The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . . § 726.102(14). . . . Stat. § 726.102(14). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(14). 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D). . . .
. . . See § 726.102(4), Fla. . . .
. . . In any event, § 726.102(4) specifically defines "claim" as including disputed claims. . . .
. . . . § 726.102(8). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(2), (12)). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(2), (12)). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(14). . . . Stat. § 726.102(14). . . .
. . . In Section 726.102, Florida Statutes, FUFTA defines asset as “property of a debtor” but excludes from . . .
. . . with, the intra-Trust transfers do not themselves constitute fraudulent transfers as contemplated by § 726.102 . . . Stat. § 726.102(2)(c). . Dzikowski v. Delson (In re Delson), 247 B.R. 873, 876 (Bankr. S.D. . . . Stat. § 726.102(14). . Doc. No. 35-10, marked as Exhibit J. . Doc. No. 48-21. . . . . Stat. § 726.102(2)(c). . Dzikowski v. Delson (In re Delson), 247 B.R. at 876. . Malek v. . . .
. . . See § 726.102(14) (defining a transfer as “every mode ... of disposing of or parting with an asset”). . . .
. . . . § 101(31); § 726.102, Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(10). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(10). . . .
. . . .” § 726.102(4). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(14). . . . Id. § 726.102(2)(a). . . .
. . . The Bank relies on the plain language of § 726.102(14), which provides that a “transfer” occurs only . . . Stat. § 726.102(14). . . . Stat. § 726.102(14) (emphasis added). .The Receiver cites as an example the Wire Request Form directing . . .
. . . . § 726.102(12). . . . .
. . . . § 726.102(8)(a). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(8)(a). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(5), and “claim” is defined as “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to . . . contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured,” id. § 726.102 . . . Id. § 726.102(2). . . . Stat. § 726.102(2), (7), (11). But the transfers were of the Hedge Fund’s funds, not Nadel’s. . . .
. . . [In the present case, and under section 726.102, “insider” includes Yali’s wife Leslie]. . . .
. . . . § 726.102(4), (3). . . . Stat. § 726.102(2). . . . Stat. § 726.102(2), (10), (12). . . . Stat. § 726.102(3). See also Cook v. . . . Stat. § 726.102(2), (12). . . .
. . . ASG alleged that Edwards was an “affiliate” and “insider” of DAE1 as defined in section 726.102, Florida . . .
. . . .” § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(5). . . . Stat. § 726.102(4). . . . Stat. § 726.102(8)(b)(6), as well as an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor, . . . Stat. 726.102(8)(d). . . .
. . . . § 726.102 (West 2013). . . . .
. . . . § 726.102(4)-(5) (defining, for purposes of FUFTA, a “claim” as “a right to payment, whether or not . . .
. . . . § 726.102(2). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(12). An "asset” is defined as "property of the debtor” Fla. Stat. § 726.102(2). . . .
. . . .” § 726.102(3), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also Friedman, 863 So.2d at 192. . . .
. . . See § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . As defined in section 726.102, a “claim” is broadly constructed and “means a right to payment, whether . . . , contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” § 726.102 . . .
. . . Ann. sec. 726.102(12); UFTA sec. 1(12), 7A (Part II) U.L.A. 15 (2006). . . . Ann. sec. 726.102(2)(b); UFTA sec. l(2)(ii), 7A (Part II) U.L.A. 14. . . . Ann. sec. 726.102(2)(a) (West 2000); UFTA sec. 1(2)(i), 7A (Part II) U.L.A. 14 (2006). . . . Ann. sec. 726.102(13); UFTA sec. 1(13), 7A (Part II) U.L.A. 15. . . . Ann. sec. 726.102(7)(a)(1) to include a “relative of the debtor”) for an “antecedent debt”. . . .
. . . See § 726.102(2)(c), Fla. . . .
. . . . § 726.102(1),(12). Thus, the issue is not, as Mrs. . . .
. . . . §§ 726.102(2) and 726.102(12). A. . . .
. . . . § 726.102(4) (2005). . . . Stat. § 726.102(3) (2005). This language is extremely broad. . . .
. . . . § 726.102(2)(c) (2001). . . .
. . . See § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . As defined in section 726.102, a “claim” is broadly constructed and “means a right to payment, whether . . . contingent, matured, unma-tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” § 726.102 . . .
. . . We recognize the broad scope allowed in an action under sections 59.29 and 726.102, Florida Statutes. . . . Section 726.102(12) defines “transfer” as, “[e]very mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional . . .
. . . See § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . As defined in section 726.102, a “claim” is broadly constructed and “means a right to payment, whether . . . , contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” § 726.102 . . . As noted by the court below, under section 726.102(3) and (4), a creditor is merely a person who “has . . . Friedman, 806 So.2d at 626 (quoting § 726.102(3)-(4), Fla. Stat. (2002)). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(6) of SWS at the time she converted the cash received from Mr. . . . Stat. § 726.102(6), a “debtor” is defined as “a person who is hable on a claim.” Ms. . . .
. . . Georgia and therefore its transfer to Speer could not have been a fraudulent transfer under section 726.102 . . .
. . . Stat. ch. 726.102(7)(b)(l-6) (West 2001). . . . . Stat. ch. 726.102(3). . . .
. . . .” § 726.102(12), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .
. . . .” § 726.102(3) and (4). . . . See § 726.102(12), Fla. Stat. (1993). . . .
. . . PRN argues that no assets, as that term is defined by section 726.102(2), Florida Statutes, were transferred . . .
. . . See § 726.102(7) of the Florida Statutes, which defines an “insider” of an individual debtor to include . . . See Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(c) (2001). . . .
. . . .” § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . .” § 726.102(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .
. . . either pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code or pursuant to the fraudulent transfer of the State of Florida, § 726.102 . . .
. . . Defendant further asserts that the entireties properties could not qualify as “assets” under § 726.102 . . . property held as a tenancy by the entireties is specifically exempt from treatment as an “asset” by § 726.102 . . . time of the transfer and are not excepted from treatment as fraudulently transferred “assets” under 726.102 . . . See Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(c) (2001). . . . upon dissolution any property formerly held as a tenancy by the entireties loses the protection of § 726.102 . . .
. . . Stardust Marine S.A., 741 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that under section 726.102(c), . . .
. . . . § 726.102(2)(b,c) (defining “asset,” as used, in turn, in the definition of “transfer” in Fla.Stat. . . . § 726.102(12)). . . . Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2). . . . Fla.Stat. § 726.102. In Roemelmeyer v. . . .
. . . Section 726.102(4), Florida Statutes (1995), defines “creditor” as “a person who has a claim.” . . . Section 726.102(3) defines “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment . . .
. . . . § 726.102(4); that, as an officer, director, and relative of an officer and director, Ms. . . . . § 726.102(7)(b)l.,2.,6.; and that Ms. Man-solillo knew that Stanley Roofing was insolvent. Ms. . . .
. . . tenancy by the entirety when it was sold to Ming, it was not an asset within the meaning of section 726.102 . . . Section 726.102(2)(c) contains a qualification that such property is excluded “to the extent it is not . . .
. . . . § 726.102(12). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(12). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(7)(b). . . . a general partner; or, (6) a general partner in a partnership of which GTI is a general partner. § 726.102 . . .
. . . . § 726.102(7)(b). . . . a general partner; or, (6) a general partner in a partnership of which GTI is a general partner. § 726.102 . . .
. . . . § 726.102(2)(c) provides that an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties is not included . . .
. . . annuity in the name of Todd Covino, constitutes a transfer as defined under Florida Statute Section 726.102 . . .
. . . . § 726.102(3) & (4). . . .
. . . . § 101(54) and Florida Statute § 726.102(12). . . . Florida Statute 726.102(12) defines "transfer” as: “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional . . .
. . . . § 726.102(7)(a) (West 1988). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(12) is basically the same if not broader. . . .
. . . 726.105(2): the transfer of Munim, P.A. patient files and assets were to an insider as defined by section 726.102 . . .
. . . . § 726.102(12). . . . execution of the Trust Amendment was a transfer within the meaning of that term used in Florida Statute 726.102 . . .
. . . See § 726.102(7), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . . § 726.102(12) as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditioned, voluntary or involuntary . . .
. . . See § 726.102(3), Fla. . . .