The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . Deveau was cited for violating section 316.130(15), Florida Statutes (2018), which provides: Notwithstanding . . .
. . . reach the question of comparative negligence, any error in the giving of. the instruction on section 316.130 . . .
. . . his report that the pedestrians were, responsible for the accident as they violated Florida Statute § 316.130 . . .
. . . The trial court found the officer had probable cause that the defendant had violated section 316.130, . . . Id. § 316.130(4). Once again, there was .no evidence that sidewalks existed. . . . Id. § 316.130(5). There was no testimony that the defendant was soliciting anyone for anything. . . . Id. § 316.130(6). . . . Id. § 316.130(19). . . .
. . . . § 316.130 (describing detailed regulations for pedestrians); id. § 316.2065 (listing regulations for . . .
. . . had probable cause to stop Williams based on the violation of a pedestrian traffic statute, section 316.130 . . . officer could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was jaywalking” in violation of section 316.130 . . . Section 316.130(4), Florida Statutes (2012) provides: Where sidewalks are not provided, any pedestrian . . .
. . . . § 316.130(3). . . . Stat. § 316.130.... . . . Stat. § 316.130(3). . . . Stat. § 316.130(3).” Id. at 1090. Also instructive is Ybarra v. . . . Stat. § 316.130(3). Id. at *2. The plaintiff nonetheless maintained that a violation of Fla. . . .
. . . subsequently searched by an officer following his alleged violation of a pedestrian traffic statute, section 316.130 . . . The defendant argued that he did not violate section 316.130(12) and, therefore, his seizure and subsequent . . . the defendant’s] testimony and by the officer’s testimony, he was acting in compliance with [section 316.130 . . . Section 316.130(12) of the Florida Statutes states that, when there is no available cross-walk, an individual . . . Section 316.130(12) of the Florida Statutes (2009) states, in pertinent part: Pedestrians; traffic regulations . . .
. . . They claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on section 316.130(8), Florida Statutes . . . Seltzer also requested the instruction which gave rise to the present appeal, namely, section 316.130 . . . The Rosenfelds argue that section 316.130(8) was legally erroneous when applied to a two-year-old child . . . Here, the trial court instructed the jury that a violation of section 316.130(8), which would place a . . . reach the question of comparative negligence, any error in the giving of the instruction on section 316.130 . . . The majority holds that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction based upon section 316.130 . . .
. . . At the conclusion of the trial testimony, the defendants requested a jury instruction on section 316.130 . . . was against the manifest weight of the evidence, (2) the jury should have been instructed on section 316.130 . . . The defendants argue that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on section 316.130 . . . The defendants therefore requested an instruction which tracked the language of section 316.130(3), Florida . . . was evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that there was a sidewalk, and section 316.130 . . .
. . . . § 316.130, Fla. Stat. § 316.072, and § 54-2 of the Miami City Code. . . . Stat. § 316.130(3). . . . Stat. § 316.130(3); see also Fla. . . . Stat. § 316.130(3). . . . Stat. § 316.130(3). . . . . the majority of this Court wrong with respect to Pastor’s arguable probable cause to arrest under § 316.130 . . . Notwithstanding what the statute does and does not require, “an arrest pursuant to § 316.130 could not . . . In my view, the district court correctly analyzed the applicability of § 316.130 in terms of whether . . . Pastor’s invocation of § 316.130 fails to amount even to an after-the-fact excuse for her actions. . . . Pastor never articulated § 316.130 as the purported basis for the arrest at the time of the arrest and . . .
. . . the Florida Statutes (“316.130(5)”). . . . Ann. 316.130(5) (West 2002). . . . In fact, 316.130(5) is an un~ derinclusive measure. . . . Neither side could point to any legislative history behind 316.130(5). . . . No such discrimination within a category exists in 316.130(5). . . .
. . . Section 316.130, Fla Stat., for example, makes it unlawful for a pedestrian to “walk along and upon the . . . As for § 316.130, Fla. . . . Under these circumstances, an arrest pursuant to § 316.130 could not be reasonable. . . .
. . . however, with Beeman’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to either read or paraphrase section 316.130 . . . Section 316.130(15), provides: Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, every driver of a vehicle . . . Section 316.130(15) places a responsibility on every driver in relation to a person either walking or . . .
. . . . § 316.130(5), (19), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .
. . . During the ensuing stop, the officers issued him a traffic citation for violation of section 316.130( . . . 4), Florida Statutes (1997), which states: 316.130 Pedestrian obedience to traffic control devices and . . . For the first time on appeal, McCellan contends that section 316.130(4) does not prohibit him from standing . . .
. . . Section 316.130(10), Florida Statutes, provides: Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other . . . Section 316.130(12), Florida Statutes, also provides: . . . .
. . . The instruction based on section 316.130(8), Florida Statutes (1989), should not have been given because . . .
. . . . § 316.130(18), Fla.Stat. (1993). . . . .
. . . court erred in failing to give requested instructions encompassing the following two statutes: Section 316.130 . . . Section 316.130(15), Florida Statutes (1989), provides as follows: Notwithstanding other provisions of . . .
. . . bureau or clerk’s office: (l-)-Three-dollars for all violations of pedestrian regulations-under-section-316.130 . . .
. . . Section 316.130, Fla.Stat. (1987); Section 318.13(3), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .
. . . or clerk’s office: (1) Two Three dollars for all violations of pedestrian regulations under section 316.130 . . .
. . . bureau or clerk’s office: (1) Two dollars for all violations of pedestrian regulations under section 316.130 . . .
. . . whether such signs were designed to implement “traffic control;” if the pedestrians violated section 316.130 . . . Section 316.130, Florida Statutes (1981), states in part as follows: (1) A pedestrian shall obey the . . .
. . . . [§ 316.130(8), Fla.Stat. (1981).] . . . signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. [§ 316.130 . . .
. . . regulations, section 316.2065, Florida Statutes, and infractions of pedestrian regulations, section 316.130 . . .
. . . Section 316.130(4), Florida Statutes (1977); Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Civ.) 4.11. . . .