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Florida Statute 836.10 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 836.10 Case Law from Google Scholar
Statute is currently reporting as:
Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 836.10

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 836
DEFAMATION; LIBEL; THREATENING LETTERS AND SIMILAR OFFENSES
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 836.10
836.10 Written or electronic threats to kill, do bodily injury, or conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism; punishment; exemption from liability.
(1) As used in this section, the term “electronic record” means any record created, modified, archived, received, or distributed electronically which contains any combination of text, graphics, video, audio, or pictorial represented in digital form, but does not include a telephone call.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to send, post, or transmit, or procure the sending, posting, or transmission of, a writing or other record, including an electronic record, in any manner in which it may be viewed by another person, when in such writing or record the person makes a threat to:
(a) Kill or to do bodily harm to another person; or
(b) Conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism.

A person who violates this subsection commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(3) This section does not impose liability on a provider of an interactive computer service, communications services as defined in s. 202.11, a commercial mobile service, or an information service, including, but not limited to, an Internet service provider or a hosting service provider, if it provides the transmission, storage, or caching of electronic communications or messages of others or provides another related telecommunications service, commercial mobile radio service, or information service for use by another person who violates this section. This exemption from liability is consistent with and in addition to any liability exemption provided under 47 U.S.C. s. 230.
History.s. 1, ch. 6503, 1913; RGS 5094; CGL 7196; s. 995, ch. 71-136; s. 1, ch. 2010-51; s. 17, ch. 2018-3; s. 1, ch. 2018-128; s. 2, ch. 2021-220.

F.S. 836.10 on Google Scholar

F.S. 836.10 on Casetext

Amendments to 836.10


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 836.10
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S836.10 - INTIMIDATION - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8851 - F: S
S836.10 - HOMICIDE-WILFUL KILL - ERROR - F: S
S836.10 - INTIMIDATION - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8852 - F: S
S836.10 - INTIMIDATION - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8853 - F: S
S836.10 - INTIMIDATION - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8854 - F: S
S836.10 1 - INTIMIDATION - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9471 - F: S
S836.10 1 - INTIMIDATION - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9472 - F: S
S836.10 1 - INTIMIDATION - REMOVED - F: S
S836.10 1 - INTIMIDATION - REMOVED - F: S
S836.10 2a - INTIMIDATION - WRITTEN/ELEC THREAT TO KILL BODILY HARM ANOTHR - F: S
S836.10 2b - INTIMIDATION - WRITTEN/ELEC THREAT MASS SHOOTNG/TERRORISM ACT - F: S



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 260 So. 3d 1024 (Fla. 2018)

. . . the instruction and name of the crime in response to amendments made by the Legislature to section 836.10 . . . Additionally, italicized notes are added that explain there are two ways to violate section 836.10. . . . must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: * There are two ways to violate § 836.10 . . . *The second way to violate § 836.10, Fla. Stat. is set forth below. 1. . . . that threatened to "shoot up" a school did not constitute a violation of law under the clause of § 836.10 . . .

AGLIO, v. STATE, 246 So. 3d 571 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Aglio is charged with violating section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2018), which provides: Any person who . . .

DOYLE, v. STATE, 240 So. 3d 95 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . section 836.05, Florida Statutes (2015), and written threats to kill or do bodily injury under section 836.10 . . . Section 836.10, "Written threats to kill or do bodily injury; punishment," provides: Any person who writes . . . The State's contention that the elements are different because the written threat under section 836.10 . . . See id. § 836.10. . . . As explained below, however, section 836.10 does not contain any element not found in section 836.05. . . .

J. A. W. v. STATE, 210 So. 3d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . juvenile, appeals his disposition for sending written threats to kill or do bodily injury under section 836.10 . . . directly to the alleged victims or their families as prohibited under the plain language of section 836.10 . . . The plain language of section 836.10 makes clear that it only applies where a threat is sent directly . . . This court has explained that section 836.10 does not criminalize written threats that have not been . . . The act of sending under section 836.10 requires both “the depositing of the communication in the mail . . .

KINGLAND ESTATES, LTD. v. DAVIS,, 170 So. 3d 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . a. making defamatory and threatening posts on the daughter’s blog in violation of sections 836.05, 836.10 . . .

CANNON, v. THOMAS, JEWETT, a, 133 So. 3d 634 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Appellant’s Facebook message to Appellee’s daughter would have qualified as a second offense under section 836.10 . . . posted on Facebook page constituted sending written threats to kill or do bodily harm in violation of § 836.10 . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 131 So. 3d 720 (Fla. 2013)

. . . This instruction was adopted in 2013. 8.22 WRITTEN THREAT TO [KILL] [DO BODILY INJURY] § 836.10, Fla. . . . Lesser Included Offenses APPENDIX — Continued WRITTEN THREAT TO KILL OR DO BODILY INJURY — 836.10 CATEGORY . . .

MACCHIONE, v. STATE, 123 So. 3d 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . stalking after an injunction, aggravated stalking with a credible threat, and violation of section 836.10 . . . a threat to kill or do bodily injury to the person to whom such letter or communication is sent_” § 836.10 . . . The significance of the stipulated facts lies in the historical development of section 836.10. . . . The State takes the opposite view, contending that the 2010 amendment to section 836.10 clarified that . . . Compare § 836.10, Fla. Stat. (2009), with § 836.10, Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

CALAMIA, v. STATE, 125 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . the extortion statute, section 836.05, and the statute criminalizing a threat of bodily harm, section 836.10 . . . Section 836.10 provides, as follows: Any person who writes or composes and also sends or procures the . . .

O LEARY, v. STATE, 109 So. 3d 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . dismiss the two counts of sending written threats to kill or do bodily harm in violation of section 836.10 . . . Because we hold that, under the circumstances of this case, appellant violated section 836.10 by posting . . . The trial court found that appellant’s posting constituted a “sending” under section 836.10. . . . Section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2011), provides: Any person who writes or composes and also sends or . . . At that point, the statement is “sent” for purposes of section 836.10. . . .

SUGGS, Jr. v. STATE, 72 So. 3d 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Based on the letters, the state charged the defendant with violating section 836.10, Florida Statutes . . . the sending of such letter or communication, shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree.... § 836.10 . . . the defendant sent only two letters, the state charged the defendant’s alleged violation of section 836.10 . . . State, 532 So.2d 50, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (the proscription which section 836.10 communicates is “not . . . In 2010, the legislature amended section 836.10 as follows: if-aAny person who writes or composes and . . . purposes of this dissent, I have edited the statute to include only the operative portions of section 836.10 . . . Section 836.10, Florida Statutes is similar to 18 U.S.C. § 876(b) involving the mailing of threatening . . . In the same way, section 836.10 prohibits the sending of any letter. . . . The majority concludes that the focus of section 836.10 is the threat to the person to whom a communication . . . In contrast, section 836.10 does not require any effect on the victim as an essential element of the . . .

SAIDI, v. STATE, 845 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . appeals his conviction of sending written threats of death or bodily injury in violation of section 836.10 . . . While conceding that he authored and sent the letters and papers, Saidi argues that section 836.10 is . . . State, 532 So.2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), that section 836.10, Florida Statutes, is constitutional, he . . . At the outset, we note our agreement with Smith, and conclude that section 836.10 is not vague. . . . See § 836.10, Fla. Stat.; Dudley v. State, 634 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Alonso v. . . .

WALKER, v. STATE, 763 So. 2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . As a result of the letters he was charged with violating section 836.10, Florida Statutes (1997). . . . appellant was charged with threatening to kill or do bodily harm to Judge Horowitz in violation of section 836.10 . . .

STATE v. J. WISE,, 664 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . Pinellas County, Florida, with forty-three counts of making written threats in violation of section 836.10 . . . Appellee was charged with sending written threats to kill or do bodily injury in violation of section 836.10 . . . Section 836.10 provides: 836.10. . . . State, 532 So.2d at 52, “[s]ection 836.10 is justified by the right of all persons to live free of unexpected . . . and unwarranted fear of harm; .... ” Since the act of “sending” under section 836.10 continues from . . .

K. REILLY, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, A., 847 F. Supp. 951 (M.D. Fla. 1994)

. . . Claims Involving Section 836.10, Florida Statutes Vagueness Petitioner alleges that § 836.10 is vague . . . Therefore, § 836.10 is not unconstitutional due to vagueness. . . . Section 838.021 requires that the target be a public servant while § 836.10 does not. . . . Section 836.10 requires that the threat be written while § 838.021 does not. . . . Petitioner also argues that § 836.10 is invalid because it lacks a “postal nexus.” . . .

DUDLEY, v. STATE, 634 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . letter, he was charged with making a written threat to kill or do bodily injury in violation of section 836.10 . . . Section 836.10. . . . For that reason, we must conclude that the elements of making a written threat under section 836.10 are . . .

AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- SENTENCING GUIDELINES RULES, 613 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1993)

. . . District School Board Employee Chapter 784 — Assault, Battery Section 836.05 — Threats, Extortion Section 836.10 . . .

E. PARKER, v. STATE, 563 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . of sending a letter containing “written threats to kill or do bodily injury” in violation of section 836.10 . . .

J. SMITH, v. STATE, 532 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . Section 836.10 makes it a felony to send or procure the sending of any document threatening to kill or . . . Respectively, § 836.10, Fla.Stat. (1987) and § 838.021(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . .

THE FLORIDA BAR, v. A., 529 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1988)

. . . MacGuire pled nolo contendere and was found guilty on August 8, 1986 of violating sections 838.021 and 836.10 . . .

A. CARTER, v. STATE, 409 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . charged with making written threats to kill or do bodily injury to another, in violation of section 836.10 . . .

FLOWERS, v. STATE, 351 So. 2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . threat to kill or injure another — both a circuit judge and a social worker — in violation of Section 836.10 . . .

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966)

. . . Kirk Johnson, Jr., executed a note payable on demand, without interest, in the amount of $278,-836.10 . . .

DELAWARE STEEL FABRICATING CORP., 141 F. Supp. 345 (D. Del. 1956)

. . . Collins had functioned as a bankruptcy receiver rather than a trustee in reorganization he would get $36,-836.10 . . .

v., 43 F. 560 (C.C.D. Me. 1890)

. . . no attendance is to be allowed, as they are not persons charged with crime. (11) Witness fees paid, $836.10 . . .