The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . . § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . ." § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .
. . . Generally, the limitations period begins to run "from the time the cause of action accrues," § 95.031 . . . Stat. (2013), which is "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs," § 95.031(1), . . . See § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat.; see also Willson , 211 So.3d at 365. . . .
. . . ." § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . suggest that any further amendment could include, any allegation supporting a tolling claim under section 95.031 . . .
. . . The Florida Legislature enacted section 95.031(2)(a), which codified the delayed discovery doctrine, . . . relevant question is when that four-year period began to run , and whether Tejera is authorized by section 95.031 . . . of conspiracy to perpetrate fraud in the inducement alleged an action "founded upon fraud," section 95.031 . . .
. . . . § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . ." § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . ." § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . See generally §§ 95.031, 95.11, Fla. Stat. (2006) ; see also Davis v. . . . accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." 217 So.3d at 1077 (quoting § 95.031 . . .
. . . ." § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017). Here, the plaintiffs argue dismissal was improper. . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(a); see also Davis v. Monahan , 832 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 2002). . . . Stat. § 95.031(1). The last element of the FDUTPA Claim is actual damages. See Dolphin LLC v. . . .
. . . Id. at 115 ; accord § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . See § 95.11(4)(g) ; § 95.031 ; Wagner , 629 So.2d at 114-15. . . .
. . . . § 95.031. . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(b). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(b)(3). Thus, the repose period is either 12 years or 20 years. . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(d). . . . taken by anyone at Piper to conceal the alleged defect, their claims are barred under Florida Statute § 95.031 . . . affirmative steps to conceal it, as required for the statute of repose to be tolled under Florida Statute § 95.031 . . .
. . . Stat. (2015) ; § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2015) ; Depicciotto v. Nationstar Mortg. . . .
. . . Stat. 95.031(1) states, “a cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(a) ) (emphasis omitted). . . .
. . . Florida's delayed discovery doctrine is codified in section 95.031(2)(a), and reads, in relevant part . . . exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3).... § 95.031 . . . Florida’s delayed discovery doctrine, as codified in section 95.031(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), provides . . .
. . . We reverse because Flanzér’s claim may be subject to the delayed discovery provisions of section 95.031 . . . commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered. § 95.031 . . . The Trustees challenge the application of section 95.031(2)(a) by emphasizing the elements that distinguish . . . But the uses of the prepositions “founded upon fraud” and “founded on fraud” in sections 95.031(2)(a) . . . As such, we see no reason why section 95.031(2)(a) would not apply to Flanzer’s claim—provided that Flanzer . . .
. . . . §§ 95.11(2)(b), 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .
. . . . §§ 95.11(3)(e), 95.031. . . . Id. § 95.031(2)(b). . . .
. . . .” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat.; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. . . .
. . . Monahan, 832 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 2002); see also § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(b), which states that products-liability actions accrue when “the facts giving rise to . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(b). . . .
. . . . § 95.11(2)(b)-(c), § 95.031(1). . . . Stat. § 95.11(2)(b)-(c), § 95.031(1), § 95.281; Smith, 61 F.3d at 1561; Bartram, 211 So.3d at 1012, 1019 . . .
. . . . § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. . § 95.03l(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . .
. . . Florida Statute Section 95.031 provides that “the time within which an action shall be begun under any . . . Section 95.031(1) in turn provides that a “cause of action accrues when the last element constituting . . . Stat. § 95.031. . Id. . Id. See also Mosher v. Anderson, 817 So.2d 812, 814 (Fla. 2002). . . . .
. . . . § 95.11(2)(b)-(c), § 95.031(1). . . .
. . . Stat. (2012) (jurisdictional statute of nonclaim); §§ 95.031(2) (prescribing periods of both limitations . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . .
. . . . § 95.031. . . . Id. § 95.031(a). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a); see also Davis v. . . .
. . . Lee, 678 So.2d 818, 821 (Fla. 1996)); see also § 95.031. . . . differently, courts applying a statute of limitations must follow the default rule codified in section 95.031 . . . Under the plain language of section 95.031(1), as applied in Davis, the cause of action accrues when . . . If we take section 95.031(l)’s directive that a cause of action accrues when its last element occurs . . . legal remedy-should be whether that tolling statute applies in any given ease, not whether section 95.031 . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(b); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-213(d); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16); Wash. Rev. . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(b); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13—213(d); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16); Wash. Rev. . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(b); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13—213(d); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16); Wash. Rev. . . .
. . . Graham, 767 So.2d 1179, 1184-85 (Fla. 2000) (quoting § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (1987)). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(1)). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . .
. . . . § 95.031. . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a). . . . Stat. §§ 95.031(2), 95.11(4)(a), (4)(b), (7). The state has no catch-all discovery statute. . . .
. . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat.; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. . . .
. . . Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Barred by Florida’s Statute of Limitations Under § 95.031(1), Fla. . . .
. . . “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs,” § 95.031(1 . . .
. . . . § 95.031. . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(b). This is commonly referred to as the delayed discovery rule. . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .
. . . See, e.g., § 95.031(2)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. . . . See, e.g., §§ 95.031(2)(a), .11(3)(j) (actions founded on fraud), .11(4)(b) (medical malpractice). . . .
. . . .” §§ 95.031(2)(b), 95.11(3), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . See § 95.031, Fla. . . .
. . . .” § 95.031. . . .
. . . . § 95.031. . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a). . . .
. . . .” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . Id. § 95.031(a). . . .
. . . See §§ 95.031(2)(a), 772.17, Fla. Stat. (2013); Seymour v. . . .
. . . . § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). The occurrence of a breach, or breaches, is a question of fact. . . . See §§ 95.031(2)(a) & (b), 95.11(4)(a) & (b), 95.11(7), Fla. Stat.. (2011). . . .
. . . We affirm because the statute of repose, section 95.031, Florida Statutes (2003), bars the product liability . . . Section 95.031(2)(b) is triggered once the product is delivered or the work completed. . . . The term “improvements to real property” in section 95.031(2)(b)1 is undefined. . . . The plain and obvious meaning of the language contained in section 95.031 supports this conclusion. . . . The products liability statute of repose, section 95.031, barred the Dominguezes’ cause of action. . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . .
. . . .” § 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .
. . . .” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 95.031. . . . Id. § 95.031(1). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a). . . . See id. § 95.031(1) (“A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a); Davis, 832 So.2d at 709 (claim accrues when the plaintiff “either knows or should . . .
. . . The defendants requested that the trial judge instruct the jury on section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes . . . Frazier’s fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to conceal claims were barred by section 95.031(2), the . . . ANALYSIS Pursuant' to the statute of repose contained in section 95.031(2), fraud claims “must be begun . . . Apr. 2, 2015), we recently held that the statute of repose provided in section 95.031(2), did not bar . . . In other words, we find that “the date of the commission of the alleged fraud” under section 95.031(2 . . .
. . . Engle -progeny case, is whether plaintiffs fraudulent concealment claim is barred pursuant to section 95.031 . . . Id. at 260 (citing § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat. (1993)). . . . Stat.) and products liability actions (§ 95.031(2)(b), Fla. . . . .” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. . . . See § 95.031(2)(d), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . Stat. 95.031(1), and therefore is also time-barred. . . .
. . . See § 95.031, Fla. . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(a) & (b); see Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 575 (holding that the “common defenses” rule applies . . .
. . . See § 95.031(1); Sarasota Welfare Home, Inc. v. . . .
. . . . § 95.031(1). . . .
. . . . § 95.031, Fla. Stat.; see Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978). . . . . § 95.031(1); see Bauld. . . . or equitable action founded on fraud must be brought within four years; however, pursuant to section 95.031 . . .
. . . legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument”); § 95.031 . . .
. . . reversibly erred by denying Reynolds’ requested jury instruction on the statute of repose, section 95.031 . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . .
. . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(1). The last element of a cause of action based on negligence is actual loss or damage. . . .
. . . See § 95.031(1) (“A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs . . .
. . . Section 95.031(1), Florida Statutes (2010), states that a “cause of action accrues when the last element . . .
. . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(b) does not extend the delayed discovery doctrine to wrongful death actions because . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a), the same logic applies here, and we therefore reject Burr’s argument for tolling . . .
. . . . § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). 1. . . . Pursuant to section 95.031(1), Florida Statutes, the Condominium Association’s claims for declaratory . . .
. . . See § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). The trial court entered summary judgment on Counts I and III. . . . “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” 95.031(1), . . .
. . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. . . .
. . . On the issue of the statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes, Reynolds argued below that . . . commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.” § 95.031 . . . that the trial court erred in denying its requested jury instruction on the statute of repose, section 95.031 . . . denying Reynolds’ requested jury instruction and verdict question on the statute of repose, section 95.031 . . .
. . . See § 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . commission of the alleged fraud,’ necessarily includes reliance by the plaintiff’) (quoting section 95.031 . . .
. . . See § 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . commission of the alleged fraud,’ necessarily includes reliance by the plaintiff’) (quoting section 95.031 . . .
. . . . § 95.031. . . . Stat. § 95.031(1). An action under FI. . . .
. . . .” § 95.031(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011); § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .
. . . . §§ 95.11(3)0'), 95.11(3)(p), 95.031(2)(a). . . . Stat. § 95.031(1), 95.11(2)(b). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(1). . . .
. . . begins to run only “ ‘when a cause of action accrues[,]’” Hearndon, 767 So.2d at 1184 (quoting section 95.031 . . . accrues “ ‘when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.’ ” Id. at 1185-86 (quoting § 95.031 . . .
. . . . § 95.031). . . . Stat. § 95.031). . . . Stat. § 95.031). . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)(j); § 95.031(2)(a). . . .
. . . Section 95.031(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes establishes a delayed discovery rule for actions founded . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a). . . . Although the Florida legislature amended § 95.031(2)(a) in 2003 to replace the phrase “[a]n action for . . . Section 95.031(2)(a) uses the phrase “founded upon fraud,” which parallels the language of § 95.11(3) . . . Notably, § 95.031(2)(a) does not contain any language paralleling or referencing the language of § 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.031. . . . See Fla.Stat. § 95.031(2)(b). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(2)(a) (2012). . . . Stat. § 95.031(1) • (2012). . . .
. . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(b) (emphasis added). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(d). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(d). Id. . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(d). It is axiomatic that “[o]ne cannot conceal what one does not know.” . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(d). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(1). . . .
. . . .” § 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
. . . Under Florida’s statute of repose — section 95.031, Florida Statutes (2007) — a party’s cause of action . . .
. . . .” § 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(1) (2003). . . .
. . . . § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2010); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. . . . Stat. (2010) (emphasis added); see also § 95.031, Fla. . . .