Cases from cite.case.law:

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 272 So. 3d 243 (Fla. 2019)

. . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla.Stat. . . .

BULA LOPEZ, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 909 F.3d 388 (11th Cir. 2018)

. . . . § 893.101. . . .

S. S. a v. STATE, 242 So. 3d 532 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See Ch. 2002-258, § 1, at 1848, Laws of Fla; § 893.101(2), Fla. . . .

CHOIZILME, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 886 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2018)

. . . . § 893.101, the Florida Supreme Court had held that the mens rea element of the precursor crime for . . . Stat. § 893.101(2002) ). . . . Section 893.101 did not, however, eliminate knowledge of the presence of the substance as an element . . . Stat. § 893.101(2) (establishing affirmative defense of lack of knowledge of illicit nature). . . . Stat. § 893.101(2) ; Adkins, 96 So.3d at 422. . . .

UNITED STATES v. ALLEN,, 714 F. App'x 988 (11th Cir. 2018)

. . . . § 893.101. Allen correctly concedes that our precedent clearly holds that a conviction under Fla. . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 238 So. 3d 182 (Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 238 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2018)

. . . See § 893.101, Fla. . . .

THAMES, DOC v. STATE, 230 So. 3d 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . . § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2002); ch. 2002-258,- § 1, at 1848,’Laws of Fla.; Knight v. . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 216 So. 3d 497 (Fla. 2017)

. . . §893.101 (2) and (3), Fla. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla, Stat. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. . . .

UNITED STATES v. PRIDGEON,, 853 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . And § 893.101 of the Florida Statutes provides that “knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled . . . Id. § 893.101(2). . . .

TERRELL, v. STATE, 212 So. 3d 1047 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . State, 808 So.2d 166, 171 (Fla. 2002), superseded on other grounds by § 893.101, Fla. . . .

UNITED STATES Of v. PEARSON,, 662 F. App'x 896 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . based on his prior drug convictions under Florida Statutes § 893.13, as modified by Florida Statutes § 893.101 . . . Stat. § 893.101(2). . . .

SPABO, v. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 837 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . question than that presented here, which was whether an affirmative defense defined by Florida Statute § 893.101 . . .

UNITED STATES v. YOUNG,, 651 F. App'x 939 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 416 (Fla. 2012) (“[Section 893.101] of the Florida Statutes] expressly eliminates . . .

JONES, v. UNITED STATES, 650 F. App'x 974 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 893.101(2). . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 191 So. 3d 291 (Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . substance or 2) knew of the presence of the substance, but did not know of its. ■■ illicit nature. § 893.101 . . . the substance or 2) knew of the presence of the substance, but did not know of its illicit nature. § 893.101 . . . the substance or 2) knew of the presence of the substance, but did not know of its illicit nature. § 893.101 . . . substance or 2) knew of the presence of the 'substance, but did not know of its illicit nature. § ■893.101 . . .

KNIGHT, v. STATE, 186 So. 3d 1005 (Fla. 2016)

. . . Knight, 107 So.3d at 453 n. 5; see also, § 893.101, Fla. . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 184 So. 3d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 893.101(2), Fla. . . .

UNITED STATES v. HUMPHREY,, 624 F. App'x 724 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 893.101(2). Subsequently, this Court has determined that a prior conviction under Fla. . . .

GONZALEZ, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 622 F. App'x 860 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 893.101, was not a "drug trafficking crime,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), and therefore was . . .

UNITED STATES v. JACKSON,, 604 F. App'x 913 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 893.101(2). . . .

UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS,, 605 F. App'x 833 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 893.101(1)-(2); see State v. . . . Stat. § 893.101(2). Williams argues that his prior cocaine convictions under Fla. . . . Stat. § 893.101, was not a “drug trafficking crime,” as defined 18' U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), and therefore . . . Stat. § 893.101, does not qualify as a drug trafficking aggravated felony under the categorical approach . . .

UNITED STATES v. CHANDLER, Jr. a. k. a. D, 603 F. App'x 789 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 893.101(1)-(2). . . . Stat. § 893.101, was not a "drug trafficking crime,” as defined 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), and therefore . . .

UNITED STATES v. DALLAS,, 596 F. App'x 886 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . • Florida Statute § 893.101 clarifies § 893.13(l)(a)(l) by indicating that knowledge of the illicit . . . STAT. § 893.101. . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 153 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2014)

. . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . Section 893.101, Florida Statutes, is created to read: 893.101 Legislative findings and intent.— (1) . . .

UNITED STATES v. SAMUEL,, 580 F. App'x 836 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 893.101, which eliminated knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance as an element . . . possession with intent to sell or deliver cannabis, in violation of § 893.13(l)(a)(2), as amended by § 893.101 . . .

UNITED STATES v. MELVIN,, 579 F. App'x 884 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 893.101(l)-(2). . . .

SARMIENTOS, v. H. HOLDER, Jr. U. S., 742 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . However, in response to these decisions, the Florida Legislature in 2002 enacted Florida Statute § 893.101 . . . Section 893.101 “thus expressly eliminates knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance . . . Paez Sarmientos argues that a conviction under § 893.13(l)(a)(l), as modified by § 893.101, does not . . . Ann. § 893.101. . Adkins, 96 So.3d at 416. In State v. . . . substance” from an element of the Florida crime to an affirmative defense through Florida Statute § 893.101 . . .

K. D. T. v. STATE, 128 So. 3d 254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2011); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 25.7. . . .

DONAWA, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 893.101, is an aggravated felony as a matter of law. . . . Stat. § 893.101, significantly changing the nature of the offense: (1) The Legislature finds that the . . . Stat. § 893.101, categorically qualifies as an aggravated felony. . . . Stat. § 893.101 effectively creates a separate offense under Fla. . . . Stat. § 893.101, qualifies as a drug trafficking aggravated felony. Mr. . . .

WESTPHAL, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG RISK MANAGEMENT,, 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415 (Fla.2012) (discussing section 893.101, which was adopted in response to Scott . . .

STEVENS, v. STATE, 120 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . State, - So.3d - (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); see also § 893.101(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2006); People v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. LEAKS,, 518 F. App'x 860 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 893.101 is facially unconstitutional, and both of Leaks’s prior convictions pursuant to that Florida . . . Stat. § 893.101 convictions within the five-year framework set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 851(e). . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- INSTRUCTIONS, 112 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. 2013)

. . . affirmative defense is raised, and because the instructions have been in place since 2007, after section 893.101 . . . The Legislature enacted section 893.101 in 2002 to explicitly provide that knowledge of the illicit nature . . . Section 893.101 provides as follows: (1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. . . . is raised, the jury shall be instructed on the permissive presumption provided in this subsection. § 893.101 . . . From my perspective, our decision in Adkins upheld the constitutionality of section 893.101, but did . . . majority of the Court held that the guilty knowledge element, in light of the express language in section 893.101 . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . .

v. RUTLEDGE, v. STATE, 117 So. 3d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Appellant, Eddie Rutledge, asks this court to declare sections 893.101 and 893.13, Florida Statutes ( . . . Rutledge’s initial brief, this argument was resolved by the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that sections 893.101 . . .

E. BASS, v. STATE, 103 So. 3d 933 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . As to appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2008), we . . .

O. S. a v. STATE, 100 So. 3d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . possession of drug paraphernalia should be reversed, because a lack of a mens rea requirement in section 893.101 . . .

BENBOW, v. STATE, 98 So. 3d 261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . On appeal, she challenges the constitutionality of section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2009), based on . . . 1348 (11th Cir.2012), and the Florida Supreme Court expressly upheld the constitutionality of section 893.101 . . .

SHELTON, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 893.101, amending the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. . . . Stat. § 893.101. . Id. § 893.13(l)(a), (6)(a). . Id. § 893.13(l)-(2). . 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996). . . . . Stat. § 893.101 (citations omitted). . State v. Adkins, No. . . . did not assert lack of knowledge of cocaine's illicit nature as an affirmative defense, as Section 893.101 . . .

FAGAN, v. STATE, 96 So. 3d 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . reversed because Section 893.135, Florida Statutes (2009), is facially unconstitutional in that Section 893.101 . . .

FONSECA, v. STATE, 114 So. 3d 1010 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . trafficking amount of amphetamine, and (3) section 893.13, Florida Statutes, as amended by section 893.101 . . . Finally, we reject Fonseca’s challenge to the constitutionality of sections 893.13 and 893.101. . . .

SMITH, Jr. v. STATE, 95 So. 3d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . court’s denial of his motions to suppress statements and physical evidence, and he argues that section 893.101 . . .

BASULTO- RODRIGUEZ, v. STATE, 95 So. 3d 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . . § 893.101(1)-(2), Fla. . . .

L. McBURROWS, v. STATE, 93 So. 3d 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Second, he argues that section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is facially unconstitutional. . . . We also reject the defendant’s argument that statutory provisions in sections 893.101(2) and (3), Florida . . .

STATE v. ADKINS,, 96 So. 3d 412 (Fla. 2012)

. . . In response to this Court’s decisions, the Legislature enacted a statute now codified in section 893.101 . . . Section 893.101 provides in full: (1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. . . . The State asserts that section 893.13, as modified by section 893.101, is facially constitutional and . . . Finally, we explain our conclusion that sections 893.13 and 893.101 do not violate due process. . . . Sections 893.13 and 893.101 do not trigger the concern raised in Lambert and Giorgetti. . . . a controlled substance inadvertently, establishing the affirmative defense available under section 893.101 . . . rise to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the substance.” § 893.101 . . . on the permissive presumption that they knew of the illicit nature of the substance in question. § 893.101 . . . (codified at § 893.101(2), Fla. Stat. (2002)). . . . the accused may — but is not required to — assert the affirmative defense enumerated under section 893.101 . . .

BECKLES, v. STATE, 92 So. 3d 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .

STATE v. WASHINGTON,, 114 So. 3d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . s facial constitutional challenge to section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2003), as amended by section 893.101 . . . nature of the substance was an element of these drug offenses, the Florida legislature enacted section 893.101 . . . . 893.101 Legislative findings and intent.— (1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. . . . Wright, rejected facial challenges to the constitutionality of section 893.13, as amended by section .893.101 . . . Thus, if this Court concluded in Taylor that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, did not violate . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 90 So. 3d 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367, 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by 893.101, Florida . . . Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308 (M.D.Fla.2011), in which the federal court held that section 893.101 . . .

ROCHE, Jr. v. STATE, 89 So. 3d 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

GARDNER, v. STATE, 89 So. 3d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .

BRYANT, v. STATE, 89 So. 3d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 77 So.Sd 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .

ROSE, v. STATE, 89 So. 3d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .

D. DELANCY, Jr. v. S. TUCKER,, 88 So. 3d 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .2d 1289, 1297-1300 (M.D.Fla.2011), held that section 893.13, Florida Statutes, as amended by section 893.101 . . .

WALKER, v. STATE, 89 So. 3d 1010 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

ALVAREZ, v. STATE, 88 So. 3d 430 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding “section 89.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .

LUNDY a k a v. STATE, 88 So. 3d 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .

T. PAGE, v. STATE, 88 So. 3d 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

HILL, v. STATE, 88 So. 3d 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101. . . .

C. MACK, v. STATE, 91 So. 3d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . The possession statute was amended by the enactment of section 893.101, Florida Statutes, on May 13, . . . instead, lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance became an affirmative defense. § 893.101 . . . a constitutional challenge to the amendment of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2001), by section 893.101 . . .

F. PIRATOVA, v. STATE, 87 So. 3d 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .

GONZALEZ, v. STATE, 87 So. 3d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

DIAZ, v. STATE, 85 So. 3d 1184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

ROSIER, v. STATE, 84 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 991, 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (‘We hold that section 893.101 did not remove scienter from . . .

L. RODRIGUEZ, v. STATE, 84 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

G. G. v. STATE, 84 So. 3d 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See §§ 893.101, .13, Fla. Stat. (2010); Brown v. State, 8 So.3d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). . . .

BLANCO, v. STATE, 89 So. 3d 933 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . So.3d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, Florida Statutes, as amended by section 893.101 . . .

G. WOODS, v. STATE, 83 So. 3d 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

DIAZ, v. STATE, 84 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

GIRALDO, v. STATE, 82 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

DENSON, v. STATE, 83 So. 3d 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

CARRERAS, v. STATE, 81 So. 3d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . grams or less of cannabis, and for possession of drug paraphernalia, should be vacated because section 893.101 . . . To the contrary, this case is an illustration of the logic and propriety of section 893.101, Florida . . .

DIAZ- MURIELL, v. STATE, 81 So. 3d 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

CRUMP, v. STATE, 81 So. 3d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

W. SMITH, v. STATE, 79 So. 3d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .

D. ADAMS, v. STATE, 76 So. 3d 367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla.2011) and hold that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .

P. MAESTAS, v. STATE, 76 So. 3d 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . We disagree and uphold the constitutionality of section 893.13 and conclude that section 893.101 does . . . We first note that this court has already held that section 893.101, Florida Statutes, is constitutional . . . In our view, section 893.101 did not remove the guilty knowledge element from these offenses, thereby . . . The legislature superseded this fourth element with the enactment of section 893.101. Miller v. . . . Section 893.101 recognizes that “actual or constructive possession” must be found for the presumption . . .

YOUNG, v. STATE, 75 So. 3d 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Shelton holds that section 893.101, Florida Statutes, which provides that knowledge of the illicit nature . . .

LITTLE, v. STATE, 77 So. 3d 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . State, 929 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . . We reject his primary contention for reversal that section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2003), which overruled . . .

VELEZ, v. STATE, 77 So. 3d 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . In response to those two decisions, the Florida Legislature in 2002 enacted section 893.101, Florida . . .

EDWARDS, v. STATE, 77 So. 3d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . State, 929 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (rejecting claim of unconstitutionality of section 893.101, Florida . . .

C. FLAGG, v. STATE, 74 So. 3d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . 6)(a) is unconstitutional because the mens rea requirement in the statute was eliminated by section 893.101 . . . illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative defense to the offenses of this chapter. § 893.101 . . . among other reasons, the decision misperceives the operation of the affirmative defense in section 893.101 . . . his innocence by proving a lack of knowledge, see Wright, 920 So.2d at 25 (explaining that section 893.101 . . . a defense to a true strict liability crime, the availability of the affirmative defense in section 893.101 . . .

SHELTON, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . . § 893.101. . . . Stat. § 893.101. . . . Stat. §§ 893.101, 893.13. B. . . . Stat. § 893.101(2). . . . Stat. § 893.101. . . .

HERNANDEZ, v. STATE, 56 So. 3d 752 (Fla. 2010)

. . . the three elements of trafficking in cocaine for offenses occurring after the enactment of section 893.101 . . . In 2002, the Legislature enacted section 893.101, Florida Statutes, eliminating knowledge of a controlled . . . See § 893.101(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . . as an element of trafficking, when the appellant’s offense occurred after the enactment of section 893.101 . . . from an instruction on trafficking in cocaine, and noting that, "for offenses occurring after section 893.101 . . .

QUICK, v. STATE, 46 So. 3d 1159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Section 893.101(2) states that the “[ljack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance . . . rise to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the substance.” § 893.101 . . . This court explained the genesis of section 893.101 as follows: In 2002, the Florida Legislature enacted . . . section 893.101, Florida Statutes, which expressly provides that knowledge of the illicit nature of . . . Section 893.101, Florida Statutes, thus makes possession of a controlled substance a general intent crime . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 45 So. 3d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . more than one issue raised in Harris, see 932 So.2d at 552, the only one identified is whether section 893.101 . . . and Burnette, the due process argument being made by the appellants in both cases was that section 893.101 . . . That case merely holds that the failure of section 893.101 to require “knowledge of the unlawful nature . . . 3.800(b)(2) in which he argued that his sentences are unconstitutional because, by virtue of section 893.101 . . . Appellant presents this same argument on appeal, and he also argues for the first time that section 893.101 . . . denying Appellant’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion and the opinion in Harris rejected the argument that section 893.101 . . .

RITHER, v. STATE, 39 So. 3d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . State, 13 So.3d 77, 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (citing § 893.101(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2006)); Links v. . . .

JOHNSON, v. STATE, 37 So. 3d 975 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . State, 808 So.2d 166 (Fla.2002), the Florida legislature clearly expressed its intent in section 893.101 . . .

MILLER, v. STATE, 35 So. 3d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . In 2002, the Florida Legislature enacted section 893.101, Florida Statutes, which expressly provides . . . Section 893.101, Florida Statutes, thus makes possession of a controlled substance a general intent crime . . .

NICHOLSON, v. STATE, 33 So. 3d 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . State, 928 So.2d 1254, 1256 n. 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (noting the 2002 enactment of section 893.101(2), . . .

TAYLOR, v. STATE, 13 So. 3d 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . . § 893.101(1)-(2), Fla. . . . Legislature eliminated this fourth element as a requirement for a conviction for trafficking in cannabis. § 893.101 . . .

A. BARRIENTOS, v. STATE, 1 So. 3d 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Section 893.101(2) provides, in pertinent part, that “knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled . . . Section 893.101 became effective May 13, 2002. See Whitehurst v. . . . Because the date of Jose A.’s alleged offense was February 27, 2006, section 893.101 is applicable to . . . defense to the offenses of [chapter 893].” § 893.101(2). . . . However, section 893.101 addresses only the fourth element of the instruction concerning knowledge of . . .

BALMORI, v. STATE, 985 So. 2d 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . State, 901 So.2d 788, 792 n. 1 (Fla.2005) (citing § 893.101, Fla. . . .

STATE v. A. KETTELL, Sr., 980 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 2008)

. . . State, 808 So.2d 166, 170-71 (Fla.2002), superseded on other grounds by § 893.101, Fla. . . .

GARZON, v. STATE C. v., 980 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 2008)

. . . use of "and” in oral instructions but "or” in written instructions), superseded on other grounds by § 893.101 . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES NO., 969 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2007)

. . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (S), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . .

EDISON, v. STATE, 954 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . and the court, over the defendants’ objection, decided to omit the third element, based on section 893.101 . . . In section 893.101(2), the legislature found that "knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance . . .

NASH, v. STATE, 951 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . State, 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996), in section 893.101, went only to the element of knowledge of the illicit . . . The precise holding of Garcia is limited to cases tried before the effective date of section 893.101, . . .

PERSON, v. STATE, 950 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . and the court, over the defendants’ objection, decided to omit the third element, based on section 893.101 . . . In section 893.101(2), the legislature found that “knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance . . .

A. KETTELL, Sr. v. STATE, 950 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . State, 64 So.2d 915, 916 (Fla.1953)), superseded on other grounds by statute, § 893.101, Fla. . . .