The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . the Bank because the Bank did not sign the ATP or otherwise agree to be bound by the ATP. (3 ER 95.15-95.16 . . . the Initial Motion, that an implied tax-sharing agreement existed between Debtor and the Bank. (3 ER 95.16 . . . (Id. at 349-50 (citing 3 ER 95.16).) . . .
. . . disputed strip by adverse possession up to the fence line, pursuant to the 1974 version of section 95.16 . . . ANALYSIS Section 95.16, as it appears today in the Florida Statutes, would compel affir-mance. . . . Rather, she redirects us to the earlier version of section 95.16, pursuant to which she contended below . . . Harpster, 403 So.2d 409, 411 (Fla.1981) (citing § 95.16, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1974)). . . . The 1987 amendment to section 95.16 of the Florida Statutes does not change this result. . . .
. . . years under color of title (the wild deed) and that the property belonged to them pursuant to section 95.16 . . . Compare § 95.16, Fla. Stat. (2003) (adverse possession under color of title), with § 95.18, Fla. . . . We focus on the latter because the Fraziers make their claim under section 95.16. . . . From the text of section 95.16(1), we see that color of title references “a claim of title exclusive . . . of any other right” founded on a written instrument of conveyance. § 95.16(1), Fla. . . .
. . . pay (2/3 x $213.03 = $142.02), the code 54 night differential ($64.38), the code 72 Sunday premium ($95.16 . . .
. . . . § 5:12-95.12 through 95.16. . . .
. . . Alternatively, Meza claims that by virtue of the adverse possession statutes, sections 95.16 and 95.18 . . .
. . . Under either section 95.16 or section 95.18, Florida Statutes (2003) “the possession of the real property . . . Section 95.16, Florida Statutes (2003), addressing adverse possession under color of title, has not been . . .
. . . See §§ 95.16; 95.18, Fla. Stat. (2003). . . . Under color of title, a property is deemed possessed under the following circumstances: 95.16 Real property . . . county is to be considered as occupied for the same length of time as the part improved or cultivated. § 95.16 . . .
. . . In Seton the court considered a title claim based on adverse possession under section 95.16, Florida . . . The Setons’ adverse claim commenced in 1984 -under section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1975), which provided . . . ’ claim had not been perfected by adverse possession of seven years before the amendment of section 95.16 . . . Under section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1975), Mrs. . . . The amendment of section 95.16 in 1987 had no effect on her title so perfected, a vested right. . . .
. . . See § 95.16, Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . See § 95.16(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). Mr. Dunbar’s theory does not depend upon these usual proofs. . . .
. . . the owner of the disputed land through adverse possession under color of title, pursuant to section 95.16 . . . holding that defendants did not establish adverse possession by color of title because, under section 95.16 . . .
. . . The court found that the appellees satisfied section 95.16, Florida Statutes, because they obtained title . . . Section 95.16, Florida Statutes, reads in part: (1) When the occupant, or those under whom he claims, . . .
. . . See § 95.16, Fla. Stat. (1995); Mumaw v. Roberson, 60 So.2d 741 (Fla.1952); see also Enos v. . . .
. . . . § 95.16(1), Fla.Stat. (1989); Seton v. Swann, 650 So.2d 35, 37 (Fla.1995). . . . The second step is concerned with the methods listed in section 95.16(2), by which a claimant may show . . . Appellants in this case predicated their adverse possession claim under color of title on section 95.16 . . .
. . . dispute, we note that issue before us is whether the trial court properly applied the version of section 95.16 . . .
. . . . § 95.16(2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1993); Shultz v. . . . Johnson, 654 So.2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (each essential element of adverse possession under § 95.16 . . . ) (in absence of some exercise of physical dominion over property, adverse possession under section 95.16 . . .
. . . . § 95.16, Fla.Stat. (1977). . . .
. . . This ease concerns the interpretation of section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1991). . . . Under section 95.16, the title to property possessed but not described in a recorded instrument cannot . . . In reaching its conclusion, the district court reviewed the history of section 95.16. In Meyer v. . . . The Court also said that: By combining sections [95.16 and 95.17] the new statute clearly states that . . . See § 95.16(2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . The court denied the city’s claim for adverse possession under color of title pursuant to section 95.16 . . .
. . . adversely possessed the lands for the requisite period of time and met the requirements of section 95.16 . . . Earlier versions of section 95.16 were reviewed by the Florida supreme court in Meyer v. . . . 95.16(2)(b). . . . (2)(b) to section 95.16(2)(c). . . . Section 95.16(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1974) stated: "... . . .
. . . on a written instrument as being a conveyance of the property, or on a decree or judgment_” Section 95.16 . . .
. . . statutory authority, the final judgment indicates that the trial court based its decision upon section 95.16 . . . Under section 95.16(1), Florida Statutes (1991), at least two elements must be proved in the instant . . . applicable statutory prescription for acquiring title by adverse possession, in this case, section 95.16 . . .
. . . that area is contiguous to the described land and [meets one of the criteria enumerated at section 95.16 . . . BARFIELD and WOLF, JJ., concur. . § 95.16, Fla.Stat. (1985), provides: 95.16 Real property actions; adverse . . .
. . . Harpster, 403 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1981), which dealt with subsection 2(b) of section 95.16, Florida Statutes . . . legislative amendment had worked, the court said: By combining the two preceding sections, [former 95.16 . . . long as that area is contiguous to the described land and “protected by a substantial enclosure.” § 95.16 . . . Sed-don, they have additionally fulfilled one of the four possible criteria of 95.16(2), in this case . . .
. . . Although the appellees’ claim of adverse possession was with color of title pursuant to § 95.16, Fla.Stat . . . proceeded to trial in 1986, the Minchews cannot prevail on their claim of adverse possession under § 95.16 . . . None of the elements of § 95.16, Fla.Stat. have been satisfied, and the claim of adverse possession must . . .
. . . . § 95.16 Florida Statutes (1979). . . .
. . . However, under the interpretation placed upon section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1988), in Seddon plaintiffs . . . the chain link fence described above was not a “substantial enclosure” within the meaning of section 95.16 . . .
. . . plaintiff claims adverse possession by substantial enclosure pursuant to the interpretation of section 95.16 . . .
. . . Section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1977). . . .
. . . Florida, title to land may be acquired by adverse possession, either “under color of title,” Section 95.16 . . . question remains as to whether this possession was “under color of title” in conformance with Section 95.16 . . . simple title based on adverse possession must depend upon satisfaction of the requirements of Section 95.16 . . .
. . . sufficient to pass an after-acquired title; (3) as color of title under some statutes of limitation (see § 95.16 . . .
. . . Reference must also be made to Sections 95.16 and 95.18, Fla. Stat. (1979). 9. . . . Section 95.16, Fla. . . .
. . . In Florida the legislature, by acts now embodied in sections 95.14 and 95.16, Florida Statutes (1981) . . .
. . . Sec. 95.16, Fla.Stat. (1981); see also Mumaw v. Roberson, 60 So.2d 741 (Fla.1952). . . . Sec. 95.16, Fla.Stat. (1981); see also Mumaw v. Roberson, supra, 60 So.2d at 743-44. . . . .
. . . that theory and should be further limited to proving such possession before 1946 by virtue of Section 95.16 . . .
. . . Section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1977). As we stated in Moore v. . . .
. . . The instrument relied upon to show color of title must be recorded (§ 95.16, Fla.Stat.) and it must purport . . .
. . . The Defendant [Seddon] has not held such property according to the provisions of Section 95.16, Florida . . . Prior to that, Section 95.16 and 95.17 as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the State of Florida in . . . The trial court refused to apply section 95.16, Florida Statutes (Supp.1974), retroactively because it . . . Section 95.16, Fla.Stat. (1973). (emphasis supplied). . . . to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16 . . . Sections 11 and 12 of chapter 74-382 amended sections 95.16 and 95.17, Florida Statutes (1973). . . . . § 95.16, Fla.Stat. (1974 Supp.). . . . Section 95.16 provides: (1) When the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into possession . . . An examination of sections 95.16 and 95.-17, Florida Statutes (1973), together with the changes made . . . This construction of section 95.16 assures all property owners that there will be some notice of adverse . . .
. . . The adverse possession statute, §95.16, Fla. . . . Stat. (1979), provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 95.16 Real property actions; adverse possession . . .
. . . See, § 95.16, Fla.Stat. (1975). . . . note 4 supra, could not be effective as conferring “color of title” because it was not recorded, see § 95.16 . . .
. . . Section 95.16, Fla.Stat. (1972). . . .
. . . Griffin, 55 Fla. 560, 46 So. 635 (1908). .Section 95.18(2), and see § 95.16(2). . . . .
. . . an individual interest in the property; (d) adverse possession under color of title, pursuant to § 95.16 . . .
. . . activities were sufficient acts of adverse possession under color of title to give them title under Section 95.16 . . .
. . . The Defendant has not held such property according to the provisions of Section 95.16, Florida Statutes . . . Prior to that, Section 95.16 and 95.17 as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the State of Florida in . . . At that time Section 95.16 read: Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims . . . The new version of Section 95.16 eliminates some of the statutory language relied upon by the supreme . . . Sections 95.16 and .17 as interpreted by Meyer v. . . .
. . . Florida Statutes §95.16; Mumaw v. Roberson, 60 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1952); Munn v. . . . Stat. §95.16; Baugher v. Boley, 58 So. 980 (Fla. 1912); Wicker v. . . . Stat. §95.16. Adverse possession under Fla. . . . . §95.16 may be exercised against a public prescriptive right of the kind asserted here. Brooks v. . . .
. . . of proving the essential facts to establish adverse possession under color of title pursuant to §§ 95.16 . . . , 95.17, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., which read in part: “95.16 Real actions; adverse possession under color of . . . husbandry, or for the ordinary use of the occupant; or . . . ” [Emphasis Supplied] ****** With respect to § 95.16 . . .
. . . is settled law that a tax deed, whether valid or invalid, is color of title under Florida Statutes 95.16 . . .
. . . Yet, for purposes of § 95.16, we cannot tell whether this status existed for more than seven years prior . . .
. . . entirely within the exclusive purview of the adverse possession statutes of the State of Florida, §§ 95.16 . . .
. . . Secs. 95.16 and 95.17 of our statutes define adverse possession with color of title and Secs. 95.18 and . . . Sec. 95.16 provides: “Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into . . . be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of Sec. 95.16 . . .
. . . for conflict, clearly hold that without color of title or payment of taxes, as prescribed by Sections 95.16 . . . It should be noted that Section 95.16, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that adverse possession commencing . . . Section 95.16, Florida Statutes, 1971, provides : “Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those' under . . . to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16 . . . to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16 . . . Fla.Stat. § 95.16, F.S.A., deals with adverse possession under color of title, so that, to be given any . . .
. . . to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16 . . .
. . . See F.S. 95.16 and 95.17, F.S.A., Laws of 1969. . . .
. . . Section 95.16, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that when an occupant of premises enters into possession . . .
. . . Sections 95.16, 95.17, F.S.1965, F.S.A. . . .
. . . Sections 95.16 and 95.17, F.S.A.1967, since without benefit of these statutes defendant’s possession . . . J., and CROSS, J., concur. .“§95.16 Real actions; adverse possession under color of title; requirements . . . be premises included loithin the toritten instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16 . . .
. . . F.S.. 95.16, F.S.A.; F.S. 95.17, F.S.A. . . .
. . . evidence fully satisfies the statutory requirements for adverse possession under color of title, §§ 95.16 . . . to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16 . . .
. . . . § 95.16 or § 95.23, F.S.A., from now asserting their claim against the property. . . . Section 95.16, F.S.A. likewise is without application. The property was the homestead of Sanborn. . . .
. . . . § 95.16. . Ma.Stat.Ann. § 732.30. . Ma.Stat.Ann. § 732.28. . . . .
. . . the daily average production of well No. 2 was 16.80 barrels of oil and 330.20 barrels of water, or 95.16 . . .
. . . to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16 . . . to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16 . . . F.S. § 95.16, F.S.A. . F.S. § 95.18, F.S.A. . Palmquist v. Johnson, Fla.1949, 41 So.2d 313. . . .
. . . amended complaint claims, ■and the final decree awards title to the Lindgrens upon the basis of Section 95.16 . . . Wares to the Lindgrens did not constitute color of title essential for adverse possession under Section 95.16 . . .
. . . . § 95.16. Finding no error in the verdict and judgment of the trial court, the same are affirmed. . . .
. . . 95.17(2), F.S.A., defining possession and occupation under color of title, brings them within section 95.16 . . . to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16 . . . S. § 95.16, F.S.A., with color of title, and the payment of taxes required under § 95.18, where there . . .
. . . Florida Statute, Chapter 95.16, 95.17, 95.18 and 95.21, apply as to adverse possession and payment of . . .
. . . The statute governing the question before the lower court is Section 95.16, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A . . . title by adverse possession under color of title in the appellant within the provisions of Sections 95.16 . . .