The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XL
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

Chapter 701
ASSIGNMENT AND CANCELLATION OF MORTGAGES

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F.S. 701.03

701.03 Cancellation.—

(1) Whenever the amount of money due under a promissory note secured by a mortgage is fully paid, the mortgagee or assignee shall within 45 days after satisfaction of the mortgage thereafter cancel the mortgage in the manner provided by law, unless the mortgage is an open-end mortgage.

(2) A mortgage that is an open-end mortgage as provided in the loan agreement may be canceled upon written notice from the borrower of the intent to close the mortgage. The mortgagee or assignee shall cancel the open-end mortgage within 45 days after receiving the notice. This subsection does not apply to an open-end mortgage existing before July 1, 2016, if the loan agreement contained procedures for canceling the mortgage.

History.—RS 1986; GS 2499; RGS 3842; CGL 5745; s. 171, ch. 73-333; s. 4, ch. 2016-53.

F.S. 701.03 on Google Scholar

F.S. 701.03 on Casetext

Amendments to 701.03

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 701.03

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 701.03.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

PORTLAND PIPE LINE CORPORATION, v. CITY OF SOUTH PORTLAND,, 288 F. Supp. 3d 321 (D. Me. 2017)

. . . Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 701.03 (2001) ( Weinstein ). . . . Weinstein § 701.03. . . .

UNITED STATES v. FULTON,, 837 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2016)

. . . Committee Notes on 1972 Proposed Rules and on 2000 Amendments and 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03 . . .

CALIFORNIA FOUNDATION FOR INDEPENDENT LIVING CENTERS, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO,, 142 F. Supp. 3d 1035 (E.D. Cal. 2015)

. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence § 701.03[2] (2d ed. 2014). . . . Weinstein, supra, § 701.03[3]; see also, e.g., Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. . . .

KENLEY, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 118 F. Supp. 3d 12 (D.D.C. 2015)

. . . MPD General Order 701.03, which governs the procedures for responding to incidents involving assaults . . . See Reply, Exh. 1 (MPD General Order 701.03(V)(E)). . . . MPD General Order 701.03(V)(F)(1). This regulation leaves little'room for-choice. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BARALOTO,, 535 F. App'x 263 (4th Cir. 2013)

. . . Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 211 (2d Cir.2005) (citing 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[1]); see also . . .

MONTOYA v. SHELDON, a a, 286 F.R.D. 602 (D.N.M. 2012)

. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[4][b], at 701-31 (J. . . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[4][b], at 701-37 (J. . . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[4][b] (J.M. . . .

DVL, INC. v. NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION, USA, USA, 490 F. App'x 378 (2d Cir. 2012)

. . . Garcia, 413 F.3d at 215 (quoting 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[1]). . . . .

L. JONES, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,, 879 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2012)

. . . See MPD General Order 701.03 at 8 (Sept. 29, 2010) accessed at https://go.mpdconline.com/ GO/PCA_7 01 . . .

DATAMILL, INC. v. UNITED STATES,, 91 Fed. Cl. 722 (Fed. Cl. 2010)

. . . .”); 4 Weinstein & Berger, supra, at § 701.03[1] (“To be admissible, lay opinion testimony must be based . . . , and evaluative.” 3 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, § 7:1; accord 4 Wein-stein & Berger, supra, at § 701.03 . . . used a reasoning process normal to the activities of everyday life. 4 Weinstein & Berger, supra, at § 701.03 . . .

NEW YORK, v. SOLVENT CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC. ICC v. E. I., 685 F. Supp. 2d 357 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[1] (footnotes omitted). . . .

SCHENECTADY INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, v. UPSTATE TEXTILES, INC., 689 F. Supp. 2d 282 (N.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . See generally 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03 (2d Ed.2009); see also Securitron Magnalock Corp . . .

GLOBAL COMPUTER ENTERPRISES, INC. v. UNITED STATES, QSS, 88 Fed. Cl. 52 (Fed. Cl. 2009)

. . . .”); 4 Weinstein & Berger, supra, § 701.03[1] (“To be admissible, lay opinion testimony must be based . . . con-elusory, and evaluative.” 3 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, § 7:1; accord 4 Weinstein & Berger, supra, § 701.03 . . . specialized knowledge obtained in his or her vocation or avocation.” 4 Weinstein & Berger, supra, § 701.03 . . . Times Commc’ns, LLC, 442 F.Supp.2d at 887; accord 4 Weinstein & Berger, supra, § 701.03[1] (“Most courts . . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[1] (2d ed.2008). . . . .

JP MORGAN CHASE, v. NEW MILLENNIAL, LC W. No. No. a, 6 So. 3d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . ; and (2) Given that section 701.03 requires that the mortgagee cancel a fully paid mortgage “within . . .

UNITED STATES v. McCALL,, 553 F.3d 821 (5th Cir. 2008)

. . . rendition of facts that the witness personally perceived.’ ’’) (quoting 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03 . . .

UNITED STATES v. FRANCO- BELTRAN,, 229 F. App'x 592 (9th Cir. 2007)

. . . See 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[3] (2d ed. 1997 & Supp.2006). . . .

PEREZ, v. HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY,, 440 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.P.R. 2006)

. . . Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[1] (footnotes omitted). . . . Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[1] (footnotes omitted). . . .

UNITED STATES v. GARCIA, v., 413 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2005)

. . . Committee Notes on 1972 Proposed Rules and on 2000 Amendments; see also 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03 . . . for the “rendition of facts that the witness personally perceived.” 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03 . . . reasoning process” by which a witness reached his proffered opinion. 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03 . . .

CUYAHOGA METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY, v. UNITED STATES,, 60 Fed. Cl. 481 (Fed. Cl. 2004)

. . . Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[1]; see also Fed.R.Evid. 602; United States v. . . .

BANK OF CHINA, NEW YORK BRANCH, v. NBM LLC, GEG BOC BM CBL a k a CBL RCHFINS, a k a a k a PO C. H. G. BHK LLC, GU, a k a IFB A., 359 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2004)

. . . See Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[4], However, Weinstein’s explains that, [t]he purposes of the . . . Id. § 701.03[4][b], . . .

TEXAS A M RESEARCH FOUNDATION, v. MAGNA TRANSPORTATION, INC. v., 338 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2003)

. . . Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 701.03[7], at 701-20 through 701-21 & Supp.2002 (Lexis-Nexis . . .

BLACK, v. CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORP. OF DELAWARE Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 243 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)

. . . Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[4][b] (Matthew Bender 2d ed.2002) (“courts should not permit . . .

PSINET, INC. v., 271 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)

. . . summary-plenary jurisdiction distinction that has developed under the Bankruptcy Act. 13 Collier nth ¶ 701.03 . . .

CANTERINO, v. W. WILSON,, 546 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 1982)

. . . IMD 701.03(J). . . .

In C. SCHRIMP, Jo, 17 B.R. 36 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981)

. . . . § 1471; see also, 13 Collier, on Bankruptcy, ¶ 701.01-701.03 (14th Ed. 1977). . . .

In GAC CORPORATION NOVAK v. J. CALLAHAN S. X Co- WESTON v. J. CALLAHAN S., 6 B.R. 981 (S.D. Fla. 1980)

. . . . § 701.03). . . .