Cases from cite.case.law:

J. KLAUBER, v. FIRST FEDERAL BANK OF FLORIDA, 198 So. 3d 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . . § 30.30(1), Fla. Stat. • (2014). The trial court’s order required Mr. . . .

SIMPSON, v. TOWN OF WARWICK POLICE DEPARTMENT,, 159 F. Supp. 3d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

. . . Law § 30.30. PI. Br. 5 (letter from ADA Kelly); Defs. 56.1, ¶ 56; Sisco Aff. 2. B. . . . because there ha[d] been no Grand Jury action or arrest within the statutory time period set forth in CPL 30.30 . . . "because there has been no Grand Jury action or arrest within the statutory period set forth in CPL 30.30 . . . Law § 30.30 is New York’s speedy-trial statute, whereas N.Y. Crim. Proc. . . . Law § 30.10, not § 30.30, that sets forth the applicable limitations periods: five years for third-degree . . .

D. BERRY, v. MARCHINKOWSKI,, 137 F. Supp. 3d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . . § 30.30, because no action had been taken in four years since the filing of the criminal complaint. . . . plaintiff] [would] necessarily result in a dismissal pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . . C.P.L. § 30.30 generally constitutes a favorable disposition for malicious prosecution purposes. . . . See Smith-Hunter, 712 N.Y.S.2d 438, 734 N.E.2d at 753 (reasoning that a § 30.30 dismissal is generally . . . instances where a malicious prosecution defendant can show that the circumstances surrounding a CPL 30.30 . . .

CECORT REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. LLOMPART- ZENO,, 100 F. Supp. 3d 145 (D.P.R. 2015)

. . . The yearly rent per square foot for the Court of Appeals was increased to $30.30/sq.ft. for office space . . .

RUCKS, v. CITY OF NEW YORK,, 96 F. Supp. 3d 138 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . . § 30.30. (Tr. 418). . . .

IN RE MOORE, Jr. v., 508 B.R. 488 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . §§ 30.30(l)(a); 56.021. . Doc. No. 40, ¶ 67. . . . .

STRAKER, v. T. JONES, U. S. U. S., 986 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

. . . Procedure Law § 30.30, after the prosecution indicated that it was not prepared to pursue the case. . . .

EDWARDS, v. SUPERINTENDENT, SOUTHPORT C. F., 991 F. Supp. 2d 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)

. . . Criminal Procedure Law §§ 30.20, 30.30, and 210.20, the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. . . . Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law Section 30.30(4), certain time periods must be excluded when computing . . . Accordingly, Petitioner’s Section 30.30 speedy trial claims are not a basis for relief. . . .

MARSHALL, v. P. O. RANDALL, No. P. O. No. P. O. s, 719 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2013)

. . . 160 (2d Cir.2002) (“[U]nder New York law, a dismissal pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . .

RACK ROOM SHOES, SKIZ LLC, v. UNITED STATES,, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2012)

. . . Women’s or girl’s blouses, Heading: 6205: Men’s or boy’s shirts shirts, and short-blouses Subheading: 30.30 . . . Women’s or girl’s blouses, shirts, Heading: 6205: Men’s or boy’s shirts and short-blouses Subheading: 30.30 . . . and similar articles, knitted or crocheted 127 Subheading: 30.40: Of synthetic fibers, Subheading: 30.30 . . . vests) and similar articles, knitted or crocheted Subheading: 90.40: Of other textile ma- Subheading: 30.30 . . . imported as parts of sets_ Heading: 6206: Women’s or girl’s blouses, shirts, and short-blouses Subheading: 30.30 . . .

YANDOW, v. G. KRONAU, J. N. Y. DMV,, 474 F. App'x 797 (2d Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 30.30. . . .

UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE, LLC, v. L. SOLIS,, 824 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2011)

. . . . § 60-30.30. II. . . .

ANILAO, v. J. SPOTA, III,, 774 F. Supp. 2d 457 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . .2d 438, 734 N.E.2d 750, 755 (2000) (noting that a dismissal under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . . were dismissed on statutory speedy-trial grounds pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 30.30 . . .

W. DEARSTYNE, v. MAZZUCA,, 48 F. Supp. 3d 222 (N.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . Section 30.30 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law provides that the prosecution must be ready for . . . CPL § 30.30(l)(a). . . . failure to obtain the videotapes prior to March of 1990 “cannot be charged to the People since CPL 30.30 . . . Procedure Law] is a statutory time in which the People of New York must be ready for trial; Section 30.30 . . . Sept. 29, 1997) (“[A] C.P.L. § 30.30 claim has been held not to raise the federal constitutional speedy . . .

MANGINO v. INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF PATCHOGUE, P., 739 F. Supp. 2d 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . .2d 438, 734 N.E.2d 750, 753 (2000) (noting that a dismissal under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . .

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR,, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D.N.M. 2009)

. . . Defendant also disclosed to the informant the exact location where he hid the 30.30 caliber rifle he . . . payment of said expert’s invoice for services rendered, which included examination and/or testing of the 30.30 . . .

WONG, v. YOO, v., 649 F. Supp. 2d 34 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . Harvey, 95 N.Y.2d 191, 195-98, 712 N.Y.S.2d 438, 734 N.E.2d 750 (N.Y.2000) (a “CPL 30.30 dismissal” based . . .

KIRK, v. BURGE,, 646 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . grounds for reversal: (1) violation of New York State’s speedy trial law, Criminal Procedure Law section 30.30 . . . Law § 30.30), such a claim is insufficient to preserve a federal constitutional speedy trial claim, see . . . Johnson, 119 F.Supp.2d 366, 374 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (“Because C.P.L. § 30.30 is merely a state law-provision . . . requiring the prosecution to be ready for trial, a § 30.30 claim does not raise a federal constitutional . . .

VERMONT v. BRILLON, 556 U.S. 81 (U.S. 2009)

. . . . §30.30(4) (West Supp. 2009); Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 45(d) (1994); Ark. Rule Crim. . . .

EDWARD J. GOODMAN LIFE INCOME TRUST, v. JABIL CIRCUIT, INC., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (M.D. Fla. 2009)

. . . 35, 44) These disclosures allegedly caused Jabil’s share price to drop “from an adjusted close of $30.30 . . .

McDAY, v. B. TRAVIS, L. P., 303 F. App'x 928 (2d Cir. 2008)

. . . Law § 30.30(l)(a). . The City’s reliance on Murray v. . . .

T. CUMMINGS, v. BURGE,, 581 F. Supp. 2d 436 (W.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . Cummings concedes that the claim in state court was couched in terms of a violation of C.P.L. § 30.30 . . . To the extent that Cummings alleges a denial of his statutory rights under C.P.L. § 30.30, that claim . . . Section 30.30 [of New York’s Criminal Procedure Law] is a statutory time frame in which the People of . . . Law § 30.30. . . . Law § 30.30(1). . . .

UNITED STATES v. TROY, 564 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Me. 2008)

. . . Law § 30.30(1)(a). Mr. Troy cites two New York cases that discuss this requirement. People v. . . . Law § 30.30(4)(b). . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. SUPERINTENDENT, COLLINS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,, 549 F. Supp. 2d 226 (N.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . The purpose of section § 30.30 is to provide a statutory time frame in which the prosecution must be . . . Section 30.30 is not, therefore, a “statutory embodiment of the constitutional guarantee to a speedy . . . Law § 30.30 and state law, it does not raise a federal constitutional claim upon which federal habeas . . . ready for trial, a § 30.30 claim does not raise a federal constitutional claim.”) . . . Law § 30.30 is insufficient to put the state appellate court on notice of the federal constitutional . . .

ROA, v. A. PORTUONDO,, 548 F. Supp. 2d 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . Schwartz should have requested a Singer hearing rather than merely filing a CPL § 30.30 motion challenging . . .

EDWARD J. GOODMAN LIFE INCOME TRUST, v. JABIL CIRCUIT, INC., 560 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (M.D. Fla. 2008)

. . . 36, 163, 179) These disclosures “caused the Company’s stock price to drop from an adjusted close of $30.30 . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. CITY OF NEW YORK,, 535 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . Law § 30.30. . . .

JONES, v. M. CUOMO,, 254 F. App'x 6 (2d Cir. 2007)

. . . Criminal Procedure Law Section 30.30 on his behalf—his argument rests on a faulty legal premise. . . . Jones would not have been entitled to relief under § 30.30(5) unless the People had waited more than . . . Holmes, 105 A.D.2d 803, 481 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (NY.App.Div.1984) (holding in the context of § 30.30 that . . .

L. ANSPACH, a A. ANSPACH E. A. E. v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH F. R. N. N. M. D., 503 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2007)

. . . See, e.g., 28 Pa.Code § 30.30 (requiring that blood donors between the ages of 17 and 18 have a written . . .

SMITH, v. M. MAHER,, 468 F. Supp. 2d 466 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . , dealt only with state statutory ready-for-trial issues under C.P.L. § 30.30, and employed only state . . . C.P.L. § 30.30 requires only that the prosecution be ready for trial within a prescribed time frame, . . . Because C.P.L. § 30.30 is merely a state law provision requiring the prosecution to be ready for trial . . . , a § 30.30 claim does not raise a federal constitutional claim. . . . Law § 30.30(l)(a). . . .

MALLET, v. MILLER,, 432 F. Supp. 2d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . Law 30.30 (2006) (“ § 30.30”). . . . is patently merit-less, as § 30.30, by its terms, does not apply to cases brought under the statute . . . See § 30.30(3)(a) (stating that speedy trial rule outlined in subdivisions one and two of rule “do not . . . March 26, 2003) (“Obviously, the failure to make a meritless section 30.30 motion does not amount to . . . According to § 30.30, a motion to dismiss must be granted if the State is not ready for trial within . . .

GORMAN, v. S. GOORD,, 154 F. App'x 269 (2d Cir. 2005)

. . . . § 30.30 to dismiss the indictment for failure to bring the case to trial within the prescribed period . . . Petitioner’s counsel made his own § 30.30 motion soon after. . . . After Dunn’s re-arrest in 1993, the state court granted his § 30.30 motion, charging against the state . . . In 1996, petitioner was also re-arrested and renewed his § 30.30 motion, which was denied. . . . That motion was denied, and the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that § 30.30 was not violated and . . .

VASQUEZ, v. G. PARROTT,, 397 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . The Magistrate Judge noted that New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 allows the prosecution six months . . . reviewing the “file, folder,” and concluded that “the People have met them requirement under Section 30.30 . . .

LLERANDO- PHIPPS, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK,, 390 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . court dismissed all charges against him under the “Speedy Trial Act,” New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . .

BROWN, v. NEW YORK STATE,, 374 F. Supp. 2d 314 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . . § 30.30 is without merit. . . . Law § 30.30(l)(a); People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 476 N.E.2d 287 (1985). . . . Law § 30.30(4). . . .

In MARKET RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORP., 320 B.R. 841 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004)

. . . The trustee’s filed time records reflect a total of 30.30 hours devoted to the administration of this . . .

WEBSTER, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK,, 333 F. Supp. 2d 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

. . . December 4, 2002 pursuant to the speedy trial provision of New York’s Criminal Procedure Law, Section 30.30 . . .

GOLUB, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK,, 334 F. Supp. 2d 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

. . . precedents hold that a dismissal of criminal charges pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . .

INGERSOLL, As v. E. LAPLANTE,, 76 F. App'x 350 (2d Cir. 2003)

. . . Attorney’s Office failed to comply with the speedy trial requirements of New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . .

L. WALKER, v. G. BENNETT,, 262 F. Supp. 2d 25 (W.D. Pa. 2003)

. . . .”) § 30.30. Petition (“Pet’n”) at 5; Petitioner’s Habeas Br. (“Pet’r Habeas Br.”) at 6-8. . . . A New York § 30.30 statutory claim is distinct from a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim. . . . Therefore, a petitioner who raises only a statutory speedy trial claim pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30 has . . . See C.P.L. § 30.30(4)(b); Rule 1000.3 Appendix. . . . C.P.L. § 30.30(l)(a). . . .

UNITED STATES v. K. FRANCIS, Jr., 327 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2003)

. . . In addition, officers found a Norinco .45 caliber handgun, a Winchester shotgun, a .22 rifle, and a 30.30 . . .

R. DONOVAN, v. M. BRIGGS,, 250 F. Supp. 2d 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . . § 30.30. . . .

v. COUNTY OF NASSAU,, 46 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir. 2002)

. . . the District Attorney’s Office, the charges were ultimately dismissed under Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . .

ROGERS, v. CITY OF AMSTERDAM,, 303 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2002)

. . . However, under New York law, a dismissal pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 — New York . . . against Pelcher will necessarily result in a dismissal pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . . See N.Y.C.P.L. §§ 10.30(1), 30.30, 210.20(l)(g). . . .

MACKENZIE, v. A. PORTUONDO,, 208 F. Supp. 2d 302 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)

. . . Penal Law § 30.30(4) ]. . . .

WALES, v. JACK M. BERRY, INC., 192 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (M.D. Fla. 2001)

. . . 89.75 18.75 71.00 Gold 109.25 4.75 104.50 Hinshaw 126.75 74.75 52.00 Walsh 60.00 28.50 31.50 Lucrezi 30.30 . . .

DOE, v. CITY OF NEW YORK,, 201 F.R.D. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

. . . Greiner, 22 F.Supp.2d 291, 293 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (CPL § 30.30 provides for mandatory dismissal with prejudice . . . Law § 30.30 (McKinney 1998)). . . .

DAVIS, a. k. a. v. MCLAUGHLIN,, 122 F. Supp. 2d 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . .”) § 30.30, contending that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. . . . to C.P.L. § 440.10 on the grounds that (1) he was denied his right to a speedy trial under C.P.L. § 30.30 . . . application for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming a denial of his speedy trial rights under C.P.L. § 30.30 . . . Petitioner asserted a speedy trial claim pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30 a full eleven months after his arrest . . . by the trial record, indicated that petitioner’s attorney “tacitly withdrew [petitioner’s C.P.L. § 30.30 . . .

CADILLA, v. JOHNSON,, 119 F. Supp. 2d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . , a § 30.30 claim does not raise a federal constitutional claim. . . . The New York Slate legislature amended portions of C.P.L. § 30.30 in 1996. . . . See C.P.L. § 30.30 (McKinney Supp. 2000). . . . C.P.L. § 30.30(2)(a) (McKinney 1992). . . . . C.P.L. § 30.30(l)(a) (McKinney 1992). . . . .

K. BORDEAU Jr. S. v. VILLAGE OF DEPOSIT, 113 F. Supp. 2d 292 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . Law § 30.30. . . .

THOMAS, v. GREINER,, 111 F. Supp. 2d 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . assistance of counsel; coercion and duress in the plea; violation of his speedy trial rights under CPL § 30.30 . . .

BENJAMIN, v. B. KERIK,, 102 F. Supp. 2d 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . . § 30.30 motion but was unable to do so because the relevant Criminal Procedure Law book was not available . . . Jones claimed that his advisor filed a “grossly insufficient” C.P.L.R. § 30.30 motion on his behalf. . . . defendant may bring a motion to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 30.30 . . .

SORCE, v. P. ARTUZ,, 73 F. Supp. 2d 292 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)

. . . . § 30.30. . . .

HOWARD, v. J. LACY,, 58 F. Supp. 2d 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)

. . . CPL § 30.30 and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging denial of the right to a speedy trial. . . . second branch of defendant’s motion based upon statutory “speedy trial” considerations under CPL § 30.30 . . . court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds pursuant to CPL § 30.20 and CPL § 30.30 . . . At most, only 165 days are chargeable to the People pursuant to CPL 30.30, even if the period preceding . . . Defendant’s remaining procedural and substantive arguments concerning the CPL 30.30 motion are without . . .

C. WHITE, v. P. KEANE,, 51 F. Supp. 2d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)

. . . because: 1) he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to N.Y.CRIm.Proc.Law (“CPL”) § 30.30 . . . This delay forms the basis of petitioner’s speedy trial claim under CPL 30.30, which requires the People . . . and stated that “the People will provide minutes to the Court for review,” the People violated CPL 30.30 . . . that although the People announced their readiness for trial within the six-month period required CPL 30.30 . . . CPL 30.30 addresses prosecutorial readiness, not readiness by the court. People v. . . .

COVINGTON, v. CITY OF NEW YORK P. A B C D- J. K, 171 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999)

. . . Law § 30.30. . . .

JACKSON, v. LEONARDO,, 162 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998)

. . . claim. .Jackson also argued that his right to a speedy trial under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . .

ERDHEIM, v. H. GREINER,, 22 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)

. . . Crim.Proc.Law § 30.30 (McKinney 1998). . Id. . Parron v. . . . CPL § 30.30(4)(f). See People v. . . . Twenty-six days were includible in the § 30.30 limit until June 14, 1993. . . . This period was excludable under CPL § 30.30(4)(f). . . . This period was excludable under CPL § 30.30(4)(b). . . .

HANSEL, v. SHERIDAN, A., 991 F. Supp. 69 (N.D.N.Y. 1998)

. . . L. 30.30(1), (5). . . .

MURPHY, v. LYNN, a a a a, 118 F.3d 938 (2d Cir. 1997)

. . . . § 30.30 (McKinney 1992). . . .

VOLVO GM HEAVY TRUCK CORPORATION, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR B., 118 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 1997)

. . . See 41 C.F.R. 60-30.30 (1996). Indisputably, Volvo GM has not yet taken such an appeal. . . . of Labor’s Administrative Review Board issues a final administrative order. 41 C.F.R. 60-30.29 & 60-30.30 . . .

GIBRIANO, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,, 965 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)

. . . CPL § 30.30. (Petition at 3, ¶ 9; Government Brief at 3; Olson Aff. Ex. B.) . . . His direct appeal, however, raised only a state statutory speedy trial claim pursuant to CPL § 30.30. . . . Section 30.30 is a statutory time frame in which the People of the State of New York must be ready for . . . trial; Section 30.30 is not, as such, a statutory embodiment of the constitutional guarantee to a speedy . . . when the petitioner 'twice raised his statutory “speedy trial” claim in the state court under Section 30.30 . . .

BOYD, v. HAWK,, 965 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)

. . . That results in the exclusion of 21 days pursuant to CPL § 30.30(4)(f). . . . motion to address the grand jury under advisement and this additional time is excludable under CPL § 30.30 . . . C.P.L. § 30.30(l)(a). . . . CPL § 30.30(4) tolls the limitation period when there is, inter alia: (1) "a reasonable period of delay . . . ; or (3) a "period during which the defendant is without counsel through no fault of the court.” (§ 30.30 . . .

VELASQUEZ, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, P. O. P. O. P. O. ID P. O. ID, 960 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)

. . . dismissed for failure to comply with the speedy trial requirements of New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . .

HEINFLING, v. COLAPINTO, H. s, 946 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

. . . Plaintiff alleges that these charges were later dismissed in September 1994 pursuant to N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 30.30 . . .

WATSON, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, a R., 92 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 1996)

. . . October 15, 1992, all charges against Watson were dismissed on speedy trial grounds pursuant to section 30.30 . . .

VELEZ, v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,, 941 F. Supp. 300 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)

. . . that Petitioner is referring to the New York speedy trial provision, set forth at N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 30.30 . . . state courts where petitioner’s state appellate brief argued denial of right to speedy trial under § 30.30 . . . courts fair opportunity to consider federal speedy trial claim where he asserted right pursuant to § 30.30 . . .

MURPHY, v. LYNN,, 903 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)

. . . found that Murphy was denied his right to a speedy trial pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . .

McGANN, v. R. KELLY,, 891 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)

. . . Law § 30.30. See id. . . .

BACCHI, v. SENKOWSKI,, 884 F. Supp. 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)

. . . On direct appeal, petitioner argued that the People did not comply with CPL § 30.30(l)(a), in that they . . .

MURPHY, v. LYNN, a a, 53 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1995)

. . . contention that he had not been afforded the speedy trial guaranteed by New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 . . .

LANDY, v. IRIZARRY,, 884 F. Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)

. . . . § 30.30, on the ground that Plaintiff had not been afforded a speedy trial. . . .

COLLINS, v. SCULLY,, 878 F. Supp. 452 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)

. . . First, that the trial court erred in applying the provisions of § 30.30 of the New York Criminal Procedure . . . Court cannot address petitioner’s claims that the trial court erred in applying the provisions of § 30.30 . . .

LoPIZZO, v. S. LeFEVRE,, 863 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)

. . . that the state violated his right to a speedy trial pursuant New York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) § 30.30 . . . As applicable to petitioner, CPL § 30.30(l)(a) required the state to be ready for trial within six months . . . However, as respondent correctly observes in opposition to the petition, a claim of violation of CPL § 30.30 . . . claims that the state violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial by allegedly violating CPL § 30.30 . . . The Sixth Amendment does not mandate a six-month period as does CPL § 30.30(l)(a). . . .

C. BENTLEY, v. SCULLY,, 851 F. Supp. 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)

. . . following claims before the Appellate Division: (1) his statutory right to speedy trial pursuant to CPL § 30.30 . . . trial court’s determination that.no speedy trial violation occurred, pursuant to N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 30.30 . . . that the length of the delay does not violate the 180 day rule, as set forth in N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 30.30 . . .

TRINITY INDUSTRIES, INC. a v. REICH,, 901 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ark. 1993)

. . . . § 60-30.28—60-30.30. . . .

BERMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. M. v. C. JORLING,, 793 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)

. . . . § 30.01-30.30. Further regulations specific to oil tankers are found in 46 U.S.C. § 3703a. . . .

UNITED STATES v. SCHALTENBRAND,, 930 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1991)

. . . Deeb’s [sic] capacity as a Deputy Counselor under Regulation 30.30 and not in the capacity of an attorney . . .

GONZALEZ, v. SUPERINTENDENT, SULLIVAN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,, 761 F. Supp. 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)

. . . . § 30.30, and held that such a delay was not chargeable to the State. . . .

PARRON, v. C. QUICK,, 869 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1989)

. . . See N.Y.Crim.P.Law § 30.30. . . . Crim.P.Law § 30.30(l)(a) — because according to the trial court’s calculations, the prosecution did not . . . trial motion would have been granted, then prejudice to Par-rón is clear: violation of N.Y.Crim.P.Law § 30.30 . . .

BUITRAGO, v. J. SCULLY,, 705 F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)

. . . . § 30.30(l)(a) (McKinney 1981). . . .

MAESTRI v. JUTKOFSKY, Jr., 860 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988)

. . . . § 30.30(2)(d), and a maximum prison sentence of fifteen days upon conviction of any one violation, . . .

WHALEY, v. J. RODRIGUEZ,, 840 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1988)

. . . of counsel because his lawyer failed to make a pretrial motion to dismiss for violation of section 30.30 . . . Section 30.30(l)(a) provides that charges against a defendant accused of a felony must be dismissed on . . . (a)), continuances granted at the request of or with the consent of the defendant or his counsel (§ 30.30 . . . material to the People's case (§ 30.30(4)(g)). . . . The merits of Whaley’s argument that section 30.30 was violated must be weighed without regard to the . . .

WHALEY, v. RODRIGUEZ, N. Y., 656 F. Supp. 1512 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)

. . . N.Y.C.P.L. § 30.30 4(b). . . . P.L. § 30.30 3(b); see also People v. . . . C.P.L. § 30.30 4(c). . . . N.Y.C.P.L. § 30.30 4(c). In People v. . . . N.Y.C.P.L. § 30.30 4(c). . . .

UNITED STATES A M PETROLEUM, INC. a v. SANTA FE ENGINEERS, INC., 660 F. Supp. 1111 (S.D. Miss. 1987)

. . . 124.56 4/16/85 344315 108.40 4/18/85 1191 131.19 4/22/85 344295 6.60 4/22/85 1230 124.46 4/22/85 1219 30.30 . . .

J. GASSETT, a k a v. SCULLY,, 646 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)

. . . the issue that Gassett’s right to a speedy trial, pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 30.30 . . . Section 30.30(4)(c) places the burden on the State to prove that a defendant whose location is unknown . . . heard the prosecution’s evidence that the State had satisfied the “due diligence” requirement of CPL § 30.30 . . .

STERMAN K. v. FERRO CORPORATION W. M. N. A. E. O G., 785 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1986)

. . . The $30.30 repurchase price discussed by the parties was only tentative since Ferro’s board of directors . . . telephoned Rosenthal to advise him that, upon reconsideration, Crane could not agree to the discussed $30.30 . . . advised Crane that Ferro would consider increasing the purchase price per share to permit Crane to net $30.30 . . . contention is that since Ferro and Crane reached an “agreement in principle” to sell the stock at $30.30 . . . Crane resulted in a valid contract between the parties fixing the repurchase price of the stock at $30.30 . . .

BARBER, v. SCULLY,, 731 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1984)

. . . motion nor the affidavit gave notice of any change in the predicate for the speedy trial motion from CPL 30.30 . . .

W. DUNTON, Jr. v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, STATE NEW YORK,, 729 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1984)

. . . November 16, Dunton moved to dismiss on the ground that the sixty day limit for trial, N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 30.30 . . . See N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 30.30 (McKinney 1981 & Supp.1983). . . .

PETERS, v. QUICK,, 567 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)

. . . Proc.Law § 30.30 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1982). . . .

UNITED STATES ECCLESTON, v. J. HENDERSON,, 534 F. Supp. 813 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)

. . . However, as evidenced by its specific exclusion from the six month limit imposed by CPL § 30.30, homicide . . .

VAZQUEZ, E. W. L. v. D. GRAY, Jr. E. M. B., 523 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)

. . . Law § 30.30 (McKinney 1980 Supp.). . . .

D. GRANT, v. CREDITHRIFT OF AMERICA, INC., 402 So. 2d 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . Section 30.30(1), Fla. Stat. . . .