Cases from cite.case.law:

A. CRAPO, v. GAINESVILLE AREA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INC. a, 274 So. 3d 453 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . But the term is defined in section 196.012(7), Florida Statutes (2014), as providing a function or service . . . legally result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of the function or service." § 196.012 . . . While not challenging the constitutionality of section 196.012(7), Alachua County argues that despite . . . Further, the dissent has overlooked the plain meaning of section 196.012(7) to impose what it believes . . . The Legislature plainly stated in section 196.012(7) that a charitable purpose is an activity for which . . . Gainesville Area Chamber of Commerce a charitable exemption from ad valorem property tax under section 196.012 . . . The statute implementing the charitable exemption, now section 196.012(7), originally consisted only . . . The court invalidated a provision of section 196.012(6) that purported to extend a public purpose tax . . . Yet the Chamber's interpretation of the statutory definition of "charitable purpose" in section 196.012 . . . Section 196.012(7) is not properly severed from its constitutional mooring. . . .

IN RE MENDOZA, 597 B.R. 686 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . . § 196.012(17) (2018) ; see also Fla. . . .

NATIONAL CENTER FOR CONSTRUCTION EDUCATION AND RESEARCH LTD. CORP. v. Ed CRAPO,, 248 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 196.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . A "charitable purpose" is defined in section 196.012(7), Florida Statutes (2015) as a function or service . . . Appellant is not an "educational institution" as defined by section 196.012(5), and therefore is not . . . Appellant's interpretation would abrogate the accreditation requirements of section 196.012(5), Florida . . . Section 196.012(5), Fla. . . .

CITY OF FORT PIERCE, a a St. v. TREASURE COAST MARINA, LC, a LC, a LC, a, 195 So. 3d 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 196.012(6), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

GROVE KEY MARINA, LLC s LLC, v, CASAMAYOR, v., 166 So. 3d 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . valorem taxes in accord with the provisions of Florida Statutes 196.199(2)(a) and Florida Statutes 196.012 . . .

J. GARCIA, v. ANDONIE,, 101 So. 3d 339 (Fla. 2012)

. . . Section 196.012(18), Florida Statutes (2006), defines “permanent residence” for ad valorem taxation purposes . . . and principal establishment to which, whenever absent, he or she has the intention of returning.... § 196.012 . . . the owner’s dependents, to be governed by the definition of permanent residence contained in section 196.012 . . . opinion, the Third District referred to the definition of “permanent residence” contained in section 196.012 . . . The Property Appraiser argues that the last sentence of section 196.012(18) prohibits the Florida property . . .

BOCA AIRPORT, INC. v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 56 So. 3d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . maintain that the legislature exempted them from intangible taxation in 1993 when it amended section 196.012 . . . lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012 . . . In 1993, section 196.012(6) was amended and the following language was added to include FBO exemptions . . . under section 196.199(2)(a), and constituted an aviation facility specifically exempted by section 196.012 . . . Paris Air, Inc., 975 So.2d 627, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing § 196.012(6), Fla. . . .

DE LA MORA, v. ANDONIE,, 51 So. 3d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Section 196.012, Florida Statutes (2006), defines “permanent residence” for purposes of this provision . . .

K. KARAYIANNAKIS, v. R. NIKOLITS, CFA,, 23 So. 3d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . . § 196.012(13), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). . . .

C. NOLTE, v. PARIS AIR, INC., 975 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 196.012(6), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

ZINGALE, v. CROSSINGS AT FLEMING ISLAND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT, a, 960 So. 2d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . 2d DCA 1999) (finding property appraiser lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of section 196.012 . . .

CITY OF GAINESVILLE, v. Ed CRAPO,, 953 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . section 166.047, Florida Statutes, and a portion of section 3 of chapter 97-197, which amended section 196.012 . . .

W. C. SHERMAN, v. RED BAY STRONGHOLD FOUNDATION,, 942 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . .” § 196.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . . Such purposes may include more than one class of exempt use.” § 196.012(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . . .” § 196.012(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .

P. CASON, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES,, 944 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2006)

. . . who “serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012 . . .

DeQUERVAIN v. V. DESGUIN,, 927 So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Their supporting affidavits stated that they met all the requirements of section 196.012 to prove that . . . The implementing statutes provide, in relevant part, as follows: 196.012 Definitions. (17) “Permanent . . . appraiser for the purpose of determining that the taxpayer is a permanent resident as defined in s. 196.012 . . .

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, v. CITY OF GAINESVILLE,, 918 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2005)

. . . In the same act, the Legislature amended section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1995), to exclude the . . . The pertinent portion of section 196.012(6), as amended, specifies that “[pjroviding two-way telecommunications . . . does not constitute an exempt use for purposes of s. 196.199,” with exceptions inapplicable here. § 196.012 . . . powers provision of the state constitution to mandate ad valorem taxation, and the amendment to section 196.012 . . . Although “governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function” is statutorily defined in section 196.012 . . .

SUNSET HARBOUR CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, v. ROBBINS,, 914 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 2005)

. . . facility, notwithstanding the fact that the facility was exempt' from property taxes under section 196.012 . . . The property appraiser appealed the board’s decision to the circuit court and argued that section 196.012 . . .

WARD, v. BROWN,, 894 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2004)

. . . lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012 . . .

SMITH, v. AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION OF GULFCOAST FLORIDA, INC., 870 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Section 196.012(1) defines “[ejxempt use of property” or “use of property for exempt purposes” as “predominant . . . Section 196.012(2) defines “[exclusive use of property” in part as “use of property solely for exempt . . . Section 196.012(7) defines “[cjharitable purpose” in part as “a function or service which is of such . . .

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, v. CITY OF GAINESVILLE,, 859 So. 2d 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . In seeking a declaration below that section 166.047 and the amendment to section 196.012(6) facially . . . or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds.” § 196.012 . . . of such facilities constituted a governmental, public purpose or function exempt pursuant to section 196.012 . . . The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to . . . This provision now appears in subsection (6). § 196.012(6), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . declared facially invalid a portion of section 3 of chapter 97-197, Laws of Florida, which amended section 196.012 . . . In section 3 of chapter 97-197, the legislature amended section 196.012(6), which sets out definitions . . .

R. NIKOLITS, v. RUNWAY HANGAR CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. a, 847 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Statutes (1999), which exempts property owned and used by a governmental agency, and under section 196.012 . . . The property appraiser concedes that the latter are exempt from real property taxes under section 196.012 . . .

TURNER, v. CONCORDE PROPERTIES, a, 823 So. 2d 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012 . . . Section 196.012(6) defines “public purpose” as one which “could properly be performed or served by an . . . McIntyre, 783 So.2d 238 (Fla.2001), when it declared the legislature’s 1994 amendment to section 196.012 . . .

FUCHS, v. W. ROBBINS, v. W. v., 818 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 2002)

. . . In Turner, the taxpayer had claimed an exemption pursuant to section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1997 . . .

O. HALE, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, STATE OF FLORIDA,, 808 So. 2d 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Section 196.012(18), Florida Statutes, defines “permanent residence” as “that place where a person has . . .

DAVIS, v. GULF POWER CORPORATION, a, 799 So. 2d 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . Board that the applicant is “a new business or an expansion of an existing business, as defined in s. 196.012 . . . Section 196.012(16)(a)l defines “Expansion of an existing business”: A business establishing 10 or more . . . in section 192.001(ll)(d), Florida Statutes (1999), cannot apply to the use of that term in section 196.012 . . . Accordingly, we hold that for purposes of section 196.1995, Florida Statutes (1999), and section 196.012 . . .

SEBRING AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. C. McINTYRE, J. T. Of v. C. J. T., 783 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2001)

. . . McIntyre, 718 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“Sebring III ”), which declared a portion of section 196.012 . . . lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012 . . . Section 196.012(6), in turn, provided: (6) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall . . . Following the outcome in Sebring II, the Legislature amended section 196.012(6)(“the 1994 amendment”) . . . The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to . . .

REINISH v. K. CLARK, L. H., 765 So. 2d 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . .” § 196.012(17), Fla. . . . state or country, it is presumed to continue until the person shows that a change has occurred.” § 196.012 . . .

TURNER, v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY AVIATION AUTHORITY, a a, 739 So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . At issue is the application of section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1997), which authorizes a governmental . . . the assessment to approximately one million dollars based on its decision that, pursuant to section 196.012 . . . suit is, in fact, a challenge to the constitutionality of the sports facility exemption in section 196.012 . . . The property at issue meets the criteria of section 196.012(6), in which the legislature deemed certain . . . On September 11, 1998, this court held unconstitutional the portion of section 196.012(6) exempting sports . . .

THE SEBRING AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. C. McINTYRE, J. T., 718 So. 2d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . the Department of Revenue (the department) challenge an order of the trial court declaring section 196.012 . . . The statutory provision, section 196.012(6), under which the raceway now claims an exemption was amended . . . There is no doubt that the raceway falls within this provision of section 196.012(6). . . . To the extent that section 196.012(6) attempts to exempt from taxation municipal property used for a . . . Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975). . . .

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, v. BROTHERS OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD, INC., 714 So. 2d 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . which commenced in 1945, was entitled to a charitable exemption from ad valorem taxation under sections 196.012 . . .

PAGE, M. L. H. v. CITY OF FERNANDINA BEACH, a, 714 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . and reverse in part, and I write only to address the applicability of the 1993 amendment to section 196.012 . . . Section 196.012(6) provides a definition of “governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function” . . . airport was exempt from ad valorem taxation and noted the “clarifying language” of the amended section 196.012 . . . Indeed, the governmental-function definition of section 196.012(6) has existed for 27 years, since 1971 . . . public restroom, and concession stand serve a governmental-governmental purpose pursuant to section 196.012 . . . As stated in Femandina Harbor Joint Venture, [u]nder the definitional provisions of Section 196.012(6 . . . (6),” appellants failed to even mention section 196.012(6), its applicability to this property, or the . . . If section 196.012(6) had not been amended or applied by the trial court below, I would agree that the . . . I would affirm the application of section 196.012(6) and the exemption granted to the airport property . . . One law subsequently amending section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes, specifically made the amendment “ . . . Since the present dispute has to do with tax rolls prepared before 1994, this amendment to section 196.012 . . . Section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1991), provided: Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or . . . After the last sentence of section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1991), chapter 93-233, section 3, at . . . The City’s answer brief cited "the amendment to Section 196.012(6)," arguing that it was a "clarifying . . .

SOUTHLAKE COMMUNITY FOUNDATION, INC. v. HAVILL,, 707 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . (4) The physical use of the Aurora project as of January 1, 1995, qualified as a charitable use (§ 196.012 . . . entitled to an exemption turns on whether it is operated for a “charitable purpose” as defined in section 196.012 . . . actions of Foundation simply do not fall within the definition of “charitable purpose” found in section 196.012 . . . See § 196.012(7), Fla. Stat. (1993). . . .

LISBOA, v. DADE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER,, 705 So. 2d 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Section 196.012(17) and (18), Florida Statutes, define the terms “permanent resident” and “permanent . . .

CRAIN, v. PUTNAM, J., 687 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . homestead by a paraplegic, hemiplegic, or other totally and permanently disabled person, as defined in s. 196.012 . . . That word is defined in section 196.012(4) as follows: “Use” means the exercise of any right or power . . . Section 196.012(13) provides in part: “‘Real estate used and owned as a homestead’ means real property . . .

CANAVERAL PORT AUTHORITY, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 690 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 1996)

. . . the lessee is serving a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function as defined in section 196.012 . . .

SARASOTA COUNTY, v. SARASOTA CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC., 667 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995)

. . . .; §§ 196.012(1), 196.192(1), Fla.Stat. (1993). . . . .

SEBRING AIRPORT AUTHORITY, v. C. McINTYRE,, 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994)

. . . lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012 . . . Section 196.012(6) defines public purpose or function as follows: (6) Governmental, municipal, or public . . . Our finding in Volusia was premised on Williams, which limits the exemptions in sections 196.012(6) and . . . 196.199(2)(a) to governmental-governmental functions: The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012 . . . (5) [now 196.012(6)] and 196.-199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to “governmental-governmental” functions . . .

SARASOTA COUNTY, v. SARASOTA CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC. Mt., 641 So. 2d 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . Section 3(a) under Article VII of the Constitution of the State of Florida, Florida Statutes Sec. 196.012 . . .

J. W. MIKOS, v. CITY OF SARASOTA, a, 636 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in section 196.012 . . . Section 196.012(6) provides that a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function is served or . . .

SEBRING AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. C. McINTYRE, J. T., 623 So. 2d 541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in Section 196.012 . . . Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975). . . . scope of the exemption at issue here in the following words: The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012 . . .

PAGE, D. v. FERNANDINA HARBOR JOINT VENTURE, By FERNANDINA MARINA INVESTORS, LTD. a a By a, 608 So. 2d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in Section 196.012 . . . Under the definitional provisions of Section 196.012(6), a municipal or public purpose is defined to . . .

MASTROIANNI, J. v. MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER OF JACKSONVILLE, INC. a EMMCO I, a EMMCO II, a, 606 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . Subsection 196.012(1), Florida Statutes (1989), likewise evidences this statutory intent by specifically . . .

TRINITY EPISCOPAL SCHOOL, INC. v. W. ROBBINS,, 605 So. 2d 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . defines the “ ‘exclusive use of property’ ” as “property that is used 100 percent for exempt purposes,” § 196.012 . . . as “predominant or exclusive use of property for educational ... use, as defined in this chapter.” § 196.012 . . . The appraiser concedes that the School is an educational institution as defined by section 196.012(4) . . .

MARATHON AIR SERVICES, INC. v. A. HIGGS,, 575 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012 . . .

PUBLIC HOUSING ASSISTANCE, INC. v. HAVILL,, 571 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . .” § 196.012(1), Fla.Stat. (1989). (Emphasis added). . . . We hold therefore that PHAI operates for a charitable purpose as defined by section 196.012(7). . . .

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., 545 So. 2d 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . correctly found that the property qualified for an ad valorem tax educational use exemption under Sections 196.012 . . . The Lake Worth Towers, Inc. case did not construe the educational use exemption derived from Sections 196.012 . . . QUALIFY AS BEING IN “ACTUAL USE” FOR PURPOSES OF ACQUIRING THE EDUCATIONAL TAX EXEMPTION UNDER SECTIONS 196.012 . . . We note that our conclusion here would also be different under the revised Section 196.012(5), Florida . . .

SAINT ANDREW S SCHOOL OF BOCA RATON, INCORPORATED, a v. E. WALKER, C. T x, 540 So. 2d 207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . See § 196.012(2), Fla.Stat. . . . Furthermore, at the time of Berkeley, the one hundred percent use requirement in section 196.012(2) was . . . legislative’s somewhat confusing employment of the following language in subsection (1) of section 196.012 . . .

CITY OF ORLANDO, v. S. HAUSMAN,, 534 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012 . . .

MIAMI- DADE COMMUNITY COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC. v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY,, 28 Fla. Supp. 2d 14 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1988)

. . . Section 196.012, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that exclusive use of property for educational purposes . . .

BYSTROM, v. CULBREATH,, 24 Fla. Supp. 2d 72 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1987)

. . . homestead by a paraplegic, hemiplegic, or other totally and permanently disabled person, as defined in § 196.012 . . .

COVENANT HOUSE, v. MARKHAM,, 488 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . See §§ 196.012 and 196.192, Fla.Stat. (1983). HERSEY, C.J., ANSTEAD and DELL, JJ., concur. . . .

R. JONES, Jr. v. LIFE CARE OF BAPTIST HOSPITAL, INC. d b a, 476 So. 2d 726 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . essential public function” being performed by appellee is also a “charitable purpose” as defined in section 196.012 . . . Section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1981), reads in pertinent part: "Charitable purpose” means a function . . .

F. REDFORD, Jr. G. B. B. v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 478 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1985)

. . . seeking a determination that the twenty-five leaseholds were not exempt under sections 196.001(2), 196.012 . . . and did not constitute a governmental, municipal, or public purpose function as defined in sections 196.012 . . .

IN RE MIAMI CHRISTIAN SCHOOL, INC., 15 Fla. Supp. 2d 171 (Dade Cty. Property Appraisal Adjustment Board 1985)

. . . Florida Statutes Section 196.012(4) provides as follows: “Educational institutions” means State, parochial . . .

W. R. DANIEL, Jr. v. CANTERBURY TOWERS, INC., 462 So. 2d 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . the denial of its claimed charitable exemptions on the basis of a constitutional challenge to section 196.012 . . . nursing facility of appellee has been granted a charitable exemption from taxes pursuant to sections 196.012 . . .

ALCIME v. BYSTROM,, 451 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . Section 196.012(16), (17), Florida Statutes (1981) provides: (16) “Permanent resident” means a person . . .

W. TURNER, Jr. v. TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND, a, 445 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . A “charitable purpose” is defined in section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1981), as follows: “Charitable . . .

W. R. DANIEL, Jr. v. T. M. MURRELL CO. INC. d b a M., 445 So. 2d 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . The lower court, basing its ruling upon section 196.192, Florida Statutes (1981) and section 196.012( . . . Appellants urge that, moreover, when section 196.198 is read together with sections 196.-192 and 196.012 . . . Section 196.012(1), Fla.Stat., provides: (1) "Exempt use of property” means predominant or exclusive . . . (Emphasis added.) .Section 196.012, Definitions. — • (4) "Educational institutions” means state, parochial . . .

CITY OF ORMOND BEACH, a v. STATE J. DEL MARCO,, 426 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . . § 196.012(13), Fla.Stat. (1981): “Renewable energy source device” or “device” means any of the following . . .

Dr. GLATSTEIN, v. CITY OF MIAMI, a a, 399 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . operated properties when used to serve a governmental, municipal, or public purpose as defined in Section 196.012 . . .

R. R. WALDEN, v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY AVIATION AUTHORITY, 375 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1979)

. . . been performing a governmental and public purpose or function, as those terms are defined in Section 196.012 . . . commercial leaseholders of county-owned Santa Rosa Island were entitled to the exemptions in sections 196.012 . . . We rejected this argument and .held that the exemptions contemplated by sections 196.012(5) and 196.199 . . . private corporation under a lease from a public body, was not entitled to exemption under sections 196.012 . . . Maccabee Investments, Inc., 343 So.2d 16 (Fla.1977), we refused to apply the exemption of sections 196.012 . . .

A. MALLARD, H. S. J. Ed v. R. G. HOBELMANN COMPANY, INC. a, 363 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . .-199(2)(a) and F.S. 196.012(5). This appeal followed. . . .

ST. JOHN S ASSOCIATES, a v. A. MALLARD,, 366 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . carries out a function which could properly be performed by the appropriate governmental unit, Section 196.012 . . . purpose or function and that the leaseholds were exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to Section 196.012 . . . The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to . . .

DADE COUNTY TAXING AUTHORITIES, v. CEDARS OF LEBANON HOSPITAL CORP. INC., 355 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 1978)

. . . See Sections 196.012, 196.192, 196.195, 196.196, and 196.197, Florida Statutes (1973). . . . See Sections 196.012, 196.192, 196.195, 196.196, and 196.197, Florida Statutes (1973). . . .

DAYTONA BEACH RACING AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES DISTRICT v. VOLUSIA COUNTY, 355 So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . “serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function” as defined by Section 196.012 . . . Section 196.012(5), Fla.Stat. (1975). . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, v. E. J. GIBBS, Jr., 342 So. 2d 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . not serve or perform a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function as defined in Section 196.012 . . .

VOLUSIA COUNTY, a v. DAYTONA BEACH RACING AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES DISTRICT, a a, 341 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1976)

. . . Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975). . . . scope of the exemption at issue here in the following words: The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012 . . .

WILLIAMS v. R. JONES, DUNES MOTEL, INC. a v. R. JONES, J. LERGENMILLER, Jr. v. R. JONES,, 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975)

. . . function and, accordingly, such leaseholds are exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to Section 196.012 . . . with respect to leaseholders of commercial property to the effect that they are exempt under Section 196.012 . . . The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) (a), Florida Statutes, relate to . . . taxation upon the same principle as the appellants here contend that they are exempt under Subsection 196.012 . . . not serve or perform a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function as defined in Section 196.012 . . .

CITY OF TAMPA, a v. R. R. WALDEN, K. C., 323 So. 2d 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal or public purpose or function, as defined in § 196.012 . . . (Emphasis supplied) and Fla.Stat. § 196.012(5) which in pertinent part provides: “(5) Governmental, municipal . . .

MACCABEE INVESTMENTS, INC. a v. MARKHAM,, 311 So. 2d 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal or public purpose or function, as defined in § 196.012 . . . The public purpose or function hereinabove mentioned is defined in sec. 196.012(5) as follows: “(5) Governmental . . . residents of the City serves a municipal or public purpose or function within the definition of sec. 196.012 . . .

W. MIKOS, v. PLYMOUTH HARBOR, INCORPORATED, a, 316 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)

. . . . § 196.012(6) (1971), which reads as follows: “(6) ‘Charitable purpose’ means a function or service . . . determination of whether the Plymouth Harbor property serves the function specified by Fla.Stat. § 196.012 . . . . §§ 196.012(6) and 196.196 (1971), and that the record demonstrated a conflict of fact on these points . . . Section 196.012, F.S.A. and the criteria in Section 196.196 in keeping with Section 3(a), Article VII . . .

NORTH MIAMI ELKS LODGE v. TAX ASSESSOR,, 41 Fla. Supp. 162 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1974)

. . . Florida Statute 196.012 defines exempt use of property to include a charitable use and further defines . . . The use is therefore not “charitable” as that term is defined by Florida Statute 196.012(6). . . .

HERTZ CORPORATION, a a v. R. R. WALDEN,, 299 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)

. . . lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal or public purpose or function, as defined in § 196.012 . . .

PRESBYTERIAN HOMES OF SYNOD OF FLORIDA, a v. K. WOOD, J. Ed STRAUGHN, v. PRESBYTERIAN HOMES OF SYNOD OF FLORIDA, a K., 297 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1974)

. . . Section 196.012(1), F. . . . Subsection (3) of Section 196.012 states: “ ‘Predominant use of property’ means property used for exempt . . . Section 196.012, F. . . .

J. Ed STRAUGHN, v. M. CAMP, 293 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1974)

. . . Laws of Florida 1971, and provisions of said Chapter brought forward as Sections 196.199(2) (a) and 196.012 . . . lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal or pub-lie purpose or function, as defined in § 196.012 . . . (5) . . . . ” Fla.Stat. § 196.012(5) (1971), F.S.A., which is also a new section, defines public purpose . . . The pertinent provisions of Chapter 71-133 so providing now appear as Sections 196.199(2) (a) and 196.012 . . . 210 So.2d 193, to Section 192.62, F.S., F.S.A., a predecessor statute to Sections 196.199(2) (a) and 196.012 . . . . § 196.012(5) (1971), F.S.A., and is therefore exempt under Fla.Stat. § 196.-199(2)(a) (1971), F.S.A . . .

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF POLICE, v. TAX ASSESSOR,, 39 Fla. Supp. 61 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1973)

. . . See §196.012 (1). . . . See §196.012(2). . . . See §196.012 (3). . . .

DADE COUNTY, a v. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. a, 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973)

. . . Neither Section 196.25(2) (c), F.S. 1969, nor the successor statutes, Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199 . . . . § 196.012(5) for definition of “public purpose,” effective December 31, 1971. . . . .

DADE COUNTY v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF POLICE, a, 268 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1972)

. . . . § 196.012(1), F.S.A. The judgment directly appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered. . . .