Cases from cite.case.law:

SOUTH CAROLINA, v. UNITED STATES E., 912 F.3d 720 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . The Department of Energy now estimates cost for construction of the facility to be $17.17 billion, with . . .

JIAHAO KUANG, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,, 340 F. Supp. 3d 873 (N.D. Cal. 2018)

. . . . § 17.17(c) (describing Department of Justice procedures to protect classified materials in civil cases . . .

WASHINGTON v. J. TRUMP, U. S. W. F., 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 17.17(c) (describing Department of Justice procedures to protect classified materials in civil cases . . .

KLIMA WELL SERVICE, INC. v. HURLEY,, 133 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (D. Kan. 2015)

. . . authority of the operator to act on behalf of the non-operators. 2 Pierce, Kansas Oil & Gas Handbook, § 17.17 . . .

IN RE GREATER LOVE TABERNACLE CHURCH OF BOSTON, v. VFC LLC,, 536 B.R. 38 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2015)

. . . (citing 4 American Law of Property § 17.17), the court stated that “inquiry notice” “is not a type of . . .

IN RE A. DEMORE, In A. A. v. HSBC USA. N. A. U. S. A. A. v. HSBC USA. N. A. U. S. A., 530 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2015)

. . . (citing 4 American Law of Property § 17.17), the court stated that “inquiry notice” “is a type of notice . . .

EASTER, v. ASURION INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., 96 F. Supp. 3d 789 (M.D. Tenn. 2015)

. . . absence; and (7) an ACAP on January 4, 2013, because her absence for the month of December 2012 was 17.17% . . .

In A. KOHAR, LLC, v. A. J., 525 B.R. 248 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2015)

. . . , which included $69,692.45 in outstanding principal and specified an ongoing per diem interest of $17.17 . . . unpaid principal of $69,692.45, accrued and unpaid interest of $54,728.57 (increasing at a per diem of $17.17 . . . principal balance of $69,692.45, annual interest would be $6,265.35, which equals daily interest of $17.17 . . .

In F. GOLEMO, H. v. E., 494 B.R. 588 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013)

. . . See 4 American Law of Property § 17.17. . . . In re Ryan, 851 F.2d at 506 (citing 4 American Law of Property § 17.17). . . .

DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. N. JOHNSON,, 495 F. App'x 84 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

. . . ’ and Paragraph 22 of the General Clauses, GSA Form 3517, ‘Measurement for Payment’ at the rate of $17.17 . . . Paragraph thirteen of the lease rider directs “Measurement for Payment” at the rate of $17.17 per occupiable . . .

In MAMMOLA, P. v., 474 B.R. 23 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012)

. . . See 4 American Law of Property § 17.17. . . .

DE SOUSA, v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,, 840 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.D.C. 2012)

. . . . § 17.17 (Department of Justice regulation stating that “[i]n judicial proceedings other than Federal . . .

ZINN Co- v. UNITED STATES, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (S.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . Zinn’s expected work life on the date of his death was 17.17 years, until age 70. 111. . . .

AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION, INC. Al- v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY J. H. Jr., 660 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can . . .

AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION, INC. Al- v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY J. H. Jr., 686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can . . .

SUN SECURED FINANCING LLC v. ARCS COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE CO. LP, 730 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2010)

. . . . § 17.17; see also id. § 17.08 (specifying methods by which sufficient written notice can be provided . . .

In COLEY, GMAC v., 433 B.R. 476 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010)

. . . absence of personal hatred, spite or ill-will.’ ” James William Moore (ed.), 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

In L. HOUSEY, W. v. As, 409 B.R. 611 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009)

. . . Mass.App.Ct. 468, 783 N.E.2d 890, 894 (2003) (emphasis added) (quoting 4 American Law of Property § 17.17 . . . See 4 American Law of Property § 17.17. . . .

HSH NORDBANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH, v. SWERDLOW, 259 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . . § 17.17.) . . . (Id. § 17.17.) . . . A § 17.17.) . . . .

In COLON a k a M. v. FA,, 563 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2009)

. . . James Casner et al., American Law of Property § 17.17 at 591 (1952). . . .

In COLON a k a M. v. FA,, 563 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2009)

. . . James Casner et ah, American Law of Property § 17.17 at 591 (1952). . . .

In TAKE- TWO INTERACTIVE SECURITIES LITIGATION, 551 F. Supp. 2d 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . carried an original exercise price of $17.33, instead of the proper and more favorable exercise price of $17.17 . . . noting receipt of options with original exercise price of $17.33 rather than proper exercise price of $17.17 . . .

In FAGAN,, 376 B.R. 81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . part: Date Amt Rec’d Amt Applied Applied To Unused Suspense 10/12/04 $2,977.00 $2,959.83 10/01/04 $ 17.17 . . . $ 17.14 11/16/04 $ 2,977.00 $2,959.83 11/01/04 $ 17.17 $ 34.34 12/13/04 $ 2,977.75 $ suspense $ 2,977.75 . . . ’s payment, $2,977, to the mortgage payment due 10/01/04, $2,959.83, leaving an “Unused” amount of $17.17 . . .

SALVINO LLC, v., 373 B.R. 578 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007)

. . . malicious conversion, have limited its application to cases sounding in tort, not in contract. 1A Collier ¶ 17.17 . . .

ISLAMIC AMERICAN RELIEF AGENCY IARA- USA v. GONZALES, In U. S., 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

. . . . § 17.17(a)(1). . . .

RYAN, v. GENERAL MACHINE PRODUCTS,, 277 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Pa. 2003)

. . . Crossley received a raise in November 2000 to $17.17 per hour. Id. 3. . . .

In Re ENRON CORPORATION SECURITIES, DERIVATIVE ERISA LITIGATION v. On v. L., 258 F. Supp. 2d 576 (S.D. Tex. 2003)

. . . attended a meeting of the Finance Committee in which he learned that Enron’s weighted cost of capital was 17.17% . . . Then, although Lead Plaintiff presented the 17.17% cost of capital as an established fact, in context . . . that if a project’s expected returns were lower than the Company’s weighted average cost of capital of 17.17% . . .

SHEPPARD v. RIVER VALLEY FITNESS ONE, L. P. d b a GP, L. L. C., 218 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.N.H. 2002)

. . . Wiebusch, New Hampshire Practice, Civil Practice and Procedure § 17.17 (2d ed.1997), which itself contains . . .

In FORD, III, Jr. v., 276 B.R. 561 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2001)

. . . defined “malicious” as “ ‘without just cause of excuse.’ ” Id. at 1150 (quoting 1A Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

UNITED STATES YONKERS BRANCH- NAACP, v., 123 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . Hispanic students accounted for 7.58% of the students in the most demanding curriculum and 17.17 % of . . .

CENTRAL LOUISIANA ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. v. DOLET HILLS MINING VENTURE, Co. KG,, 116 F. Supp. 2d 710 (W.D. La. 1999)

. . . 2,250,000 tons $14.17 2,125,000 tons $14.85 2,000,000 tons $15.60 1,875,000 tons $16.46 1,750,000 tons $17.17 . . .

In G. CALVERT M. L. FORKER, v. DUENOW MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,, 227 B.R. 153 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998)

. . . on the house, the taxes payable on the house, and the escrow account balance, the debtors had only $17.17 . . .

L. LOSEE, v. MASCHNER,, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1343 (S.D. Iowa 1998)

. . . He bought a catalog for $11.89, and spent $17.17 on canteen items and $3.63 on postage. . . .

In L. MILLER, L. MILLER, v. J. D. ABRAMS INCORPORATED,, 156 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1998)

. . . defined “malicious” as “ ‘without just cause or excuse.’ ” Id. at 1150 (quoting 1A Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

In L. MILLER, L. MILLER, v. J. D. ABRAMS INCORPORATED,, 156 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1998)

. . . defined “malicious” as “ ‘without just cause or excuse.’ ” Id. at 1150 (quoting 1A Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

MILLS, v. R. FREEMAN,, 942 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Ga. 1996)

. . . Teacher 12.36 14.34 Experience (Years) Range of All Schools 7.61 — 17.17 8.68 — 17.34 1995-1996 Elementary . . .

BANCAMERICA COMMERCIAL CORPORATION ASARCO v. TRINITY INDUSTRIES, INC., 900 F. Supp. 1427 (D. Kan. 1995)

. . . $801.00 67.48% $55.59 $37.51 $838.51 10/93 11/17/93 $2,956.00 $1,686.00 $0.00 $225.00 $1,461.00 49.42% $17.17 . . .

In ELLERBEE, MILLS, v. ELLERBEE,, 177 B.R. 731 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995)

. . . willful’ means nothing more than an act which necessarily leads to injury.” 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

R. HOLLAND, D. v. VALHI INCORPORATED, a a R. HOLLAND, E. D. v. VALHI INCORPORATED, a a, 22 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 1994)

. . . following calculation: To calculate Retirees' percentage contribution to the Plan: $1,454,839.00 = 17.17% . . . $8,472,200.00 To calculate Retirees’ portion of the residual assets: 17.17% x $5,376,505.00 = $923,146.00 . . .

PEOPLE OF TERRITORY OF GUAM, v. V. McGRAVEY,, 14 F.3d 1344 (9th Cir. 1994)

. . . This instruction was taken from 1 Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 17.17 . . .

In WANG LABORATORIES, INC. STEEL HECTOR DAVIS v. WANG LABORATORIES, INC., 155 B.R. 289 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993)

. . . Agreement, § 17.17. .There is also a "replacement remedy” with regard to failed components contained . . . See Agreement, §§ 17.17, 17.28. . . .

R. HOLLAND, E. D. v. AMALGAMATED SUGAR COMPANY,, 787 F. Supp. 996 (D. Utah 1992)

. . . following calculation: To calculate Retirees’ percentage contribution to the Plan: $1,454,839.00 = 17.17% . . . $8,472,200.00 To calculate Retirees’ portion of the residual assets: 17.17% x $5,376,505.00 = $923,146.00 . . .

In A. DANISE, d b a, 112 B.R. 492 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990)

. . . Costs FNMA seeks reimbursement for the cost of the $2,170.83 committee fee, representing 17.17 hours . . . Of the 17.17 hours listed in the Committee’s timesheet, 8.21 are not allowed. . . . The application lists 17.17 hours for the Committee, which at the Committee's rate of $125.00 per hour . . .

In RYAN, M. STERN, v. CONTINENTAL ASSURANCE COMPANY,, 851 F.2d 502 (1st Cir. 1988)

. . . See 4 American Law of Property § 17.17. . . . See, e.g., 4 American Law of Property § 17.17; Tiffany’s Real Property § 1265 (“[I]f a conveyance is . . .

In RYAN, M. STERN, v. CONTINENTAL ASSURANCE COMPANY,, 851 F.2d 502 (1st Cir. 1988)

. . . See 4 American Law of Property § 17.17. . . . See, e.g., 4 American Law of Property § 17.17; Tiffany’s Real Property § 1265 (“[I]f a conveyance is . . .

In ROBISON, VICTOR FEDERAL SAVINGS LOAN ASSOCIATION, v. ROBISON,, 86 B.R. 182 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988)

. . . The cases shade imperceptively from one group to another.” 1A Collier on Bankruptcy H 17.17, pp. 1656 . . .

In ROSE, a k a YOUNG v. ROSE a k a, 86 B.R. 86 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988)

. . . Jung 246 Wis. 82, 16 N.W.2d 417 (1944) (holding to the contrary); see 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

In REMICK, d b a KLES HERMAN, d b a d b a J J Co. Co. SCP Co. CBS CBS CBS U Co. Co. T. B. Co. MCA, Co. v. REMICK,, 96 B.R. 935 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987)

. . . The cases shade imperceptively from one group to another.” 1A Collier on Bankruptcy U 17.17, pp. 1656 . . .

In T. McCUNE J. AMERICAN BANK OF RAYTOWN, v. T. McCUNE J., 82 B.R. 510 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987)

. . . other’s injury, is a willful and malicious injury within the exception.” 1A Collier on Bankruptcy para. 17.17 . . . The cases shade imperceptively from one group to another.” 1A Collier on Bankruptcy para. 17.17, pp. . . .

In RYAN, M. STERN, v. CONTINENTAL ASSURANCE COMPANY,, 70 B.R. 509 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987)

. . . constructive notice of transfers which are outside the chain of title. 4 American Law of Property § 17.17 . . .

In R. FREEMAN, AETNA CASUALTY SURETY COMPANY, v. R. FREEMAN,, 68 B.R. 904 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1987)

. . . .) ¶ 17.17 at 1652-53; Den Haerynck v. Thompson, 228 F.2d 72 (10th Cir.1955). . . .

PREMIER DENTAL PRODUCTS COMPANY v. DARBY DENTAL SUPPLY COMPANY, INC. DARBY DENTAL SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., 794 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1986)

. . . Callmann, Unfair Competition, Trademarks, and Monopolies, supra, at § 17.17. . . .

In F. DELBRIDGE, Sr. S., 61 B.R. 484 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986)

. . . these total costs are divided by the 49 animals which share the feed, it computes to an average of $17.17 . . .

In CONNER ERICSON STATE BANK, v. CONNER, 59 B.R. 594 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986)

. . . or maliciousness necessary to except the liability from discharge.” 1A Collier on Bankruptcy para. 17.17 . . .

In A. DeVIER, Jr. ROSS, v. A. DeVIER, Jr., 57 B.R. 602 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986)

. . . excuse, may constitute a willful and malicious injury, (footnotes omitted.) 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . . exceptions to the discharge, however, was not changed at all by the amendments. 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

In IRELAND, AMERICAN BANK OF SPICKARD- TRENTON, v. IRELAND,, 49 B.R. 269 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985)

. . . a willful and malicious injury within the meaning of the exception.” 1A Collier on Bankruptcy para. 17.17 . . .

GENOVESE DRUG STORES, INC. v. CONNECTICUT PACKING COMPANY, INC., 732 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1984)

. . . Lighthipe, 88 N.J.L. 199, 203, 96 A. 94, 95-96 (1915); 4 American Law of Property § 17.17 at 592-93 ( . . .

FRADKIN, v. T. ERNST,, 571 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1983)

. . . 53.58% Against the Plan 31.39 36.69 37.32 45.06 Abstained 0.94 1.11 1.12 1.36 Street Names 14.44 XX 17.17 . . .

LEASEAMERICA CORPORATION, v. ECKEL d b a, 710 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1983)

. . . Grant Company, 481 F.2d 664 (4th Cir.1973). 1A Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed.) para. 17.17, at 1653- . . .

LEASEAMERICA CORPORATION, v. ECKEL d b a, 710 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1983)

. . . Grant Company, 481 F.2d 664 (4th Cir.1973). 1A Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed.) para. 17.17, at 1653- . . .

PROPRIETORS INSURANCE COMPANY, O. R. V. v. VALSECCHI, J. S. J., 435 So. 2d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . Hay, Conflict of Laws, §§ 17.11-17.17 (1982); 33 U.Fla.L.Rev. 436, supra. . . .

In A. M. KYRIAZES, DE BARTOLO, v. A. KYRIAZES,, 38 B.R. 353 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983)

. . . B.R. 593 (N.D.Ill.1980); In re Amador, 596 F.2d 428 (10th Cir.1979); 1A, Collier on Bankruptcy, Par. 17.17 . . .

In LA BRANT, VESSEL, HTH v. LA BRANT, 23 B.R. 367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982)

. . . F.Supp. 528 (W.D.Mo.1976); In re Amador, 596 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1979); 1A, Collier on Bankruptcy, Sec. 17.17 . . .

In D. H. OVERMYER TELECASTING CO. INC. HADAR LEASING INTERNATIONAL CO. INC. v. D. H. OVERMYER TELECASTING CO. INC., 23 B.R. 823 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982)

. . . Klein, 31 Tr. 2944) 17.17. Unused and Unusable Equipment Covered by Lease H-1002. . . .

In ASKEW, BRAWNER, v. ASKEW,, 22 B.R. 641 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982)

. . . without just cause or excuse, may constitute a willful and malicious injury. 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

In NORTON J. I. CALLAHAN, v. NORTON,, 21 B.R. 725 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982)

. . . any of the workman who caused the damage to testify to their intent.’)” 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

In L. HAYNES, CADILLAC VENDING CO. Co. v. L. HAYNES,, 19 B.R. 849 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982)

. . . (S.D.N.Y.1979); Matter of Brazington, 3 B.R. 309 (Bkrtcy.D.Idaho 1980); 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

In DONOFRIO, FIRSTMARK ACCEPTANCE CORP. v. DONOFRIO,, 19 B.R. 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982)

. . . Collier On Bankruptcy, Vol. 1A, Section 17.17, at 1653, 14th Ed. (1979). . . .

In GURDA FARMS, INC. DeLEON, v. GURDA FARMS, INC. In J. GURDA, DeLEON, v. J. GURDA,, 15 B.R. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)

. . . is without just cause or excuse, may constitute a willful and malicious injury. 1A Collier, supra, ¶ 17.17 . . .

In L. CATRON L. J. ST. PETER, J. St. C. v. CATRON,, 15 B.R. 408 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)

. . . without just cause or excuse, may constitute a willful and malicious injury.” 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

In McLAUGHLIN, FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ATLANTA, v. McLAUGHLIN,, 14 B.R. 773 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981)

. . . Also 1A Collier (14th Ed. 1979) § 17.17 at p. 1653. . . .

In LEWIS CITIZENS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF FLIPPIN, ARKANSAS, v. L. LEWIS,, 17 B.R. 46 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1981)

. . . See also 1A Collier on Bankruptcy para. 17.17(1), pp. 1650.4, 1653, 1654 (1976), to the following effect . . .

In LANGER UNITED STATES v. LANGER, 12 B.R. 957 (D.N.D. 1981)

. . . Colliers on Bankruptcy § 17.17[1] (14th ed. 1978). . . .

K. DUNAWAY, v. H. WEBSTER,, 519 F. Supp. 1059 (N.D. Cal. 1981)

. . . . § 17.17 (1973). . . .

In OBERMEYER BENEFICIAL FINANCE COMPANY, v. OBERMEYER,, 12 B.R. 26 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981)

. . . Colliers On Bankruptcy, Vol. 1A, § 17.17, at 1653, 14th Ed. (1979). . . .

In Re SMITH, OHIO CITIZENS TRUST COMPANY, v. SMITH,, 11 B.R. 20 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981)

. . . Collier On Bankruptcy, Vol. 1A, § 17.17, at 1653, 14th Ed. (1979). . . .

In ANSON, ANSON, v. HOPKINS,, 9 B.R. 741 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)

. . . just cause or excuse, may constitute a willful and malicious injury.” 1A Collier on Bankruptcy para. 17.17 . . .

In DEAN, UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. DEAN,, 9 B.R. 321 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981)

. . . in fact the property of another was converted, but was done willfully and maliciously. 1(a) Collier 17.17 . . .

In SCHUCK, L. ECK, v. SCHUCK,, 13 B.R. 461 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1980)

. . . .) ¶ 17.17 at 1652-53; Den Haerynck v. Thompson, 228 F.2d 72 (10th Cir. 1955). . . .

In ERTZ, J L GREGOR, v. ERTZ, J L, 6 B.R. 637 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1980)

. . . Bankruptcy Act”, held that “the injuries must have been both willful and malicious, Collier, Vol. 1A Section 17.17 . . .

D. FRANKS a k a v. THOMASON, 4 B.R. 814 (N.D. Ga. 1980)

. . . Home Indemnity Co., 546 F.2d 1149, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977), citing 1A Collier on Bankruptcy § 17.17, at . . .

In F. DAY, Jr. MURRAY d b a C C Co. v. F. DAY, Jr. a k a, 4 B.R. 750 (S.D. Ohio 1980)

. . . See cases cited in 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 footnotes 4-10. . . . determining if the actions of Day were “willful and malicious” is that provided in 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

In E. REAVES, III. C. REAVES v. H. BARTELT, C. III,, 3 B.R. 605 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1980)

. . . 764 (4th Cir. 1931); In Matter of Utz, 7 F.Supp. 612 (D.C.Md.1934); 4A Collier on Bankruptcy, para. 17.17 . . .

In G. BRAZINGTON, HOLDER v. G. BRAZINGTON,, 3 B.R. 309 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1980)

. . . Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th Edition, Section 17.17 at page 1667 comments on this clause as follows: “ . . . See Note 2, 1A Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) 1650.3 (Section 17.17). . . .

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, v. HALE,, 618 F.2d 143 (1st Cir. 1980)

. . . See 1A Collier on Bankruptcy U 17.17 at 1652-53; Den Haerynck v. . . .

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, v. HALE,, 618 F.2d 143 (1st Cir. 1980)

. . . See 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 at 1652-53; Den Haerynck v. . . .

CENTURY HEATING VENTILATING CO. v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 618 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980)

. . . substitute for the thermostat system, the DOE model contemplates use of the burner during a standard 17.17 . . .

In PRENZI, WARD v. PRENZI, 3 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1980)

. . . Kavenaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 37 S.Ct. 28, 61 L.Ed. 205 (1916). 1A Colliers on Bankruptcy, § 17.17(1) (14th . . .

In ZODA s PETERS, v. ZODA,, 2 B.R. 377 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980)

. . . Plaintiff but that the Bankrupt did it both willfully and maliciously. 1A Collier on Bankruptcy, § 17.17 . . .

In M. KASLER, INDUSTRIE AERONAUTICHE E. MECCANICHE RINALDO PIAGGIO S. p. A. v. M. KASLER,, 611 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1979)

. . . must be for injuries caused by conduct that was both willful and malicious. 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

In M. KASLER, INDUSTRIE AERONAUTICHE E. MECCANICHE RINALDO PIAGGIO S. p. A. v. M. KASLER,, 611 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1979)

. . . must be for injuries caused by conduct that was both willful and malicious. 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

LAWRENCE T. LASAGNA, INC. v. L. FOSTER In, LAWRENCE T. LASAGNA, INC. v. L. SUTHERS, LAWRENCE T. LASAGNA, INC. v. HALL, 609 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1979)

. . . Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17[1], at 1653 (14th ed. 1978). . . .

LAWRENCE T. LASAGNA, INC. v. L. FOSTER In, LAWRENCE T. LASAGNA, INC. v. L. SUTHERS, LAWRENCE T. LASAGNA, INC. v. HALL, 609 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1979)

. . . Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17[1], at 1653 (14th ed. 1978). . . .

In RAINEY, SECURITY MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, a v. RAINEY,, 1 B.R. 569 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979)

. . . and particularly where drunken driving is involved, although as stated in 1A Collier, Bankruptcy § 17.17 . . .

In SMITH, MASON, v. SMITH,, 2 B.R. 30 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1979)

. . . .) ¶ 17.17. . . . Ibid. ¶ 17.17 n. 6. . . .

In L. GABRIELSON, a k a J. HAFF L. v. L. GABRIELSON, a k a, 1 B.R. 563 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1979)

. . . See generally 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17[1] (14th ed. 1974). . . .

In MALLORY MULKEY, v. MALLORY, 1 B.R. 201 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979)

. . . an inappropriate basis for § 17a(8) exceptions to a bankruptcy discharge. 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 . . .

In OLMSTEAD, TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, v. OLMSTEAD,, 608 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1979)

. . . See In re Mountjoy (W.D.Mo.), 368 F.Supp. 1087; 1A Collier Bankruptcy H 17.17 at 1666-1667. . . .

In OLMSTEAD, TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, v. OLMSTEAD,, 608 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1979)

. . . See In re Mountjoy (W.D.Mo.), 368 F.Supp. 1087; 1A Collier Bankruptcy ¶ 17.17 at 1666-1667. . . .

In COLLINS, D. A. LEONARD, v. COLLINS,, 1 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1979)

. . . Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th Ed., Vol. 1A, § 17.17, p. 1650.3. . . . exception of § 17a(8), the injuries ‘must have been both willful and malicious’, Collier, Vol. 1A § 17.17 . . .

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)