The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . court instructed the jury that it could find the gas station negligent per se for violating section 526.141 . . . The district court reversed, holding that “under deJesus, violation of section 526.141[was] merely evidence . . .
. . . station, the issue is whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a violation of section 526.141 . . . : Florida Statute 526.141, regarding- self-service gasoline stations, reads, in pertinent part, as to . . . Section 526.141 appears to fall within the third category of statutes outlined in deJesus. . . . As such, an instruction that a section 526.141 violation is negligence is erroneous. See Schulte v. . . . Moreover, appellee did not suffer the type of injury section 526.141 was designed to prevent. . . .
. . . . § 526.141(4), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . . .
. . . . § 526.141, Fla.Stat. (1983). . . .
. . . monstrous conduct under a claim of negligence per se resulting from its failure to comply with section 526.141 . . . permitting Ferry to fill his pail with gasoline, unsupervised by the Shop & Go employees, offended section 526.141 . . . In that circumstance, the violation of section 526.141 might warrant invocation of the negligence per . . . Additionally, the plaintiffs have pleaded a breach of section 526.141, Florida Statutes, in the dispensing . . .
. . . Exxon, wrongfully refused to pump gasoline from the self-service island for him contrary to Section 526.141 . . . Unaware of Section 526.141(5), Butler refused to pump appellant’s gas. . . . Section 526.141(5) provides that every full-service gas station which offers self-service gas at a lower . . . All the parties agree that Butler did not comply with Section 526.141(5). . . . We expressly leave for another day the question of whether a violation of Section 526.141(5) gives rise . . .
. . . Section 526.141, Florida Statutes (1975), requires that self-service gasoline stations keep an attendant . . . * * The “agreement” pertaining to packaging of flammable materials is, I think, defined in Section 526.141 . . . Even in the absence of Section 526.141, I think the provisions of Section 672.314 are susceptible to . . . Appellants essentially argue that Section 526.141 is designed to protect a particular class of persons . . . I consider that Section 526.141 was at most intended to protect against a particular type of injury and . . .