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Florida Statute 69 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 69 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Chapter 69
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS
View Entire Chapter
CHAPTER 69
CHAPTER 69
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS
69.011 Supreme Court; bond not to be required of certain officers in certain original proceedings.
69.021 Bondholders’ committee.
69.031 Designated financial institutions for property in hands of guardians, curators, administrators, trustees, receivers, or other officers.
69.041 State named party; lien foreclosure, suit to quiet title.
69.051 General and special magistrates; compensation.
69.061 Loss of negotiable instrument; indemnity.
69.071 Number of jurors.
69.081 Sunshine in litigation; concealment of public hazards prohibited.
69.011 Supreme Court; bond not to be required of certain officers in certain original proceedings.Constitutional officers of the state, boards of county commissioners, and school boards of the several counties of this state shall not be required to furnish any bond or other security for the procurement of or to render effective any restraining order, injunction, or other order, writ or judgment in cases of original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of Florida.
History.s. 1, ch. 19172, 1939; CGL 4621(1); s. 23, ch. 67-254; s. 1, ch. 69-300.
Note.Former s. 69.03.
69.021 Bondholders’ committee.
(1) SELECTION.In any action to foreclose the lien of any mortgage or deed of trust given to secure any issue of bonds or other obligations and encumbering real or personal property or both when the owners of the bonds or beneficiaries of the trust exceed ten in number, on motion of a party or on its own initiative, the court may appoint three persons, two of whom shall constitute a quorum for all purposes, as a committee for the protection of the holders of bonds or units or certificates of beneficial interest. The committee is vested with such powers and authority and shall discharge such duties in connection with the litigation and its subject matter as is necessary and proper in the court’s discretion to protect the interest of the holders of the bonds and beneficiaries of the trust involved in, or affected by, the litigation. During the pendency of such litigation, the court may prescribe, modify, abrogate or nullify the powers and authority of the committee.
(2) QUALIFICATIONS.No person is eligible for appointment to, nor qualified to act as a member of, the committee who is interested in the outcome of the action or in the subject matter thereof, or who is an officer, director or stockholder of any party to the actions, or who is related by blood or marriage to, or directly or indirectly associated with or employed by:
(a) Any official of the court.
(b) Any person who is interested in the outcome of the actions.
(c) Any person who is interested in the subject matter.
(d) Any person who is an officer, director or stockholder of any corporate party to the action.
(3) COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES.The compensation and expenses of the committee shall be fixed by the court and may be taxed as costs and ordered paid by such parties in interest, and in such manner and at such time, and out of such funds or property involved in the action as the court determines. The court may remove any members of the committee and appoint a successor or successors to fill the vacancies that result from removal, resignation or death of members of the committee. The committee is subject to the supervision and control of the court at all times, and amenable to its orders until the approval of the final reports, if any, of the committee and the discharge of the committee by the court.
(4) EMPLOYMENT OF COUNSEL.The employment of counsel by the committee shall be approved by the court and the compensation of counsel shall be fixed by the court.
(5) ONLY LEGALLY APPOINTED COMMITTEES RECOGNIZED.Any bondholders’ committee not appointed by the court in which the action is pending shall be heard in the action or permitted, directly or indirectly, to dominate or control the litigation or the action of the trustee or trustees under deed or deeds of trust under which the action is predicated, nor permitted to acquire, directly or indirectly, the property at any sale in said action.
History.ss. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ch. 16831, 1935; CGL 1936 Supp. 5977(22)-(26); s. 23, ch. 67-254; s. 18, ch. 79-400.
Note.Former ss. 69.09-69.13.
69.031 Designated financial institutions for property in hands of guardians, curators, administrators, trustees, receivers, or other officers.
(1) When it is expedient in the judgment of any court having jurisdiction of any estate in process of administration by any guardian, curator, executor, administrator, trustee, receiver, or other officer, because the size of the bond required of the officer is burdensome or for other cause, the court may order part or all of the personal property of the estate placed with a bank, trust company, or savings and loan association designated by the court, consideration being given to any bank, trust company, or savings and loan association proposed by the officer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in probate proceedings and in accordance with s. 733.402, the court shall allow the officer at any time to elect to post and maintain bond for the value of the personal property, or such other reasonable amount determined by the court, whereupon the court shall vacate or terminate any order establishing the depository. When the property is placed with the designated financial institution, it shall file a receipt therefor in the name of the estate and give the officer a copy. Such receipt shall acknowledge the property received by the financial institution. All interest, dividends, principal and other debts collected by the financial institution on account thereof shall be held by the financial institution in safekeeping, subject to the instructions of the officer authorized by order of the court directed to the financial institution.
(2) Accountings shall be made to the officer at reasonably frequent intervals. After the receipt for the original property has been filed by the financial institution, the court shall waive the bond given or to be given or reduce it so that it shall apply only to the estate remaining in the hands of the officer, whichever the court deems proper.
(3) When the court has ordered any property of an estate to be placed with a designated financial institution, any person or corporation having possession or control of any of the property, or owing interest, dividends, principal or other debts on account thereof, shall pay and deliver such property, interest, dividends, principal and other debts to the financial institution on its demand whether the officer has duly qualified or not, and the receipt of the financial institution relieves the person or corporation from further responsibility therefor.
(4) Any bank, trust company, or savings and loan association which is designated under this section, may accept or reject the designation in any instance, and shall file its acceptance or rejection with the court making the designation within 15 days after actual knowledge of the designation comes to the attention of the financial institution, and if the financial institution accepts, it shall be allowed a reasonable amount for its services and expenses which the court may allow as a charge against the property placed with the financial institution.
History.ss. 1, 2, 3, ch. 21980, 1943; s. 1, ch. 57-198; s. 23, ch. 67-254; s. 1, ch. 2021-183; s. 1, ch. 2021-239.
Note.Former s. 69.15.
69.041 State named party; lien foreclosure, suit to quiet title.
(1) Under the conditions prescribed in this section for the protection of the state, the state may be named a party to a civil action in any court of this state, or in any district court of the United States, having jurisdiction of the subject matter, either:
(a) To quiet title to real property wherein the state has or claims any adverse interest in the title to real estate; or
(b) For the foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien on real or personal property on which the state has or claims a mortgage or other lien.
(2) The complaint shall set forth with particularity the nature of the interest claimed by the state in such real property with respect to quiet title proceedings. In the case of mortgage or lien foreclosure, the complaint shall set forth with particularity the nature of the lien claimed by the state in such real property.
(3) A judicial sale in a mortgage foreclosure action shall have the same effect respecting the discharge of the property from liens and encumbrances held by the state as is provided about such matters by the law of this state. A sale to satisfy a lien inferior to one of the state shall be made subject to and without disturbing the lien of the state, unless the state consents that the property may be sold free of its liens and the proceeds divided as the parties may be entitled.
(4)(a) The Department of Revenue has the right to participate in the disbursement of funds remaining in the registry of the court after distribution pursuant to s. 45.031(7). The department shall participate in accordance with applicable procedures in any mortgage foreclosure action in which the department has a duly filed tax warrant, or interests under a lien arising from a judgment, order, or decree for support, as defined in s. 409.2554, or interest in a reemployment assistance tax lien under contract with the Department of Economic Opportunity through an interagency agreement pursuant to s. 443.1316, against the subject property and with the same priority, regardless of whether a default against the department, the Department of Economic Opportunity, or the former Agency for Workforce Innovation has been entered for failure to file an answer or other responsive pleading.
(b) With respect to a duly filed tax warrant, paragraph (a) applies only to mortgage foreclosure actions initiated on or after July 1, 1994, and to those mortgage foreclosure actions initiated before July 1, 1994, in which no default has been entered against the Department of Revenue before July 1, 1994. With respect to mortgage foreclosure actions initiated based upon interests under a lien arising from a judgment, order, or decree for support, paragraph (a) applies only to mortgage foreclosure actions initiated on or after July 1, 1998, and to those mortgage foreclosure actions initiated before July 1, 1998, in which no default has been entered against the Department of Revenue before July 1, 1998.
History.ss. 1, 2, 3, ch. 29724, 1955; s. 23, ch. 67-254; s. 1, ch. 70-326; s. 2, ch. 94-314; s. 2, ch. 94-353; s. 12, ch. 98-397; s. 17, ch. 2001-158; s. 3, ch. 2002-218; s. 2, ch. 2003-36; s. 44, ch. 2011-142; s. 4, ch. 2011-213; s. 39, ch. 2012-30.
Note.Former ss. 69.17-69.19.
69.051 General and special magistrates; compensation.General and special magistrates appointed by the court shall be allowed such compensation for any services as the court deems reasonable, including time consumed in legal research required in preparing and summarizing their findings of fact and law.
History.s. 1, ch. 28169, 1953; s. 23, ch. 67-254; s. 356, ch. 95-147; s. 57, ch. 2004-11.
Note.Former s. 62.071.
69.061 Loss of negotiable instrument; indemnity.The court may order that the loss of a negotiable instrument shall not be set up in any action to recover on it if satisfactory indemnity is given against the claims of any other person on the instrument.
History.s. 73, ch. 1096, 1861; RS 1080; GS 1486; RGS 2686; CGL 4353; s. 23, ch. 67-254.
Note.Former s. 54.01.
69.071 Number of jurors.In all civil actions when a jury is impaneled, a jury of six qualified jurors is sufficient.
History.s. 1, ch. 4717, 1899; GS 1494; RGS 2694; CGL 4361; s. 8, ch. 67-254; s. 25, ch. 73-333.
Note.Former ss. 54.14, 53.041.
69.081 Sunshine in litigation; concealment of public hazards prohibited.
(1) This section may be cited as the “Sunshine in Litigation Act.”
(2) As used in this section, “public hazard” means an instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, instrument, person, procedure, product, or a condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure or product, that has caused and is likely to cause injury.
(3) Except pursuant to this section, no court shall enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard or any information concerning a public hazard, nor shall the court enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing any information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from the public hazard.
(4) Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard, any information concerning a public hazard, or any information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from the public hazard, is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced.
(5) Trade secrets as defined in s. 688.002 which are not pertinent to public hazards shall be protected pursuant to chapter 688.
(6) Any substantially affected person, including but not limited to representatives of news media, has standing to contest an order, judgment, agreement, or contract that violates this section. A person may contest an order, judgment, agreement, or contract that violates this section by motion in the court that entered the order or judgment, or by bringing a declaratory judgment action pursuant to chapter 86.
(7) Upon motion and good cause shown by a party attempting to prevent disclosure of information or materials which have not previously been disclosed, including but not limited to alleged trade secrets, the court shall examine the disputed information or materials in camera. If the court finds that the information or materials or portions thereof consist of information concerning a public hazard or information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from a public hazard, the court shall allow disclosure of the information or materials. If allowing disclosure, the court shall allow disclosure of only that portion of the information or materials necessary or useful to the public regarding the public hazard.
(8)(a) Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing information relating to the settlement or resolution of any claim or action against the state, its agencies, or subdivisions or against any municipality or constitutionally created body or commission is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced. Any person has standing to contest an order, judgment, agreement, or contract that violates this section. A person may contest an order, judgment, agreement, or contract that violates this subsection by motion in the court that entered such order or judgment, or by bringing a declaratory judgment action pursuant to chapter 86.
(b) Any person having custody of any document, record, contract, or agreement relating to any settlement as set forth in this section shall maintain said public records in compliance with chapter 119.
(c) Failure of any custodian to disclose and provide any document, record, contract, or agreement as set forth in this section shall be subject to the sanctions as set forth in chapter 119.

This subsection does not apply to trade secrets protected pursuant to chapter 688, proprietary confidential business information, or other information that is confidential under state or federal law.

(9) A governmental entity, except a municipality or county, that settles a claim in tort which requires the expenditure of public funds in excess of $5,000, shall provide notice, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 50, of such settlement, in the county in which the claim arose, within 60 days of entering into such settlement; provided that no notice shall be required if the settlement has been approved by a court of competent jurisdiction.
History.s. 1, ch. 90-20; s. 1, ch. 91-85; s. 1, ch. 96-349.

F.S. 69 on Google Scholar

F.S. 69 on Casetext

Amendments to 69


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 69
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S713.69 - FRAUD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8911 - M: S
S713.69 - FRAUD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8912 - F: T
S713.69 - LARC - REMOVE PROP UND LIEN HOTEL APT HOUSE LT 1K DOL - M: S
S713.69 - LARC - RMV PROP UND LIEN HOTEL APT HOUSE 1KDOL OR MRE - F: T



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

J. TRUMP, v. R. VANCE, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 2412 (U.S. 2020)

. . . authority that the President cites from the drafting or ratification process is The Federalist No. 69 . . . The Federalist No. 69, p. 416 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). . . . Regan , 453 U.S. 654, 679-683, 101 S.Ct. 2972, 69 L.Ed.2d 918 (1981) ; United States v. . . . The Federalist No. 69, p. 416 (C. . . . be "as independent as possible ... of the States." 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 69 . . .

MCGIRT, v. OKLAHOMA, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Harris , 267 U.S. 352, 353, 45 S.Ct. 317, 69 L.Ed. 652 (1925) (lands "lying within the former Creek Nation . . . Harris , 267 U.S. 352, 357, 45 S.Ct. 317, 69 L.Ed. 652 (1925) ; Woodward v. . . .

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER AND PAUL HOME, v. PENNSYLVANIA, J. v., 140 S. Ct. 2367 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Departments had no authority under the ACA to promulgate the initial church exemption, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 69 . . .

P. BARR, v. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, INC., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Empire Storage & Ice Co. , 336 U.S. 490, 498, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949) (speech integral to criminal . . .

ESPINOZA, v. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (U.S. 2020)

. . . make disciples, and foster spiritual development"); The Holy See, John Paul II, Catechesi Tradendae ¶69 . . . Board of Ed. of Ewing , 330 U.S. 1, 69, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) (appendix to dissent of Rutledge . . . Id. , at 68-69, 67 S.Ct. 504. . . . Id. , at 69, 67 S.Ct. 504. . . . Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted in Everson , 330 U.S. at 69, 67 S.Ct. 504. . . . Glenn, The Myth of the Common School 69 (1988) (Glenn) (quoting S. . . . Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 828-829, 120 S.Ct. 2530 (plurality opinion); see Jorgenson, supra , at 69-70, . . . Society of Sisters , 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Society of Sisters , 268 U.S. 510, 535-536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). . . . Jacobs , 571 U.S. 69, 77, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013) ). . . . Fall , 266 U.S. 507, 511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925) ; see also Illinois Bd. of Elections v. . . . Brief for Respondent 69-70 (citing United States v. . . . Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 69 (1765). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. THURAISSIGIAM, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States , 195 U.S. 65, 69, 24 S.Ct. 826, 49 L.Ed. 99 (1904) -made this clear. . . . Waldman , 266 U.S. 113, 45 S.Ct. 85, 69 L.Ed. 195 (1924) ; United States ex rel. Polymeris v. . . . Shaughnessy , 336 U.S. 806, 69 S.Ct. 921, 93 L.Ed. 1054 (1949) ; United States ex rel. Knauff v. . . . Tod , 267 U.S. 228, 230-231, 45 S.Ct. 257, 69 L.Ed. 585 (1925). . . . S. international land border." 69 Fed. Reg. 48879 (2004). . . . Waldman , 266 U.S. 113, 119-120, 45 S.Ct. 85, 69 L.Ed. 195 (1924) (observing that immigration officials . . . Shaughnessy , 336 U.S. 806, 69 S.Ct. 921, 93 L.Ed. 1054 (1949), we reversed for procedural error because . . . Id. , at 812, 69 S.Ct. 921 ; see also Accardi , 347 U.S. at 267, 74 S.Ct. 499 (faulting the Attorney . . . Waldman , 266 U.S. 113, 45 S.Ct. 85, 69 L.Ed. 195 (1924) (habeas petition by family fleeing religious . . .

KANSAS v. C. BOETTGER v., 140 S. Ct. 1956 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Laws § 34, pp. 68-69; 1827 Ill. Laws p. 145; 1816 Mich. Pub. Acts p. 24; 1816 Ga. Laws p. 178. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, J. v., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Donovan , 452 U.S. 490, 539, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981) ("[T]he post hoc rationalizations . . . Regan , 453 U.S. 654, 686, 101 S.Ct. 2972, 69 L.Ed.2d 918 (1981) ). . . .

BOSTOCK, v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA v. Jr. Co- R. G. G. R. v., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Gregory , 69 F.2d 809, 810-811 (CA2 1934) (L. Hand, J.). . . . Edwards & Sons, Inc. , 876 F.2d 69, 70 (CA8 1989) (per curiam ); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. . . . State Bd. of Ed. , 249 Cal.App.2d 58, 62-64, 57 Cal.Rptr. 69, 72-73 (1967) (upholding revocation of secondary . . . See Tr. of Oral Arg. in Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, pp. 69-70 ("If there was that case, it might be the rare . . . case in which sexual orientation discrimination is not a subset of sex"); see also id. , at 69 ("Somebody . . . Act No. 4-69, but the House of Representatives vetoed the bill, H. . . . Edwards & Sons, Inc. , 876 F.2d 69, 70 (CA8 1989) (per curiam ), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089, 110 S.Ct . . .

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, v. COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION LLC, v., 140 S. Ct. 1837 (U.S. 2020)

. . . L. 82-336, 66 Stat. 69 (emphasis added). Similar language appears in a host of other statutes. . . . Stat. §§ 23-69, 23-70 (2017); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 216-D:2 (2019) ; Me. Rev. Stat. . . .

ANDRUS v. TEXAS, 140 S. Ct. 1875 (U.S. 2020)

. . . In addition, Tran picked Andrus out of a photo array, 46 Tr. 66, 69-70, and testified at trial that the . . .

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, LLC, III v. LLC, v. LLC, n De De La El Y v., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (U.S. 2020)

. . . 2031, 132 L.Ed.2d 136 (1995) (discussing the doctrine); see also, e.g. , Brief for Aurelius et al. 48-69 . . . (arguing the doctrine does not apply in this context); Brief for UTIER 69-85 (same); Reply Brief for . . .

WEXFORD HEALTH, v. GARRETT, 140 S. Ct. 1611 (U.S. 2020)

. . . exhaustion requirement no longer applied to respondent's claims in light of his postrelease filing. 938 F.3d 69 . . .

MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS, v. UNITED STATES v. v. v., 140 S. Ct. 1308 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Department of Agriculture , 569 U.S. 513, 527, 133 S.Ct. 2053, 186 L.Ed.2d 69 (2013). . . .

GEORGIA, v. PUBLIC. RESOURCE. ORG, INC., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . ----, ----, 140 S.Ct. 702, 707-708, 206 L.Ed.2d 69 (2020) (discussing Ring v. . . .

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE PISTOL ASSOCIATION, INC. v. CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK,, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Va. , 719 F.2d 69, 72, n. 5 (C.A.4 1983). 2 It is even possible that one or more of the petitioners may . . . State did not save her case from mootness since a State may not be sued under § 1983. 520 U.S. at 67-69 . . .

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, v. A. CHRISTIAN,, 140 S. Ct. 1335 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Fall , 266 U.S. 507, 511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925) ). . . . efforts to negotiate settlement agreements and issue orders for cleanups account for approximately 69% . . .

RAMOS, v. LOUISIANA, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Belton , 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), holding limited by Arizona v. . . . Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 69 (1765). . . . Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ; Garcia v. . . . Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ); DeStefano v. . . . Belton , 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), that allowed a police officer to search . . . See Carolina Const., Art. 69 (1669), in 5 Thorpe 2781; Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American . . .

BABB, v. WILKIE,, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Nakshian , 453 U.S. 156, 166, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981). . . .

K. KAHLER, v. KANSAS, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (U.S. 2020)

. . . 399, 441-442 (1870) ; see also Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 69 . . . Wood , 12 N.Y.2d 69, 76, 236 N.Y.S.2d 44, 187 N.E.2d 116, 121-122 (1962) ; State v. . . .

C. HERNANDEZ, v. MESA, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 735 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Agee , 453 U.S. 280, 292, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (quoting Harisiades v. . . .

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO v. ACEVEDO FELICIANO,, 140 S. Ct. 696 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Rhode Island , 345 U.S. 67, 69, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953) ). . . .

RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Wallace & Tiernan Co. , 336 U.S. 793, 794-795, n. 1, 69 S.Ct. 824, 93 L.Ed. 1042 (1949) ; 15A C. . . .

RETIREMENT PLANS COMMITTEE OF IBM, v. W. JANDER,, 140 S. Ct. 592 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Fall , 266 U.S. 507, 511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925). . . .

B. WEISSBURG, v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,, 140 S. Ct. 201 (U.S. 2019)

. . . No. 19-69 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

ELHADY, v. H. KABLE,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 562 (E.D. Va. 2019)

. . . MSJ Ex. 7 at 68-69 (Hakmeh). . . . Agee , 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) ("[N]o governmental interest is more . . .

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR, v., 935 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . See also Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the Dark Web , 69 . . .

UNITED STATES v. BAPTISTE,, 935 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . New York , 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). . . .

UNITED STATES v. LILLARD,, 935 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . See In re Castaic Partners II, LLC , 823 F.3d 966, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2016) ("The test for mootness of . . .

L. SMITH, v. SHARP,, 935 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Scale-Revised (WAIS-R); 55 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III); 55 (WAIS-III); 69 . . . provides a range, rather than a fixed score like the WAIS assessments, and Smith obtained a range of 69 . . . assessments to disregard Smith's scores (both 55) on the WAIS-III assessments, Smith still averaged a 69 . . .

GALDERMA LABORATORIES L. P. S. A. S. A. v. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., 390 F. Supp. 3d 582 (D. Del. 2019)

. . . (D.I. 69; D.I. 70 at 20; D.I. 129; D.I. 219 at 3 n.1; D.I. 230). . . .

DYROFF, v. ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP, INC., 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Roommates.com , 521 F.3d 1157, 1167-69 (9th Cir 2008) (en banc). A. . . .

DIVERSE POWER, INC. v. CITY OF LAGRANGE, GEORGIA,, 934 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) ). II. . . . Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). . . .

SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR v. BRISTOL EXCAVATING, INC., 935 F.3d 122 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060-69 (1938). . . .

STONE, v. TROY CONSTRUCTION, LLC, 935 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . (App. at 69.) . . . (App. at 69.) Unsurprisingly, Troy has not identified a single employee who did so. . . . (App. 73; see also App. 69, 72, 86.) . . .

COLE v. CARSON, v., 935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jones Dissent at 458-59, 436-69. . . .

BACA v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, G. T. L. M., 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Arizona , 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) ; see also Will v. Mich. . . . Arizonans , 520 U.S. at 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055. . . . Arizonans , 520 U.S. at 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055. . . . See id. at 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055. Therefore, the outcome here should be the same as in Arizonans . . . . See Arizonans , 520 U.S. at 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055 ; Memphis Light , 436 U.S. at 8-9, 98 S.Ct. 1554. . . . Utah , 321 F.3d 1263, 1267-69 (10th Cir. 2003). . . . Because § 1983 actions "do not lie against a State," id. at 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, the Court concluded, . . . See id. at 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055 ("[T]he claim for relief the Ninth Circuit found sufficient to overcome . . .

PARKER, v. LANDRY,, 935 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) ), and we do not hesitate to condemn . . .

BURKE, v. REGALADO, v., 935 F.3d 960 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Fact Concerts, Inc. , 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BEGAY,, 934 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 69, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), as modified (July 6, 2010). . . .

BOWLES, v. DESANTIS,, 934 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Diagnostic Prison, 686 F.3d 1261, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that district court did not abuse . . .

GUPTA, v. MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY, LLC,, 934 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . does not intend to accept.' " Bauer , 743 F.3d at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 . . . Ill.App.3d 1035, 92 Ill.Dec. 780, 485 N.E.2d 591, 595 (1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 . . .

UNITED STATES v. CANO,, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) ; see Ramsey , 431 U.S. at 620, . . .

TIJERINO v. STETSON DESERT PROJECT, LLC, L J., 934 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Reed Elsevier , 559 U.S. at 160-69, 130 S.Ct. 1237 ; Day , 698 F.3d at 1099-1100 ; Leeson , 671 F . . .

NEW YORK STATE CITIZENS COALITION FOR CHILDREN, v. J. POOLE,, 935 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Poole , 922 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing]. . . . Poole , 922 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2019); see also Armstrong v. . . . Poole , 922 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding a right privately enforceable under § 1983 to recover "foster . . .

UNITED STATES v. GLENN,, 935 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . McNealy , 625 F.3d 858, 868-69 (5th Cir. 2010). . . . See McNealy , 625 F.3d at 868-69 (concluding "potentially available" exculpatory evidence "should be . . .

WAL- MART STORES, INCORPORATED L. L. C. s v. TEXAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMMISSION, 935 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dynamics Corp. of Am. , 481 U.S. 69, 95, 107 S.Ct. 1637, 95 L.Ed.2d 67 (1987) (concurring). . . .

UNITED STATES v. CLARK,, 935 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rodriguez , 69 F.3d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1995) ; see United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. SCANZANI,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 210 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Cordero-Rosario , 786 F.3d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. . . .

ROMO, v. P. BARR,, 933 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L. . . . Sessions , 860 F.3d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 2017). See Leyva-Licea v. . . .

LILLY, v. CITY OF NEW YORK NYPD No. NYPD No., 934 F.3d 222 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 168-69. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. . . .

MAMMANA, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, 934 F.3d 368 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) ). . . .

YOUKHANNA v. CITY OF STERLING HEIGHTS C., 934 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . R. 69-25 (WDIV Video No. 1). . . . R. 69-14 (Taylor Dep. at 59) (Page ID #2592). Matal v. . . . R. 69-20 (Rrasi Dep. at 43) (Page ID #2959). Ms. . . . R. 69-25 (WDIV Video No. 1). . . . R. 69-20 (Rrasi Dep. at 47-49) (Page ID #2963-65); R. 69-14 (Taylor Dep. at 101-02) (Page ID #2634-35 . . .

ARCHER AND WHITE SALES, INCORPORATED, v. HENRY SCHEIN, INCORPORATED L. L. C. L. L. C., 935 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jackson , 561 U.S. 63, 68-69, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 177 L.Ed.2d 403 (2010) (citing Howsam , 537 U.S. at 83- . . .

O DONNELL, v. CAINE WEINER COMPANY, LLC,, 935 F.3d 549 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Simmons Airlines, Inc. , 62 F.3d 863, 868-69 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. . . .

IN RE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE S SUNDAY TICKET ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Jr. v. LLC LLC NFL LLC LLC LP LLC LLC NFL LP LLC LP LLC LP Co. LLC LP LLC, 933 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Major League Baseball Players Ass'n , 805 F.2d 663, 668-69 (7th Cir. 1986) ("When a football game is . . .

J. MALOUF, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,, 933 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . issuance of an injunction" from the securities industry), aff'd , 450 U.S. 91, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 . . .

DOE, v. COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO,, 933 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 668-69. . . .

GREYER, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, v., 933 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States, 11 F.3d 1360, 1367-69 (7th Cir. 1993) (describing dismissal with prejudice as a "draconian . . . Lord, Williston on Contracts § 69:12, p. 549 (4th ed. 2003) (Williston)); see also Air Wisconsin Airlines . . .

MTD PRODUCTS INC. v. IANCU,, 933 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . J.A. 1367-69 (noting that "mechanical control assembly" is used generically to describe mechanisms for . . . J.A. 1367-69 (noting that "mechanical control assembly" is used generically to describe mechanisms for . . .

IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT T MOBILITY, LLC,, 933 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . J.A. 368-69; see also J.A. 270-71. . . .

HARDEMAN, v. CURRAN,, 933 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). . . . Ct. 831, 197 L.Ed.2d 69 (2017) (failure-to-protect claim). . . .

ODDO, v. BIMBO BAKERIES U. S. A. INC., 391 F. Supp. 3d 466 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . No. 66, 69.) I will deny BBUSA's Motion. I. . . . Nos. 66, 69.) III. . . . No. 69.) . . . No. 69), and all related submissions, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary . . .

IN RE MIAMI METALS I, INC., 603 B.R. 531 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Packles (In re Hilsen) , 404 B.R. 58, 69 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Inv. Exchange Grp., LLC v. . . .

ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, v. HOSPIRA, INC. v. Dr. s Dr. s, 933 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Eli Lilly & Co. , 119 F.3d 1559, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ). . . .

H. BURTON, v. KOHN LAW FIRM, S. C., 934 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Pigatto , 712 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted . . .

REYES, v. FISCHER, J. X., 934 F.3d 97 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Fischer, 837 F.3d 162, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2016) (same); Vincent, 718 F.3d at 168-69 (discussing Annucci) . . .

UNITED STATES v. TREVINO,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 901 (W.D. Mich. 2019)

. . . Dewey , 452 U.S. 594, 598-599, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. GAMMELL, v., 932 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 336 U.S. 613, 620, 69 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949), and if Minnesota used this language . . .

BAKALIAN v. CENTRAL BANK OF REPUBLIC OF TURKEY T. C. v. T. C. v. T. C. v. T. C., 932 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rptr. 69, 72 (1967). Nor do they seek the return of a specific piece of personal property. . . .

J. AVENA, v. CHAPPELL,, 932 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Williams , 529 U.S. at 368-69, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (reversing a death sentence for ineffective assistance . . .

PATEL, v. FACEBOOK, INC., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69-71 (Ga. 1905), and treatises later identified four privacy torts recognized . . .

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, N. A. v. UNITED STATES,, 932 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 63-69, at 3-5 (1913). . . .

SIEGEL, s s v. HSBC NORTH AMERICA HOLDINGS, INC. HSBC USA, N. A. HBUS,, 933 F.3d 217 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at ¶¶ 66, 69. . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. HARPER,, 934 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 397 F.3d 564, 568-69 (7th Cir. 2005). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BROWN, v. J., 932 F.3d 1011 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Oct. 3, 2013), ECF No. 69 at 50. . . .

LUXOTTICA GROUP, S. P. A. a v. AIRPORT MINI MALL, LLC, a d. b. a. LLC, a a. k. a. C. C., 932 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wynn , 212 Ga.App. 69, 441 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1994), disapproved on other grounds by George v. . . .

CHAVEZ, De E. De De De v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a, 933 F.3d 186 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Supp. 2d 556, 568-69 (E.D. La. 2012), aff'd , 546 F. App'x 409 (5th Cir. 2013). . . .

O NEAL, v. BALCARCEL,, 933 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 336 U.S. 440, 444-45, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949) (declining to find the erroneous . . .

T. SCHMITT v. LAROSE,, 933 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bd. of Elections , 148 Ohio St.3d 176, 179-80, 69 N.E.3d 696 (2016) (initiative making marijuana possession . . .

KORTRIGHT CAPITAL PARTNERS LP, TY v. INVESTCORP INVESTMENT ADVISERS LIMITED,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . (Trial Tr. at 69 (Taylor).) . . . (Trial Tr. at 1467-69 (Hubbard).) This Court need not credit Dr. . . .

C. S. MCCROSSAN INC. v. FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 932 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Supp. 65, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding company was plaintiff's authorized representative where it was . . .

UNITED STATES v. NYGREN,, 933 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Owolabi, 69 F.3d 156, 164 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding district court's imposition of enhancement when . . .

KODIAK OIL GAS USA INC. HRC LLC v. BURR S. EOG S., 932 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hicks , 533 U.S. at 368-69, 121 S.Ct. 2304. . . . See Hicks , 533 U.S. at 366-69, 121 S.Ct. 2304. . . .

UNITED STATES v. HUNTER, 932 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. MIZUNO,, 933 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Olson , 69 Haw. 559, 751 P.2d 666 (1988), the Hawai'i Supreme Court considered several certified questions . . .

UNITED STATES v. PRADO,, 933 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id . at 467-69. And in United States v. . . . Schermerhorn , 906 F.2d 66, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1990), or had an "effect on interstate commerce," see, e.g . . .

CANT v. M. MOODY S. S., 933 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. 1843, 1865-69, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BANYAN, 933 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Doughton , 270 U.S. 69, 81, 46 S.Ct. 256, 70 L.Ed. 475 (1926) ("owner of the shares of stock in a company . . .

HUBBELL, v. FEDEX SMARTPOST, INC., 933 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . White , 548 U.S. 53, 59-69, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (rejecting the Sixth Circuit's contrary . . .

IN RE DOBOS, s v., 603 B.R. 31 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Civil Rule 69(a) (made applicable in bankruptcy by Rule 7069) ("The procedure on execution [of a . . . BAP Oct. 24, 2008) (citing Civil Rule 69(a) and applying state law concerning the expiration of judgments . . .

GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY, v. ISAACSON R. S. Mo. K. M. a, 932 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . [b]efore stacking can be an issue, there must first be applicable coverages to stack.' " Id. at 668-69 . . .

UNITED STATES v. LAUREANO- SALGADO, a k a L. a k a, 933 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . See, e.g., Peake, 874 F.3d at 69 ; United States v. . . . Peake, 874 F.3d at 69 (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted). . . . Jones, 748 F.3d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 2014). This is as it should be. . . . Spencer, 621 F.3d 59, 69-70 (1st Cir. 2010) ; see generally Skinner v. . . . Vigneau, 337 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that satisfying this part of the ordinary test is no . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. RIVERA- CARRASQUILLO, a k a KX, a k a a k a a k a n V a k a, 933 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Peake, 874 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2017) ; Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d at 15 ; Maldonado- Rivera, 489 F.3d . . . Peake, 874 F.3d at 69 (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1995). . . .

BREDA, v. CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, d b a, 934 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . App'x 563, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding no presumption of arbitrability where plaintiff based her . . .

VIRNETX INC. v. APPLE INC., 931 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Thompson , 337 U.S. 163, 172-73, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949) ). . . .

SILVERTOP ASSOCIATES INC. v. KANGAROO MANUFACTURING INC., 931 F.3d 215 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Rodriguez-Miranda , 562 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that several elements of a plush toy depicting . . .

CAMPBELL, H. C. H. v. UNITED STATES,, 932 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 69 F.3d 1571 (Fed. . . .

STEWARD HOLY FAMILY HOSPITAL, INC. v. MASSACHUSETTS NURSES ASSOCIATION,, 932 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . See, e.g., id. at 568-69, 133 S.Ct. 2064 ; N. New England Tel. Operations LLC v. . . .