The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . The department refused to pay "based on its assertion that section 11.066 prohibits a state agency from . . . Subsection (3) of section 11.066 provided that "[n]either the state nor any of its agencies shall pay . . . Id. at 1265 (quoting section 11.066). . . . absolute bar to the State's payment of all judgments," the Court conceded, "[i]n interpreting section 11.066 . . . monetary damages from the state or a state agency only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. § 11.066 . . .
. . . However, DEP refused to pay the judgment, asserting payment was barred by section 11.066(3), which states . . . The trial court denied the petition, finding section 11.066(3) barred payment. . . . This court reversed, finding section 11.066(3) did not pertain to contract actions. Id. at 1038. . . . The supreme court affirmed, finding section 11.066 was intended to apply only to claims based on the . . .
. . . courts seeking writs of mandamus to compel payment or, in the alternative, declarations that sections 11.066 . . . Section 11.066(3) requires “an appropriation made by law” for compelling payment of judgments against . . . the State or its agencies, while section 11.066(4) provides that the lack of an “appropriation made . . . The as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of section 11.066(3), Florida Statutes (2016), which . . . Should the Class fail in obtaining a writ of mandamus, pursuant to section 11.066(4), the constitutional . . .
. . . Citrus Canker Eradication Program (“Class”) appeal an order that denied- its motion to declare sections 11.066 . . . See § 11.066(4), Fla. Stat. (2016). We upheld that decision. Dep’t of Agric. v. . . . But, we reversed the court’s declaration that section 11.066(3) was constitutional “as applied” because . . . the Class had “not yet availed itself of the appropriation process contemplated by section 11.066.” . . . Nothing in section 11.066(3) refers to a claim bill. . . .
. . . Applicability of Section 11.066(2) The Department claims that the trial court erred in the takings trial . . . by failing to apply the presumption contained in section 11.066(2), Florida Statutes, as well as the . . . Even if section 11.066(2) applied, however, there was undisputed evidence before the trial court that . . . Thus, if the presumption of section 11.066(2) had been applied, the plaintiffs’ evidence overwhelmingly . . . Because section 11.066(2) applies only to the presumption of public harm, it is not applicable to the . . .
. . . Florida Statutes, without first petitioning the Legislature to appropriate such funds pursuant to section 11.066 . . .
. . . First, the class contended that section 11.066, Florida Statutes (2000), which prohibits the execution . . . Second, and alternatively, they argued that section 11.066 was unconstitutional as applied to takings . . . However, the court reasoned that the language in subsection 11.066(4) — “Notwithstanding s. 71.091, a . . . The court did not reach “the question of whether section 11.066 is unconstitutional.” . . . Finally, the court held that section 11.066(3) was constitutional as applied. . . .
. . . In order to decide this issue we must interpret section 11.066(3), Florida Statutes (2005), on which . . . State, 958 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), the First District Court of Appeal held that section 11.066 . . . The issue here concerns DEP’s refusal to pay the judgment based on its assertion that section 11.066 . . . Accordingly, the First District concluded that the Legislature did not intend section 11.066 to apply . . . In fact, the only other Florida case that has discussed section 11.066 is Haire v. . . . The majority and I part ways because I find that section 11.066 is clear and unambiguous. . . . Subsection (4) of section 11.066 expressly answers the question before this Court. . . . .” § 11.066(4), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . . § 11.066(3), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . Again, I disagree and would apply the plain language of section 11.066. . . .
. . . However, DEP refused to pay the judgment asserting section 11.066(3), Florida Statutes (2001), barred . . . The relevant portion of section 11.066, Florida Statutes (2001), provides: (1) As used in this section . . . denying the Petition for Writ of Mandamus, stating that in the face of the clear language of section 11.066 . . . and, thus, was entitled to mandamus relief rests on this court’s interpretation of whether section 11.066 . . . Accordingly, we certify the following question to be one of great public importance: DOES SECTION 11.066 . . .
. . . . §§ 11.02,11.065 & 11.066 (describing procedures relating to the enactment of a claims bill). . . .
. . . . § 11.062(2)(a); § 11.066(4); § 11.70(3)(d); § 14.29(3)(b), (12); § 20.04(7)(a); § 20.19(6)(f); § 20.23 . . .
. . . during oral argument, observing that this is nothing more than a reiteration of the language in section 11.066 . . .
. . . . § 11.066. . . .
. . . . § 11.066. . . .
. . . . § 11.066(3). . . . In addition, the Court is not persuaded by CSB’s suggestion that the importance of Fla Stat. § 11.066 . . .
. . . The Phebe [Case No. 11.066]; Burke v. Trevitt [Id. 2,163]; La Jeune Eugenie [Id. 15.551]. . . .