Cases from cite.case.law:

COHEN, v. STATE, 171 So. 3d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person at the called number, in violation of Florida Statutes 365.16 . . . revoking Cohen’s probation, the trial court erroneously relied upon an uncharged violation of section 365.16 . . . the same sentence based solely on the charged violation of making an obscene phone call under section 365.16 . . . Section 365.16(l)(a) provides: (1) Whoever: (a) Makes a telephone call to a location at which the person . . . Section 365.16(l)(c) provides: (1) Whoever: (c) Makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or . . .

H. L. D. JR. A v. STATE, 83 So. 3d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 365.16(l)(b), (d), Fla. Stat. (2008). . Rule 8.140. Extraordinary Relief. (a) Basis. . . .

In H. JACKSON L., 442 B.R. 469 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010)

. . . STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT Principal balance 53,261.94 Accrued interest 1,651.20 Accumulated late charges 365.16 . . . 212,108.30 Prepetition Arrearages Monthly payment ($503.08/mo. x 6) 3,018.48 Accumulated late charges 365.16 . . .

G. AVRICH, v. STATE, 936 So. 2d 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . calls to the victim where the victim had a reasonable expectation of privacy, in violation of section 365.16 . . . Counts 2-9 charged the defendant with violating section 365.16(l)(a) by making obscene and harassing . . . Originally, section 365.16(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), criminalized individuals who, “by means of . . . State, 650 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla.1995); § 365.16(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . See § 365.16(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). We affirm on all other issues on appeal. . . .

F. DURIE, Jr. v. STATE, 901 So. 2d 171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . made harassing telephone calls to an assistant attorney general, allegedly in violation of section 365.16 . . . The language of section 365.16(1) is thus critical to our analysis. . . . Florida case law on section 365.16(l)(d) is nonexistent. . . . Section 365.16(l)(d) does not include a legitimacy requirement. . . . We therefore hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law in misinterpreting section 365.16 to . . .

A No. E. BROWN, 748 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1999)

. . . Brown of harassing communications in violation of Section 365.16, Florida Statutes. Ms. . . . Brown with harassing communications in violation of Section 365.16, and stalking in violation of Section . . .

SEYBEL, v. STATE, 693 So. 2d 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . should have been prosecuted under the misdemeanor statute prohibiting harassing telephone calls, section 365.16 . . . Thus, while it is illegal to make repeated harassing telephone calls under section 365.16, those same . . .

GILBREATH, v. STATE, 650 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1995)

. . . We have for review a decision of the district court that expressly declares to be valid section 365.16 . . . The statute originally was worded: “365.16(1) Whoever by means of telephone communication: (a) Makes . . . After this ease was decided, the legislature amended the statute to read: 365.16. . . . There are no cases dealing specifically with the constitutionality of § 365.16(l)(a). . . . With these restrictions we find section 365.16(l)(a) valid for reasons similar to those upon which we . . . In Keaton we held: Because the scope of section 365.16(l)(a) is not limited to cases where the listener . . .

GILBREATH, v. STATE, 629 So. 2d 962 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . .” § 365.16(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

THE FLORIDA BAR, v. A. HELINGER, Jr., 620 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 1993)

. . . 1991 Respondent pleaded guilty to six counts of making obscene phone calls in violation of section 365.16 . . .

J. STODDARD, v. WOHLFAHRT,, 573 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . claim, and this time Stoddard alleged, as a basis for damages under count two, the violation of section 365.16 . . . Section 365.16 makes it a second-degree misdemeanor to make an obscene, lewd, or lascivious comment, . . . third amended complaint changing his theory of a cause of action from a statutory violation of section 365.16 . . . numerous references to Florida cases calculated to support his claim, as well as a reference to section 365.16 . . .

STALL, STATE LONG, v. STATE, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990)

. . . . § 365.16(1)(a), Fla.Stat. (1977). . . .

WEINER v. STATE OF FLORIDA, 43 Fla. Supp. 2d 61 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1990)

. . . Stat. 365.16(l)(b)(c) (d) and Trespass In A Structure or Conveyance in violation of Fla. . . .

STATE OF FLORIDA v. FIRTELL, 18 Fla. Supp. 2d 169 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1986)

. . . three (3) counts of knowingly permitting a telephone under their control to be used contrary to Section 365.16 . . .

STATE OF FLORIDA v. FIRTELL, 13 Fla. Supp. 2d 65 (Broward Cty. Ct. 1985)

. . . annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass George Izzo or Marlene Izzo at the number called, contrary to F.S. 365.16 . . .

SPACE- TECH INDUSTRIES, INC. v. OTTO THE TRIBUNE COMPANY, 6 Fla. Supp. 2d 242 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1984)

. . . The Tribune Company, with (I) inteference with plaintiffs business (II) violation of Florida Statute 365.16 . . .

STATE v. ELDER,, 382 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1980)

. . . County Court for Duval County, Florida, which initially and directly passed upon the validity of section 365.16 . . . The issue presented is whether section 365.16(l)(b), which forbids the making of an anonymous telephone . . . We need not, however, pass on whether section 365.16(l)(b) validly proscribes pure speech. . . . Accordingly, we hold that section 365.16(l)(b), as construed in this opinion, is constitutional. . . . At least one legitimate communicative or informative function is stated in section 365.16 itself. . . .

STATE v. KEATON,, 371 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1979)

. . . Appellee was charged by information under section 365.16(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), with making . . . The issue before us is whether section 365.16(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), suffers from the infirmity . . . Appellee argues that section 365.16(l)(a) is not limited to language which is “obscene” as defined by . . . Because section 365.16(l)(a) is directed to conduct — obscene phone calls which are harassing— rather . . . The intent of the legislature with regard to the scope of section 365.16(l)(a) is arguably unclear. . . . I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion holding that section 365.16(l)(a), Florida Statutes . . .

ARMSTRONG v. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,, 366 So. 2d 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . Florida Statute 365.16 proscribes the use of a telephone to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person . . .

INGRAHAM v. WRIGHT, 430 U.S. 651 (U.S. 1977)

. . . . § 365.16 (Supp. 1977), and there can be little doubt that if that same “punishment” had been inflicted . . . by an officer of the state courts for violation of § 365.16, it would have had to satisfy the requirements . . .

GREER v. SCOFIELD,, 89 F. Supp. 75 (W.D. Tex. 1950)

. . . to his former wife during the years 1942, 1943 and 1944, in the respective amounts of $4,000.00, $7,-365.16 . . .

GRAY MOTOR CO. v. UNITED STATES, 16 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1927)

. . . return was audited, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that an overassessment of $365.16 . . .