encased” concealed firearms. . . . I would hope that the legislature would take this opportunity to amend section 790.25(5) to address the . . . Section 790.25(5) addresses possession of a concealed firearm in a private conveyance, stating that it . . . concluded as a matter of law, based on these facts and the liberal construction mandated in section 790.25 . . . Several cases have applied section 790.25(5) to conclude that it is not a violation of section 790.01 . . . of whether the presence of ammunition in a vehicle takes a firearm out of the exception in section 790.25 . . . under the applicable law, including the liberal construction that must be applied pursuant to section 790.25 . . .

TROCK, v. STATE, 990 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . One of those exceptions is contained in section 790.25(5), which provides: [I]t is lawful and is not . . . possession of firearms and other weapons, including lawful self-defense as provided in s. 776.012. § 790.25 . . . Accordingly, the exception contained in section 790.25(5) applies, and Track’s possession of the firearm . . . and could not be removed without opening the flap, it was "encased” within the exception of section 790.25 . . . While the State did cite to section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (2006), in its brief, its assertion that . . .

FLORIDA RETAIL FEDERATION, INC. v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA,, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008)

. . . See § 790.25(3). . . . See § 790.25(3)(i); Dixon v. State, 831 So.2d 775, 775-776(Fla. 4th DCA 2002). . . . See § 790.25 l(4)(a). . . . See § 790.25 l(4)(a). . . . See § 790.25l(4)(c). .See § 790.25 l(4)(e). . . .

J. DOUGHTY, v. STATE, 979 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . In this case, we consider whether the private conveyance exception of section 790.25, Florida Statutes . . . The legislature detailed the private conveyance exception in section 790.25(5), which permits the carrying . . . Section 790.25(5) further provides, “[n]othing herein contained, shall he construed to authorize the . . . Yet, pursuant to the unambiguous language of section 790.25(5), even a securely encased weapon does not . . . his waist in a securely encased zippered pack, inside an automobile. , We recognized that “section 790.25 . . .

McKINZIE, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 265 F. App'x 858 (11th Cir. 2008)

. . . . § 790.25(3)(n) (2006). . . .

DIXON, v. STATE, 831 So. 2d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . console of the vehicle he was driving and was therefore lawfully possessed within the meaning of section 790.25 . . . However, section 790.25(5) provides an exception where it states, in pertinent part, Notwithstanding . . . However, both cases were decided before section 790.25 was amended to include the private conveyance . . .

STATE v. RAGLAND,, 789 So. 2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . In a vehicle pursuant to s. 790.25(5); except that school districts may adopt turitten and published . . . basis of Ragland’s motion to dismiss was the exception provided in subpart three, which cites section 790.25 . . . Section 790.25 concerns the “lawful ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons.” . . . The motion argued that Ragland’s possession of the firearm was legal under section 790.25. . . . 709.115(2)(a)3., which allows the possession of firearms and weapons “[i]n a vehicle pursuant to s. 790.25 . . .

STATE v. ANDERSON,, 764 So. 2d 848 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . dismissal because he was permitted to possess the firearm at his place of business pursuant to section 790.25 . . . He further argued that section 790.25(2)(b)(l), providing that the protections of the section did not . . . Section 790.25 protects the rights of citizens in Florida to lawfully own and possess firearms. . . . In keeping with this declaration, section 790.25(2) specifies uses not authorized, which include, in . . . Anderson argues that, given the legislative intent in section 790.25(4) that the section be construed . . .

DORELUS, v. STATE, 747 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1999)

. . . .” § 790.25(5), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . .

STATE v. ANTON, ANTON, v. STATE, 700 So. 2d 743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . See § 790.25(3)(n), Fla. . . .

STATE v. L. WILLIAMS,, 679 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1993), provides that an adult may possess a concealed firearm inside . . .

GEMMILL, v. STATE, 657 So. 2d 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . However, section 790.25(5) provides an exception to section 790.01(2) and states, in pertinent part: . . . However, section 790.25 specifically provides that the securely encased exception does not legalize the . . . shall be construed to authorize the carrying of a concealed firearm or other weapon on the person. § 790.25 . . . Such an interpretation would be illogical and render section 790.25(5) meaningless. . . .

STATE v. BERNARD,, 650 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . He cites section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1993), and cases defining when one may possess, without . . .

BOSWINK, v. STATE, 636 So. 2d 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . Boswink claimed that his possession of the firearms in his truck was lawful because, under section 790.25 . . .

BELL, v. STATE, 636 So. 2d 80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . . § 790.25(5), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

RIDLEY, v. STATE, 621 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1993)

. . . .” § 790.25(5), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

ASHLEY, v. STATE, 619 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1993)

. . . statutory provisions concerning the issue in this case are sections 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989), 790.25 . . . possession of firearms and other weapons, including lawful self-defense as provided in s. 776.012.' § 790.25 . . . State, 477 So.2d 557, 559 (Fla.1985), we construed the language of section 790.25(5) that reads “or is . . . As previously indicated, the legislature has directed that the exception contained within section 790.25 . . . Under those factual circumstances, even giving section 790.25(5) a liberal interpretation in favor of . . .

DIMA, v. STATE, 621 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . that the defendant’s prosecution for carrying a concealed firearm was precluded pursuant to section 790.25 . . . Section 790.25(5) further provides: “Nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize the carrying . . .

SMITH, v. STATE, 617 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . Judge Dell that the Ashley majority “has ignored the legislature’s directive that ‘[tjhis subsection [790.25 . . . shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms_’ § 790.25 . . . Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1991), provides in pertinent part: [I]t is lawful and is not a violation . . . the Legislature meant by the phrase “otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use ” in section 790.25 . . . concealed firearm within the interior of a private conveyance under the circumstances outlined in section 790.25 . . . was not waived in this case, I think the facts of this case illustrate why the Amaya, view of section 790.25 . . . It also appears to me that the Amaya interpretation of section 790.25(5) reads too much into “readily . . . When section 790.25(5) was added to chapter 790, two new definitions were also adopted to explain the . . .

STATE v. ASHLEY,, 601 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . With all due respect, I think that the majority in interpreting section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes ( . . . doing, I believe that the majority has ignored the legislature’s directive that “[t]his subsection [790.25 . . . shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms_” § 790.25 . . . Ashley filed a sworn motion to dismiss, arguing that he fell within section 790.25(5), which states that . . . Amaya, like the defendant here, contended that he fell within the section 790.25(5) exception because . . . Section 790.25(5), we conclude, contemplates an operable firearm. . . . While section 790.25(5) clearly states that “[t]his subsection shall be liberally construed in favor . . . The Amaya court also failed to offer any case law support for its interpretation of section 790.25(5) . . .

GODWIN, v. STATE, 593 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1992)

. . . Compare § 790.053, Fla.Stat. (1989) with § 790.25(2)(b)l., Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

STATE v. A. COMMONS,, 592 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . State, 453 So.2d 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), in which we held that section 790.25(3)(n) must be read in pari . . . Bryant, 373 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (§ 790.25(3)(Z) no defense to carrying a concealed weapon . . . The same holding obviously applies to the other exception in § 790.25(3)(n), which applies to the defendant . . . of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. . 790.25 . . .

URQUIOLA, v. STATE, 590 So. 2d 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . without opening the lid, in effect, concedes that the firearm was encased within the exception of Section 790.25 . . . container lid must be secured by a zipper, or attached in some way or there will be a violation of Section 790.25 . . . We therefore hold that it was “securely encased” within the meaning of Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes . . . Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1989). (5) POSSESSION IN PRIVATE CONVEYANCE. . . .

STATE v. PAULK,, 588 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . It appears to us that the exemption from 790.053 and 790.06 created by 790.25(3)(n) is specifically limited . . .

STATE OF FLORIDA v. ASHLEY, 49 Fla. Supp. 2d 137 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991)

. . . automobile is not violative of Florida Statute section 790.01, as that section, defined by section 790.25 . . .

AMAYA, v. STATE, 580 So. 2d 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Section 790.25(5), we conclude, contemplates an operable firearm. . . .

STATE OF FLORIDA v. WILLIAMS, 45 Fla. Supp. 2d 190 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991)

. . . Stat. 790.25(5) requires that the statute be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, defendant . . .

TAYLOR, v. STATE, 558 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . . § 790.25, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . .

ARNESMAN, v. STATE, 540 So. 2d 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . consider Alexander inapposite as it dealt with the meaning and interpretation to be given to section 790.25 . . . unsuccessfully to extend the Alexander interpretation of the legislative intent behind the section 790.25 . . . clearly appears when we consider carefully what the legislature did and did not do by enacting section 790.25 . . . The exception in section 790.25(5) seems to be directed at the possession of a securely encased and not . . . Section 790.25(5) contains a specific proviso that the exception does not “authorize the carrying of . . .

SUNDAY, v. STATE, 537 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . he possessed the weapon at his home and such possession is made lawful by the exception in section 790.25 . . . Section 790.25(3)(n) applies only to offenses involving the application of section 790.053 (prohibiting . . . Because section 790.25(3) indicates no legislative intent that its exceptions apply to the offense under . . . 4th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 486 So.2d 595 (Fla.1986), involved the application of the exception under 790.25 . . .

STATE v. GOMEZ,, 508 So. 2d 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1985) provides an exception stating: [I]t is lawful and is not a . . .

SHERROD, v. STATE, 484 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . The appellant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon in violation of section 790.25, Florida Statutes . . . The appellant argued that his conduct was within section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (Supp.1984), . . . State, 287 So.2d 63 (Fla.1973), the supreme court found the “at his home” exception in section 790.25 . . . court avoided a vagueness challenge to the “at his home” exception in subsection (3)(n) of section 790.25 . . . Thus, we hold that the legislature’s failure to define the phrase “at his home” in section 790.25(3)( . . .

CITY OF MIAMI, v. E. SWIFT,, 481 So. 2d 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . vehicle in such a manner comes within the exception to carrying a concealed weapon found in Section 790.25 . . . Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982). (5) POSSESSION IN PRIVATE CONVEYANCE.— Notwithstanding . . .

ALEXANDER, v. STATE, 477 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1985)

. . . We hold that section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981), as modified by sections 790.25(5) and 790.001 . . . charge, citing an exception to the prohibition against carrying a concealed weapon found in section 790.25 . . . on target practice ranges or other lawful places, and lawful hunting and other lawful purposes.” § 790.25 . . . An exception to that proscription is provided in section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982), which . . . carrying a concealed weapon that is not securely encased or is readily accessible for immediate use. § 790.25 . . .

COLLINS, v. STATE, 475 So. 2d 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . Under section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (1983), it is not unlawful for a person to possess firearms . . . possession of the firearm while in his own yard qualifies for the statutory exception delineated in section 790.25 . . .

YOKES, v. STATE, 458 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . Appellant contends that his possession was lawful pursuant to the provisions of Section 790.25(5), Florida . . . approved of a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss predicated upon the provisions of Section 790.25 . . .

COCKIN, Jr. v. STATE, 453 So. 2d 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . Black nor Cockin was a person “possessing arms at his home ...” so as to insulate them under Section 790.25 . . . State, 290 So.2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (Section 790.25(3)(n), which makes it lawful for a person to possess . . . Bryant, 373 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (Section 790.25(3)(l) not defense to carrying a concealed . . . The State says, however, that Section 790.25(3)(n) does not apply to a person who carries a concealed . . . While Section 790.-25(2)(b)l expressly provides that the protections of Section 790.25 do not apply, . . .

ALEXANDER, v. STATE, 450 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . Whether section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981) as refined in sections 790.25(5), Florida Statutes . . . property, as does the policy declaration in the statute with which we are here most concerned, section 790.25 . . . Section 790.25(1). . . . Prior to amendment in 1982, section 790.25(3)(Z) made an exception merely for “[a]ny person traveling . . . Ensor apparently prompted the legislature to add section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), which . . .

STATE v. MILLER,, 413 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . There are certain exceptions which are set out in section 790.25(3): (3) EXCEPTIONS. — The provisions . . .

A. MOSES, v. STATE, 413 So. 2d 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . presented on this record the trial court should have applied the place of business exception of Section 790.25 . . . State, 287 So.2d 63 (Fla.1973); Section 790.25(4), Florida Statutes (1979). Reversed and remanded. . . .

STATE v. SWOVELAND,, 413 So. 2d 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . could not be prosecuted because he came within the exception fashioned by the legislature in section 790.25 . . . appellee from the proscription of the concealed firearm statute by the exception contained in section 790.25 . . . dismissed this case on the authority of Han-igan, and the secure encasement exception contained in section 790.25 . . . The terms “weapons” and “firearms” in section 790.25, Florida Statutes (1979), are used interchangeably . . . Declaration of Policy when the exceptions to the proscription of the concealed gun law were created. § 790.25 . . .

STATE v. HAMILTON,, 409 So. 2d 211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . . § 790.25(3)(1), Fla. Stat. (1979). . . .

R. CATES, v. STATE, 408 So. 2d 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . convicted because his gun was “securely encased” as contemplated by the exception set forth in section 790.25 . . . Bryant, 373 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), that the exceptions of section 790.25(3) only eliminate the . . . carrying concealed pistols and that the appellate courts of Florida have often recognized that the section 790.25 . . . specifically noted that it was not considering the effect of any of the exceptions contained in section 790.25 . . .

E. REICHENBACH v. DAYS INN OF AMERICA, INC., 401 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . See § 790.25(3)(n), Fla.Stat. (1979); Brevard County v. . . .

E. ENSOR, v. STATE, 403 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1981)

. . . leather strap snapped over the hammer, was concealed under section 790.01(2) but was excepted by section 790.25 . . .

STATE v. MURRAY, Jr., 382 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . the commission of a felony was based upon the trial court’s interpretation of a portion of Section 790.25 . . . Finally, Section 790.25(2)(a) specifically provides that the protections afforded by Section 790.25 “ . . .

UNITED STATES v. MACKER, 608 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1979)

. . . . § 790.25(3)(n), it is clearly illegal in that state as well as under federal law to carry a concealed . . .

STATE v. R. TORRES,, 375 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . That subsection (3)(n) of Florida Statutes Section 790.25 specifically exempts a ‘person possessing arms . . .

STATE v. BRYANT,, 373 So. 2d 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . weapon, under Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1977), the trial court improperly relied upon Section 790.25 . . .

UNITED STATES v. ULLRICH,, 580 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1978)

. . . . § 790.25(3)(I) (1975), to except also such conduct from the prohibition against carrying a concealed . . .

UNITED STATES v. BOWER,, 575 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1978)

. . . Under § 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes, it is not unlawful to carry a gun without a license in one’s . . . Defendant’s analysis of Florida’s gun licensing statutes is correct: under § 790.25(3)(n) one need not . . . It would appear that § 790.25(3)(n), which excepts the registration requirements for “a person possessing . . .

McNAMARA, v. STATE, 357 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1978)

. . . concealed weapon, which motion alleged that appellant came within the exception contained in Section 790.25 . . . argument made in the motion to dismiss the information that he came within the exception of Section 790.25 . . .

UNITED STATES v. M. RUFFIN,, 575 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1978)

. . . INCOME (RUFFIN) 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Increase in Taxable Income ............................ 790.25 . . .

McNAIR, v. STATE, 354 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . exempted from the crime charged in that he carried the firearm at his own home pursuant to Section 790.25 . . .

BRANT, v. STATE, 349 So. 2d 674 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . acquittal as to the charge of carrying a concealed weapon because he was within the exception of Section 790.25 . . . Florida Statutes (1975) allowing persons to carry a firearm in their home or apartment [See Section 790.25 . . .

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. F. O NEILL, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977)

. . . Davis devoted 790.25 hours to this case, for which she requests compensation at the hourly rate of $23.45 . . . 40.20 301.50 $2,401.95 Davis 12/4/70-5/22/73 12/4/70-5/22/73 5/23/73-8/29/75 Less: 5/23/73-8/29/75 790.25 . . .

G. ILEY v. HARRIS,, 345 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1977)

. . . Section 790.25(4), Florida Statutes, provides: “This act shall be liberally construed to carry out the . . .

G. ILEY v. HARRIS,, 339 So. 2d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . Section 790.25(3), Florida Statutes (1975). . . .

STATE v. SKROBACKI,, 331 So. 2d 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . Court finds that the weapon in question was ‘securely encased’ within the purview of Florida Statute 790.25 . . .

RASH, v. STATE, 331 So. 2d 373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . judge that he does not come within the statutory exception to § 790.01, Fla.Stat. as set forth in § 790.25 . . .

STATE v. BUTLER,, 325 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . I agree that the words oí § 790.25 (3) (i), Fla.Stat. should be given their ordinary meaning and conclude . . . . § 790.25(3), which provides: “The provisions of §§ 790.05 and 790.06 shall not apply in the following . . . We differ upon this basis in that we apply a strict construction to § 790.25(3) (l), the exemption section . . .

STATE v. WILSON, 43 Fla. Supp. 10 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1975)

. . . A taxicab is a “place of business” as that phrase is used in Florida Statute §790.25(3) (n). . . . The defendant, therefore, comes within the “place of business” exemption, as stated in F.S. §790.25(3 . . .

STATE v. L. HANIGAN,, 312 So. 2d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . . § 790.25 which provides in part: “(1) Declaration of policy. — The legislature finds as a matter of . . . (3) (n), and the Construction in Section 790.25 (4). . . .” . . . These decisions do not fully answer the point about § 790.25(1) referring only to weapons. . . . In view of the Declaration and Construction which are made a part of § 790.25, we think it must. . . . There is no logical basis upon which to distinguish paragraphs (Z) and (n) of § 790.25(3). . . .

B. FACION, v. STATE, 290 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)

. . . . § 790.25(3) (n) FjS.A. . . . Sub-section 3 of § 790.25 provides that the licensing requirements and prohibitions of F.S. §§ 790.05 . . . State, Fla.App.1973, 279 So.2d 317, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that F.S. § 790.25 . . .

L. PEOPLES, v. STATE, 287 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1973)

. . . trial, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, thereby passing on the validity of Sections 790.01 and 790.25 . . . According to defense counsel, the charges were subject to dismissal pursuant to Section 790.25. . . . Defense counsel then moved to dismiss the charges, alleging that Section 790.01 (and 790.25 as it pertains . . . First, he argues that Sections 790.01 and 790.25, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., as applied to a person in . . . (1), the Exceptions to said Section in Section 790.-25(3) (n), and the Construction in Section 790.25 . . .

FRENCH, v. STATE, 279 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)

. . . Having set the basic statutory framework, we now turn to Section 790.25, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the . . . Subsection 2 thereof sets forth that § 790.25 shall not authorize the carrying of a concealed weapon . . . 790.06, if that person comes within one of the fourteen enumerated exceptions of § 790.25(3). . . . It is undisputed that appellant comes within the statutory exception provided by § 790.25(3) (n). . . . See Florida Statutes § 790.25(3) (n) (1969), F.S.A. . Section 790.001(6), Fla.Stat., F.S.A. . . . . I believe the majority opinion, to the extent it holds that § 790.25(3) (n), F. . . . The most that can be said for § 790.25(3) (n) is that it authorizes the possession of a firearm in one . . .

H. KEMPER, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF DAYTON, OHIO,, 277 So. 2d 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)

. . . recites liability for the following amounts: (1) in the sum of $38,328.67, and (2) in the sum of $8,-790.25 . . .

RINZLER, v. CARSON,, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972)

. . . which includes Chapter 790 dealing with the subject of weapons and firearms, has declared (Section 790.25 . . . And in Section 790.25(4) the Legislature has declared that this section shall supersede any law, ordinance . . .

STATE v. BRYANT,, 250 So. 2d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)

. . . As to weapons; see, e. g., § 790.08 and § 790.25, F.S.1969, F.S.A. . . .

v., 15 Cust. Ct. 43 (Cust. Ct. 1945)

. . . whisky was originally gauged at 967.94 proof gallons; upon withdrawal for export it was regauged at 790.25 . . .

v., 13 Cust. Ct. 127 (Cust. Ct. 1944)

. . . whisky to be regauged and said regauge showed the actual quantity of spirits in said barrels to be 790.25 . . . Upon withdrawal for export 3 years later the customs gauger reported 790.25 proof gallons. . . .