Cases from cite.case.law:

S. CANNON, v. STATE, 206 So.3d 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . diligence”), by the statutory provision to which Florida Supreme Court looked in Steinhorst, see § 38.02 . . .

Dr. D. JACKSON, v. LEON COUNTY ELECTIONS CANVASSING BOARD C. a, 214 So. 3d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc., 325 So.2d 475, 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (motion untimely under section 38.02 . . .

GONZALEZ, v. HUERTA,, 826 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . Penal Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 38.02. See also Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. . . .

BROADCAST MUSIC, INC. MJ d b a ATV LLC, v. PRANA HOSPITALITY, INC. d b a, 158 F. Supp. 3d 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

. . . indicates, the “Flat Rate Bill” of $17,500 (calculated by combining the two flat rates) reflects a 38.02% . . .

MACEDO, v. H. HOLDER, Jr. U. S., 582 F. App'x 488 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . Ortiz argues that, contrary to the BIA’s decision, his conviction under Texas Penal Code § 38.02(b) as . . . Texas Penal Code § 38.02 does not categorically describe offenses involving moral turpitude. . . . a modified categorical approach is used to determine whether Ortiz was convicted under a part of § 38.02 . . . A person violates § 38.02(b) by intentionally giving a false or fictitious name, residential address, . . . See § 38.02(b); Green v. State, 951 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). . . .

MANCIAS, v. H. HOLDER, Jr. U. S., 558 F. App'x 368 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . Rivas argues that, contrary to the BIA’s decision, his prior conviction under Texas Penal Code § 38.02 . . . Texas Penal Code § 38.02 does not categorically describe offenses involving moral turpitude. . . . whether Rivas was convicted under a part of § 38.02 that describes a CIMT. . . . The record reflects that Rivas was convicted of the offense described in § 38.02(b). . . . See § 38.02(b); Green v. State, 951 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). . . .

WALSH, v. TEHACHAPI UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2014)

. . . Larson & Larson, supra, § 38.02. Kealoha, 713 F.3d at 524. . . . See Larson & Larson, supra, §§ 38.01, 38.02. . . .

UNITED STATES v. YOUNG,, 960 F. Supp. 2d 881 (N.D. Iowa 2013)

. . . 62 184 35 48 35 334 52 205 102 24 ,68 15 17 51% 315 53% 30% 38% 39% 37% 43% 35% 20 127 17 23 57.14% 38.02% . . . (W.D. of Texas’s 38.02% application rate divided by the N.D. of Texas's 1.47%). . Id. . . .

B. KEALOHA, v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS COMPENSATION PROGRAMS U. S. i Co., 713 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 2013)

. . . Larson & Larson, supra, § 38.02. The irresistible impulse test was once the “prevailing rule.” . . . See Larson & Larson, supra, §§ 38.01, 38.02. . . .

CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY v. STONEBRIDGE FINANCIAL CORPORATION,, 797 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Pa. 2011)

. . . the performance of ‘professional services.’ ” 4 New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide §§ 38.05, 38.02 . . .

CHILES, v. G. G. HEMPSTEAD,, 426 F. App'x 310 (5th Cir. 2011)

. . . Penal Code § 38.02. . . .

UNITED STATES v. GATAMBA,, 419 F. App'x 529 (5th Cir. 2011)

. . . Also pertinent is Texas Penal Code § 38.02(b), which provides: “A person commits an offense if he intentionally . . . identification information, probable cause arose to arrest Gatamba for violation of Texas Penal Code § 38.02 . . . therefore, at that point, Ga-tamba was, or could have been, arrested for violation of Texas Penal Code § 38.02 . . . consent to search his pockets, the Officer would have placed Gatam-ba under arrest for violation of § 38.02 . . .

DAVIS, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 94 Fed. Cl. 53 (Fed. Cl. 2010)

. . . Onoda study for the proposition that they had "found 3 cases of ADEM and nine of Guillain-Barre among 38.02 . . .

SERRICCHIO, v. WACHOVIA SECURITIES, LLC,, 706 F. Supp. 2d 237 (D. Conn. 2010)

. . . They did, however, include 38.02 hours preparing the Amended Complaint, the Motion to Amend, and the . . . wholly separable from time spent on successful claims asserted in the original Complaint, the other 38.02 . . .

D. H. J. R. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 12 So. 3d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See also § 38.02, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . Douglas, 633 So.2d 1166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), we stated: Section 38.02 contemplates that the judge will . . .

STEIN, v. STATE, 995 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2008)

. . . A motion to disqualify is governed substantively by section 38.02, Florida Statutes (2002), which provides . . .

PACHO, v. ENTERPRISE RENT- A- CAR COMPANY,, 572 F. Supp. 2d 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . former’s complete ownership of the latter’s stock.” 2-38 Warren’s Negligence in the New York Courts § 38.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. ARROYOS- FERNANDEZ,, 286 F. App'x 881 (5th Cir. 2008)

. . . We look to the state “failure to identify” offense under Texas Penal Code § 38.02(b) for guidance on . . . Tex Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(b)(2). . . . . § 1028(b)(6), while the maximum punishment under § 38.02(b) is 180 days, see Tex. . . . . §§ 12.22, 38.02(c)(2). . . . Tex Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(b). . . .

GRIM, v. STATE v. R., 971 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2007)

. . . See § 38.02, Fla. . . .

CORIE H. a v. CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, 954 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Petitioners also make reference to section 38.02, Florida Statutes, and Florida Code of Judicial Conduct . . . Section 38.02, Florida Statutes (2006) (emphasis added), provides in part as follows: In any cause in . . .

RATH, M. D. v. NETWORK MARKETING, L. C. f k a, 944 So. 2d 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . However, that statute applies only to orders for disqualification under sections 38.02 or 38.05, dealing . . .

In INTERNATIONAL ZINC COATINGS CHEMICAL CORP., 355 B.R. 76 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006)

. . . Sparks, Delaware Corporation Law & Practice § 38.02 at 38^1 (2005) (stating simply that a “lawful dissolution . . .

MANSFIELD, v. STATE, 911 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 2005)

. . . State, 717 So.2d 477, 481 n. 3 (Fla.1998) (quoting § 38.02, Fla. Stat. (1991)). . . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. STATE v. V. Jr., 919 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2005)

. . . See also § 38.02, Fla. Stat. (2004); Canon 3(E)(1)(b), Code of Jud. Conduct. . . . material witness” as contemplated by chapter 16053, Laws of Florida (1933), the predecessor to section 38.02 . . . Thus, Judge Carney was not a material witness as contemplated by rule 2.160(d)(2), section 38.02, and . . .

CHARLES, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES DISTRICT NINE, 914 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Rule 1.432 was repealed and replaced by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160 and sections 38.02 . . .

UNITED STATES v. GRANT,, 349 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2003)

. . . See Texas Penal Code § 38.02. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BRIGHAM,, 343 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2003)

. . . See Texas Penal Code § 38.02. . . .

MASTERFOODS USA, v. ARCOR USA, INC. S. A. I. C., 230 F. Supp. 2d 302 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)

. . . this package, 18, or 14.88%, said that they believed Mars or m & m’s® put out that candy, while 46, or 38.02% . . .

SCHWAB, v. STATE v. W., 814 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 2002)

. . . State, 452 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla.1984); see also § 38.02, Fla. . . .

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC. v. CARROLL, W., 801 So. 2d 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 38.02, Fla. Stat. (1999); Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(e); Waterhouse v. . . .

WATERHOUSE, v. STATE, 792 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2001)

. . . Similarly, section 38.02, Florida Statutes (1999), dictates that a motion to disqualify must be filed . . . This statute seems to apply to judges hearing cases in "any of the courts of this state,” ■ § 38.02, . . .

ASAY, v. STATE, 769 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2000)

. . . Similarly, section 38.02, Florida Statutes (1999), provides that motions to disqualify must be filed . . .

OLIVER, v. WOODS, 209 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2000)

. . . . § 38.02(a), which provides: “ ‘A person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to report or . . . requested the information.’ ” Brown, 443 U.S. at 49 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2637 (quoting Texas Penal Code Ann. § 38.02 . . .

TEFFETELLER, v. L. DUGGER, v., 734 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1999)

. . . Section 38.02, Florida Statutes (1979), provides that a suggestion of disqualification must be filed . . .

T. RIVERA, v. STATE, 717 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1998)

. . . .” § 38.02, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

CASHMAN HOLDINGS, INC. f k a Co. a a v. E. CAMPBELL, v. CASHMAN, a a J. a a E. a M. a M. a LLC, a L. a E. CAMPBELL, a v. CASHMAN, a LLC, a, 177 F.R.D. 664 (D. Minn. 1998)

. . . Minn.R.Civ.P. 38.02. . . . Minn.R.Civ.P. 38.02 Advisory Committee Comment. . . .

STEINHORST, v. STATE, 695 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1997)

. . . process violation could be addressed only if Steinhorst did not waive his claim pursuant to section 38.02 . . . In my opinion, section 38.02 merely provides that, pri- or to final judgment, if a defendant does not . . . I recognize however that section 38.06, Florida Statutes (1991), in conjunction with section 38.02 could . . . Section 38.06 provides that where grounds for disqualification as set forth in 38.02 appear of record . . . Again, I note that I believe it is actually section 38.06, in conjunction with 38.02, that the trial . . .

UNITED STATES v. McDONALD,, 106 F.3d 1218 (5th Cir. 1997)

. . . . § 38.02(b). McDonald was sentenced to five days in jail for his “failure to identify” offense. . . .

CAVE, v. STATE, 660 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1995)

. . . Judicial Administration, rule 3.230 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and sections 38.01, 38.02 . . . Sections 38.01, 38.02, 38.09 are likewise inapplicable since they pertain to issues not relevant to this . . .

E. BOOTH, v. BROWN,, 8 Vet. App. 109 (Vet. App. 1995)

. . . properly and timely handled upon receipt”); and VA Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21-1, Part IV, paras. 38.02 . . .

R. ROBINETTE, v. BROWN,, 8 Vet. App. 69 (Vet. App. 1995)

. . . BVA remanded cases are properly and timely handled upon receipt”); and Manual M21-1, Part IV, paras. 38.02 . . .

MASON, v. BROWN,, 8 Vet. App. 44 (Vet. App. 1995)

. . . properly and timely handled upon receipt”); VA Ajdjudioation Procedure Manual, M21-1, Part IV, paras. 38.02 . . .

SHIPWASH, v. BROWN,, 8 Vet. App. 218 (Vet. App. 1995)

. . . properly and timely handled upon receipt”); and VA Adjudication PROCEDURE Manual, M21-1, Part IV, paras. 38.02 . . .

P. ALLDAY, v. BROWN,, 7 Vet. App. 517 (Vet. App. 1995)

. . . receipt”), and VA Adjudioation ProCEduRE Manual, M21-1 [hereinafter Manual M21-1], Part IV, paras. 38.02 . . . opinion and in accordance with VBIA § 302, the Hickman memorandum, and Manual 21-1, Part IV, paras. 38.02 . . .

ALBRIGHT, v. M. RODRIGUEZ, U. S. La NM NM, 51 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995)

. . . requested the information.’ " 443 U.S. at 49, 99 S.Ct. at 2639 (quoting Tex.Penal Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 38.02 . . .

G. BLOCK, v. BROWN,, 7 Vet. App. 343 (Vet. App. 1994)

. . . Oct. 8, 1994) (same); see also VA Adjudication PROCEDURE Manual, M21-1, Part IV, paras. 38.02, 38.03 . . .

HENDRIX, v. STATE, 637 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1994)

. . . Hendrix claims that the judge erred in refusing to recuse himself in violation of section 38.02, Florida . . . Section 38.02, Florida Statutes (1989) provides in relevant part: 38.02 Suggestion of disqualification . . .

STEINHORST, v. STATE, 636 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1994)

. . . See § 38.02, Fla.Stat. (1991) (suggestion of disqualification must be filed within thirty days after . . .

C. DOUGLASS, v. E. DOUGLAS,, 633 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . The second ground for disqualification was based on section 38.02 which allows for disqualification of . . . Section 38.02 contemplates that the judge will determine the truth of the suggestion to disqualify. . . .

PRESLEY, v. CITY OF BENBROOK,, 4 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 1993)

. . . officers’ entry into his house and arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and that Texas Penal Code § 38.02 . . . The district court granted summary judgment on his challenge to section 38.02(a), while a jury determined . . . in relevant part: Section 38.02. . . . Presley’s challenge faces the initial hurdle that § 38.02 has been upheld sub silentio several times. . . . Whether the arrest is “lawful” is not a precondition for the citizen’s compliance with § 38.02(a). . . .

FRANKEL, v. SLOTKIN, H. A. Jr. E. S. H. H. F. FMI Co., 984 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir. 1993)

. . . Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule 10b-5 § 38.02[b], at 2-131 (1992). . . . .

THE FLORIDA BAR Re AMENDMENT TO FLORIDA RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, 609 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992)

. . . Currently, two statutory provisions, sections 38.02 and 38.10, Florida Statutes (1991), authorize a party . . .

ROSEN, v. ROSEN,, 576 So. 2d 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . See § 38.02, Fla.Stat. (1989); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.432. . . . .

DIAMOND MORTGAGE CORPORATION OF ILLINOIS, A. J. v. SUGAR, D. P. C. M. M. P. C. P. C. P. C. P. C. M. P. C., 913 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1990)

. . . See, e.g., 2A Collier on Bankruptcy If 38.02 (14th ed. 1978). . . .

DIAMOND MORTGAGE CORPORATION OF ILLINOIS, A. J. v. SUGAR, D. P. C. M. M. P. C. P. C. P. C. P. C. M. P. C., 913 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1990)

. . . See, e.g., 2A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 38.02 (14th ed. 1978). . . .

CARNER, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA,, 42 Fla. Supp. 2d 154 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1990)

. . . The disqualification of judges (in civil cases) in Florida is governed by §§ 38.02 and 38.10, Fla. . . . Section 38.02 covers disqualification of judges who are related within the third degree to a party or . . . provides the procedure to seek disqualification and apparently supercedes the procedure outlined in 38.02 . . . that had they been raised in Florida pre-judgment, would have mandated disqualification under Section 38.02 . . .

L. BARBER, v., 562 So. 2d 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . motion to be made, it is by its terms confined to disqualification for consanguinity under sections 38.02 . . .

D. BROWN, v. ST. GEORGE ISLAND, LTD., 561 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1990)

. . . of section 38.10 only became applicable when there had been a prior disqualificátion under section 38.02 . . . Statutes (1989), and that neither of Judge Cooksey’s disqualifications had taken place under section 38.02 . . . Section 38.02 states that a party may show by a suggestion that the judge or the judge’s relative is . . . because section 38.02 did not become law until ten years after section 38.10 was enacted. . . . 38.10 and that a subsequent disqualification under section 38.02 shall be treated in the same manner . . .

ST. GEORGE ISLAND, LTD. a v. A. RUDD, a R. N. A. D. ST. GEORGE ISLAND, LTD. a v. A. RUDD, N. A. R. a a a D. ST. GEORGE ISLAND, LTD. a v. A. RUDD, R. St. a, 553 So. 2d 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . . § 38.02. Judge Gary granted the motions without explanation. . . . relationships, not familial ones, and therefore they did not properly constitute “suggestions” under section 38.02 . . .

R. LAWSON S. v. LONGO, GREG O BERRY, INC. v. LONGO,, 547 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . In Carlton, the Supreme Court of Florida held that sections 38.02 and 38.10, Florida Statutes, were no . . .

ST. GEORGE ISLAND, LTD. a v. A. RUDD,, 547 So. 2d 961 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . George’s motion was made pursuant to sections 38.02 and 38.10, Florida Statutes, and it therefore follows . . . Of these four grounds, only the first is arguably cognizable under section 38.02, while the other three . . . Accordingly, we find that Judge Cooksey’s disqualification was pursuant to a 38.10 motion and not a section 38.02 . . .

ST. GEORGE ISLAND, LTD. a v. A. RUDD,, 547 So. 2d 958 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . This, petitioner argues, applies only where the previous disqualification was made pursuant to section 38.02 . . .

GLADDEN, v. W. ROACH, 864 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1989)

. . . Gladden that if he continued to refuse to answer, he would be charged, under Texas Penal Code Article 38.02 . . . Gladden asks this court to declare Article 38.02 unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff and to . . . Gladden was charged with a violation of Article 38.02 only at the time of his April 23,1983, arrest. . . . At the time of Gladden’s arrest, Art. 38.02 made it an offense for a person “lawfully stopped” by an . . . The basis of Gladden’s argument on this point is that the Article 38.02 imposes a cost on his assertion . . .

GASSNER, v. CITY OF GARLAND, TEXAS, M. L., 864 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1989)

. . . . § 38.02, was declared facially unconstitutional. . . . use of vulgar language in a public place — also would have supported an arrest for a violation of § 38.02 . . .

HEATH, v. A. J. BROWN, R. J. D., 858 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1988)

. . . . § 38.02 (Vernon 1974), which requires a person lawfully stopped by a peace officer to report his name . . .

H. ELLIS v. MERRILL LYNCH CO. W. A. S. FRIEDENBERG B. JT, v. MERRILL LYNCH CO. W. A., 664 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1987)

. . . See also Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule 10b-5 § 38.02[b] and n. 21 (“[n]o one would suggest . . .

MARTINELLI v. CITY OF BEAUMONT, C., 820 F.2d 1491 (9th Cir. 1987)

. . . reasonable suspicion that the man was involved in a crime: The application of Tex.Penal Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 38.02 . . .

FMC CORPORATION, v. F. BOESKY L. P. F. L. P. IFB L. P. p. l. c. L. P. F. Co. S. B. B., 673 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1987)

. . . See Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule 10b-5, § 38.02[b] (2d ed. 1985 rev.). . . .

HEATH v. A. J. BROWN, R. J. E., 807 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1987)

. . . . § 38.02 (Vernon 1974). . . . As a result, plaintiffs were arrested and charged with violating § 38.02. . . . The court ruled that § 38.02 was constitutional on its face, but, relying on Brown v. . . . The facial constitutionality of § 38.02 was explicitly left open again in Trejo v. . . . Claim II: (declaration that § 38.02 is unconstitutional) 33 Vi 0% 3. . . .

E. FUREY, v. CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A, 780 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986)

. . . Under State and Federal Law, 51 Tex.L.Rev. 885, 913-14 (1973); McQuillin, 14 Municipal Corporations § 38.02 . . .

WINDSOR COMMUNICATIONS GROUP INC. t a v. GRANT, 75 B.R. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1985)

. . . See, e.g., 2A Collier on Bankruptcy If 38.02 (14th ed. 1976). . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 458 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1984)

. . . That procedural requirement is a feature of sections 38.02, 38.04 and 38.10, Florida Statutes (1983), . . .

UNITED STATES v. MALDONADO,, 735 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1984)

. . . . § 38.02 (Vernon 1974). . . . Maldonado, however, argues that his violation of section 38.02 cannot justify his arrest because this . . . While the district court in Spring purported to invalidate section 38.02 “on its face,” that case involved . . . Because Texas law allows severance of the provision of section 38.02 justifying Maldonado’s arrest from . . .

In DOUD, d b a UNITED MUTUAL SAVINGS BANK, v. DOUD,, 30 B.R. 731 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983)

. . . Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide, § 38.02[2], p. 38-9. . . .

MADISON CONSULTANTS, a I. S. v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Co. Co., 710 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1983)

. . . Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule 10b-5, § 38.02[c], at 2-127 to 2-130 (1981). . . .

SIKES, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a, 429 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . That note provides: “This rule replaces the procedural parts of §§ 38.02, 38.04 and 38.10, F.S. and unifies . . .

TREJO, v. PEREZ,, 693 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1982)

. . . . § 38.02, and in not submitting his affirmative defense of good faith. . . . Penal Code Ann. § 38.02. . . . Penal Code Ann. § 38.02 provides that “A person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to report . . . 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), in which it reversed a conviction for violating § 38.02 . . . Basis of the Arrest Perez did not charge Trejo with violating § 38.02. . . .

SPRING, v. CALDWELL,, 692 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1982)

. . . The district court reached the merits, and held that section 38.02 of the Texas Penal Code, the “Failure . . . placed him under arrest for violating the Texas “Failure to Identify” law, Texas Penal Code Ann. § 38.02 . . . district court granted the writ, set aside Spring’s conviction, vacated Spring’s sentence, and declared § 38.02 . . . Section 38.02 provides as follows: FAILURE TO IDENTIFY AS WITNESS (a) A person commits an offense if . . . imprisonment is authorized because justice and municipal courts, which routinely hear cases under § 38.02 . . .

JUDGE, v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,, 93 F.R.D. 372 (E.D. Tenn. 1981)

. . . , required the parties to make express demands in order to claim their right to trial by jury, Rule 38.02 . . .

In UNITED TRACTORS, INC. A. MINER, v. F. MITCHELL,, 15 B.R. 719 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)

. . . matters which the Act or the Bankruptcy Rules reserve to the judge alone.” 2A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 38.02 . . .

In MATTER UNITED TRACTORS, INC. MINER, v. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY, L. L. D., 16 B.R. 563 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)

. . . matters which the Act or the Bankruptcy Rules reserve to the judge alone.” 2A Collier on Bankruptcy para. 38.02 . . .

SPRING, v. CALDWELL, M., 92 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Tex. 1981)

. . . The Final Judgment included a declaration that Section 38.02 of the Texas Penal Code is unconstitutional . . . of Texas, and informed her of the pendency of this case and the constitutional attack upon Section 38.02 . . . Insofar as Apodaca argues that Section 38.02(a) violates the Fourth Amendment because it permits police . . . Respondents urge that a new trial is necessary because (1) Section 38.02 of the Texas Penal Code has . . . However, that charge was made subsequent to his arrest under Section 38.02, and it is clear from the . . .

In UNITED TRACTORS, INC. A. MINER, v. SHARP FORD- MERCURY, INC., 13 B.R. 239 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)

. . . matters which the Act or the Bankruptcy Rules reserve to the judge alone.” 2A Collier on Bankruptcy para. 38.02 . . .

STATE v. SLORA, 1 Fla. Supp. 2d 26 (Palm Beach Cty. Cir. Ct. 1981)

. . . Material witness in Rule 3.230 Fla.R.Cr.P. was adopted from 38.02 F.S. (1979). . . . this Court cannot conclude that it would be a material witness as used in Rule 3.230 Fla.R.Cr.P., or 38.02 . . .

SPRING, v. CALDWELL, M., 516 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D. Tex. 1981)

. . . on November 13, 1975, for refusing to identify himself to a police officer, in violation of Section 38.02 . . . petitioner was convicted in the Houston Municipal Court and fined $100 plus costs for violation of Section 38.02 . . . The application of Texas Penal Code Ann. § 38.02 to arrest and convict petitioner for his failure to . . . Further, the Court concludes Section 38.02 of the Texas Penal Code is unconstitutional on its face. . . . Section 38.02 of the Texas Penal Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. . . . .

W. FOLMAR, v. AMERICAN HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, W. FOLMAR, v. MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE COMPANY,, 91 F.R.D. 22 (E.D. Tenn. 1981)

. . . Rule 38.02, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. . . .

WOLTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,, 634 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1980)

. . . Hills’ issued and outstanding common shares rose to 947, of which taxpayer’s 360 shares constituted 38.02 . . .

BROWN v. TEXAS, 443 U.S. 47 (U.S. 1979)

. . . Penal Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 38.02 (a) (1974), which makes it a criminal act for a person to refuse to . . . Nonetheless, he was held in custody and charged with violating § 38.02 (a). . . . There, he moved to set aside the information on the ground that § 38.02 (a) of the Texas Penal Code violated . . . Penal Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 38.02 (1974). . . . The entire section reads as follows: “§ 38.02. . . .

In ESTATE CARLTON, HAYES v. ROGERS,, 378 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1979)

. . . of Justice Overton from participation in the decision on rehearing in this case, based on sections 38.02 . . . opinion as to the overall legal sufficiency of the petitioners’ request, their reliance on sections 38.02 . . . Pursuant to sections 38.02 and 38.10, Florida Statutes (1977), and the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon . . . In our own state, sections 38.02 and 38.10, Florida. . . . Section 38.02 requires that a suggestion for disqualification must be filed not more than thirty days . . .

BERNSTEIN v. UNIVERSAL PICTURES, INC. v. COMPOSERS AND LYRICISTS GUILD OF AMERICA, INC., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)

. . . in a democracy the felt need of the masses has a claim upon the law.” 5 Moore’s Federal Practice 'i 38.02 . . .

v. A. J. v., 69 T.C. 773 (T.C. 1978)

. . . 480.00 38.02 (0.54%) Sidney Bum. 37 2 mo. 1,216.92 96.46 (1.37%) It was understood after submission of . . .

In STATE FINANCIAL SERVICE, INC., 432 F. Supp. 129 (M.D. La. 1977)

. . . We find 14 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed.), ¶ 11-38.02, p. 11-38.8, to be dis-positive: “Should it develop . . .

v., 68 T.C. 39 (T.C. 1977)

. . . Lahner. 40 4.22 Wolter Construction Co., Inc. 360 38.02 Total. 947 100 On March 2, 1970, River Hills . . .

GOODMAN v. CITY OF DALLAS, 73 F.R.D. 642 (N.D. Tex. 1977)

. . . In addition East lined up the customers pursuant to Art. 38.02 of the Texas Penal Code and required identification . . .

WILISCH, v. WILISCH,, 335 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . . § 38.02, which is, in pertinent part: “In any cause in any of the courts of this state any party to . . .

THOMAS v. THOMAS, 44 Fla. Supp. 201 (Palm Beach Cty. Cir. Ct. 1976)

. . . Florida Statutes, provides for three methods by which a judge may be disqualified from a case — (1) §38.02 . . . of his own motion disqualify himself if he knows that any of the grounds for disqualification under §38.02 . . . In this particular case, the suggestion of disqualification contains no grounds under §38.02. . . . I am unable to disqualify myself under §38.02 since I am not aware of any grounds under that section. . . . party, assuming he or she exercises reasonable diligence, may file a suggestion of disqualification (FS§38.02 . . .

DATA LEASE FINANCIAL CORP. v. BLACKHAWK HEATING PLUMBING CO. INC. BLACKHAWK HEATING PLUMBING CO. INC. v. DATA LEASE FINANCIAL CORP., 325 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . . § 38.02 (1973); See 18A Fla.Jur., Judges, §§ 54 and 62, (1971).” . . . Instead of relying on Fla.Stat. 38.02 with the thirty day time limit as we supposed, appellants relied . . . . § 38.02 (1973); See 18A Fla.Jur., Judges, §§ 54 and 62 (1971). . . .

UNITED STATES v. C. TALLANT, Sr., 407 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Ga. 1975)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 38.02[2] (1975). . . .