The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXVIII
NATURAL RESOURCES; CONSERVATION, RECLAMATION, AND USE

Chapter 376
POLLUTANT DISCHARGE PREVENTION AND REMOVAL

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F.S. 376.12

376.12 Liabilities and defenses of responsible parties; liabilities of third parties; financial security requirements for vessels; liability of cargo owners; notification requirements.—

(1) LIABILITY FOR CLEANUP COSTS.—Because it is the intent of ss. 376.011-376.21 to provide the means for rapid and effective cleanup and to minimize cleanup costs and damages, any responsible party who permits or suffers a prohibited discharge or other polluting condition to take place within state boundaries shall be liable to the fund for all costs of removal, containment, and abatement of a prohibited discharge, unless the responsible party is entitled to a limitation or defense under this section.

(2) LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CLEANUP COSTS.—Except as provided in subsection (3), a responsible party’s liability to the fund for costs of removal, containment, and abatement shall be as follows:

(a) For a vessel transporting pollutants as cargo:

1. For any such vessel of 3,000 gross tons or more, $10 million or $1,200 per gross ton, whichever is greater.

2. For any such vessel of less than 3,000 gross tons, $2 million or $1,200 per gross ton, whichever is greater.

(b) For any other vessel: $500,000 or $600 per gross ton, whichever is greater.

(3) EXCEPTIONS TO LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.—The provisions of subsection (2) shall not apply when:

(a) The department demonstrates that such discharge was the result of willful or gross negligence or willful misconduct of, or the violation of an applicable federal or state safety, construction, or operating regulation or rule by, the responsible party, an agent or employee of the responsible party, or a person acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible party, except where the sole contractual arrangement arises in connection with carriage by a common carrier by rail; or

(b) The responsible party fails or refuses:

1. To report the incident as required by law and the responsible party knows or has reason to know of the incident; or

2. To provide reasonable cooperation and assistance requested by a state or federal on-scene coordinator in connection with cleanup activities. The responsible party must file an objection with the department if such party deems that cooperation or assistance requested by a state or federal on-scene coordinator is unreasonable. Such an objection must be filed with the department within 2 working days after the request. If such request is determined by the department to be unreasonable, the responsible party may assert a claim against the fund, pursuant to s. 376.123, for reimbursement of expenses incurred in carrying out such request. The responsible party may not file an objection to a request based solely on the premise that the requested activity did not have satisfactory results, that the responsible party has exceeded the applicable limitation of liability, or that the responsible party has a defense to liability.

(4) LIABILITY FOR NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES.—Each responsible party is liable to the fund, pursuant to s. 376.121, for all natural resource damages that result from the discharge.

(5) LIABILITY FOR PROPERTY DAMAGES.—Each responsible party is liable to any affected person for all damages as defined in s. 376.031, excluding natural resource damages, suffered by that person as a result of the discharge.

¹(6) ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES OF RESPONSIBLE PARTIES.—A responsible party that disputes any claim by the department may request a hearing pursuant to s. 120.57.

(7) DEFENSES TO LIABILITY.—In any proceeding determining claims of the fund or any other claims by the state pursuant to ss. 376.011-376.21, it shall not be necessary for the department to plead or prove negligence in any form or manner. The department need only plead and prove that the prohibited discharge or other polluting condition occurred. The only defenses of a person alleged to be responsible for the discharge to an action or proceeding for damages or cleanup costs shall be to plead and prove that the occurrence was solely the result of any of the following or any combination of the following:

(a) An act of war.

(b) An act of government, either federal, state, county, or municipal.

(c) An act of God, which means only an unforeseeable act exclusively occasioned by the violence of nature without the interference of any human agency.

(d) An act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the responsible party or a third party whose act or omission occurs in connection with any contractual relationship with the responsible party, except where the sole contractual arrangement arises in connection with carriage by rail,

provided that, to establish entitlement to any of the foregoing defenses, the responsible party shall plead and prove that the responsible party exercised due care with respect to the pollutant concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of the pollutant and in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of others and the foreseeable consequences of those acts or omissions.

(8) EXCEPTIONS TO DEFENSES.—The defenses provided in subsection (7) shall not apply with respect to a responsible party who fails or refuses:

(a) To report the discharge as required by law, when the responsible party knows or has reason to know of the discharge; or

(b) To provide reasonable cooperation and assistance requested by a state or federal on-scene coordinator in connection with cleanup activities. The responsible party must file an objection with the department, pursuant to subsection (3), if such party deems that cooperation or assistance requested by a state or federal on-scene coordinator is unreasonable.

(9) LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTIES.—In any case in which a responsible party establishes that a discharge or threat of a discharge and the resulting cleanup costs and damages were caused solely by an act or omission of one or more third parties as described in paragraph (7)(d), or solely by such an act or omission in combination with an act of war, an act of government, or an act of God, the third party or parties shall be treated as the responsible party or parties for all purposes of determining liability under ss. 376.011-376.21.

(10) LIABILITY OF CARGO OWNERS.—The owner of a pollutant transported as cargo on any vessel suffering a discharge within state waters is liable for all cleanup costs within the applicable vessel liability limits established under this section, not paid for by the owner or operator of the vessel. However, the cargo owner is not liable under this subsection if the vessel owner, operator, or master is found in compliance with the financial security requirements of this section at the time of the discharge or fails to provide certified notification of the cancellation or withdrawal of financial security to the department and the cargo owner at least 3 working days before the vessel entered state waters.

(11) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR VESSELS AND TERMINAL FACILITIES.—In addition to any civil penalties which may apply, any person responsible who fails to give immediate notification of a discharge to the department or the nearest Coast Guard Marine Safety Office or National Response Center commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. However, a discharge of 5 gallons or less of gasoline or diesel from a vessel shall not give rise to felony penalties for failure to comply with the state notification requirements in this subsection. After reporting a discharge, a vessel shall remain in the jurisdiction of the department until such time as the department is able to prove financial responsibility for the damages resulting from the discharge. The master of a vessel that fails to remain in the jurisdiction of the department for a reasonable time after notice of a discharge commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. The department shall not detain the vessel longer than 12 hours after receiving proof of financial responsibility. The department shall, by rule, require that the terminal facility designate a person at the terminal facility as the person in charge of that facility for the purposes specified by this section.

History.—s. 12, ch. 70-244; s. 326, ch. 71-136; s. 12, ch. 74-336; ss. 4, 5, ch. 80-382; s. 18, ch. 90-54; s. 1, ch. 91-135; s. 293, ch. 94-356; s. 1013, ch. 95-148; s. 8, ch. 96-263; s. 104, ch. 96-410.

¹Note.—As amended and substantially reworded by s. 8, ch. 96-263. Former paragraph (5)(b), relating to administrative procedures, was amended by s. 104, ch. 96-410, and reads:

(b) If either the claimant or the person determined by the secretary to be responsible for the discharge disagrees with the amount of the damage award, such person may request a hearing pursuant to ss. 120.569 and 120.57.

F.S. 376.12 on Google Scholar

F.S. 376.12 on Casetext

Amendments to 376.12

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 376.12

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S376.12 - CONSERVATION-ENVIRONMENT - FAIL NOTIFY OF POLLUTANT DISCHARGE OVER 5 GAL - F: T

S376.12 - CONSERVATION-ENVIRONMENT - VESSEL MASTER FAIL TO REMAIN IN DISTRICT - F: T

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

CARTER, v. PASCHALL TRUCK LINES, INC., 324 F. Supp. 3d 900 (W.D. Ky. 2018)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(1). b. . . . possession, control and responsibility concerning the operation of the vehicles, in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . other words, an indemnification clause does not necessarily violate the requirement of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . Complaint in order to illustrate an alleged violation of the TILA regulations, specifically 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment for the duration of the lease." 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

VALADEZ, v. CSX INTERMODAL TERMINALS, INC., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1254 (N.D. Cal. 2018)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(1). . . .

MERVYN, v. ATLAS VAN LINES, INCORPORATED,, 882 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2018)

. . . . § 376.12(d). . . . See 49 C.F.R. § 376.11 ; 49 C.F.R. § 376.12. . . . . § 376.12(d). . . . plain terms of the lease; as well as violations of the Truth-In-Leasing regulations under 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

EDWARDS, Jr. v. MCELLIOTTS TRUCKING, LLC LLC LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 867 (S.D.W. Va. 2017)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(1) (“control regulation”) which state's: (c) Exclusive possession and responsibilities. . . . Prior to 1992 the majority view of Section 376.12(c)(1) interpreted the regulation to create an irrebuttable . . . Section 376.12(c)(4) clarifies: Nothing in the provisions required by paragraph (c)(1) of this section . . . Independent Contractor Agreement 116(a); 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1). . . . . § 376.12(c)(1). The parties contest the effect of the regulation on their relationship. . . .

DEROLF, v. RISINGER BROS. TRANSFER, INC., 259 F. Supp. 3d 876 (C.D. Ill. 2017)

. . . . § 376.12(a) because the Plaintiffs were not “owners” of the equipment as that term is defined by the . . . the OA are designed to impermissibly limit Defendant Risinger’s legal obligations under 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . Next, the Plaintiffs allege that the OAs lack certain provisions that are required by 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

SENTRY SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, v. LOPEZ,, 241 F. Supp. 3d 777 (W.D. Tex. 2017)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(1). . . .

PUGA, v. ABOUT TYME TRANSPORT, INC., 227 F. Supp. 3d 760 (S.D. Tex. 2017)

. . . . §§ 376.11 and 376.12, those regulations, like the statute, state only the conditions upon which the . . .

FOX v. TRANSAM LEASING, INC., 839 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2016)

. . . The truckers contend that this $15 usage fee violates 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(i). . . . Section 376.12(h) addresses a different abusive practice than § 376.12(i). . . . Section 376.12(h), then, is not in tension with § 376.12(i), and it does not authorize TransAm to require . . . (citing 49 U.S.C. § 13906; 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(j)(1)). . . . It is those compelled purchases that § 376.12(f) prohibits. . . .

ALTOM TRANSPORT, INC. v. WESTCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE CO., 823 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 376.12, because it failed to include aspects of how Stampley’s compensation would be calculated; . . . Whether the regulation, 49 C.F.R. § 376.12, could impose liability without the presence of a contract . . . where, as here, the party had an actual contract and the question is whether it is inconsistent with § 376.12 . . .

GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY, v. NATIONAL CASUALTY COMPANY,, 807 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(4) (“[njothing in the provisions required by paragraph (c)(1) of this section is intended . . . See 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1). . . .

MERVYN, v. NELSON WESTERBERG, INC., 142 F. Supp. 3d 663 (N.D. Ill. 2015)

. . . . § 376.12, a provision of the Truth-in-Leasing regulations.promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier . . . as the complaint sought the remedies of disgorgemént, restitution, or constructive trust for the § 376.12 . . . In so doing, the court addressed certain issues— whether § 376.12 governs only the content of the parties . . .

FOX, v. TRANSAM LEASING, INC., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (D. Kan. 2015)

. . . . § 376.12(i). . . . chargeback under § 376.12(h). . . . However, section 376.12(h) and section 376.12(i) must be read together, in harmony&emdash;TransAm cannot . . . There is no language suggesting that § 376.12(h) exempts a motor carrier from compliance with § 376.12 . . . (i) or makes any sort of exceptions to § 376.12(f). . . .

DELANEY, Ad R. a Ad KKD, v. RAPID RESPONSE, INC. A. LLC,, 81 F. Supp. 3d 769 (D.S.D. 2015)

. . . In 1992, 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 was amended, specifically § (c)(4) was added, which provided in pertinent . . . The ICC stated section 376.12 did “not affect ‘employment status.’ ” Id.; see also UPS Ground Freight . . . Hart, 31 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir.1994) (“The parties agree that compliance with [§ 376.12] creates an . . . The interpretation that § 376.12(c)(1) creates a rebuttable presumption of an agency relationship is . . . Additionally, the court finds the lease complies with 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1), as paragraph B vests . . .

MERVYN, v. NELSON WESTERBERG, INC., 76 F. Supp. 3d 715 (N.D. Ill. 2014)

. . . . § 376.12, a provision of the Truth-in-Leasing regulations promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier . . . The § 376.12 Claims Mervyn’s § 376.12 claims allege that Defendants, by violating various provisions . . . of the Lease, also violated § 376.12. . . . The Scope of § 376.12 Defendants’ first ground for summary judgment on the § 376.12 claims is purely . . . But Defendants are wrong to argue that § 376.12 governs only the Lease’s content, for it also plainly . . .

VILLALPANDO, v. EXEL DIRECT INC., 303 F.R.D. 588 (N.D. Cal. 2014)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(1).” Id., Section 11. . . . Exel states in its Opposition brief that the compensation term in the ITA is "in accord with 49 C.F. § 376.12 . . . by any other method of compensation mutually agreed upon by the parties to the lease.” 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . Section 376.12 provides that an authorized carrier may provide transportation services in equipment it . . . complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment for the duration of the lease.” 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

CARNEY v. JNJ EXPRESS, INC., 10 F. Supp. 3d 848 (W.D. Tenn. 2014)

. . . . § 376.12. 49 C.F.R. § 376.11(a). . . . The Carneys allege that the Leases do not meet the requirements of the TIL under 49 C.F.R. § 376.12. . . . the regulations are missing from the Leases and that other terms conflict with the terms listed in § 376.12 . . . contractor relationship may exist when a carrier lessee complies with 49 U.S.C. §14102....” 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

BEAVERS, v. VICTORIAN,, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (W.D. Okla. 2014)

. . . . § 376.12 (formerly, § 1057.12 or, earlier, § 1057.4). . . .

UPS GROUND FREIGHT, INC. v. FARRAN,, 990 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ohio 2014)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(4). Id. . . . the Interstate Commerce Commission amended the underlying regulation, now re-numbered as 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . various courts have held that the ICC’s intent in making the amendment is effective and 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . The ICC 1992 amendment to 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 shows that the Ohio Supreme Court misinterpreted what the . . . Technically, the Haack case interprets a PUCO regulation which parallels 49 C.F.R. § 376.12. . . .

MARADIAGA v. INTERMODAL BRIDGE TRANSPORT, INC., 899 F. Supp. 2d 551 (N.D. Tex. 2012)

. . . . § 376.12(d), (g), (h), and (l) in violation of federal truth-in-leasing regulations. . . . . § 376.12(d), (g), (h), and (l). . . . 14704 for IBT’s alleged violations of the aforementioned truth-in-leasing regulations under section 376.12 . . . , but also that Plaintiffs were injured as a result of IBT’s failure to comply with section 376.12. . . . IBT’s alleged failure to compensate Plaintiffs as agreed, however, is not a violation of section 376.12 . . .

JONES EXPRESS, INC. v. WATSON,, 871 F. Supp. 2d 719 (M.D. Tenn. 2012)

. . . . § 376.12(b) (requiring that leases “specify the time and date ... on which the lease begins and ends . . . ”); id. § 376.12(d) (requiring that the amount to be paid to the owner-operator be “clearly stated on . . . In that regard, the Lease does not appear to be in compliance with § 376.12(j)(l), but Mr. . . . Ernest Watson also argues that Jones Express breached 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(j)(2), which states: (2) If . . . However, the Court does find that the Lease was out of compliance with § 376.12(j) for a different reason . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, No. v. COMERICA BANK,, 860 F. Supp. 2d 519 (S.D. Ohio 2012)

. . . unrelated to the cost of maintenance of the Plaintiffs’ vehicles, and therefore [was] in violation of § 376.12 . . . made a decision to focus their efforts on establishing a private right of action under 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . return the drivers’ maintenance escrows within the mandated time period in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. LLC, v. SUPERVALU, INC., 651 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 376.12(e). . . .

C. THOMAS, v. JOHNSON AGRI- TRUCKING, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (D. Kan. 2011)

. . . . § 376.12(c) creates an irrebuttable presumption of employment, making Johnson Trucking liable as a . . . That regulation, 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1), states: The lease shall provide that the authorized carrier . . . Again, the ICC has stressed that the intention of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(4) was to establish that § 376.12 . . . As noted above, 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(4) stipulates that “[a]n independent contractor relationship may . . . Because 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 creates only a rebuttable presumption of agency, the court must analyze the . . .

CLARENDON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, v. MEDINA, Co- Co-, 645 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 376.12(a), the COA cannot be a lease within the meaning of those regulations. . . . The defendants instead dispute the relevance of even the portion of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(a) that permits . . .

D. CARROLL, M. v. G. KAMPS,, 795 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ind. 2011)

. . . . §§ 376.12(b), (d), (j). See also Rediehs Express Inc., 491 N.E.2d at 1010. . . . . § 376.12(c)(1). See also Ill. . . . See 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1). See also Ill. . . . Given these marked deviations from the requirements set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 376.11 and 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

In ARCTIC EXPRESS INC. D A v., 636 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 376.12. . . . funds were subject to the requirements of the Truth-in-Leasing regulations; specifically, 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . We agree with the district court and the Intrenet court that 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(k), when viewed in the . . . Section 376.12(k), with its remedial purpose, parallels the trust provisions of the PSA and the PACA . . . Comerica nonetheless argues that because § 376.12(k) permits the commingling of funds and calls for the . . .

In ARCTIC EXPRESS INC. D A v., 636 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 2011)

PORT DRIVERS FEDERATION INC. v. ALL SAINTS St., 757 F. Supp. 2d 463 (D.N.J. 2011)

. . . . § 376.12(d), (2) the compensation documentation provision of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(g), (3) the signed . . . lease of a specific duration provision of 49 C.F.R. §§ 376.11(a)-(b) and 376.12(b), (4) the workers’ . . . of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h). . . . All Saints maintains that Section 11(B) of the proposed lease satisfies § 376.12(j)(l). . . . There is no violation of § 376.12(i). . . .

FOSTER v. CEVA FREIGHT, LLC,, 272 F.R.D. 171 (W.D.N.C. 2011)

. . . . § 376.12 and § 376.11(a). (Doc. No. 29 at 8). . . . or Services Provision in Violation of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(i)”; “Failure to Provide Insurance Policy in . . . of Set-Offs Charged for Damages in Violation of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(j)(3)”; “Failure to Take Complete . . . Payment in Violation of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(f)”; “Undisclosed, Undocumented and Excessive Charge-Backs . . . to Compensation in Violation of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h).” . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO. INC. AZ Co. NV v. Co. AZ Co. NV, 632 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 376.12(h), provides that [t]he lease shall clearly specify all items that may be initially paid for . . . court erred in concluding that Swift’s Revised Lease complied with 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h). . . . Section 376.12(h) provides as follows: The lease shall clearly specify all items that may be initially . . . In furtherance of these goals, § 376.12(h) contains both a disclosure provision, requiring carriers to . . . The court concluded that, at least with respect to flat-fee charge-backs, “376.12(h) does not require . . .

PORT DRIVERS FEDERATION INC. v. ALL SAINTS EXPRESS, INC., 757 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.N.J. 2010)

. . . . § 376.12(d)); (2) documentation regarding the lessors’ compensation (49 C.F.R. § 376.12(g)); (3) a . . . Identification of Compensation Rates: § 376.12(d) Section 376.12(d) requires that: The amount to be paid . . . any trip in the service of the authorized carrier.” 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(d) (emphasis added). . . . Compensation Documentation Provisions: § 376.12(g) Section 376.12(g) reads: Regardless of the method . . . ); and (5) violation of the chargeback provision of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h). . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. G. L. E. Jr. E. E. v. LANDSTAR SYSTEM, INC., 622 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 376.12(d) and (h), provisions of the Truth-in-Leasing regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 376.1 et seq., by . . . (d) and that Landstar is allowed to make profit from charge-back items under § 376.12(h). . . . Some district courts have ruled that § 376.12 requires more specificity. . . . The ICC explained that it had incorporated these concerns into § 376.12(h). . . . See 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(i). . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. MAYFLOWER TRANSIT, LLC,, 615 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 376.12(j)(1). . . . Let us turn, then, to the question whether the chargeback violates § 376.12(f). . . . No one would say that the latter violates § 376.12(f); it is not a “sale” of insurance any more than . . . it can’t be selling insurance to the lessors), it is made clear by comparing § 376.12(f) with § 376.12 . . . Section 376.12(j)(l) confirms our understanding of § 376.12(i): A chargeback for the cost of insurance . . .

RUIZ, v. AFFINITY LOGISTICS CORP., 697 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (S.D. Cal. 2010)

. . . . §§ 376.11 and 376.12. . . . the lessor is an independent contractor or an employee of the authorized carrier lessee.” 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

FARACA a k a A. C. v. FLEET LOGISTICS, LLC,, 693 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. Wis. 2010)

. . . . § 14102, and a related regulation, 49 C.F.R. 376.12(f) (fifth cause of action), as well as for attorney . . .

F. BAYS, v. SUMMITT TRUCKING, LLC,, 691 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D. Ky. 2010)

. . . . § 376.12 establishes a rebuttable presumption that Dekalands was acting within the scope of his employment . . . carrier lessee complies with 49 U.S.C. § 14102 and attendant administrative requirements. 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . Aug. 26, 2003) (noting that 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 “imposes an irrebuttable statutory employment relationship . . . This court’s construction of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 gives effect to that congressional intent of thwarting . . . State Agency Law: Presumption Not Rebutted Since 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 creates a rebuttable presumption . . .

HUGGINS, v. FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC., 592 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(1). Mr. . . . Section 376.12(c)(1) requires a lease between a federally authorized carrier and an owner-operator to . . . complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment” during the term of the lease. 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . Huggins’s claim based on respondeat superior, liability under § 376.12(c)(1) (the so-called “control . . . In 1992, the Interstate Commerce Commission (the predecessor governing agency) made it plain that § 376.12 . . .

CUNNINGHAM, v. LUND TRUCKING CO., 662 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (D. Or. 2009)

. . . . § 376.12, in several particulars. . . . Id.; 49 C.F.R. § 376.12. . . . Compensation Amount— 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(d) Section 376.12(d) provides, in pertinent part, “The amount . . . Time of Payment — 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(f) Section 376.12(f) provides, in pertinent part, “The lease shall . . . Deductions from Compensation— 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h) Section 376.12(h) provides, in pertinent part, “The . . .

SIMPSON, v. EMPIRE TRUCK LINES, INC., 571 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(1) (originally codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1057.12(c)(1)). . . . carrier lessee complies with 49 U.S.C. 14102 and attendant administrative requirements. 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

ARMSTRONG, Jr. v. UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, v., 606 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Tenn. 2009)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(1), and to maintain liability insurance on the equipment. . . .

OWNER OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. COMERICA BANK,, 615 F. Supp. 2d 692 (S.D. Ohio 2009)

. . . . § 376.12. . . . by Arctic.” 540 F.Supp.2d at 932; see 2006 WL 1339427, at *4 (“funds held in escrow under 49 C.F.R. 376.12 . . . This Court found that imposing a statutory trust on funds held in escrow under 49 C.F.R. 376.12(k) “is . . .

STALLINGS, v. WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC. J., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Kan. 2009)

. . . . § 376.12). . . . As plaintiff points out, 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1) provides that a lease agreement required by the FMCSR . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, v. UNITED VAN LINES, LLC,, 556 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 2009)

. . . Based on the plain meaning of the phrase “any of this insurance” in the third sentence of § 376.12(j) . . . The final rule, in adopting what is now 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(j)(l), moved the substance of sub-paragraph . . . Finally, the Owner-Operators argue that construing § 376.12(j)(l) in accordance with its plain meaning . . . In these circumstances, we must apply the plain language of § 376.12(j)(l) reflecting the Secretary’s . . . (h) and the “forced purchase” prohibition in § 376.12(i). . . .

L. MERRIAM, v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, a a a J. Co. a, 580 F. Supp. 2d 838 (S.D. Iowa 2008)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(1) and § 383.5 of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Regulations in support . . .

M. BRINKER J. v. NAMCHECK, d b a WRN, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (W.D. Wis. 2008)

. . . . §§ 376.12(h) and (j) by charging plaintiffs for drug tests, single state registration and insurance . . . without clearly specifying those charges in their leases; (2) defendant violated § 376.12(f) by failing . . . within 15 days of when he handed in his required paperwork to defendant; and (3) defendant violated § 376.12 . . . Id., § 376.12(j). . . . Section 376.12 requires motor carriers to include certain provisions and adhere to them. . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. G. L. E. Jr. E. E. v. LANDSTAR SYSTEM, INC., 541 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2008)

. . . . § 376.12(d) and (h), provisions of the Truth-in-Leasing regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 376.1 et seq., by . . . (d) and that Landstar is allowed to make profit from charge-back items under § 376.12(h). . . . Some district courts have ruled that § 376.12 requires more specificity. . . . Accordingly, Defendant’s lease is in violation of [§ 376.12(h)] and therefore illegal. . . . Thus, Landstar has failed to comply with § 376.12(h). . . .

OWNER OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. COMERICA BANK,, 540 F. Supp. 2d 925 (S.D. Ohio 2008)

. . . . § 376.12, and that Arctic therefore had unlawfully failed to return them to owner-operators upon termination . . . Plaintiffs claim that the federal Truth-in-Leasing regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(k), created a statutory . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. BULKMATIC TRANSPORT COMPANY,, 503 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2007)

. . . . § 376.12. . . . . § 376.12(g). . . . . § 376.12(d) and (g). . . . See 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(d). . . . Accordingly, the Lease violates 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(d). . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOC. INC. v. C. R. ENGLAND, INC., 508 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D. Utah 2007)

. . . . § 376.12(h) requires that [t]he lease shall clearly specify all items that may be initially paid for . . . Improper management of escrow accounts. 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(k) requires, in relevant part, that the lease . . . Forced purchases, in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12®; and c. . . . . § 376.12(k). 48. Disclosure of charge-backs. . . . The Court finds that Defendant has violated 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(k) by failing to clearly set forth in . . .

SAULLO, v. J. DOUGLAS, 957 So. 2d 80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The amended leasing provision, currently codified at 49 C.F.R. 376.12, added subsection (c)(4), that . . . a carrier lessee complies with 49 U.S.C. 14102 and attendant administrative requirements. 49 C.F.R. 376.12 . . . complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment for the duration of the lease.” 49 C.F.R. 376.12 . . . More specifically, 49 C.F.R. 376.12(c)(4) compels a motor carrier’s lease creating an independent contractor . . . See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. 376.12 (2007). . . .

REPUBLIC WESTERN INSURANCE COMPANY, v. WILLIAMS P. B. v. P. B., 212 F. App'x 235 (4th Cir. 2007)

. . . complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment for the duration of the lease. 49 C.F.R § 376.12 . . . Like other federal trucking regulations, § 376.12(c)(1) was "intended to safeguard the public by preventing . . .

M. WILSON, N. N. N. St. Co- v. IESI N. Y. CORPORATION d b a K G, 444 F. Supp. 2d 298 (M.D. Pa. 2006)

. . . . § 376.11 — 376.12. . . .

RIVAS, v. RAIL DELIVERY SERVICE, INC. a v. K R a A. Sr. v. RWA v. a, 423 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2005)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(1), which requires leases to state that the motor carrier assumes complete responsibility . . . did not own to haul goods unless it entered into a written agreement that complied with 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ALLIED VAN LINES, INC., 231 F.R.D. 280 (N.D. Ill. 2005)

. . . . § 376.12." . . .

PADRTA D. v. LEDAR TRANSPORT, INC., 116 F. App'x 36 (8th Cir. 2004)

. . . . § 376.12(k). . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, v. C. R. ENGLAND, INC., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Utah 2004)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(4), provides that compliance with the regulation does not affect the issue of whether the . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. Sr. v. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO. INC. AZ Co. NV Ms Ms, 367 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2004)

. . . . § 376.12(b) (requiring that leases “specify the time and date ... on which the lease begins and ends . . . ”); id. § 376.12(d) (requiring that the amount to be paid to the owner-operator be “clearly stated on . . . See 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(d) (requiring a clear statement on the face of the lease of the owner-operator . . .

J. MILITELLO, v. CENTRAL STATES, SOUTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST AREAS PENSION FUND,, 360 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2004)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(1). . . .

AI JESSEP, v. JACOBSON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., 350 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 376.12(e) (2002) (“The lease shall clearly specify who is responsible for loading and unloading the . . .

POULIOT, v. PAUL ARPIN VAN LINES, INC. v. D. D B A, 292 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Conn. 2003)

. . . . § 376.12 governs the contract and that compliance with § 376.12 imposes a “statutory employee” regime . . . This understanding is also consistent with the court’s analysis of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 infra. b. . . . Section 376.12 Arpin also raises the possibility that 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 imposes a “statutory employee . . . Neither 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 nor § 376.12 impose a “statutory employee” relationship on Arpin and Pouliot . . . Arpin's reliance on this statute, as well as the fact that it is the authority for 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

SHINN v. S. GREENESS,, 218 F.R.D. 478 (M.D.N.C. 2003)

. . . . § 376.12. 49 U.S.C. § 14102(a)(4) states that “[t]he Secretary [of Transportation] may require a motor . . . and with other applicable law as if the motor vehicles were owned by the motor carrier.” 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . Defendant Beck argues, however, that 49 U.S.C. § 14101 et seq. and 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 “do [ ] not elevate . . . Defendant Beck points to 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(e)(4) (adopted in 1992), which states that “Nothing in the . . . In making this determination, the court specifically cited the language of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(4) but . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ARCTIC EXPRESS, INC., 288 F. Supp. 2d 895 (S.D. Ohio 2003)

. . . . § 376.12(k). . . . Second, even though Arctic and D & A’s liability under § 376.12(k) has been established here, Sterling . . . Express, Inc., 159 F.Supp.2d 1067 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (holding that Defendants had violated 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . The Defendants, as this Court has already held, violated Section 376.12(k) by not returning the amounts . . . on the Plaintiffs' claim for unauthorized deduction of purchase or rental payments under 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. NEW PRIME, INC., 339 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 376.12(h); (2) are unauthorized deductions from compensation, in violation of § 376.12(i); and (3 . . . ) are unauthorized deductions of escrow funds, in violation of § 376.12(k). . . . Section 376.12(k)(2) requires that a lease agreement specify the “items to which the escrow fund can . . . be applied.” § 376.12(k)(2). . . . Therefore, the Excess Mileage Charge is not subject to the dictates of § 376.12(k). IV. . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ARCTIC EXPRESS, INC., 270 F. Supp. 2d 990 (S.D. Ohio 2003)

. . . . § 376.12(k). See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. . . .

GAGNON, a v. SERVICE TRUCKING INC. a, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (M.D. Fla. 2003)

. . . . § 376.12(c)(1) (formerly 49 C.F.R. § 1057.12(c)(1)). . See, e.g., Simmons v. . . .

FITZPATRICK, Jr. v. MORGAN SOUTHERN, INC., 261 F. Supp. 2d 978 (W.D. Tenn. 2003)

. . . . §§ 376.11, 376.12. . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ARCTIC EXPRESS, INC., 238 F. Supp. 2d 963 (S.D. Ohio 2003)

. . . . § 376.12(k) of the federal truth-in-leasing regulations. . . . Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, concluding that the Defendants had violated 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, v. MAYFLOWER TRANSIT, INC., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (S.D. Ind. 2002)

. . . . § 376.12(f); and the requirement that the carrier return funds held in escrow within 45 days of the . . . termination of a lease. 49 C.F.R. §§ 376.2(l), 376.12(k)(6). . . . We further conclude that, while § 376.12(k)(6) permits Mayflower to “deduct monies for those obligations . . . Section 376.12(0 provides in pertinent part: "The lease shall specify that payment to the lessor shall . . . Section 376.12(k)(6) provides: "If escrow funds are required, the lease shall specify: ... . . .

In TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT INC. v., 278 B.R. 226 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2002)

. . . . §§ 376.11-376.12. . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. NEW PRIME, INC. d b a, 213 F.R.D. 537 (W.D. Mo. 2002)

. . . . § 376.12. . . . purchase or rental contract” regulated by the Truth-in-Leasing regulations codified at 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . Plaintiffs maintain that the Service Contract violates 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h) which reads as follows: . . . Plaintiffs allege multiple violations of § 376.12(k). . . . There are no provisions specifying that Defendants will pay interest as set forth under § 376.12(k)(5 . . .

In INTRENET, INC. v., 273 B.R. 153 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002)

. . . . § 376.12(k), a written lease regarding escrow funds must include the following: (1) The amount of any . . . language of the independent contractor agreements closely tracks the requirements set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . See 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(k)(“7/ escrow funds are required, the lease shall specify ... ”)(emphasis added . . . We do not believe that a complete tracking of the language of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(k) in the written lease . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. NEW PRIME, INC. d b a, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (W.D. Mo. 2001)

. . . Specifically, Plaintiffs allege violations of the following regulations: (1) 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h) — . . . ; and (3) 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(k) — Escrow funds. . . . Plaintiffs’ claims are based on regulations codified at 49 C.F.R. 376.12. . . . See 49 C.F.R. 376.12. . . . See 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h),(i) & (k). . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, E. v. MAYFLOWER TRANSIT, INC., 204 F.R.D. 138 (S.D. Ind. 2001)

. . . accounts” and for fuel-tax credit accounts, which are “escrow funds” pursuant to 49 CFR §§ 376.20) and 376.12 . . . unexpend-ed portion of the fuel tax credits within forty-five days after the lease expires. 49 CFR § 376.12 . . . He filed an affidavit in support of plaintiffs' motions to certify the classes. . 49CFR§ 376.12(m) provides . . . permit costs, and for any other purposes mutually agreed upon by the lessor and lessee.” . 49 CFR § 376.12 . . . In addition, 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(j)(l) regarding insurance provides: "If the authorized carrier will make . . .

OWNER OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ARCTIC EXPRESS, INC. D A, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (S.D. Ohio 2001)

. . . . § 376.12(i) (unauthorized deduction of purchase or rental payments), and in Count II a violation of . . . 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(k) (unauthorized deduction and non-return of escrow funds). . . . In this case, the Court need not find a “flat ban” or per se violation of § 376.12(k)(6) as the Ledar . . . The Court is not persuaded by the Defendants’ claim that such disclosure satisfies § 376.12(k). . . . The Defendants’ insistence on doing just that is a direct violation of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(k). y. . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, E. v. MAYFLOWER TRANSIT, INC., 161 F. Supp. 2d 948 (S.D. Ind. 2001)

. . . . § 376.12(Z). Complaint ¶ 36. . . . pursuant to 49 CFR § 376.2(e) or whether the accounts are "escrow" accounts pursuant to § 376.2(l) and 376.12 . . . The basis for such liability is 49 CFR § 376.12(m), which provides: This paragraph applies to owners . . . State permit costs, and for any other purposes mutually agreed upon by the lessor and lessee. 49 CFR § 376.12 . . . this insurance, the lease shall specify the amount which will be charged-back to the lessor. 49 CFR § 376.12 . . .

FIREMAN S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, v. EMPIRE FIRE MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, 152 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 2001)

. . . . § 376.12. . . .

LYONS v. ANDERSEN, 123 F. Supp. 2d 485 (N.D. Iowa 2000)

. . . . § 1057.12(c)(1) [now § 376.12(c)(1) ] to state that a carrier is liable for the operation of the equipment . . . the lessor is an independent contractor or an employee of the authorized carrier lessee.” 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment for the duration of the lease. 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 . . . The correct regulatory citation is 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1). . . . . Section 1057.12 was renumbered in 1997 as section 376.12, without changing the language of either of . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ARCTIC EXPRESS, INC. D A, 87 F. Supp. 2d 820 (S.D. Ohio 2000)

. . . . § 376.12®, (k)(l)-(6). . . . Specifically, the Plaintiffs have alleged violations of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12® and (k). . . . . 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(i) and (k). . . . See 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(0(6). . . . See 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(k). . Codified as 49 C.F.R. Part 376 in 1996. . . . .

OWNER- OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. NEW PRIME, INC. v. v., 192 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1999)

. . . . §§ 376.12(i) & (k). . . . The carriers argue that the leasing regulations on which the Owner-Operators rely, 49 C.F.R. §§ 376.12 . . .

In SOUTHERN STAR FOODS, INC. G. M. MATHER, v. NORTHFIELD FREEZING SYSTEMS, INC. a, 202 B.R. 784 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1996)

. . . of Southern Star’s fixed assets (not including accounts receivable and poultry inventory) and $931,-376.12 . . .

AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, v. ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES OF FLORIDA, INC., 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996)

. . . . § 376.12(6), Fla. Stat. (1995). Fifth, we look at Waite v. . . .

In M. TOWNSEND, III,, 187 B.R. 230 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995)

. . . Class 3 The IRS has filed a secured claim for $214,-376.12 for income taxes. . . .

ARNEY, v. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,, 448 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . Arney was charged with failing to report an oil spill, a violation of Section 376.12(7), Florida Statutes . . . Section 376.12(7) provides in part: In addition to the civil penalty, the pilot and the master of any . . . regulations requiring designation of persons in charge of terminal facilities for the purposes of Section 376.12 . . . at the time of the spill and, therefore, that he was not the proper person to charge under Section 376.12 . . .

AMERICAN WATERWAYS OPERATORS, INC. v. O D. ASKEW,, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971)

. . . Section 376.12, Florida Statutes Annotated, provides in part: Liabilities of licensees. — Because it . . . ’s recovery of cleanup costs — by simply pleading and proving the fact of a discharge under Section 376.12 . . .

CHARLES LEICH AND COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES, 165 Ct. Cl. 127 (Ct. Cl. 1964)

. . . Excess profits credit computed under income method as shown on Schedule EP_$100, 494.32 Income tax- $61, 376.12 . . .