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Florida Statute 30.02 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 30.02 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title V
JUDICIAL BRANCH
Chapter 30
SHERIFFS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 30.02
30.02 Bond of sheriffs; large counties.In each county in the state having a population in excess of 150,000 according to the last state census, the sheriff shall give bond as required by the board of county commissioners, to be filed with the clerk of the circuit court and be conditioned upon the faithful discharge of the duties of his or her office. When a sheriff is appointed to fill a vacancy, a bond may not be a prerequisite to succession in office; however, if the county commission requires a bond for the office of sheriff, the commission shall allow a period of 10 days after the effective date of the appointment in which the bond may be provided.
History.ss. 1, 4, ch. 3724, 1887; RS 1237; GS 1666; RGS 2871; CGL 4568; s. 1, ch. 17754, 1937; ss. 10, 12, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 172, ch. 95-147; s. 15, ch. 95-312; s. 11, ch. 98-34.

F.S. 30.02 on Google Scholar

F.S. 30.02 on Casetext

Amendments to 30.02


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 30.02
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 30.02.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

QUARLES, v. UNITED STATES, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (U.S. 2019)

. . . . § 30.02(a)(3) (West 2019). . . .

L. ROBERTS, II, v. GORDY,, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1231 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . (citing Nimmer on Copyright § 30.02) (emphasis added). . . .

UNITED STATES, v. J. STITT, II. v., 139 S. Ct. 399 (U.S. 2018)

. . . . §§ 30.01, 30.02 (West 1989) (effective 1974); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-201(1), 76-6-202 (1978) ; W. . . .

UNITED STATES v. ISLAS- SAUCEDO,, 903 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2018)

. . . Uribe , 838 F.3d 667, 671 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a) is divisible). . . . PENAL CODE § 30.02(a) (2017). C. . . . burglary, while a conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) does not. 753 F.3d at 176. . . . As a result of its findings that § 30.02(a)(3) was broader than generic burglary, and because §§ 30.02 . . . of violence ... meaning § 30.02 is a qualifying felony under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)."). . . .

UNITED STATES v. DAVIS, 903 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018)

. . . that his ACCA sentencing enhancement based upon multiple burglary convictions under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. FUENTES- CANALES,, 902 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2018)

. . . The en banc court further held that § 30.02(a)(3)"is broader than generic burglary." . . . generic burglary under the ACCA, and §§ 30.02(a)(1) and (a)(3) are not divisible. . . . Fuentes-Canales was convicted under subsections (a) and (d) of § 30.02. . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a) and (d) (West 2008). U.S. . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(d)(2) (West 2008). See United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. WIESE, Jr. Jr., 896 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 2018)

. . . that Wiese could have been convicted under a non-generic form of Texas burglary, Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . In 2003, when Wiese was convicted of being a felon in possession, all of § 30.02(a) was considered generic . . . That we held five years later that § 30.02(a)(3) is not generic burglary, United States v. . . . Constante , 544 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), or that we held earlier this year that § 30.02 . . . Shepard documents reflect that he was convicted with the requisite intent under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. DAVILA, L., 890 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2018)

. . . Guidelines based on Montalvo's prior conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . , arguing that his prior conviction did not qualify for that enhancement because Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . Herrold , 883 F.3d at 529 ("In light of Texas case law, we hold that Texas Penal Code §§ 30.02(a)(1) . . . ; and, as the dissent in Herrold recognizes, "[t]he effect of" Herrold 's ruling Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . and convictions under § 30.02(a)(1) qualified as generic burglary); Soc'y of Separationists, Inc. v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. GODOY,, 890 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2018)

. . . The enhancement reflected Godoy's two prior burglary convictions under Texas Penal Code § 30.02. . . . In support of his argument that Texas Penal Code § 30.02 is not a crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)( . . . 1)(A)(ii), Godoy urged that § 30.02 is broader than generic "burglary of a dwelling." . . . And even if it were not, a § 30.02 burglary offense is not a crime of violence under § 16(b) because . . . Penal Code § 30.02(a). . . .

UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ- CEPEDA,, 714 F. App'x 442 (5th Cir. 2018)

. . . 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) based on his Texas convictions of burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. DANIELS,, 714 F. App'x 413 (5th Cir. 2018)

. . . His appeal rests on the assertion that Texas Penal Code § 30.02 is not divisible under Mathis v. . . . After his brief was filed, we held that § 30.02 is divisible under Mathis. United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. GASCA,, 714 F. App'x 414 (5th Cir. 2018)

. . . argues that the district court erred in treating his 2004 burglary conviction under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . United States, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 196 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), § 30.02 is indivisible and not categorically . . .

UNITED STATES v. BACIO- GONZALES,, 713 F. App'x 357 (5th Cir. 2018)

. . . Guidelines based on Bacio-Gonzales’ prior conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . sentence, arguing that the Texas burglary statute is not divisible and that not every violation of § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. HERROLD,, 883 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2018)

. . . We begin by evaluating the scope of Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(3). A. . . . I begin with § 30.02(a)(3). . . . PENAL CODE §§ 30.01(3), 30.02, 30.04. . . . Penal Code § 30.02(a) (2017). Mathis v. . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(3) (West 2011)."); United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. ORTIZ- CHAVIRA,, 873 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . Before his 2016 deportation, he had been convicted of burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. ORTIZ- MARTINEZ,, 692 F. App'x 768 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . based on a determination that his conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . United States, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), § 30.02 defines a single indivisible . . . Conde-Castaneda, 753 F.3d 172, 175-76 (5th Cir. 2014), this court held that § 30.02 is a divisible statute . . . courts may apply the modified categorical approach to determine which of the three subsections in § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. J. STITT, II,, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 30.02. . . . Penal Code §§ 30.01, 30.02 (1986) (emphasis added). . . . reconsideration where the Fifth Circuit had upheld the use of a conviction under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ- CEPEDA,, 691 F. App'x 181 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) based on his Texas convictions of burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), that the burglary statute is not divisible and that not every violation of § 30.02 . . . He also contends that the state-court documents failed to show under which subsection of § 30.02 he was . . .

UNITED STATES v. MADRID- MARTINEZ,, 695 F. App'x 743 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . The sentence was based on his prior convictions for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . The Texas burglary statute, § 30.02(a), has three subsections, and our court has held an offense under . . . § 30.02(a)(1) qualifies as generic burglary. . . . Moreover, § 30.02(a) is divisible and, therefore, amenable to the modified categorical approach. . . . Madrid’s contentions regarding the divisibility of § 30.02(a) are, therefore, unavailing. . . .

UNITED STATES v. GARZA- FLORES,, 690 F. App'x 264 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . l)(A)(ii) based on his prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), that the Texas burglary statute is not divisible and that not every violation of § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. BACIO- GONZALES,, 690 F. App'x 193 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . ) based on his prior Texas felony convictions for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . L.Ed.2d 604 (2016); that the Texas burglary statute is not divisible and that not every violation of § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. GALVAN- FUENTES,, 690 F. App'x 161 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 30.02(a) (2009), is a divisible statute that is amenable to application of the modified categorical . . . Galvan-Fuentes’s argument, in reliance on Mathis, that § 30.02(a) is not divisible and, thus, cannot . . .

UNITED STATES v. PRADO- MENDOZA,, 689 F. App'x 825 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . on Prado-Mendoza’s prior conviction for burglary of a habitation in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . Conde-Castaneda, 753 F.3d 172, 176-77 (5th Cir. 2014), we held that § 30.02(a) is a divisible statute . . . and that a conviction under § 30.02(a)(1) qualifies as a generic burglary. . . . We recently revisited this holding in light of Mathis and decided that § 30.02(a) is “elements-based” . . .

UNITED STATES v. GASCA,, 689 F. App'x 826 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . According to Gasea, the district court erred in treating his 2004 conviction under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . United States, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), § 30.02 is indivisible and not categorically . . . The Texas burglary statute, § 30.02(a) has three subsections, and we have held that an offense under . . . § 30.02(a)(1) qualifies as generic burglary. . . . Moreover, § 30.02(a) is divisible and therefore amenable to the modified categorical analysis. . . .

UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ- CANTU,, 689 F. App'x 828 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 30.02 (2009), is a divisible statute that is amenable to application of the modified categorical . . . Ramirez-Cantu’s argument, in reliance on Mathis, that § 30.02(a) is not divisible and, thus, cannot support . . .

UNITED STATES v. TURRUBIARTES- GONZALEZ, De La, 689 F. App'x 811 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . (2015) based on his prior conviction of burglary of a habitation in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . Conde-Castaneda, 753 F.3d 172, 176-77 (5th Cir. 2014), we held that § 30.02(a) is a divisible statute . . . and that a conviction under § 30.02(a)(1) qualifies as a generic burglary. . . . In Uribe, we decided that § 30.02(a) “is elements-based, it is divisible and the modified categorical . . .

UNITED STATES v. GOMEZ- JIMENEZ,, 689 F. App'x 383 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . based on a determination that his conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . United States, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), § 30.02 defines a single indivisible . . . Conde-Castaneda, 753 F.3d 172, 175-76 (5th Cir. 2014), this court held that § 30.02 is a divisible statute . . . courts may apply the modified categorical approach to determine which of the three subsections in § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. REYNA- LOZANO,, 689 F. App'x 380 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . 1)(A)(ii) based on his prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), that the Texas burglary statute is not divisible and that not every violation of § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ- VILLALZANA,, 689 F. App'x 352 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . enhancement was improper, Ramirez-Villalzana contends, because the Texas burglary statute, Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . 136 S.Ct. at 2249-50, Whether the district court erred thus turns on whether, in light of Mathis, § 30.02 . . . While the instant appeal was pending, we concluded that § 30.02(a) is a divisible, elements-based statute . . . Consequently, “the modified categorical approach applies to determine which of the provisions of § 30.02 . . . the permissible record documents reveals that Ramirez-Villalza-na’s prior convictions were based on § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. BAHENA, Jr., 689 F. App'x 362 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 4B1.1 based on his Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02. . . .

UNITED STATES v. DANIELS,, 689 F. App'x 376 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . His appeal rests on the assertion that Texas Penal Code § 30.02 is not divisible under Mathis v. . . . After his brief was filed, we held that § 30.02 is divisible under Mathis. United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. SALDIVAR- VASQUEZ,, 689 F. App'x 305 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . Penal Code § 30.02(a)(1), which the district court characterized as crimes of violence. . . . Conde-Castaneda, 753 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that § 30.02(a) is divisible and reiterating . . . that offenses under § 30.02(a)(1) qualify as generic burglary). . . . In Uribe, the court decided that § 30.02(a) “is elements-based, it is divisible and the modified categorical . . . and the district court did not err in treating Saldivar-Vas-quez’s Texas burglary convictions under § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. FLORES- VERA,, 689 F. App'x 284 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) enhancement based upon his prior conviction under Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)( . . . We have previously held that § 30.02(a) is divisible under the modified categorical approach and that . . . a § 30.02(a)(1) conviction supports a § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) enhancement. . . .

UNITED STATES v. DIAZ- SIERRA,, 689 F. App'x 284 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . Diaz was convicted of burglary under Texas Penal Code § 30.02. . . . Section 30.02 is a divisible statute, and we have held that a violation of § 30.02(a)(1) constitutes . . . Because the state court documents reflect that Diaz pleaded guilty to an offense under § 30.02(a)(1), . . .

UNITED STATES v. NEIVA- OREJUELA,, 689 F. App'x 287 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . Neiva was convicted of burglary under Texas Penal Code § 30.02, a divisible statute. . . . Those documents demonstrate that Neiva pleaded guilty under § 30.02(a)(1), which, for purposes of the . . .

UNITED STATES v. VELASQUEZ,, 689 F. App'x 249 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . due to his prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . Conde-Castaneda, 753 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that § 30.02(a) is divisible and reiterating . . . that offenses under § 30.02(a)(1) qualify as generic burglary). . . .

UNITED STATES v. FRANCO- VILLAGRANA,, 688 F. App'x 296 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . Section 30.02(a) of the Texas Penal Code is divisible, the state court documents reflect that Franco-Villagrana . . . violated § 30.02(a)(1), and a violation of § 30.02(a)(1) constitutes generic burglary of a dwelling. . . .

UNITED STATES v. AREVALO,, 688 F. App'x 308 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . the subsection of the Texas burglary statute that supports such an enhancement, Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. DAVILA, L., 688 F. App'x 285 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . based on his 2012 Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . Conde-Castaneda, 753 F.3d 172, 175-77 (5th Cir. 2014), our court concluded: § 30.02(a) was divisible . . . because of the differing elements required for § 30.02(a)(1) and (a)(3); and, a conviction under § 30.02 . . . (a)(1), but not under § 30.02(a)(3), qualified as generic burglary. . . . Montalvo maintains state-court documents do not explicitly state whether he was convicted under § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. MYERS,, 688 F. App'x 276 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . under the modified categorical approach, show that Myers was convicted of violating Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. LINARES- BRICENO,, 687 F. App'x 385 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 30.02, By failing to raise any specific error in the revocation or revocation sentence, he has abandoned . . . He argues that § 30.02(a) is not divisible and, in the alternative, that the Government failed to show . . . violence because the judgment references § 30.01(a)(1) while the indictment tracks the language of § 30.02 . . . Section 30.02(a) of the Texas Penal Code is divisible, and a violation of § 30.02(a)(1) constitutes generic . . . established that a conflict renders the judgment unreliable for purposes of determining which subsection of § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. SEGUNDO,, 687 F. App'x 376 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . In 2008, Segundo was convicted of burglary of a habitation, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02( . . . Because § 30.02(a) is divisible, the court, under the modified categorical approach, may consider certain . . . These documents show Segundo was convicted under § 30.02(a)(1), which constitutes generic burglary of . . .

UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON,, 686 F. App'x 279 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . More specifically, Johnson argues that Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a) is not divisible. . . . Johnson also argues that § 30.02(a) does not constitute generic burglary of a dwelling because it encompasses . . . not err in applying the crime-of-violence enhancement because Johnson was convicted of • violating § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. HERROLD,, 685 F. App'x 302 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . predicate because Mathis compels the conclusion that Texas’s burglary provision, Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . Uribe, this court held that Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a) remained divisible after Mathis. . . .

YESH MUSIC, LLC K. v. AMAZON. COM, INC., 249 F. Supp. 3d 645 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)

. . . Librarian of Cong., 608 F.3d 861, 863 (D.D.C. 2010); see generally Nimmer on Copyright § 30.02. . . .

UNITED STATES v. CASTILLO- RIVERA,, 853 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . Constante, 544 F.3d 584, 585, 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (relying on the language of TPC § 30.02(a) to conclude . . .

UNITED STATES v. SIMPSON,, 682 F. App'x 299 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . Simpson argues that he only pleaded guilty to a burglary offense under subsection 30.02(a)(3) of the . . . A conviction under the former does not count, a crime of violence because section 30.02(a)(3) does not . . . Penal Code § 30.02(a). . . . .

UNITED STATES v. MONDRAGON,, 680 F. App'x 315 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 2L1.2(b)(1) because of his prior burglary conviction under Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a). . . . We have previously held that Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a) is divisible and recently reaffirmed this holding . . . Accordingly, Mondragon, who was convicted under Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(1), qualified for the sentencing . . .

UNITED STATES v. NIXON, Jr., 673 F. App'x 459 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . (3) based on his prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation because (1) Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . (a) is not a divisible statute and (2) not every violation of § 30.02(a) qualifies as a crime of violence . . .

UNITED STATES v. De TREVINO- RODRIGUEZ,, 672 F. App'x 490 (5th Cir. 2017)

. . . determination that his prior conviction for burglary of a habitation in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. BERNEL- AVEJA, B., 844 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . The Texas offense at issue was set forth in Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(3), which . criminalized “entering . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(3), was not generic burglary because it did not contain the element of intent . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(3)); Herrera-Montes, 490 F.3d at 391 (addressing Tenn. . . . Penal Code Ann, § 30.02(a)(3)). . Id. 587. . Ohio Rev. . . . Penal Code § 30.02(a)(3) (similar). . 490 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2007). . Id. at 391 (citing Tenn. . . . Penal Code] section [30.02](a)(3) necessarily developed the intent to commit the crime while remaining . . . . § 30.02(a)(1) (West 2011) Wis. Stat. . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(2) (West 2011) Wyo. Stat. . . . Bonilla, the Fourth Circuit held that a conviction under Texas Penal Code section 30.02(a)(3) qualified . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202; Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 13, § 1201; Va. . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02 (West 2011)). . Id. at 192-93. . Id. at 193. . Id. . Id. . United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. CASTRO- ALFONSO,, 841 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . Garcia-Mendez’s “burglary of a habitation” conviction fell under §§ 30.01(1) and 30.02(a)(1) of the Texas . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(1). . . . conviction under § 39-14-403 is even more closely akin to Garcia-Mendez’s Texas conviction under § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. ROJAS- IBARRA, 669 F. App'x 269 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . court relied on Rojas-Ibarra’s prior conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . of a dwelling” to enhance his sentence because there is no evidence identifying the subsection of § 30.02 . . . 2014) (applying a modified categorical approach to determine whether a defendant’s conviction under § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. BRYANT,, 669 F. App'x 238 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . Bryant had previously been convicted under Texas’s burglary of a habitation statute, Texas Penal -Code § 30.02 . . . (a), and Bryant had admitted to violating Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(1) and (a)(3) in his judicial confession . . . modified categorical approach, we determined that Uribe had confessed to and been convicted under § 30.02 . . . Like Uribe, Bryant confessed to violating § 30.02(a)(1) and (a)(3), and was convicted under § 30.02(a . . . Because 30.02(a)(1) is a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines, Bryant’s crime of violence . . .

UNITED STATES v. URIBE,, 838 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . Penal Code § 30.02(a), his presen-tence report included, and the district court applied, a 16-level crime . . . Penal Code § 30.02(a). . . . Uribe confessed to violating § 30.02(a)(1) and (a)(3), and he was convicted under § 30.02(a). . . . him under . § 30.02 generally. . . . Penal Code § 30.02(a), was later amended to include “assault’’ in every subsection. . . .

UNITED STATES v. HOWELL,, 838 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . Penal Code § 30.02(a)). . Id. at 177-78. . U.S. . . .

UNITED STATES v. STRECKER,, 654 F. App'x 652 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . argues that the state court records do not indicate whether he was convicted under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . (a)(1) or Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(3) for his burglary of a habitation and his attempted burglary . . . Because § 30.02(a)(3) does not constitute generic burglary, he asserts that the statute can be violated . . . The documentation submitted to the sentencing court established that Strecker was convicted under § 30.02 . . . A conviction under § 30.02(a)(1) qualifies as a generic burglary offense. See United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. MEMBRENO- DAVID,, 650 F. App'x 194 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . Penal Code §§ 30.02, 30.04. . . .

UNITED STATES v. HERNANDEZ- BORJAS,, 641 F. App'x 367 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . Penal Code § 30.02(a). . . . Penal Code § 30.02(a)(1). . . . under § 30.02(a)(1). . . . The Government asserts that, because § 30.02(a)(1) and § 30.02(a)(3) require proof of different facts . . . penalty provisions — § 30.02(c)(2) (second-degree felony), or § 30.02(d) (first-degree felony). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HERROLD,, 813 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . our holding in Conde-Castaneda, in which we held that burglary of a building under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . Section 30.02 of the Texas Penal Code is a generic burglary statute, punishing nonconsensual entry into . . . Our reasoning admittedly never explicitly stated which provision of 30.02 we were classifying as generic . . . As we later clarified, Silva “could have only been referring to § 30.02(a)(1)” in holding that Texas . . . Hageon, 418 Fed.Appx. 295, 298 (5th Cir.2011) ("The Texas crime of burglary as defined in § 30.02(a)( . . .

UNITED STATES v. BRYANT,, 615 F. App'x 199 (5th Cir. 2015)

. . . 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), to determine which of the three alternatives of Section 30.02 . . . In Conde-Castaneda we further held that, where, as here, a defendant was indicted under both Section 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ- TORRES,, 615 F. App'x 174 (5th Cir. 2015)

. . . The indictment and judgment establish that Ramirez-Torres was convicted under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. WILSON,, 622 F. App'x 393 (5th Cir. 2015)

. . . Presley argues for the first time on appeal that his Texas burglary conviction under Section 30.02(a) . . . In that case, we noted that “[a] burglary conviction under Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(1) qualifies as . . . a crime of violence [under the career offender guideline] but a conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) does . . . Clair, because a conviction under Section 30.02(a)(3) is not a crime of violence. . . . But Constante clearly held that a conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) is not a violent felony. . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. EMEARY, Jr., 794 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2015)

. . . The bill of information for the 1998 conviction reveals that it was under § 30.02(a)(3) of the Texas . . . ACCA’s fifteen-year minimum sentence because, including the 1998 conviction under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . In Constante, 544 F.3d at 587, this court held that convictions under Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(3) . . . .3d 619 (5th Cir.2014), principally because I believed that it was unclear whether Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . Post-Johnson, it is now clear without any room for doubt that Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(3) offenses . . .

UNITED STATES v. ST. CLAIR, VI, St., 608 F. App'x 192 (5th Cir. 2015)

. . . applying the career offender guideline because his prior burglary convictions under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . Clair’s three prior convictions were for violations of Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(3). . . . Clair’s two convictions under § 30.02(a)(3) are not crimes of violence. . . . Constante repeatedly stated that a conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) is not a violent felony. . . . But Constante clearly held that a conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) is not a violent felony. . . .

ALLIED WASTE NORTH AMERICA, INC. a BFI LLC, a v. LEWIS, KING, KRIEG WALDROP, P. C. a PLLC, a Jr. LLC, a, 93 F. Supp. 3d 835 (M.D. Tenn. 2015)

. . . Defendants failed to timely designate and produce the witness in accordance with the requirements of Rule 30.02 . . . trial which advised the jury that it could infer that Allied/BFI’s policies and procedures and Rule 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. CUEVAS- BRAVO, a k a, 601 F. App'x 738 (10th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 30.02. . . .

UNITED STATES v. LEDEZMA- RODRIGUEZ,, 595 F. App'x 435 (5th Cir. 2015)

. . . a person who has “a greater right to possession of the property than the actor,” Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. SANCHEZ, Jr., 592 F. App'x 317 (5th Cir. 2015)

. . . First, he asserts his prior convictions for burglary under Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a) are not violent . . .

UNITED STATES v. MORIN- GUTIERREZ,, 587 F. App'x 221 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 30.02(a)(1) for entering a habitation without the effective consent of the owner with the intent . . . A conviction under § 30.02(a)(1) qualifies as a generic burglary offense because § 30.02(a)(1) includes . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. EMEARY, Jr., 773 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . The district court classified Emeary’s prior conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) of the Texas Penal Code for . . . words, under the reasoning of Ramirez, it remains an open question whether Emeary’s conviction under § 30.02 . . . There is no definitive answer in the decisions of the Supreme Court or this circuit whether Emeary’s § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. WALLACE,, 584 F. App'x 263 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 30.02 (Vernon 2011). . . . (a)(3) because only a § 30.02(a)(1) conviction is a first degree felony. . . . (a)(1) and § 30.02(a)(3), and the judgment recited only that he had been convicted under § 30.02(c)(2 . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(c)(2). . . . (c)(2) means that the conviction may still be considered a violation of § 30.02(a)(1). . . .

UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ- MATA,, 582 F. App'x 527 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . Guidelines § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) based on his Texas conviction for burglary under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. MACIAS- FUENTES,, 582 F. App'x 437 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . Aug. 25, 2014), wherein we held that § 30.02 of the Texas Penal Code was divisible and that a written . . . (a)(1) and § 30.02(a)(3), was sufficient to establish that the defendant was convicted of both offenses . . . alleged in the indictment and thus sufficiently establishes that he was convicted of violating both § 30.02 . . . (a)(1) and § 30.02(a)(3). . . . Because § 30.02(a)(1) qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines, the district court did not . . .

UNITED STATES v. FEARANCE,, 582 F. App'x 416 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 30.02 is divisible and that a written judicial confession containing an admission to two types of . . . burglary proscribed in the Texas statute, specifically § 30.02(a)(1) and § 30.02(a)(3), is sufficient . . . Fearance’s written judicial confession contained an admission to both § 30.02(a)(1) and § 30.02(a)(3) . . . Because § 30.02(a)(1) qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA, the district court did not err in . . .

BEATTY, v. STEPHENS,, 759 F.3d 455 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . Penal Code § 30.02(a)(1). . . .

UNITED STATES v. RISCAJCHE- SIQUINA, 30 F. Supp. 3d 580 (S.D. Tex. 2014)

. . . The main focus in the Texas cases has been Sections 30.02(a)l and (a)(3) of the Texas Penal Code. . . . Section 30.02 states in pertinent part: A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent . . . Penal Code § 30.02(a). . . . There is a dearth of authority that discusses subpart (2) of Section 30.02(a), involving the “remaining . . . Nevertheless, there are many number of Fifth Circuit cases that hold that Section 30.02(a) complies with . . .

UNITED STATES v. BIAS,, 569 F. App'x 632 (10th Cir. 2014)

. . . Bias: 1) pled guilty in Texas to burglary of a building under Texas Penal Code Annotated § 30.02(a)(3 . . .

UNITED STATES v. ANDERSON,, 755 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 30.02 qualified as a crime of violence for the purpose of categorizing him as a career offender pursuant . . . there are several methods by which a defendant may commit a burglary under Texas Penal Code Ann. § 30.02 . . . Anderson notes that there is no document that indicates which subsection of § 30.02 he violated. . . . His indictment included language from both Texas Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(1) and § 30.02(a)(3). . . .

UNITED STATES v. CONDE- CASTANEDA,, 753 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . Penal Code § 30.02(a). . . . Conde maintains that § 30.02(a)(1) and § 30.02(a)(3) should be grouped together and analyzed under the . . . As we stated earlier, this is exactly the case with § 30.02(a)(1) and § 30.02(a)(3). . . . Conde’s indictment establishes that Conde was charged with violating § 30.02(a)(1) and § 30.02(a)(3), . . . 30.02(a), and did so by entering a habitation. . . .

UNITED STATES v. CHAPMAN,, 21 F. Supp. 3d 839 (S.D. Tex. 2014)

. . . Penal Code §§ 30.02(a)(1), (a)(3). . . . (a)(3), not § 30.02(a)(1). . . . Penal Code 30.02). . . . Penal Code § 30.02(1). . . . The court in Silva did not distinguish between § 30.02(a)(1) and § 30.02(a)(3). . . .

TAYLOR, v. FCI MARIANNA,, 557 F. App'x 911 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 161— 62 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that a conviction under § 30.02 was a violent felony . . . Silva foreclosed his argument that a conviction under Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(3) was not a violent . . . Therefore, since his prior convictions under § 30.02(a)(3) were no longer violent felonies, he should . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a). . . . Acknowledging that Silva had determined that a conviction under § 30.02 constituted a violent felony . . .

UNITED STATES v. CASTANEDA,, 740 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . Whether Castaneda was convicted under § 30.02(a)(1) or § 30.02(a)(3) therefore matters because the former . . . In the instant case, to determine whether § 30.02(a)(1) or § 30.02(a)(3) formed the basis of Castaneda . . . while § 30.02(a)(1) is a generic burglary, § 30.02(a)(3) is not. . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a) (West Supp.2000). . . . . Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(3) (West Supp.2000). . . . .

UNITED STATES v. HOOVER, III,, 548 F. App'x 300 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . prior conviction for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. ARMENDARIZ- PEREZ,, 543 F. App'x 876 (10th Cir. 2013)

. . . Armendariz-Perez’s prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . Rather, it appears the only court which has considered Texas Penal Code § 30.02 on categorical grounds . . . Texas Penal Code § 30.02, to which Mr. . . . Texas Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(1). . . . Texas Penal Code Ann. §§ 30.01 (1 )(B) and 30.02(a)(1). . . . . Error In determining that convictions for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 categorically . . . my view, the district court erred by treating all burglaries of habitations under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . Texas case law tells us that convictions under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 can reach “non-dwellings,” including . . . without the effective consent of Emilio Perez, the owner thereof, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . Order Deferring Adjudication listed as the offense charged "Burglary of a Habitation Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

CANA- CORONADO, v. H. HOLDER, Jr. U. S., 547 F. App'x 463 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . The BIA noted that, under § 30.02(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code, a person commits burglary if he “enters . . .

UNITED STATES v. MORALES- RAMIREZ,, 540 F. App'x 368 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 30.02(A)(1) And (A)(3), which provide different means of committing burglary of a habitation. . . . This court has concluded that an offense under § 30.02(a)(1) constitutes a crime of violence for purposes . . . Conversely, this court has held that an offense under § 30.02(a)(3) is not a “violent felony” under 18 . . .

UNITED STATES v. GOMEZ, Jr., 539 F. App'x 528 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . A burglary conviction under Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(1) qualifies as a crime of violence but a conviction . . . under § 30.02(a)(3) does not qualify. . . . Gomez’s burglary indictment, in effect, conjunctively charged violations of § 30.02(a)(1) and (a)(3). . . . We must consider, therefore, that Gomez was convicted under § 30.02(a)(3) which does not require proof . . .

UNITED STATES v. PEREZ,, 523 F. App'x 287 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) based on a Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . . that, under the Armed Career Criminal Act, a conviction for Texas burglary of a habitation under § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. GARCIA- GUILLEN,, 520 F. App'x 243 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . Garcia-Guillen contends that his prior conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. OVALLE- CASTILLO,, 544 F. App'x 379 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . conviction for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. MUNOZ- GUERRERO, v., 547 F. App'x 416 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on a Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation under § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. EIKELBOOM,, 546 F. App'x 370 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . However, a conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) does not constitute a COV because that statutory subsection . . . The first paragraphs of both state indictments track the language of the version of § 30.02(a)(1) in . . . (d) proves that he was convicted under § 30.02(a)(1). . . . However, unlike the version of § 30.02(d) relied upon in Morales-Ordaz, the version of § 30.02(d) applicable . . . See § 30.02(d) (West 1993). . . .

UNITED STATES v. MORONES- VARGAS,, 519 F. App'x 244 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . )(1)(A)(ii) based on a Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code Section 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ,, 545 F. App'x 315 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) based on a Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. GONZALES,, 534 F. App'x 230 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 2L1.2 based upon his prior conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. MELENDEZ- HERNANDEZ,, 517 F. App'x 279 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) based on a Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation under § 30.02 . . .

THRESHOLD MEDIA CORP. v. RELATIVITY MEDIA, LLC,, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2013)

. . . Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts § 7:62 (3d ed.2012); see also 6 Nimmer, supra, at § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. GOMEZ,, 516 F. App'x 348 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . Silva Gomez contends that his prior conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. CAMPOS- CONTRERAS,, 514 F. App'x 490 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on a Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation under § 30.02 . . .