Cases from cite.case.law:

STATE v. BROWNE,, 187 So. 3d 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Though the lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code was 15.15 months in the Department . . .

LAND F. v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC PDQ It LLC, 140 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D.S.C. 2015)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 (2d ed.1983). . . .

KENNEDY, v. CAIN,, 624 F. App'x 886 (5th Cir. 2015)

. . . Comparing that figure to the 36.8% calculation resulted in an absolute disparity of 15.15%. . . .

BANNER HEALTH f b o v. M. BURWELL, U. S., 126 F. Supp. 3d 28 (D.D.C. 2015)

. . . For this period, the agency calculated a one-year inflation rate of 7.57 percent, or 15.15 percent over . . .

SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL, v. M. R. JEWELL, U. S., 76 F. Supp. 3d 198 (D.D.C. 2014)

. . . See also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 15.15[3] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2000) (“An amendment is futile . . .

In CAPITAL ONE BANK CREDIT CARD INTEREST RATE LITIGATION, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2014)

. . . The rate on that card appears to be variable starting at 15.15% and fluctuating with 12.9% and 4.9%. . . . deposition, she agreed that the account statements for -5888 showed a variable rate that fluctuated from 15.15% . . . Moreover, the July 2005 billing statement shows a Purchase APR of 15.15% and a Cash Advance APR of 20.24% . . .

T. SNYDER, v. VILLAGE OF MIDLOTHIAN,, 302 F.R.D. 231 (N.D. Ill. 2014)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[3], p. 15-194 (1984). . . .

IMAGEPOINT, INC. R. v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,, 27 F. Supp. 3d 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)

. . . Section 15.15 of the Loan and Security Agreement states: “This Agreement and the Notes shall be construed . . .

A. RODRIGUEZ, a k a v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES, 559 F. App'x 188 (3d Cir. 2014)

. . . Penal Law § 15.15(1), when the term “intentionally” appears in a criminal statute, “it is presumed to . . .

NATIONAL ATM COUNCIL, INC. v. VISA INC. v. v., 7 F. Supp. 3d 51 (D.D.C. 2013)

. . . .”); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) . . .

ENERQUEST OIL GAS, LLC, LLC, v. PLAINS EXPLORATION PRODUCTION COMPANY, EOG V. S. Jr., 981 F. Supp. 2d 575 (W.D. Tex. 2013)

. . . United States, 405 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir.1968) (quoting 3 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[2]). . . .

TAMPA BAY WATER, a v. HDR ENGINEERING, INC. a, 731 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[2]. . . .

ESTATE OF EISEN, v. PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., 126 So. 3d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . situation, the purpose of the statute of limitations would be defeated. 3 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 . . .

BAYATFSHAR, v. AERONAUTICAL RADIO, INC., 934 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2013)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 [4.-2] (2d ed. 1982)). . . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, § 15.15 [4.-2] (2d ed.1978)); see also Goodman v. . . .

LEVITON MANUFACTURING CO. INC, v. J. REEVE, Jr. H. M. M., 942 F. Supp. 2d 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)

. . . In particular, the Agreement states that: 15.15 Governing Law. . . .

BNP PARIBAS MORTGAGE CORPORATION BNP v. BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. AG, v. N. A., 866 F. Supp. 2d 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . the use of judicial resources and the impact on the judicial system.” 3 Moore’s Federal, Practice § 15.15 . . .

IDAHO POWER COMPANY, v. UNITED STATES,, 105 Fed. Cl. 141 (Fed. Cl. 2012)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[3], p. 15-194 (2d ed. 1984))). . . .

FOX, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 851 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2012)

. . . See also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 15.15[3] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) . . .

RNC SYSTEMS, INC. v. MODERN TECHNOLOGY GROUP, INC., 861 F. Supp. 2d 436 (D.N.J. 2012)

. . . A, § 15.15.) . . .

ZALDUONDO, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 845 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2012)

. . . . § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000)). . . .

C. BOND, v. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,, 828 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2011)

. . . . § 15.15[3] (3d ed.2000)); accord In re Interbank Funding Corp. Secs. . . . Prac. 3d § 15.15 (3d. ed.2000)). . . .

R. WILSON, v. COX,, 828 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2011)

. . . . § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000)). . . .

DOES I THROUGH III, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 815 F. Supp. 2d 208 (D.D.C. 2011)

. . . Mineta, 205 F.R.D. 29, 31 (D.D.C.2001) (quoting 3 Moore’s federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000)); . . .

In COLUMBIA HOSPITAL FOR WOMEN MEDICAL CENTER, INC. v. NCRIC,, 461 B.R. 648 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2011)

. . . . § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 1999)). . . . .

W. PAYNE, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 773 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D.D.C. 2011)

. . . .”); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000) (“An amendment is futile if it merely . . .

In DAIRY FARMERS OF AMERICA, INC. CHEESE ANTITRUST LITIGATION., 767 F. Supp. 2d 880 (N.D. Ill. 2011)

. . . contract prices increased from $14.11 to $15.55; and August 2004 contract prices increased from $14.12 to $15.15 . . .

OOUCH, a. k. a. a. k. a. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, H. Jr., 633 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 15.15(1). . . .

HARDISON, v. LITTLE, s, 723 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (M.D. Tenn. 2010)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed.); see also Winget v. . . .

I. ONYEWUCHI, v. T. GONZALEZ, U. S., 267 F.R.D. 417 (D.D.C. 2010)

. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .

ASHER, M. v. UNARCO MATERIAL HANDLING, INC. a a, 596 F.3d 313 (6th Cir. 2010)

. . . Practice ¶ 15.15 [4.-1], at 15-220 (1982)); Advisory Comm. . . .

PIETSCH, v. McKISSACK McKISSACK,, 677 F. Supp. 2d 325 (D.D.C. 2010)

. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .

MORGAN, v. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 657 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2009)

. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); see also Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .

APPALACHIAN VOICES, v. CHU,, 262 F.R.D. 24 (D.D.C. 2009)

. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .

McGEE, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 646 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2009)

. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .

NEW JERSEY BUILDING LABORERS STATEWIDE BENEFITS FUND v. AMERICAN CORING SUPPLY GMS HAHR KTC KNAPEK MROCZEK MJR M S SBI SBW, SLAYCO, 341 F. App'x 816 (3d Cir. 2009)

. . . On September 19, 2007, counsel for the Funds sent Mark a letter invoking § 15.15(c) of the CBA and requesting . . .

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N. A. v. KB HOME, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (D. Nev. 2009)

. . . Specifically, Defendants contend Section 15.15 of the Operating Agreement bars Plaintiff from enforcing . . . Plaintiff responds that Section 15.15 applies to third-party beneficiaries, not secured creditors such . . . Additionally, Plaintiff argues Defendants’ interpretation of Section 15.15 conflicts with the UCC. . . . Defendants reply that Section 15.15 is a substantive provision applying to all creditors. . . . Section 15.15 of the Operating Agreement states that “[n]one of the provisions of this Agreement shall . . .

NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a s o St. v. TOTAL TOOL SUPPLY, INC., 621 F. Supp. 2d 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . .”); 3 James Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[l]-[3] (3d ed. 1997). Turkenitz v. . . .

EDWARDS, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 616 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2009)

. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .

FRENKEL, v. NEW YORK CITY OFF- TRACK BETTING CORPORATION,, 611 F. Supp. 2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . .”); 3 James Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[1]-[3] (3d ed. 1997). Turkenitz v. . . .

GOLDFISH SHIPPING, S. A. v. HSH NORDBANK AG., 623 F. Supp. 2d 635 (E.D. Pa. 2009)

. . . Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice-Civil § 15.15[2] (3d ed.1997), and 6 C. Wright, A. . . .

J. WALKER, v. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, 256 F.R.D. 234 (D.C. Cir. 2009)

. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .

RUMBER v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 598 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2009)

. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .

TEGG CORPORATION, v. BECKSTROM ELECTRIC CO., 650 F. Supp. 2d 413 (W.D. Pa. 2008)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 15.15[3], at 15—47 to 15-48 (3d ed. 2000). . . .

E. WILLIAMS v. L. SAVAGE, 569 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . PRAC. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .

TRIAD AT JEFFERSONVILLE I, LLC, v. O. LEAVITT,, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .

N. SPERLING, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, v., 542 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .

BEAN, v. UNITED STATES,, 538 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .

AMORE, ESTATES OF AMORE v. ACCOR NORTH AMERICA, INC., 529 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .

SIMPSON, Dr. v. SOCIALIST PEOPLE S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA,, 529 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . PRACTICE § 15.15[3] (3d ed.2000)); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .

W. KRIEGER, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,, 529 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed.2000 . . .

KLAYMAN, v. JUDICIAL WATCH, INC., 247 F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C. 2007)

. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .

DEHAEMERS, v. W. WYNNE,, 522 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D.D.C. 2007)

. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .

ELLIOTT, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,, 521 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2007)

. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .

VANN, v. KEMPTHORNE,, 467 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2006)

. . . . § 15.15[2] (3d ed.2000) (observing that “the party opposing amendment bears a burden of production . . .

UNITED STATES v. PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. f k a, 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006)

. . . advertising and promotional spending increased by over 21% from 2002 to 2003, rising to a staggering $15.15 . . .

In R. McGUIER v. R., 346 B.R. 151 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006)

. . . Therefore, for the reasons stated, no costs are allowed while fees in the amount of $2,272.50 (15.15 . . .

In BROTHERS, R. M. Jr. v., 345 B.R. 406 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006)

. . . , Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 15.15[2], at 15-145 (2d Ed.2005). . . .

L. HARRISON, v. NORTON,, 429 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2006)

. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore's Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .

GARFIELD, v. T. POOLE,, 421 F. Supp. 2d 608 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . Penal Law § 15.15, even an intoxicated person may be capable of forming the requisite intent. . . .

HIBBERT, v. POOLE,, 415 F. Supp. 2d 225 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . Penal Law § 15.15, even an intoxicated person may be capable of forming the requisite intent. . . .

ARTHUR, v. MAERSK, INC. d b a d b a, 434 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2006)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice— Civil § 15.15[2] (3d ed.1997); 6 Wright et al., supra, § 1488 . . . .2004) (same), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 420, 163 L.Ed.2d 320 (2005); 3 Moore et al., supra, § 15.15 . . .

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. A. WILLIAMS,, 231 F.R.D. 42 (D.D.C. 2005)

. . . . § 15.15(e) (providing the Secretary of Transportation with discretion to share specific records or . . .

SCOTT, v. STATE, 909 So. 2d 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . The plea agreement provided that Scott would receive concurrent sentences of 15.15 months in prison with . . .

In A. PULVER, d b a R. A. v. A., 327 B.R. 125 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . amendments which correct the specific factual details will relate back. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 . . .

E. WRIGHT, v. N. HERMAN, 230 F.R.D. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

. . . Detroit News, Inc., 211 F.Supp.2d 101, 114 (D.D.C.2002) (quoting 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3 . . .

GONZALEZ, v. ASHCROFT,, 369 F. Supp. 2d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . . § 15.15(2) provides in relevant part that “[a] statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating . . . Second, even if the intent were not clear, section 15.15(2) would engraft onto section 263.05 only some . . . As is clear from section 15.15(1), while that level of “mental culpability” could encompass “intentional . . . Thus, if this Court’s analysis of the statute is correct, section 15.15(1) would mandate only that the . . . Thus, because the second half of the statute contains no scienter requirement, section 15.15(1) by its . . .

In FISHER, v., 320 B.R. 52 (E.D. Pa. 2005)

. . . granting Advanta a lien upon the Home; an interest rate of 14.25%; an annual percentage rate (“APR”) of 15.15% . . . Advanta offered Fisher the Mortgage with a 14.25% interest rate and an effective APR of 15.15%. . . .

In ENRON CORPORATION SECURITIES, DERIVATIVE ERISA LITIGATION v. On v. L., 310 F. Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. Tex. 2004)

. . . Freer, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[4.-2] at 161 (2d ed.1993). See Skoczylas v. . . .

PFEIFFER, v. LEWIS COUNTY, 308 F. Supp. 2d 88 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)

. . . purposes of compensation, D/COs are classified as Grade 18 positions and receive between $13.13 and $15.15 . . .

NATIONAL CITY MORTGAGE CO. v. NAVARRO, 220 F.R.D. 102 (D.D.C. 2004)

. . . . § 15.15[3] (3d ed.2000) (defining futility)); compare Compl. HH 67, 73, 80, 87, 143 with Am. . . .

In AGENT ORANGE PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION. v., 220 F.R.D. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)

. . . the use of judicial resources and the impact on the judicial system.” 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .

MATSUSHITA ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD. v. CINRAM INTERNATIONAL, INC., 299 F. Supp. 2d 348 (D. Del. 2004)

. . . requires tight tolerances for the size of the center hole; it may be no less than 15.0 mm and no more than 15.15 . . .

STATE v. L. BROWN,, 855 So. 2d 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . sentence points, as reflected on the criminal punishment code worksheet equaled 48.2, requiring that a 15.15 . . .

A. ANDERSON, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 218 F.R.D. 307 (D.D.C. 2003)

. . . Detroit News, Inc., 211 F.Supp.2d 101, 114 (D.D.C.2002) (quoting 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3 . . .

UNITED STATES D. CAMPBELL, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION,, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (M.D. Fla. 2003)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15(2), at 1021)). “ ‘The Federal rule on the “relation back” of . . .

In T. JOHNSON D. T. D. v., 299 B.R. 676 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003)

. . . Nevertheless, under the IRCP, they still would have been obligated to pay $15.15 based on their 2001 . . . than participating in the IRCP when they did not have the funds available to make even the modest $15.15 . . . Furthermore, based on their present circumstances, their payments would be $15.15 at the most and $0 . . .

H. ADAIR, v. T. JOHNSON,, 216 F.R.D. 183 (D.D.C. 2003)

. . . . § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . . Prac. § 15.15[1], . . .

BOYD, v. GRASSMICK, 216 F.R.D. 166 (D.D.C. 2003)

. . . Detroit News, Inc., 211 F.Supp.2d 101, 114 (D.D.C.2002) (quoting 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3 . . .

H. HOFFMANN, v. UNITED STATES, 266 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2003)

. . . [or], reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled”) (quoting 3 Moore's Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .

In ANDERSON IV, v. IV,, 292 B.R. 496 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . amendments which correct the specific factual details will relate back. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 . . .

BANCOULT v. S. McNAMARA, 214 F.R.D. 5 (D.D.C. 2003)

. . . Detroit News, Inc., 211 F.Supp.2d 101, 114 (D.D.C.2002) (quoting 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3 . . .

M. BOWLER, J. v. D. HAWKE,, 320 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2003)

. . . immediate effect on the parties invoking the court’s jurisdiction); Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise, § 15.15 . . .

HAMPTON BAYS CONNECTIONS, INC. v. DUFFY, J. s, 212 F.R.D. 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . insufficient and it would be futile to grant leave to amend.” 3 Moore’s Federal Practice (3d ed.1997) § 15.15 . . .

MERCEXCHANGE, L. L. C. v. EBAY, INC., 271 F. Supp. 2d 784 (E.D. Va. 2002)

. . . (citing 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d. ed.2002)). . . .

M. K. v. TENET,, 216 F.R.D. 133 (D.D.C. 2002)

. . . to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . . complaint would survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .

ROBINSON, v. THE DETROIT NEWS, INC., 211 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D.D.C. 2002)

. . . fails to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .

W. JACKSON, v. STATE, 817 So. 2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . receive was 22 months where he had one prior felony conviction and a minimum recommended sentence of 15.15 . . .

M. POLSBY, v. G. THOMPSON,, 201 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2002)

. . . to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .

CHILDERS, v. Y. MINETA,, 205 F.R.D. 29 (D.D.C. 2001)

. . . to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . . 994 F.2d at 876, and because the complaint is not clearly futile, see 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .

STEPHENSON, v. E. LANGSTON, 205 F.R.D. 21 (D.D.C. 2001)

. . . to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .

CATSKILL DEVELOPMENT, L. L. C. L. L. C. L. L. C. v. PARK PLACE ENTERTAINMENT CORP., 154 F. Supp. 2d 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

. . . Section 15.15 states that the Agreement "shall become effective, of full force and effect and the parties . . .

LeBLANC, v. CLEVELAND Jr. J. R. D. d b a s, 248 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2001)

. . . jurisdiction in the dispensable party’s absence); 3 James William Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 . . .

E. R. SQUIBB SONS, INC. v. LLOYD S COMPANIES Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. s Co. Co. Co. Co. St. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. St. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. Co. U. K. Co. s, 241 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2001)

. . . ... will relate back .... ” (footnotes omitted)); 3 James William Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 . . .

In J. TRECO As In JCPL v. J., 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001)

. . . primarily in the form of overdrafts on certain of its operating accounts at BNY — -in the amount of $15.15 . . . MIBL subsequently defaulted on its obligation to repay the $15.15 million. . . . To satisfy this obligation, BNY liquidated Meridien Tanzania’s pledged account in the amount of $15.15 . . . The manager questioned the validity of the Meridien Tanzania Agreement and demanded return of the $15.15 . . . seeking, inter alia, (1) a declaratory judgment that BNY, not Meridien Tanzania, had the right to the $15.15 . . .

In J. TRECO As In JCPL v. J., 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001)

. . . primarily in the form of overdrafts on certain of its operating accounts at BNY — in the amount of $15.15 . . . MIBL subsequently defaulted on its obligation to repay the $15.15 million. . . . To satisfy this obligation, BNY liquidated Meridien Tanzania’s pledged account in the amount of $15.15 . . . The manager questioned the validity of the Meridien Tanzania Agreement and demanded return of the $15.15 . . . seeking, inter alia, (1) a declaratory judgment that BNY, not Meridien Tanzania, had the right to the $15.15 . . .

MASON, v. TOWN OF NEW PALTZ POLICE DEPARTMENT,, 103 F. Supp. 2d 562 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” 3 Moore & Freer, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 . . .