The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVI
CRIMES

Chapter 827
ABUSE OF CHILDREN

View Entire Chapter

CHAPTER 827

ABUSE OF CHILDREN

827.01 Definitions.

827.03 Abuse, aggravated abuse, and neglect of a child; penalties.

827.035 Newborn infants.

827.04 Contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a child; penalty.

827.06 Nonsupport of dependents.

827.071 Sexual performance by a child; child pornography; penalties.

827.08 Misuse of child support money.

827.10 Unlawful desertion of a child.

827.11 Exposing children to an adult live performance.

827.01 Definitions.—As used in this chapter:

(1) “Caregiver” means a parent, adult household member, or other person responsible for a child’s welfare.

(2) “Child” means any person under the age of 18 years.

(3) “Placement” means the giving or transferring of possession or custody of a child by any person to another person for adoption or with the intent or purpose of surrendering the control of the child.

History.—s. 48, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 7, ch. 96-322.

827.03 Abuse, aggravated abuse, and neglect of a child; penalties.—

(1) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Aggravated child abuse” occurs when a person:

1. Commits aggravated battery on a child;

2. Willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child; or

3. Knowingly or willfully abuses a child and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child.

(b) “Child abuse” means:

1. Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child;

2. An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child; or

3. Active encouragement of any person to commit an act that results or could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child.

(c) “Maliciously” means wrongfully, intentionally, and without legal justification or excuse. Maliciousness may be established by circumstances from which one could conclude that a reasonable parent would not have engaged in the damaging acts toward the child for any valid reason and that the primary purpose of the acts was to cause the victim unjustifiable pain or injury.

(d) “Mental injury” means injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial impairment in the ability of the child to function within the normal range of performance and behavior as supported by expert testimony.

(e) “Neglect of a child” means:

1. A caregiver’s failure or omission to provide a child with the care, supervision, and services necessary to maintain the child’s physical and mental health, including, but not limited to, food, nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine, and medical services that a prudent person would consider essential for the well-being of the child; or

2. A caregiver’s failure to make a reasonable effort to protect a child from abuse, neglect, or exploitation by another person.

Except as otherwise provided in this section, neglect of a child may be based on repeated conduct or on a single incident or omission that results in, or could reasonably be expected to result in, serious physical or mental injury, or a substantial risk of death, to a child.

(2) OFFENSES.—

(a) A person who commits aggravated child abuse commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(b) A person who willfully or by culpable negligence neglects a child and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(c) A person who knowingly or willfully abuses a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(d) A person who willfully or by culpable negligence neglects a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(3) EXPERT TESTIMONY.—

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a physician may not provide expert testimony in a criminal child abuse case unless the physician is a physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 or has obtained certification as an expert witness pursuant to s. 458.3175 or s. 459.0066.

(b) A physician may not provide expert testimony in a criminal child abuse case regarding mental injury unless the physician is a physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 who has completed an accredited residency in psychiatry or has obtained certification as an expert witness pursuant to s. 458.3175 or s. 459.0066.

(c) A psychologist may not give expert testimony in a criminal child abuse case regarding mental injury unless the psychologist is licensed under chapter 490.

(d) The expert testimony requirements of this subsection apply only to criminal child abuse and neglect cases pursuant to this chapter, dependency cases pursuant to chapter 39, and cases involving sexual battery of a child pursuant to chapter 794 and not to family court cases.

History.—s. 1, ch. 4721, 1899; s. 1, ch. 4971, 1901; GS 3236, 3238; RGS 5069, 5071; s. 1, ch. 9331, 1923; CGL 7171, 7173; s. 1, ch. 65-113; s. 1, ch. 70-8; s. 940, ch. 71-136; s. 49, ch. 74-383; s. 30, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 84-238; s. 8, ch. 96-322; s. 16, ch. 99-168; s. 1, ch. 2003-130; s. 9, ch. 2012-155; s. 6, ch. 2015-177; s. 5, ch. 2017-153.

Note.—Former s. 828.04.

827.035 Newborn infants.—It shall not constitute neglect of a child pursuant to s. 827.03 or contributing to the dependency of a child pursuant to s. 827.04, if a parent leaves a newborn infant at a hospital, emergency medical services station, or fire station or brings a newborn infant to an emergency room and expresses an intent to leave the infant and not return, in compliance with s. 383.50.

History.—s. 8, ch. 2000-188; s. 24, ch. 2001-53.

827.04 Contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a child; penalty.—

(1) Any person who:

(a) Commits any act which causes, tends to cause, encourages, or contributes to a child becoming a delinquent or dependent child or a child in need of services; or

(b) Induces or endeavors to induce, by act, threat, command, or persuasion, a child to commit or perform any act, follow any course of conduct, or live in a manner that causes or tends to cause such child to become or to remain a dependent or delinquent child or a child in need of services,

commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(2) It is not necessary for any court exercising juvenile jurisdiction to make an adjudication that any child is delinquent or dependent or a child in need of services in order to prosecute a violation of this section. An adjudication that a child is delinquent or dependent or a child in need of services shall not preclude a subsequent prosecution of a violation of this section.

(3) A person 21 years of age or older who impregnates a child under 16 years of age commits an act of child abuse which constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. A person who impregnates a child in violation of this subsection commits an offense under this subsection regardless of whether the person is found to have committed, or has been charged with or prosecuted for, any other offense committed during the course of the same criminal transaction or episode, including, but not limited to, an offense proscribed under s. 800.04, relating to lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon any person under 16 years of age. Neither the victim’s lack of chastity nor the victim’s consent is a defense to the crime proscribed under this subsection.

History.—s. 50, ch. 74-383; s. 30, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 77-73; s. 1, ch. 77-429; s. 4, ch. 88-151; s. 8, ch. 90-53; s. 2, ch. 96-215; s. 10, ch. 96-322.

827.06 Nonsupport of dependents.—

(1) The Legislature finds that most parents want to support their children and remain connected to their families. The Legislature also finds that while many parents lack the financial resources and other skills necessary to provide that support, some parents willfully fail to provide support to their children even when they are aware of the obligation and have the ability to do so. The Legislature further finds that existing statutory provisions for civil enforcement of support have not proven sufficiently effective or efficient in gaining adequate support for all children. Recognizing that it is the public policy of this state that children shall be maintained primarily from the resources of their parents, thereby relieving, at least in part, the burden presently borne by the general citizenry through public assistance programs, it is the intent of the Legislature that the criminal penalties provided for in this section are to be pursued in all appropriate cases where civil enforcement has not resulted in payment.

(2) Any person who willfully fails to provide support which he or she has the ability to provide to a child or a spouse whom the person knows he or she is legally obligated to support commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(3) Any person who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent violation of subsection (2) or who violates subsection (2) and who has owed to that child or spouse for more than 1 year support in an amount equal to or greater than $5,000 commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(4) Upon a conviction under this section, the court shall order restitution in an amount equal to the total unpaid support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing.

(5)(a) Evidence that the defendant willfully failed to make sufficient good faith efforts to legally acquire the resources to pay legally ordered support may be sufficient to prove that he or she had the ability to provide support but willfully failed to do so, in violation of this section.

(b) The element of knowledge may be proven by evidence that a court or tribunal as defined by s. 88.1011 has entered an order that obligates the defendant to provide the support.

(6) It is the intent of the Legislature for the state attorneys, the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association, and the Department of Revenue to work collaboratively to identify strategies that allow the criminal penalties provided for in this section to be pursued in all appropriate cases, including, but not limited to, strategies that would assist the state attorneys in obtaining additional resources from available federal Title IV-D funds to initiate prosecution pursuant to this section.

History.—s. 52, ch. 74-383; s. 31, ch. 75-298; s. 200, ch. 91-224; s. 1282, ch. 97-102; s. 1, ch. 2001-51; s. 14, ch. 2002-173; s. 41, ch. 2005-39; s. 153, ch. 2007-5; s. 38, ch. 2008-61; s. 77, ch. 2011-92.

827.071 Sexual performance by a child; child pornography; penalties.—

(1) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:

(a) “Child” or “minor” means any person, whose identity is known or unknown, younger than 18 years of age.

(b) “Child pornography” means:

1. Any image depicting a minor engaged in sexual conduct; or

2. Any image that has been created, altered, adapted, or modified by electronic, mechanical, or other means, to portray an identifiable minor engaged in sexual conduct.

(c) “Deviate sexual intercourse” means sexual conduct between persons not married to each other consisting of contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and the penis, or the mouth and the vulva.

(d) “Female genitals” includes the labia minora, labia majora, clitoris, vulva, hymen, and vagina.

(e) “Identifiable minor” means a person:

1. Who was a minor at the time the image was created, altered, adapted, or modified, or whose image as a minor was used in the creating, altering, adapting, or modifying of the image; and

2. Who is recognizable as an actual person by the person’s face, likeness, or other distinguishing characteristic, such as a unique birthmark, or other recognizable feature.

The term may not be construed to require proof of the actual identity of the identifiable minor.

(f) “Intentionally view” means to deliberately, purposefully, and voluntarily view. Proof of intentional viewing requires establishing more than a single image, motion picture, exhibition, show, image, data, computer depiction, representation, or other presentation over any period of time.

(g) “Performance” means any play, motion picture, photograph, or dance or any other visual representation exhibited before an audience.

(h) “Promote” means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, send, post, share, or advertise or to offer or agree to do the same.

(i) “Sadomasochistic abuse” means flagellation or torture by or upon a person, or the condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise physically restrained, for the purpose of deriving sexual satisfaction from inflicting harm on another or receiving such harm oneself.

(j) “Sexual battery” means oral, anal, or female genital penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or female genital penetration of another by any other object; however, “sexual battery” does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose.

(k) “Sexual bestiality” means any sexual act between a person and an animal involving the sex organ of the one and the mouth, anus, or female genitals of the other.

(l) “Sexual conduct” means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, or sadomasochistic abuse; actual or simulated lewd exhibition of the genitals; actual physical contact with a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if such person is a female, breast, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of either party; or any act or conduct which constitutes sexual battery or simulates that sexual battery is being or will be committed. A mother’s breastfeeding of her baby does not under any circumstance constitute “sexual conduct.”

(m) “Sexual performance” means any performance or part thereof which includes sexual conduct by a child.

(n) “Simulated” means the explicit depiction of conduct set forth in ¹paragraph (l) which creates the appearance of such conduct and which exhibits any uncovered portion of the breasts, genitals, or buttocks.

(2) A person is guilty of the use of a child in a sexual performance if, knowing the character and content thereof, he or she employs, authorizes, or induces a child to engage in a sexual performance or, being a parent, legal guardian, or custodian of such child, consents to the participation by such child in a sexual performance. A person who violates this subsection commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(3) A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he or she produces, directs, or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child. A person who violates this subsection commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(4) It is unlawful for any person to possess with the intent to promote any photograph, motion picture, exhibition, show, representation, or other presentation which, in whole or in part, includes child pornography. The possession of three or more copies of such photograph, motion picture, representation, or presentation is prima facie evidence of an intent to promote. A person who violates this subsection commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(5)(a) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly possess, control, or intentionally view a photograph, motion picture, exhibition, show, representation, image, data, computer depiction, or other presentation which, in whole or in part, he or she knows to include child pornography. The possession, control, or intentional viewing of each such photograph, motion picture, exhibition, show, image, data, computer depiction, representation, or presentation is a separate offense. If such photograph, motion picture, exhibition, show, representation, image, data, computer depiction, or other presentation includes child pornography depicting more than one child, then each such child in each such photograph, motion picture, exhibition, show, representation, image, data, computer depiction, or other presentation that is knowingly possessed, controlled, or intentionally viewed is a separate offense. A person who violates this paragraph commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(b) Paragraph (a) does not apply to any material possessed, controlled, or intentionally viewed as part of a law enforcement investigation.

(6) Prosecution of a person for an offense under this section does not preclude prosecution of that person in this state for a violation of any other law of this state, including a law providing for greater penalties than prescribed in this section or any other crime punishing the sexual performance or the sexual exploitation of children.

History.—s. 4, ch. 83-75; s. 1, ch. 85-273; s. 1, ch. 86-38; s. 1, ch. 91-33; s. 1, ch. 92-83; s. 1283, ch. 97-102; s. 1, ch. 2001-54; s. 4, ch. 2007-143; s. 15, ch. 2011-220; s. 3, ch. 2012-19; s. 9, ch. 2022-165; s. 3, ch. 2022-212.

¹Note.—The cross-reference was revised by the editors, incident to compiling the 2022 Florida Statutes, as a result of meshing amendments by s. 9, ch. 2022-165, and s. 3, ch. 2022-212.

827.08 Misuse of child support money.—Any person who willfully misapplies funds paid by another or by any governmental agency for the purpose of support of a child shall, for the first offense, be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, and for a second or subsequent conviction under this section, be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. A person shall be deemed to have misapplied child support funds when such funds are spent for any purpose other than for necessary and proper home, food, clothing, and the necessities of life, which expenditure results in depriving the child of the above named necessities. All public welfare agencies shall give notice of the provisions of this section at least once to each payee of any public grant made for the benefit of any child and shall report violations of this section to the proper prosecuting officer.

History.—s. 1, ch. 61-216; s. 956, ch. 71-136; s. 65, ch. 74-383.

Note.—Former s. 828.201.

827.10 Unlawful desertion of a child.—

(1) As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Care” means support and services necessary to maintain the child’s physical and mental health, including, but not limited to, food, nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine, and medical services that a prudent person would consider essential for the well-being of the child.

(b) “Caregiver” has the same meaning as provided in s. 39.01.

(d) “Desertion” or “deserts” means to leave a child in a place or with a person other than a relative with the intent not to return to the child and with the intent not to provide for the care of the child.

(e) “Relative” has the same meaning as provided in s. 39.01.

(2) A caregiver who deserts a child under circumstances in which the caregiver knew or should have known that the desertion exposes the child to unreasonable risk of harm commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(3) This section does not apply to a person who surrenders a newborn infant in compliance with s. 383.50.

(4) This section does not preclude prosecution for a criminal act under any other law, including, but not limited to, prosecution of child abuse or neglect of a child under s. 827.03.

History.—s. 41, ch. 2014-224.

827.11 Exposing children to an adult live performance.—

(1) As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Adult live performance” means any show, exhibition, or other presentation in front of a live audience which, in whole or in part, depicts or simulates nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or specific sexual activities as those terms are defined in s. 847.001, lewd conduct, or the lewd exposure of prosthetic or imitation genitals or breasts when it:

1. Predominantly appeals to a prurient, shameful, or morbid interest;

2. Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community of this state as a whole with respect to what is suitable material or conduct for the age of the child present; and

3. Taken as a whole, is without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for the age of the child present.

(b) “Knowingly” means having general knowledge of, reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry of both:

1. The character and content of any adult live performance described in this section which is reasonably susceptible of examination by the defendant; and

2. The age of the child.

(2) A person’s ignorance of a child’s age, a child’s misrepresentation of his or her age, or a bona fide belief of a child’s consent may not be raised as a defense in a prosecution for a violation of this section.

(3) A person may not knowingly admit a child to an adult live performance.

(4) A violation of subsection (3) constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

History.—s. 4, ch. 2023-94.

F.S. 827 on Google Scholar

F.S. 827 on Casetext

Amendments to 827

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 827

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S468.827 - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - RENUMBERED SEE REC # 4645 - M: F

S827.03 1 - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7492 - F: T

S827.03 1a - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - REPEALED 1996 AGGRAVATED ABUSE - F: S

S827.03 1a - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7324 - F: T

S827.03 1b - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - REPEALED 1996 AGGRAVATED ABUSE WILLFUL TORTURE - F: S

S827.03 1b - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7492 - F: T

S827.03 1c - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - REPLD 1996 AGGRAV ABUSE MALICIOUS PUNISHMENT - F: S

S827.03 1c - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7324 - F: T

S827.03 1d - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - REPEALED 1996 AGGRAVATED ABUSE WILLFUL CAGING - F: S

S827.03 2 - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7324 - F: F

S827.03 2a - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7324 - F: F

S827.03 2a - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - AGGRAVATED CHILD ABUSE - F: F

S827.03 2b - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7324 - F: F

S827.03 2b - NEGLECT CHILD - NEGLECT CHILD WITH GREAT BODILY HARM - F: S

S827.03 2c - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7324 - F: F

S827.03 2c - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - ABUSE CHILD WITHOUT GREAT BODILY HARM - F: T

S827.03 2d - NEGLECT CHILD - NEGLECT CHILD WITHOUT GREAT BODILY HARM - F: T

S827.03 3b - NEGLECT CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7493 - F: S

S827.03 3c - NEGLECT CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7494 - F: T

S827.04 1 - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - REPEALED 1996 GREAT HARM PHYSICAL MENTAL INJ - F: T

S827.04 1 - CONTRIB DELINQ MINOR - REMOVED - M: F

S827.04 1 - NEGLECT CHILD - REPEALED 1996 GREAT HARM DEPRIVE ALLOW - F: T

S827.04 1a - CONTRIB DELINQ MINOR - CAUSE TO BECOME DELINQ DEPENDENT NEEDY - M: F

S827.04 1b - CONTRIB DELINQ MINOR - CAUSE CHILD COMMIT ACT OF DELINQ DEPEND NEED - M: F

S827.04 2 - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - REPEALED 1996 PHYSICAL OR MENTAL INJURE CHILD - M: F

S827.04 2 - NEGLECT CHILD - REPEALED 1996 DEPRIVE OR ALLOW DEPRIVATION - M: F

S827.04 3 - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - OVER 21 IMPREGNATE CHILD UNDER 16 CHILD ABUSE - F: T

S827.05 - NEGLECT CHILD - REPEALED 1996 - M: S

S827.06 - WITHHOLD SUPPORT - NON SUPPORT OF CHILDREN OR SPOUSE - M: F

S827.06 3 - WITHHOLD SUPPORT - CHILD SPOUSE 4TH SUBSQ OFF OR OWE 5K DOLS MORE - F: T

S827.071 2 - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - USE OR ALLOW CHILD TO ENGAGE IN SEX - F: S

S827.071 3 - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - DIRECT PROMOTE SEXUAL PERFORMANCE BY CHILD - F: S

S827.071 4 - OBSCENE MATERIAL-POSSESS - POSS PROMOTE PRESENT DEPICT CHILD PORNOGRAPHY - F: S

S827.071 5 - OBSCENE MATERIAL-POSSESS - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9761 - F: T

S827.071 5a - OBSCENE MATERIAL-POSSESS - POSS CONTROL VIEW DEPICTION CHILD PORNOGRAPHY - F: T

S827.08 - NEGLECT CHILD - MISUSE CHILD SUPPORT MONEY 2ND OR SUBSQ OFF - F: T

S827.08 - NEGLECT CHILD - MISUSE CHILD SUPPORT MONEY 1ST OFF - M: F

S827.10 2 - NEGLECT CHILD - UNLAWFUL DESERTION OF A CHILD - F: T

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

ESPINOZA, v. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Helms , 530 U.S. 793, 827-828, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660 (2000) (plurality opinion). . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). . . .

KANSAS v. C. BOETTGER v., 140 S. Ct. 1956 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Rep. 826, 827 (N. P. 1831). . . .

BOSTOCK, v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA v. Jr. Co- R. G. G. R. v., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Fort Worth Bank & Trust , 487 U.S. 977, 986, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988). . . .

NASRALLAH, v. P. BARR,, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Holder , 558 U.S. 233, 248, 130 S.Ct. 827, 175 L.Ed.2d 694 (2010). . . .

BANISTER, v. DAVIS,, 140 S. Ct. 1698 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Turpin , 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996), and Gonzalez illustrates the point . . .

TERRITORY OF GUAM, v. DAVIS., 140 S. Ct. 2739 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 19-827. Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

RAMOS, v. LOUISIANA, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) ). . . . Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). . . . 495, 74 S.Ct. 686 ; Barnette , 319 U.S. at 630-642, 63 S.Ct. 1178 ; see also Payne , 501 U.S. at 825-827 . . . Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). . . .

K. KAHLER, v. KANSAS, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Pohlot , 827 F.2d 889, 899, and n. 9 (C.A.3 1987) (describing bipartisan support for that proposal). . . .

GUERRERO- LASPRILLA, v. P. BARR, v. P., 140 S. Ct. 1062 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Holder , 558 U.S. 233, 251, 130 S.Ct. 827, 175 L.Ed.2d 694 (2010). . . . Kucana , 558 U.S. at 251, 130 S.Ct. 827 (quoting Gutierrez de Martinez v. . . . Kucana , 558 U.S. at 251, 130 S.Ct. 827. And we see no reason to make an exception here. . . . Holder , 558 U.S. 233, 251, 130 S.Ct. 827, 175 L.Ed.2d 694 (2010). . . . and convincing evidence" that should "dislodge the presumption," Kucana , supra , at 252, 130 S.Ct. 827 . . .

MCKINNEY, v. ARIZONA, 140 S. Ct. 702 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Id ., at 827. This Court denied the State's petition for certiorari. Ryan v. . . .

C. HERNANDEZ, v. MESA, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 735 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Federal Tort Claims Act ('FTCA'), the Alien Tort Statute ('ATS'), or federal criminal law." 885 F.3d at 827 . . .

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 935 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mink , 410 U.S. 73, 105, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)); see also id. . . . for Freedom of the Press , 489 U.S. at 772, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (quoting Mink , 410 U.S. at 80, 93 S.Ct. 827 . . . See id. at 772 n.20, 773, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mink , 410 U.S. at 105, 93 S.Ct. 827 . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. JOHNSON,, 934 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Shah, 665 F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. . . .

B. VANZANT v. HILL S PET NUTRITION, INC., 934 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Live Nation Entm't, Inc. , 746 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2014). . . .

BACA v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, G. T. L. M., 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Thornton , 514 U.S. 779, 827, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995) (concluding states cannot constitutionally . . .

BURKE, v. REGALADO, v., 935 F.3d 960 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Spirit Aerosystems Holdings, Inc. , 827 F.3d 1229, 1236 n.2 (10th Cir. 2016), as amended (July 6, 2016 . . .

HARVILLE, v. CITY OF HOUSTON, MISSISSIPPI,, 935 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Town of Independence , 827 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 2016). 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 . . . City of Raleigh , 867 F.2d 823, 827 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We are not persuaded that a preference for family . . .

UNITED STATES v. FELICIANOSOTO,, 934 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Reid, 827 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2016) ). . . .

MEJIA- RAMOS, v. P. BARR,, 934 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Gonzales, 454 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) ). . . .

DOLLAR LOAN CENTER OF SOUTH DAKOTA, LLC, v. AFDAHL, LLC, v., 933 F.3d 1019 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Anoka Cty., 827 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hager v. Ark. . . .

IN RE MATTHEWS, In In In In III,, 934 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Turpin , 518 U.S. 651, 657, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HERNANDEZ- MARTINEZ, v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v., 933 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . into plenary resentencing proceedings.' " Rodriguez , 921 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Dillon , 560 U.S. at 827 . . .

KOH, v. USTICH,, 933 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d 827, 837 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (emphasis added). After Mr. . . .

EFFEX CAPITAL, LLC, v. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION,, 933 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Camp , 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) ). . . .

KELSAY, v. ERNST,, 933 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Carroll , 658 F.3d 819, 827 (8th Cir. 2011) ; Shannon , 616 F.3d at 864-65 ; Brown v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BRAZIER,, 933 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . White , 406 F.3d 827, 832 (7th Cir. 2005) ; see also United States v. . . .

LANDMARK AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, v. DEERFIELD CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. J., 933 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Taylor , 827 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .

BASTARDO- VALE, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES, 934 F.3d 255 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (noting that stare decisis "promotes . . .

UNITED STATES v. RUELAS- CARBAJAL,, 933 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Reid , 827 F.3d 797, 801-02 (8th Cir. 2016). . . .

UNITED STATES v. NG LAP SENG, Ng, Ng W. C., 934 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Garavito-Garcia , 827 F.3d 242, 251 & n.58 (2d Cir. 2016) (rejecting double jeopardy challenge and noting . . .

HAVLISH, v. FIFTH AVENUE COMPANY, Co., 934 F.3d 174 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. at 816, 827. . . .

KIRSCHENBAUM, v. ASSA CORPORATION, Co., 934 F.3d 191 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. at 816, 827. . . . Ct. at 816, 827. . . .

UNITED STATES v. TREVINO,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 901 (W.D. Mich. 2019)

. . . App'x 821, 827-28 (6th Cir. 2015). B. . . .

UNITED STATES v. WHITE OWL,, 932 F.3d 1192 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ramirez-Hernandez , 449 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2006). . . .

DOE, v. MCKESSON, 935 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Corp. , 162 F.3d 827, 831 (5th Cir. 1998). . . .

AGUA CALIENTE TRIBE OF CUPE O INDIANS OF PALA RESERVATION, v. SWEENEY, 932 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jewell , 827 F.3d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 2016). . . . Aguayo , 827 F.3d at 1221. A. . . .

LOCAL COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL- CIO v. CITY OF NEW YORK, 392 F. Supp. 3d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Morgan Chase & Co. , 827 F. . . .

KORTRIGHT CAPITAL PARTNERS LP, TY v. INVESTCORP INVESTMENT ADVISERS LIMITED,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . (Trial Tr. at 127 (Taylor); Trial Tr. at 676-77, 827 (Vamvakas); Trial Tr. at 1239 (Popplewell).) . . . (Trial Tr. at 128-34 (Taylor); Trial Tr. at 1240 (Popplewell); accord Trial Tr. at 827 (Vamvakas).) . . . (Trial Tr. at 678-79, 827-31 (Vamvakas).) . . . (Trial Tr. at 678-79; 827 (Vamvakas).) . . .

C. S. MCCROSSAN INC. v. FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 932 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 748 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 2014). . . .

TEXAS, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION EEOC P. U. S., 933 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . EEOC (Texas I ), 827 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2016). . . . Texas I , 827 F.3d 372. . . . Texas I , 827 F.3d at 384 (discussing Luminant ). . . . Texas I, 827 F.3d at 383. . . . Texas I , 827 F.3d at 384-85. . . .

IN RE GOOGLE INC. COOKIE PLACEMENT CONSUMER PRIVACY LITIGATION H., 934 F.3d 316 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . They here adequately did so, following our decision in In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation , 827 . . . Nickelodeon , 827 F.3d at 274. . . . with due process); see also In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merchant Discount Antitrust Litig ., 827 . . .

JET MIDWEST INTERNATIONAL CO. LTD, v. JET MIDWEST GROUP, LLC, F. F. M., 932 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. , 357 F.3d 827, 828-29 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Carden v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. LAUREANO- SALGADO, a k a L. a k a, 933 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Johnson, 915 F.3d 827, 838 (1st Cir. 2019). . . .

LONGORIA, v. HUNTER EXPRESS, LIMITED, 932 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . O'Neill , 286 F.3d 827, 831 n.6 (5th Cir. 2002) ). . . .

D. LISLE, Jr. v. WELBORN,, 933 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Snyder , 478 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Snipes v. . . . Snyder , 478 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir. 2007) (reversing dismissal; prisoner's receipt of some medical care . . .

J. MAHLER, v. FIRST DAKOTA TITLE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a LLC, a LLC C. A. Jr., 931 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . MJ Optical, Inc. , 870 F.3d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 2017). Mahler's claim fails at the second step. . . .

UNITED STATES v. DUKE,, 932 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ultsch , 578 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir. 2009) ; cf. Rita , 551 U.S. at 350-51, 127 S.Ct. 2456. . . .

K. HASSEN, v. RUSTON LOUISIANA HOSPITAL COMPANY, L. L. C., 932 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Town of Independence , 827 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 2016). . . . Morris , 827 F.3d at 400 (citing Burton v. . . . Morris , 827 F.3d at 400 (citing Willis v. Cleco Corp. , 749 F.3d 314, 319-20 (5th Cir. 2014) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. FELDMAN,, 931 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Takhalov , 827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.), modified on denial of reh'g , 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016). . . . Takhalov , 827 F.3d at 1313. . . . Takhalov , 827 F.3d at 1323. . . . Takhalov , 827 F.3d at 1314. Instead, it was a set of "lies about something else," id. . . . Takhalov , 827 F.3d at 1314. . . . Takhalov , 827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.), modified on denial of reh'g , 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016). . . . See Takhalov , 827 F.3d at 1312-24. . . .

J. GILLIAM, C. Ad v. SEALEY, E. C. T. A. Sr. C. T. A. WTVD LLC J. C. Ad v. C. T. A. E. C. T. A. Sr. WTVD LLC, 932 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Artis , 329 N.C. 679, 406 S.E.2d 827 (1991). . . .

LACEY, Ry v. NORAC, INC., 932 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Allen Health Systems, Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2002). She has failed to meet her burden. . . .

DAVIS, v. GUAM M. C. F. P. F. I. M., 932 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . /Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate , 470 F.3d 827, 851-52 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Fletcher, J., concurring . . .

GENETIC VETERINARY SCIENCES, INC. v. LABOKLIN GMBH CO. KG,, 933 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . CellzDirect, Inc. , 827 F.3d 1042, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . CellzDirect , 827 F.3d at 1048. . . . See CellzDirect , 827 F.3d at 1048. . . . Id . at 40 (citing 827 F.3d at 1052 ). However, any reliance on CellzDirect is misguided. . . . CellzDirect , 827 F.3d at 1048. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BONIN,, 932 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Greenleaf Orthopedic Assocs., S.C. , 827 F.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .

FOROUZAN v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . Oilmen Participation Corp. , 441 F.3d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 2006). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HALL, III,, 931 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Johnson , 827 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2016), we have never held that variances are prohibited on the . . .

K. T. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., 931 F.3d 1041 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Point Landing, Inc., 616 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1980). . . .

EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT, v. BARR,, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . Camp , 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) ). . . .

PEREZ, v. ABBOTT,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 803 (W.D. Tex. 2019)

. . . Docket no. 827 at 5 n.4. In the leading case on bail-in relief, Jeffers v. Clinton , 740 F. . . . See docket no. 827 at 3. . . .

UNITED STATES v. JENNINGS, Sr., 930 F.3d 1024 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Limley, 510 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. . . .

L. JACKSON, v. BARTOW,, 930 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Stoller , 827 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2016) ; Hurlow v. . . .

MATSON, v. SANDERSON FARMS, INC., 388 F. Supp. 3d 853 (S.D. Tex. 2019)

. . . Metrocare Servs. , 809 F.3d 827, 832 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2016) ; see Roberson-King v. La. . . .

FIRST- CLASS MONITORING, LLC, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF AMERICA, INC., 389 F. Supp. 3d 456 (E.D. Tex. 2019)

. . . CellzDirect, Inc. , 827 F.3d 1042, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ). . . . AT&T Mobility LLC , 827 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. . . .

BIGSBY, Jr. v. BARCLAYS CAPITAL REAL ESTATE, INC., 391 F. Supp. 3d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Sols., Inc., 55 Cal.4th 1185, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827, 292 P.3d 871, 875 (2013) ("[O]rdinarily, the statute . . . Aryeh, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827, 292 P.3d at 875. . . .

K. GRIGGS, v. CHICKASAW COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,, 930 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Town of Ball , 827 F.3d 515, 527 (5th Cir. 2016). . . .

SMITH v. UNITED STATES, 930 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Tidwell, 827 F.3d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). . . .

UNITED STATES v. SIHAI CHENG,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 141 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . United States, 827 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 2016) ). . . .

IN RE J. ELMS, D. W., 603 B.R. 11 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2019)

. . . (In re Wcislak ), 446 B.R. 827, 829 (Bankr. N.D. . . .

MANNING v. CALDWELL, s FOR CITY OF ROANOKE s, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cty. , 827 F.3d 314, 318-20 (4th Cir. 2016) ; see also Rooker v. . . .

VUGO, INC. v. CITY OF NEW YORK,, 931 F.3d 42 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Los Angeles , 827 F.3d 1192, 1198-1200 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that city ordinances regulating . . .

WESTERN WATERSHEDS PROJECT, v. BERNHARDT,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D. Or. 2019)

. . . Bonjorno , 494 U.S. 827, 848, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990), Scalia, J., concurring (noting . . .

ALARM DETECTION SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED, v. VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, a, 930 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bar Ass'n , 922 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2019). . . .

JUANCHENG KANGTAI CHEMICAL CO. LTD. NAC v. UNITED STATES,, 932 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 827 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. . . . Hutchison , 827 F.3d at 1362 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). II. . . . 1581(c) would have been "an exercise in futility" and therefore manifestly inadequate, Hutchison , 827 . . .

GREEN, v. KENNEWAY,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 275 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Martin , 444 Mass. 213, 827 N.E.2d 198, 204-05 (2005) (holding that, "[i]nsofar as [Miranda ] adequately . . .

A. SEVER, v. CITY OF SALEM,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 299 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 208 (1st Cir. 2016). . . .

UNITED STATES v. STRUBBERG,, 929 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wynn , 827 F.3d 778, 786 (8th Cir. 2016). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BLUNT, v. III,, 930 F.3d 119 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Boscia , 573 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir. 1978). . . .

DILLARD v. CITY OF SPRINGDALE, ARKANSAS O L. P. L. P. USA, LLC v. O L. P. L. P. USA, LLC, 930 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Anoka Cty. , 827 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). . . . Dadd , 827 F.3d at 754-55 (internal quotations omitted). . . .

STARR INDEMNITY LIABILITY COMPANY, v. BRIGHTSTAR CORP., 388 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Lloyd's Underwriters, 827 F. Supp. 985, 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing, inter alia Nassau Tr. Co. v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. OSMAN, 929 F.3d 962 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Reid , 827 F. 3d 797, 800-01 (8th Cir. 2016). See United States v. . . .

CARDIONET, LLC, v. SCOTTCARE CORPORATION,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 442 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . AT & T Mobility LLC , 827 F.3d 1341, 1348-49 (Fed. . . . Intellectual Ventures , 850 F.3d at 1327 ; Content Extraction , 776 F.3d at 1351 ; Bascom Glob. , 827 . . . Bascom Glob. , 827 F.3d at 1355. . . .

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION,, 928 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Orgs., Inc. , 397 U.S. 150, 152, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) ; Inv. Co. Inst. v. . . . banks to provide data processing services to other banks and bank customers. 397 U.S. at 151, 90 S.Ct. 827 . . . Id. at 152, 90 S.Ct. 827. . . .

IN RE J. TRUMP, D. H., 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Camp , 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) ; see also Wyoming v. . . .

CIVIL BEAT LAW CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INC. v. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL PREVENTION,, 929 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mink , 410 U.S. 73, 79, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973) ; then quoting FBI v. . . . Dep't of Commerce , 827 F.2d 1333, 1335 (9th Cir. 1987) ; Long v. . . .

CORBITT, SDC, a v. VICKERS,, 929 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting a Fourth Amendment claim of a § 1983 plaintiff . . . Dodd, 827 F.2d at 7-8. . . . See Dodd, 827 F.2d at 7-8 (holding no Fourth Amendment violation in a factual situation involving an . . . City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1987) (refusing to apply reasonableness standard to accidental . . .

OIL GAS TRANSFER L. L. C. v. KARR,, 928 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dakota , 2013 ND 24, ¶5, 827 N.W.2d 36, 40. . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. FINCHER,, 929 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Leanos , 827 F.3d 1167, 1169-70 (8th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. . . .

OIL GAS TRANSFER L. L. C. v. KARR, 929 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dakota , 2013 ND 24, ¶5, 827 N.W.2d 36, 40. . . .

TWUM, v. P. BARR,, 930 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 130 S.Ct. 827, 175 L.Ed.2d 694 (2010), preserves the courts' ability to review . . . Id. at 252-53, 130 S.Ct. 827. . . . and therefore shielded from court oversight by [Section] 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)," id. at 248, 130 S.Ct. 827 . . . waiver provision at issue here as one such statutory grant of discretion, id. at 243 n.10, 130 S.Ct. 827 . . .

EUROPA EYE WEAR CORP. v. KAIZEN ADVISORS, LLC AO v. LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 228 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Parker View Farm, Inc. , 827 F. Supp. 2d 53, 60 (D. . . .

F. HOFFMANN, v. L. PULIDO, CSATF- SP C. CSATF- SP,, 928 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cleveland, Inc ., 316 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). . . .

ARIAS LEIVA, v. WARDEN,, 928 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Warden, Atlanta Pen. , 993 F.2d 824, 827 n.3 (11th Cir. 1993). . . .

MILWAUKEE CENTER FOR INDEPENDENCE, INC. v. MILWAUKEE HEALTH CARE, LLC,, 929 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 827. . . .

ATHENA DIAGNOSTICS, INC. LTD. E. V. v. MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES, LLC,, 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . CellzDirect, Inc. , 827 F.3d 1042, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2016). But this case involves neither scenario. . . . CellzDirect, Inc. , 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016). . . .

UNITED STATES v. B. LEDBETTER A. A. L., 929 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . See id. at 827. . . . App'x at 827. . . .

ARRAZABAL, v. P. BARR,, 929 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lozano-Zuniga , 832 F.3d at 827 (citing Musa v. Lynch , 813 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 2016) ). . . .

JOHNSON, v. A. LEONARD, M. DDS,, 929 F.3d 569 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Anoka Cty. , 827 F.3d 749, 755 (8th Cir. 2016) ("Delay in the provision of treatment or in providing . . .

SIERRA CLUB v. J. TRUMP, T. K., 929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Camp , 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970), where the Court articulated a limit on causes . . . Orgs. , 397 U.S. at 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, then quoting 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2012) (current version at 25 U.S.C . . .

YANBIN YU, v. APPLE INC. Yu, v. Co., 392 F. Supp. 3d 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . AT & T Mobility LLC , 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. . . . Internet Servs. , 827 F.3d at 1350. . . .