The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XL
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

Chapter 701
ASSIGNMENT AND CANCELLATION OF MORTGAGES

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CHAPTER 701

ASSIGNMENT AND CANCELLATION OF MORTGAGES

701.01 Assignment.

701.02 Assignment not effectual against creditors unless recorded and indicated in title of document; applicability.

701.03 Cancellation.

701.04 Cancellation of mortgages, liens, and judgments.

701.041 Title insurer; mortgage release certificate.

701.06 Certain cancellations and satisfactions of mortgages validated.

701.01 Assignment.—Any mortgagee may assign and transfer any mortgage made to her or him, and the person to whom any mortgage may be assigned or transferred may also assign and transfer it, and that person or her or his assigns or subsequent assignees may lawfully have, take and pursue the same means and remedies which the mortgagee may lawfully have, take or pursue for the foreclosure of a mortgage and for the recovery of the money secured thereby.

History.—s. 1, Dec. 11, 1834; RS 1985; GS 2498; RGS 3840; CGL 5743; s. 782, ch. 97-102.

701.02 Assignment not effectual against creditors unless recorded and indicated in title of document; applicability.—

(1) An assignment of a mortgage upon real property or of any interest therein, is not good or effectual in law or equity, against creditors or subsequent purchasers, for a valuable consideration, and without notice, unless the assignment is contained in a document that, in its title, indicates an assignment of mortgage and is recorded according to law.

(2) This section also applies to assignments of mortgages resulting from transfers of all or any part or parts of the debt, note or notes secured by mortgage, and none of same is effectual in law or in equity against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, unless a duly executed assignment be recorded according to law.

(3) Any assignment of a mortgage, duly executed and recorded according to law, purporting to assign the principal of the mortgage debt or the unpaid balance of such principal, shall, as against subsequent purchasers and creditors for value and without notice, be held and deemed to assign any and all accrued and unpaid interest secured by such mortgage, unless such interest is specifically and affirmatively reserved in such an assignment by the assignor, and a reservation of such interest or any part thereof may not be implied.

(4) Notwithstanding subsections (1), (2), and (3) governing the assignment of mortgages, chapters 670-680 of the Uniform Commercial Code of this state govern the attachment and perfection of a security interest in a mortgage upon real property and in a promissory note or other right to payment or performance secured by that mortgage. The assignment of such a mortgage need not be recorded under this section for purposes of attachment or perfection of a security interest in the mortgage under the Uniform Commercial Code.

(5) Notwithstanding subsection (4), a creditor or subsequent purchaser of real property or any interest therein, for valuable consideration and without notice, is entitled to rely on a full or partial release, discharge, consent, joinder, subordination, satisfaction, or assignment of a mortgage upon such property made by the mortgagee of record, without regard to the filing of any Uniform Commercial Code financing statement that purports to perfect a security interest in the mortgage or in a promissory note or other right to payment or performance secured by the mortgage, and the filing of any such financing statement does not constitute notice for the purposes of this section. For the purposes of this subsection, the term “mortgagee of record” means the person named as the mortgagee in the recorded mortgage or, if an assignment of the mortgage has been recorded in accordance with this section, the term “mortgagee of record” means the assignee named in the recorded assignment.

History.—s. 1, ch. 6909, 1915; RGS 3841; CGL 5744; s. 13, ch. 20954, 1941; s. 2, ch. 89-41; s. 20, ch. 2005-241.

701.03 Cancellation.—

(1) Whenever the amount of money due under a promissory note secured by a mortgage is fully paid, the mortgagee or assignee shall within 45 days after satisfaction of the mortgage thereafter cancel the mortgage in the manner provided by law, unless the mortgage is an open-end mortgage.

(2) A mortgage that is an open-end mortgage as provided in the loan agreement may be canceled upon written notice from the borrower of the intent to close the mortgage. The mortgagee or assignee shall cancel the open-end mortgage within 45 days after receiving the notice. This subsection does not apply to an open-end mortgage existing before July 1, 2016, if the loan agreement contained procedures for canceling the mortgage.

History.—RS 1986; GS 2499; RGS 3842; CGL 5745; s. 171, ch. 73-333; s. 4, ch. 2016-53.

¹701.04 Cancellation of mortgages, liens, and judgments.—

(1)(a) Within 10 days after receipt of the written request of a mortgagor, a record title owner of the property, a fiduciary or trustee lawfully acting on behalf of a record title owner, or any other person lawfully authorized to act on behalf of a mortgagor or record title owner of the property, the mortgagee or mortgage servicer shall send or cause to be sent an estoppel letter setting forth the unpaid balance of the loan secured by the mortgage. If the written request is made by a person other than the mortgagor, the request must include a copy of the instrument showing such person’s title in the property or other lawful authorization, and the mortgagee or mortgage servicer must notify the mortgagor of the request.

(b) The estoppel letter must at a minimum include:

1. The unpaid balance of the loan secured by the mortgage as of the date specified in the estoppel letter, including an itemization of the principal, interest, and any other charges comprising the unpaid balance; and

2. Interest accruing on a per-day basis for the unpaid balance from and after the date specified in the estoppel letter, if applicable.

(c)1. Except for mortgages for which a notice of lis pendens in a foreclosure action or a suggestion of bankruptcy has been properly filed and recorded, the mortgagee or mortgage servicer may not qualify, reserve the right to change, or condition or disclaim the reliance of others on the information provided in an estoppel letter under paragraph (b), and any attempt to do so is void and unenforceable. However, if the mortgagee or mortgage servicer determines that any of the information provided in the estoppel letter under paragraph (b) was inaccurate, the mortgagee or mortgage servicer may send a corrected estoppel letter to the person who requested the estoppel letter in the same manner as used to respond to the original written request. If the original written request is made by a person other than the mortgagor, the mortgagee or mortgage servicer must also provide a copy of any corrected estoppel letter to the mortgagor.

2. If the person who requested the original estoppel letter under paragraph (a) receives a corrected estoppel letter by 3 p.m. in such person’s time zone at least 1 business day before a payment is issued in reliance on the previous estoppel letter, the corrected estoppel letter supersedes all prior estoppel letters.

3. If any of the information provided in the estoppel letter under paragraph (b) was inaccurate, but the person who requested the estoppel letter did not timely receive a corrected estoppel letter as provided in subparagraph 2., the mortgagee or mortgage servicer may not deny the accuracy of such information as against any person who relied on it. This subparagraph does not affect the right of a mortgagee to recover any sum that it did not include in an estoppel letter from any person liable for payment of the loan or other obligations secured by the mortgage, nor does it limit any claim or defense to recovery which such person may have at law or in equity.

(d) The mortgagee or mortgage servicer acting in accordance with a request in substantial compliance with this subsection is expressly discharged from any obligation or liability to any person on account of the release of the requested information, other than the obligation to comply with the terms of the estoppel letter.

(e) If a payment is received at the location and in the manner specified by the mortgagee or mortgage servicer, the mortgagee or mortgage servicer must accept and may not return any payment received in reliance on an estoppel letter and must promptly apply such payment to the unpaid balance of the loan properly due under or secured by the mortgage.

(f)1. A written request for an estoppel letter under paragraph (a) must be sent to the mortgagee or mortgage servicer by first-class mail, postage prepaid; by common carrier delivery service; or by e-mail, facsimile, or other electronic means at the address made available by the mortgagee or mortgage servicer for such purpose or through an automated system provided by the mortgagee or mortgage servicer for requesting an estoppel letter. The written request is considered received by the mortgagee or mortgage servicer:

a. Five business days after the request sent by first-class mail is deposited with the United States Postal Service;

b. The day the request is delivered by a common carrier delivery service; or

c. The day the request is sent by e-mail, facsimile, or other electronic means or through an automated system provided by the mortgagee or mortgage servicer for requesting an estoppel letter.

If any of the days in sub-subparagraph a., sub-subparagraph b., or sub-subparagraph c. fall on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday specified in s. 110.117(1) or the laws of the United States, the request for an estoppel letter is considered timely received by the mortgagee or mortgage servicer on the next business day.

2. The mortgagee or mortgage servicer must send an estoppel letter by first-class mail, postage prepaid; by common carrier delivery service; or by e-mail, facsimile, or other electronic means, as directed in the written request, or through an automated system provided by the mortgagee or mortgage servicer for this purpose. However, the mortgagee or mortgage servicer is not required to pay for a common carrier delivery service. If the 10-day period after a written request is received by the mortgagee or mortgage servicer ends on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday specified in s. 110.117(1) or the laws of the United States, the estoppel letter is considered timely if it is sent by the close of business on the next business day.

(g) Notwithstanding s. 655.059, a mortgagee or mortgage servicer may provide the financial information required under this subsection to a person authorized under this subsection to request the financial information.

(2)(a) Within 60 days after the unpaid balance of a loan secured by a mortgage has been fully paid or paid pursuant to an estoppel letter under subsection (1), whichever is earlier, the mortgagee or mortgage servicer shall execute in writing an instrument acknowledging release of the mortgage; have the instrument acknowledged, or proven, and send it or cause it to be sent for recording in the official records of the proper county; and send or cause to be sent the recorded release to the mortgagor or record title owner of the property. The prevailing party in a civil action brought against the mortgagee or mortgage servicer to enforce the requirements of this paragraph is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs.

(b) The recorded release of the mortgage does not relieve the mortgagor, or the mortgagor’s successors or assigns, from any personal liability on the loan or other obligations previously secured by the mortgage.

(3) Within 60 days after the unpaid balance on a lien or judgment has been fully paid to the person entitled to the payment thereof, the creditor or assignee, or the attorney of record in the case of a judgment, to whom the payment was made shall execute in writing an instrument acknowledging satisfaction of the lien or judgment; have the instrument acknowledged, or proven, and send it or cause it to be sent for recording in the official records of the proper county; and send or cause to be sent the recorded satisfaction to the person who has made the full payment. The prevailing party in a civil action brought against the creditor or assignee, or the attorney of record in the case of a judgment, to enforce the requirements of this subsection is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs.

(4) When a writ of execution has been issued, docketed, and indexed with a sheriff and the judgment upon which it was issued has been fully paid, it is the responsibility of the person receiving payment to request, in writing, addressed to the sheriff, return of the writ of execution as fully satisfied.

History.—s. 1, ch. 4138, 1893; s. 1, ch. 4918, 1901; GS 2500; RGS 3843; CGL 5746; s. 1, ch. 80-17; s. 15, ch. 93-250; s. 12, ch. 94-170; s. 8, ch. 2007-44; s. 1, ch. 2012-49; s. 1, ch. 2023-135.

¹Note.—Section 4, ch. 2023-135, provides that “[t]his act applies to all mortgages, and all loans secured by such mortgages, existing as of, or entered into on or after, October 1, 2023.”

701.041 Title insurer; mortgage release certificate.—

(1) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:

¹(a) “Estoppel letter” means a statement containing, at a minimum, the information required in s. 701.04(1)(b).

(b) “Mortgagee” means:

1. The grantee of a mortgage; or

2. If a mortgage has been assigned of record, the last person to whom the mortgage has been assigned of record.

(c) “Mortgage servicer” means the last person to whom a mortgagor or the mortgagor’s successor in interest has been instructed by a mortgagee to send payments on a loan secured by a mortgage. A person transmitting an estoppel letter is the mortgage servicer for the mortgage described in the estoppel letter.

(d) “Mortgagor” means the grantor of a mortgage.

(e) “Record” means to record with the clerk of the circuit court or the comptroller in the county or counties in which the real property securing the mortgage is located.

(f) “Title insurer” means a corporation or other business entity authorized and licensed to transact the business of insuring titles to interests in real property in this state under chapter 624.

¹(2) CERTIFICATE OF RELEASE.—An officer or duly appointed agent of a title insurer may, on behalf of a mortgagor or a person who acquired from the mortgagor title to all or a part of the property described in a mortgage, execute a certificate of release that complies with the requirements of this section and record the certificate of release in the real property records of each county in which the mortgage is recorded if a satisfaction or release of the mortgage has not been executed and recorded after the date payment in full of the loan properly due under or secured by the mortgage was made in accordance with an estoppel letter furnished by the mortgagee or mortgage servicer.

(3) CONTENTS.—A certificate of release executed under this section must contain:

(a) The name of the mortgagor, the name of the original mortgagee, and, if applicable, the mortgage servicer; the date of the mortgage; the date of recording; and the volume and page or document number in the real property records in which the mortgage is recorded, together with similar information for the last recorded assignment of the mortgage.

(b) A statement that the mortgage being released is eligible for release under this section.

(c) The name of the title insurer filing the certificate of release, a statement that the person executing the certificate of release is an officer or a duly appointed agent of the title insurer, a statement that the title insurer is authorized and licensed to transact the business of insuring titles to interests in real property in this state under chapter 624 or chapter 626, and, if executed by a duly appointed agent, shall further provide the recording information of the appointment of such agent as required by subsection (4).

(d) A statement that the certificate of release is made on behalf of the mortgagor or a person who acquired title from the mortgagor to all or a part of the property described in the mortgage.

(e) A statement that the mortgagee or mortgage servicer provided an estoppel letter which was used to make payment in full of the unpaid balance of the loan secured by the mortgage.

(f) A statement that payment in full of the unpaid balance of the loan secured by the mortgage was made in accordance with the estoppel letter and that a copy of the certificate of release was sent to the mortgagee or mortgage servicer that provided the estoppel letter.

(4) EXECUTION.—

(a) A certificate of release authorized by subsection (2) must be duly executed, sworn to or affirmed under penalty of perjury before a notary public, and recorded and may be executed by an officer of a title insurer or by a duly appointed agent of a title insurer. Such delegation to an agent by a title insurer shall not relieve the title insurer of any liability for damages caused by the agent for the execution or recordation of a certificate of release.

(b) The appointment of an agent must be duly executed, acknowledged, and recorded by an officer of a title insurer and must state:

1. The title insurer as the principal.

2. The identity of the person, partnership, or corporation authorized to act as agent to execute and record certificates of release provided for in this section on behalf of the title insurer.

3. That the agent has the full authority to execute and record certificates of release provided for in this section on behalf of the title insurer.

(c) A separate appointment of agent shall not be necessary for each certificate of release provided that at least one such appointment is recorded in the county in which the mortgaged property is located. The appointment of agent must be rerecorded where necessary to establish authority of the agent, but such authority shall continue until a revocation of appointment is recorded in the office of the county recorder in which the appointment of agent was recorded.

(d) After recordation of a title insurer’s revocation of appointment in the office of the county recorder in which the appointment was recorded, the agent whose appointment is revoked in such county shall have no further authority to execute or record certificates of release as provided in this section on behalf of that title insurer with respect to any mortgages recorded in that county, and no such certificate of release thereafter executed or recorded by that agent on behalf of that title insurer shall be effective to release any mortgage recorded in that county.

(5) EFFECT.—For purposes of releasing the mortgage, a certificate of release containing the information and statements provided for in subsection (3) and executed as provided in subsection (4) is entitled to be recorded with the county recorder and operates as a release of the mortgage described in the certificate of release. The county recorder shall rely upon the certificate to release the mortgage. Recording of a certificate of release by a title insurer or its agent shall not relieve the mortgagor, or the mortgagor’s successors or assigns, from any personal liability on the loan or other obligations secured by the mortgage. A certificate of release recorded pursuant to this section fulfills any other obligation of the mortgagee or mortgage servicer to file a satisfaction or release of the mortgage.

(6) LIABILITY OF TITLE INSURER AND TITLE INSURANCE AGENT.—

(a) In addition to any other remedy provided by law, a title insurer and title insurance agent recording a certificate of release under this section shall be liable to the holder of the obligation secured by the mortgage for actual damage sustained due to the recording of the certificate of release. Reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party.

(b) The title insurer named in a certificate of release filed by a duly appointed agent shall be liable pursuant to this subsection without regard to whether the title insurer authorized the specific certificate of release recorded by the agent.

(c) The title insurer and title insurance agent shall have no liability under this subsection if the title insurer or title insurance agent shows that payment in full of the unpaid balance of the loan secured by the mortgage was made in accordance with the estoppel letter furnished by the mortgagee or the mortgage servicer.

(d) Liability of a title insurer pursuant to this section shall be considered to be a title insurance claim on real property in this state pursuant to s. 627.7865.

(7) RECORDING.—If a mortgage is recorded in more than one county and a certificate of release is recorded in one of such counties, a certified copy of the certificate of release may be recorded in another of such counties with the same effect as the original. In all cases, the certificate of release shall be entered and indexed as satisfactions of mortgage are entered and indexed.

(8) APPLICATION.—This section applies only to a mortgage that secures a loan in the principal amount of $500,000 or less as determined from the recorded mortgage and contains no disclosure of record that the mortgage secures an open-end or revolving line of credit agreement.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-122; s. 9, ch. 2007-44; s. 2, ch. 2023-135.

¹Note.—Section 4, ch. 2023-135, provides that “[t]his act applies to all mortgages, and all loans secured by such mortgages, existing as of, or entered into on or after, October 1, 2023.”

701.06 Certain cancellations and satisfactions of mortgages validated.—All cancellations or satisfactions of mortgages made prior to the enactment of chapter 4138, Acts of 1893, by the mortgagee or assignee of record of such mortgage entering same on the margin of the record of such mortgage in the presence of the custodian of such record and attested by the said custodian and signed by said mortgagee or assignee of record of such mortgage, shall be valid and effectual for every purpose as if the same had been done subsequent to the enactment of chapter 4138, Acts of 1893.

History.—s. 1, ch. 14763, 1931; CGL 1936 Supp. 5746(1).

F.S. 701 on Google Scholar

F.S. 701 on Casetext

Amendments to 701

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 701

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S372.701 - FAILURE TO APPEAR - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 6694 - M: S

S377.701 - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - FAIL TO SUBMIT REQUIRED INFO SUBMIT FALSE INFO - M: F

S377.701 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - VIOLATE PROVISION OF PETROLEUM ALLOCATION ACT - M: F

S601.701 - FRAUD - FALSIFY OR KEEP FALSIFIED CITRUS FRUIT RECORDS - M: F

S601.701 - HEALTH-SAFETY - FAIL TO KEEP REQUIRED CITRUS FRUIT RECORDS - M: F

S701.05 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - REPEALED 2005-122 - M: S

S985.701 1a2 - SEX OFFENSE-AGAINST CHILD-FONDLING - BY EMPLOYEE AGAINST JUVENILE OFFENDER - F: S

S985.701 3a - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - FAIL TO PREPARE SEX MISCONDUCT REPORT - M: F

S985.701 3b - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - IN REPORT OF SEX MISCONDUCT - M: F

S985.701 3c - INTIMIDATION - TO ALTER REPORT OF SEX MISCONDUCT - F: T

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

J. TRUMP, v. R. VANCE, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 2412 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Rev. 701, 713 (1995). . . . Knobel , 94 N.Y.2d 226, 230, 701 N.Y.S.2d 695, 723 N.E.2d 550, 552 (1999) (explaining New York rule for . . .

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL, v. MORRISSEY- BERRU St. v., 140 S. Ct. 2049 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Roy , 476 U.S. 693, 699-701, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986), enforce child-labor protections, . . .

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER AND PAUL HOME, v. PENNSYLVANIA, J. v., 140 S. Ct. 2367 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Commissioner , 531 U.S. 206, 220, 121 S.Ct. 701, 148 L.Ed.2d 613 (2001). . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Triplett , 494 U.S. 715, 720, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990) (Scalia, J., for the Court) (attorney . . . Triplett , 494 U.S. 715, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990), is even weaker. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, J. v., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . § 701(a)(2) ). The majority then upheld the injunction on two grounds. . . . That presumption can be rebutted by a showing that the relevant statute "preclude[s]" review, § 701(a . . . )(1), or that the "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law," § 701(a)(2). . . . To "honor the presumption of review, we have read the exception in § 701(a)(2) quite narrowly," Weyerhaeuser . . . law" and therefore not subject to APA arbitrary-and-capricious review in the first place. 5 U.S.C. § 701 . . .

BOSTOCK, v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA v. Jr. Co- R. G. G. R. v., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Sess., § 2 (1999); H.R. 217, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (2001); S. 16, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 701 . . .

ROGERS, v. GREWAL,, 140 S. Ct. 1865 (U.S. 2020)

. . . County of Westchester , 701 F.3d 81, 89 (C.A.2 2012). . . . See Gould , 907 F.3d, at 677 ; Kachalsky , 701 F.3d, at 101 ; Drake , 724 F.3d, at 440 ; Masciandaro . . . County of Westchester , 701 F.3d 81, 100 (C.A.2 2012) (deferring to the legislature's conclusion that . . .

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE PISTOL ASSOCIATION, INC. v. CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK,, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (U.S. 2020)

. . . County of Westchester , 701 F.3d 81, 87 (CA2 2012). . . . New York City Dept. of Social Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 695-701, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). . . . No. 1 , 551 U.S. 701, 720, 748, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 168 L.Ed.2d 508 (2007) (holding case live due in part . . .

COUNTY OF MAUI, HAWAII, v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND,, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (U.S. 2020)

. . . McBride , 564 U.S. 685, 701, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 180 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011) (plurality opinion). . . .

ROMAG FASTENERS, INC. v. FOSSIL, INC., 140 S. Ct. 1492 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Mutual Film Corp. , 186 A.D. 701, 702, 174 N.Y.S. 784 (1919) (declining to award profits because there . . .

COMCAST CORPORATION, v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN- OWNED MEDIA,, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Dallas Independent School Dist. , 491 U.S. 701, 720, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). . . .

GUERRERO- LASPRILLA, v. P. BARR, v. P., 140 S. Ct. 1062 (U.S. 2020)

. . . ." § 701(a)(1). . . .

L. ALLEN, v. A. COOPER, III,, 140 S. Ct. 994 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Expense Bd. , 527 U.S. 666, 699-701, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (dissenting opinion); Federal . . .

N. JOHNSON, v. RIMMER,, 140 S. Ct. 1294 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 19-701 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

L. BALDWIN, Et Ux. v. UNITED STATES, 140 S. Ct. 690 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Nelson, Statutory Interpretation 701 (2011)). . . .

RIDGELL, v. CITY OF PINE BLUFF, A In, 935 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dist. , 491 U.S. 701, 735-36, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) ; Russell v. . . .

G. STEPHENS v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a, 935 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Chrysler Motors Corp. , 107 Idaho 701, 692 P.2d 345, 348 (1984). . . .

TIMS, v. LGE COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION,, 935 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Byers , 701 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2012) ("If the parties litigate the case under the assumption . . .

SCHINK, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 935 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . See generally DSM-IV-TR at 685, 701-17. . . .

L. SMITH, v. SHARP,, 935 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014). . . .

UNITED STATES v. TOWN OF COLORADO CITY,, 935 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dist. , 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). . . .

EDMO, v. CORIZON, INC. Al v. Al, 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dist. of Cal. , 840 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1988). . . .

IN RE BOWLES,, 935 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014), and Atkins v. . . . Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014). . . . Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014). . . .

BOWLES v. FLORIDA,, 140 S. Ct. 2589 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Florida , 572 U.S. 701, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014). . . .

BOWLES, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 935 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014), and Atkins v. . . . Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 710, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014) ("[T]he medical community defines . . . Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HAWKINS, a. k. a. D III, a. k. a., 934 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . And Rule 701 makes clear that lay opinion testimony is admissible only if it "is ... not based on ... . . . Evid. 701(c). . . . Evid. 701 and Fed. R. Evid. 702." (quoting United States v. . . . 201, 210 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[O]pinion testimony, whether offered by a lay witness pursuant to [ Rule 701 . . . reasons that many of [the agent's] opinions were not helpful to the jury as lay testimony under Rule 701 . . .

BACA v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, G. T. L. M., 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Believing [section] 701 to be unconstitutional, they are in the position of having to choose between . . . violating their oath and taking a step-refusal to comply with [section] 701-that would be likely to bring . . .

CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE, v. MCMAHON,, 934 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony , 538 U.S. 701, 712, 123 S.Ct. 1887, . . .

UNITED STATES v. STAHLMAN,, 934 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . So you're saying that it's excluded under 701? . . . GC: Your Honor, under 701, he's talking about the context of the conversation. . . . Evid. 701 & 702. . . . Evid. 701. . . . See Rule 701(a) ; cf. also United States v. . . .

BIONDO, v. KALEDIA HEALTH, d b a, 935 F.3d 68 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Indian River County Hospital District, 701 F.3d 334, 350 (11th Cir. 2012) ; see also, id. . . . Liese, 701 F.3d at 350. . . .

IN RE SWEARINGEN,, 935 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . APPENDIX August 09, 2019 Bryce Benjet Senior Staff Attorney Innocence Project 40 Worth Street, Suite 701 . . . Laboratory Service July 19, 2019 Bryce Benjet Senior Staff Attorney Innocence Project 40 Worth Street, Suite 701 . . .

ST. CHARLES SURGICAL HOSPITAL, L. L. C. v. LOUISIANA HEALTH SERVICE INDEMNITY COMPANY,, 935 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co., LLC , 701 F.3d 1224, 1235 (8th Cir. 2012) ; Anesthesiology Assocs. of Tallahassee v. . . . Jacks , 701 F.3d at 1234 (citing Anesthesiology Assocs. of Tallahassee , 2005 WL 6717869, at *2 ). . . .

PIZZUTO, Jr. v. BLADES,, 933 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Florida , 572 U.S. 701, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014). . . .

BARNES, v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, a USA, N. A. a JP Co. a IBM a, 934 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Chase Home Fin., LLC , 701 F. . . . Barnes , 701 F. App'x at 674-75. . . .

IN RE JOHNSON, v., 935 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Florida , 572 U.S. 701, 721-22 (2014) ; In re Cathey , 857 F.3d at 237-38. . . .

MCMICHAEL, v. TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE DEEPWATER DRILLING, INCORPORATED RIGP DCL, L. L. C. USA,, 934 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Neopost USA, Inc. , 701 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2012). . . . Heico Cos., L.L.C. , 782 F.3d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Reed , 701 F.3d at 441 ). . . .

IN RE ASCOT FUND LIMITED, a, 603 B.R. 271 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . See, e.g. , In re Ocean Rig UDW Inc. , 570 B.R. 687, 701-02 (Bankr. . . .

DINAPLES, v. MRS BPO, LLC MRS BPO, LLC,, 934 F.3d 275 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Marcus, Yitzchak Zelman [ARGUED], Marcus & Zelman, 701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300, Asbury Park, NJ 07712 . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. MCCALL, a k a, 934 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hargrove , 701 F.3d 156, 161-62 (4th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. . . .

LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. FOWLKES PLUMBING, L. L. C., 934 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Copper Mountain , 208 P.3d at 697-98 ; id . at 701 (Martinez, J., dissenting) (collecting ten cases . . .

CLARK, v. WARDEN,, 934 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bell , 556 U.S. 449, 472, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009). . . .

COEUR D ALENE TRIBE, a v. W. HAWKS A., 933 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Paiute-Shoshone Indians , 538 U.S. 701, 712, 123 S.Ct. 1887, 155 L.Ed.2d 933 (2003). . . .

UNITED STATES v. NG LAP SENG, Ng, Ng W. C., 934 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Rosen , 716 F.3d 691, 699-701 (2d Cir. 2013) (rejecting vagueness challenge to quid pro quo element of . . .

VALBRUNA SLATER STEEL CORPORATION, v. JOSLYN MANUFACTURING COMPANY,, 934 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 701. Valbruna's counterarguments miss the mark. . . .

ADLER, v. SPI SOLAR, INC. SPI Co., 391 F. Supp. 3d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Evid. 701 ) employ comparisons, speculative projections extending as far as 20 years forward, and academic . . .

BRENDA L. v. SAUL,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 858 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . (R. 701-06); [Dkt. #3, at Page 2/4]. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BROWN, v. J., 932 F.3d 1011 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . [a]n increase in the length of a sentence may ... add little additional deterrence." 790 F.3d 699, 701 . . .

C. CHILDRESS, ALDA St. HLAA- StL A v. FOX ASSOCIATES, LLC, C. CHILDRESS, ALDA St. HLAA- StL A v. LLC,, 932 F.3d 1165 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dist. , 701 F.3d 334, 343 (11th Cir. 2012) ). . . .

CHAVEZ, De E. De De De v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a, 933 F.3d 186 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Ford Motor Co. , 183 Ill.2d 459, 233 Ill.Dec. 828, 701 N.E.2d 1102, 1104-05 (1998) (same, under Illinois . . .

JONES, v. A. BERRYHILL,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 831 (M.D. Tenn. 2019)

. . . Id., referencing TR 696-701. . . .

UNITED STATES v. COLLIER,, 932 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Engelmann , 701 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 2012). . . .

COLE, v. CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC. CRST,, 932 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . App. 4th 701, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 (2013), and Bradley v. Networkers Int'l, LLC , 211 Cal. . . .

VIEIRA, v. MENTOR WORLDWIDE, LLC LLC LLC, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . Bureau , 701 F.2d 1276, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall be freely given . . .

UNITED STATES v. HERNANDEZ- MIESES,, 931 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Infante, 701 F.3d 386, 392 (1st Cir. 2012). . . .

UNITED STATES v. DUKE,, 932 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Johnson , 916 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 2019). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BUCHANAN,, 933 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at PageID 700-701. . . .

ATLAS BREW WORKS, LLC, v. P. BARR,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 6 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181 ; see also Clarke, 915 F.2d at 701 (parties must show that resolution . . .

YEARWOOD, v. BARR,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . . § 701. . . . (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) ). . . .

DAVIS, v. GUAM M. C. F. P. F. I. M., 932 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Antelope , 430 U.S. 641, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977). . . .

DINE CITIZENS AGAINST RUINING OUR ENVIRONMENT v. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS U. S. LLC,, 932 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Interior , 701 F.3d 927 (D.C. Cir. 2012). . . .

YOUNG, v. WINKLER,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 868 (S.D. Ohio 2019)

. . . . § 701 et seq. Doc. 12 at PageID 144-48. . . .

FOROUZAN v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . NIBCO , 701 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 2010). . . .

C. ESPOSITO, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . . § 701 et seq. ("Rehab Act"); New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Executive Law § 290 et seq. . . .

O. KOEPKE, v. M. KOEPKE,, 275 So. 3d 1278 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Renew, 639 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). . . .

IN RE BELMONTE, D. v. P. A., 931 F.3d 147 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Lopez (In re Lopez) , 345 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The bankruptcy court's choice of remedies is . . .

HUPP R. H. a v. COOK C. R., 931 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Brown , 701 F.3d 120, 126 (4th Cir. 2012). . . . Place , 462 U.S. 696, 701, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). . . . marijuana was inside apartment and would be destroyed if officer waited to secure warrant); Brown , 701 . . .

FACIANE, v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA,, 931 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Plan , 701 F.3d 718, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (similar). . . . plan documents that discussed a complicated "backloading" issue in a pension plan's benefits formula. 701 . . . See Osberg , 862 F.3d at 207-08 ; Kifafi , 701 F.3d at 722-23. . . . See Witt , 772 F.3d at 1277 ; Riley , 744 F.3d at 245 ; Kifafi , 701 F.3d at 729 ("repudiation ... . . .

UNITED STATES v. COONCE, Jr., 932 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Florida , 572 U.S. 701, 134 S. . . .

HIGHPOINT TOWER TECHNOLOGY INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,, 931 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 701 ). . . .

TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC v. PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR ACRES, PERMANENT OVERLAY EASEMENT FOR ACRES AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR ACRES IN MILFORD AND WESTFALL TOWNSHIPS, PIKE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBERS a c o L. P., 931 F.3d 237 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Code §§ 5-701 to -737; the Federal Power Act ("FPA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 824 - 824w ; and, of course, the NGA . . .

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, v. AMAZON. COM, INC., 390 F. Supp. 3d 964 (W.D. Wis. 2019)

. . . Mallett , 2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523. . . .

PRESQUE ISLE COLON AND RECTAL SURGERY, v. HIGHMARK HEALTH, f k a f k a, 391 F. Supp. 3d 485 (W.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. , 429 U.S. 477, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) ). . . .

BIGSBY, Jr. v. BARCLAYS CAPITAL REAL ESTATE, INC., 391 F. Supp. 3d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . App'x 699, 701 (2d Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). IV. . . .

IN RE HANNA, DMM s, v., 603 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019)

. . . Luppino (In re Luppino), 221 B.R. 693, 701-02 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998). . . . In re Luppino, 221 B.R. at 701 ; see also In re Bentley, 531 B.R. at 688 ("Fraud by non-disclosure is . . . Adolph Coors Co., 701 F.2d 542, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc), overruled in part on other grounds . . .

ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY AFFILIATED PLANS, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 22 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . No. 104-191, § 701(a) (permitting group plans to exclude preexisting condition coverage within a "6-month . . .

IN RE BIG DOG II, LLC,, 602 B.R. 64 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . Thomas's testimony pursuant to Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding opinion testimony . . . Testimony presented pursuant to Rule 701 is acceptable where it is rationally based on the witness's . . .

SOUTHERN HENS, INCORPORATED, v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION R., 930 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 114-74, § 701, 129 Stat. 584, 599 (2015). . . .

SAID, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Air Lines, Inc., 701 F. . . .

In CRANBERRY GROWERS COOPERATIVE, v. S. LAYNG,, 930 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Airlines Voucher Litig ., 799 F.3d 701, 714 (7th Cir. 2015). . . .

MORENO GALVEZ, v. T. CUCCINELLI,, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1208 (W.D. Wash. 2019)

. . . Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that "emotional stress, depression, and reduced sense . . .

TERESE F. v. SAUL,, 387 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . City of Huntington Woods , 344 Mich. 701, 74 N.W.2d 897, 899 (1956). . . .

CHACOTY, v. POMPEO, U. S., 392 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . . § 701 et seq. , and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. . . .

R. BRADLEY, v. VILLAGE OF UNIVERSITY PARK, ILLINOIS,, 929 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Shawano-Gresham School Dist. , 295 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2002) ("the failure to conform with the procedural . . .

MANNING v. CALDWELL, s FOR CITY OF ROANOKE s, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Davis , 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) (rejecting a reading that "would make . . .

WESTERN WATERSHEDS PROJECT, v. BERNHARDT,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D. Or. 2019)

. . . . §§ 701 et seq. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. . . .

RICHARDSON, v. THOMAS,, 930 F.3d 587 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Florida , 572 U.S. 701, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014). . . .

S. R. NEHAD K. R. v. N. BROWDER, 929 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Smith , 394 F.3d at 701 ; see also Franklin v. Foxworth , 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994). . . .

K. B. BY AND THROUGH QASSIS v. METHODIST HEALTHCARE MEMPHIS HOSPITALS, Le s, 929 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Health Plan of Ohio , 701 F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he removing party ... ha[s] the burden of . . .

UNITED STATES v. PETRUK, v., 929 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Farnell, 701 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 2012). . . . Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) ); see Farnell, 701 F.3d at 261 (explaining . . .

AUTOMOTIVE BODY PARTS ASSOCIATION, v. FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,, 930 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d at 701. ABPA fails to explain how that well-supported finding constitutes error. . . .

ABC SOILS, INC. v. DRS POWER TECHNOLOGY, INC., 386 F. Supp. 3d 107 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Auth., 443 Mass. 697, 701, 823 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (2005) ; see Sullivan v. Bos. . . .

TQ DELTA, LLC, v. DISH NETWORK LLC,, 929 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Cellular Comm'cns Equip., LLC , 701 F. App'x 978, 981 (Fed. . . .

UNITED STATES v. DANIELS,, 930 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Uvalle-Patricio , 478 F.3d 699, 701 (5th Cir. 2007) ). United States v. . . .

GN NETCOM, INC. v. PLANTRONICS, INC., 930 F.3d 76 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Pena-Santo , 809 F.3d 686, 701 n.10 (1st Cir. 2015). . . .

REINALT- THOMAS CORPORATION, d b a v. MAVIS TIRE SUPPLY, LLC,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1261 (N.D. Ga. 2019)

. . . Bushmaster Firearms, Inc. , 486 F.3d 701, 705 (1st Cir. 2007). . . .

LORENZO, v. P. BARR,, 929 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 701. . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. FINCHER,, 929 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wolfe , 701 F.3d 1206, 1216 (7th Cir. 2012). . . .

UNITED STATES v. FIGUEROA- FIGUEROA,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 70 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 701, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). . . .

REID v. DONELAN,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Id. at 701, 121 S.Ct. 2491. . . . Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months," 533 U.S. at 701 . . . See 533 U.S. at 701, 121 S.Ct. 2491. . . . Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701, 121 S.Ct. 2491. . . .

EUROPA EYE WEAR CORP. v. KAIZEN ADVISORS, LLC AO v. LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 228 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Suez, S.A. , 585 F.3d 696, 701 (2d Cir. 2009). . . .