The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title IV
EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Chapter 17
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

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F.S. 17.26

17.26 Cancellation of state warrants not presented within 1 year.—

(1) If any state warrant issued by the Chief Financial Officer or Comptroller against any fund in the State Treasury is not presented for payment within 1 year after the last day of the month in which it was originally issued, the Chief Financial Officer may cancel the warrant and credit the amount of the warrant to the fund upon which it is drawn. If the warrant so canceled was issued against a fund that is no longer operative, the amount of the warrant shall be credited to the General Revenue Fund. The Chief Financial Officer shall not honor any state warrant after it has been canceled.

(2) The funds represented by a warrant canceled under subsection (1) are presumed abandoned by the payee or person entitled to the warrant and shall be reported and remitted as unclaimed property under s. 717.117, except that written notice to the apparent owner of the unclaimed property is not required before filing of the report. An action may not be commenced thereafter for recovery of funds represented by the warrant, except as provided by chapter 717. This subsection applies to all warrants issued on or after July 1, 1992.

(3) When a warrant canceled under subsection (1) represents funds that are in whole or in part derived from federal contributions and disposition of the funds under chapter 717 would cause a loss of the federal contributions, the Governor shall certify to the Chief Financial Officer that funds represented by such warrants are for that reason exempt from treatment as unclaimed property. Obligations represented by warrants are unenforceable after 1 year from the last day of the month in which the warrant was originally issued. An action may not be commenced thereafter on the obligation unless authorized by the federal program from which the original warrant was funded and unless payment of the obligation is authorized to be made from the current federal funding. When a payee or person entitled to a warrant subject to this subsection requests payment, and payment from current federal funding is authorized by the federal program from which the original warrant was funded, the Chief Financial Officer may, upon investigation, issue a new warrant to be paid out of the proper fund in the State Treasury, provided the payee or other person executes under oath the statement required by s. 17.13 or surrenders the canceled warrant.

(4) If a valid obligation of the state is due, owing, and unpaid and it becomes unenforceable for any reason because of the provisions and limitations contained in this section, the person entitled to payment on the obligation may present a claim for relief to the Legislature, provided the claim is made within the time limitations presently provided by law.

(5) This section does not extend any applicable statute of limitations or revive any barred claim with respect to any state obligation outstanding and unpaid on July 1, 1995.

History.—ss. 1, 2, ch. 22006, 1943; s. 1, ch. 29645, 1955; s. 1, ch. 73-220; s. 2, ch. 85-61; s. 1, ch. 88-256; s. 7, ch. 95-312; s. 2, ch. 2001-60; s. 38, ch. 2003-261.

F.S. 17.26 on Google Scholar

F.S. 17.26 on Casetext

Amendments to 17.26

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 17.26

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 17.26.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

COBURN, v. EVERCORE TRUST COMPANY, N. A., 160 F. Supp. 3d 361 (D.D.C. 2016)

. . . Penney’s stock price dropped from $36.72 at the end of the first quarter of 2012 to $17.26 a year later . . .

MALIBU BOATS, LLC, v. NAUTIQUE BOAT COMPANY, INC., 122 F. Supp. 3d 722 (E.D. Tenn. 2015)

. . . must have “at least one propulsion member to propel the hull at a speed in excess of 15 knots,” or 17.26 . . .

NAACP, v. SNYDER,, 879 F. Supp. 2d 662 (E.D. Mich. 2012)

. . . between two majority African-American districts, Districts 5 and 6, which now contain a 24.53% and a 17.26% . . . community between two districts, one with a 24.53% Hispanic voting-age population and the other with a 17.26% . . .

TYLER, v. LIZ CLAIBORNE, INC. F. L., 814 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . financials and held the above-detailed conference call, LIZ’s share price dropped $7.72 per share, or 17.26% . . .

AWUAH, v. COVERALL NORTH AMERICA, INC., 791 F. Supp. 2d 284 (D. Mass. 2011)

. . . Court therefore will award fees for 33% of the hours Attorney Casavant has recorded, for a total óf 17.26 . . .

ARKANSAS GAME AND FISH COMMISSION, v. UNITED STATES,, 87 Fed. Cl. 594 (Fed. Cl. 2009)

. . . Finally, the gauge at Corning reached a range of 10.5 to 11.5 feet for an average of 17.26 days during . . .

FONSECA v. UNITED STATES, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (E.D. Wis. 2007)

. . . Code INS § 17.26(4)(b). . . .

D. DIFELICE, v. US AIRWAYS, INC., 436 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Va. 2006)

. . . At this point, Group shares had fallen in value from their post-announcement highs and closed at $17.26 . . .

UNITED YOUTH CAREERS, INC. Jr. v. CITY OF AMES, IOWA,, 412 F. Supp. 2d 994 (S.D. Iowa 2006)

. . . Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages (Clerk’s No. 1), alleging that Section 17.26 . . . Ames has adopted an ordinance, codified at § 17.26, which reads in pertinent part as follows: Sec. 17.26 . . . On August 9, 2005, Ames enacted Amendments to § 17.26. . . . six months; or if previously convicted of any crime of fraud or violence to persons or property. § 17.26 . . . Plaintiffs next object to § 17.26(13) of the pre-amendment ordinance, which provides that the City Clerk . . .

D. DIFELICE, v. US AIRWAYS, INC., 397 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Va. 2005)

. . . Air Group responded by declining in price further and sharply to $17.26. . . .

D. DIFELICE, v. US AIRWAYS, INC., 397 F. Supp. 2d 735 (E.D. Va. 2005)

. . . Air Group’s shares would not have closed at $17.26 per share on July 27, 2001 after the announcement . . .

ARGORA PROPERTIES L. P. A TEXAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, v. FOULSTON SIEFKIN L. L. P. a a, 70 F. App'x 989 (10th Cir. 2003)

. . . Argora informed Foulston the base annual rent under the renewal clause was $784,125 ($17.26 per rsf based . . .

BIOSITE, INC. v. XOMA LTD. US LLC, v., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2001)

. . . See 3B Moore, Federal Practice, §§ 17.26 (3d ed.1988) (“forum state restrictions, however, do not apply . . .

STANDARD MANUFACTURING CO. INC. DBP, v. UNITED STATES,, 42 Fed. Cl. 748 (Fed. Cl. 1999)

. . . trailers, and a 14.32% figure for the last twenty-nine trailers, AAI’s average profit rate comes to 17.26% . . .

G. HAINES, v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE,, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991 (M.D. Tenn. 1998)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 17.26[3], at 17-111 (3d ed. 1997) (“[T]he capacity of an entity charted . . . them recognizes them as separate legal entities having capacity to sue or be sued.” 4 Moore, supra, § 17.26 . . .

DOMINO MEDIA, INC. a v. KRANIS, 9 F. Supp. 2d 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 17.26[1][b] (1998). . . .

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, v. K. PATEL,, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995)

. . . Patel asserts that the Par stock fell 17.26% from March 1988 to July 1988 in the absence of specific . . .

EAGAN, KEITH, v. JACKSON, a k a C. A. R. E. ABC CORP., 855 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994)

. . . Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 17.26 at 17-219 (1993) (“Rule 17(c) deals only with the protection . . .

a v., 101 T.C. 61 (T.C. 1993)

. . . See 3A Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, par. 17.26, at 17-210 (2d ed. 1993); 6A Wright, et ah, Federal . . .

KOLLSMAN, A DIVISION OF SEQUA CORPORATION, v. D. COHEN, CUBIC CORPORATION, 996 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1993)

. . . Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1570 p. 506 (1990); Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 17.26 p. 17 . . .

F. KNIGHT, Jr. S. T. D. S. S. Jr. L. Dr. W. Y. N. S. Dr. Jr. v. STATE ALABAMA M. Jr. S. Jr. B. H. J. P. Dr. D. III, F. A. A. Sr. A. G. A M W. Dr. A M Jr. W. M. H. B. L. A. R. C. Dr. V. Dr. E. B. F. W. Jr. W. T. Jr. R. R. E. W. A. C. J. D. Jr. T. B. Jr. O. H. Jr. T. Jr. E. G. Jr. S. H. Jr. B. Dr. A. UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ALABAMA A M a a a a a a a a a a, 787 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ala. 1991)

. . . 19.05 22.30 20.45 20.95 21.86 U of Ala — Huntsville 15.85 22.08 20.87 18.31 21.15 U of Ala — Birmingham 17.26 . . .

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. P. JONES, C. a, 763 F. Supp. 1101 (M.D. Ala. 1991)

. . . Grotheer, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 17.26 at 17-219 (1990); 6A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. . . .

THOMAS, v. J. W. HUMFIELD,, 916 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1990)

. . . Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 17.26, at 17-210 (2d ed. 1989) (citing Donnelly v. . . .

A. SAVERING, v. UNITED STATES, 18 Cl. Ct. 704 (Cl. Ct. 1989)

. . . 75.02 10/29/84 2.5 41.68 11/28/84 2.5 41.68 Total 1984 31.0 $512.65 1/2/85 2.5 16.67 $ 41.68 2/5/85 2.5 17.26 . . . 60.41 9/26/85 2.5 43.15 10/24/85 2.5 43.15 11/15/85 2.5 43.15 Total 1985 35.5 $654.41 1/31/86 2.5 $17.26 . . .

AD HOC COMMITTEE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS, MINOR AND UNDER- AGE STUDENTS ATTENDING GREENBURGH ELEVEN UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. GREENBURGH UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 873 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1989)

. . . Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice, If 17.26 (2d Ed.1987). . . .

COCHRAN H. v. CELOTEX CORP., 123 F.R.D. 307 (C.D. Ill. 1988)

. . . This amounts to $6.60 for donuts purchased for jurors which could not be returned, $17.26 for telephone . . .

SUSAN R. M. CHARLES L. M. v. NORTHEAST INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, a, 818 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1987)

. . . Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice § 17.26, at 17-275 to 17-276 (2d ed. 1986). . . . . Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice §§ 17.16, 17.26, at 17-189 to 17-191, 17-272 (2d ed. 1986); Tex.Prob.Code . . .

In ZAWISZA,, 73 B.R. 929 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)

. . . MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 17.26, at 17-275 to 17-276. (2d ed. 1986). . . .

VON BULOW, AUERSPERG v. VON BULOW,, 634 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)

. . . Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice, If 17.26 (2d ed. 1985). . . . difference in terminology, “the functions of the two are precisely the same” 3A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 17.26 . . .

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, 632 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1986)

. . . Eglit, supra, at § 17.26. Nonetheless, some courts place the burden upon the plaintiff. . . .

III, v. SOUTHERN NATIONAL BANK OF HOUSTON, TEXAS,, 771 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1985)

. . . Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 17.26 at 17-283 (2d ed. 1985); 6 C. Wright & A. . . .

In CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., 51 B.R. 1005 (N.D. Ill. 1985)

. . . . § 1961 has varied between 17.26% in December 1977 and 9.17% in February 1985. . . .

HELMINSKI, v. AYERST LABORATORIES, A DIVISION OF AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORP. a, 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985)

. . . Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice j| 17.26 (1985). . . .

LAKER AIRWAYS LIMITED, v. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, LAKER AIRWAYS LIMITED, v. SABENA, BELGIAN WORLD AIRLINES,, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983)

. . . .; 3A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 17.26; In re Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, Etc., 476 F.Supp. 521 ( . . .

UNITED STATES v. H. HENAGAN W., 552 F. Supp. 350 (M.D. Ala. 1982)

. . . and taxation of such costs, in the absence of contrary federal law. 3A Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 17.26 . . .

DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ADVOCACY CENTER, INC. v. MELTON, DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ADVOCACY CENTER, INC. v. MELTON,, 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1982)

. . . sue as a representative of another is usually determined by state law. 3A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 17.26 . . . Id.; 3A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 17.26 at 17-280; 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: . . .

SCHNEIDER a v. LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, v. UNITED STATES MARCHETTI a v. LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, v. UNITED STATES ZIMMERLY Do a E. v. LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,, 658 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

. . . plays a hybrid role, advising one or more parties as well as the court. 3A Moore’s Federal Practice H 17.26 . . .

R. WILLIAMS v. PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION, 617 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1980)

. . . and the decision of the Area Arbitrator shall be final and conclusive except as otherwise provided in 17.26 . . . . . 17.26 The Joint Coast Labor Relations Committee has jurisdiction to consider issues that are presented . . .

WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, v. M. COSTLE,, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978)

. . . charges about EPA’s accounting, intending to show that SSL recovery cost should have been figured at $17.26 . . . Petitioners’ own study from which the $17.26 figure is derived clearly confirms EPA’s contention: the . . . $17.26 figure results from subtracting profits of operation of SSL recovery from the capitalized cost . . .

R. STIPP M. v. STATE, 355 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . In addition Sec. 17.26 of the ordinances of the City of Plantation makes it a violation of city ordinance . . .

M. S. v. WERMERS, N. R. J. T., 557 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1977)

. . . Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 17.26 (2d ed. 1974); 6 C. Wright & A. . . .

L. CRONE v. UNITED STATES, 538 F.2d 875 (Ct. Cl. 1976)

. . . Gentzsch, 355 F.Supp. 349, 350-53 (E.D.Pa.1972); 3A Moore, Federal Practice, fl 17.26, at 908 n.21 (2d . . .

VELMA L. CRONE, ET AL. v. THE UNITED STATES, 210 Ct. Cl. 499 (Ct. Cl. 1976)

. . . Pa. 1972) ; 3A Moore, Federal Practice, ¶17.26, at 908 n.21 (2d ed. 1974). . . .

FOE, v. D. VANDERHOOF,, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975)

. . . Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, H 1560, at 773 (1972); 3A Moore, Federal Practice, [[17.26 . . .

SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ, 411 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1973)

. . . following: the power of eminent domain to acquire land for the construction of school facilities, id., §§ 17.26 . . .

FAHRNER, a J. H. v. E. GENTZSCH V. PINEDA v. E. GENTZSCH v. PINEDA,, 355 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Pa. 1972)

. . . See 3A Moore, Federal Practice, ¶17.26, p. 908 (2d Ed.1970). Compare Berkowitz v. . . .

INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORPORATION, v. GENERAL TELEPHONE ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Haw. 1972)

. . . ITT F & F, 117; GTE F & F, 17.7, but cf. 17.26(b) and GTE Vol. III, Interrog. & Stips., ITT Ex. . . .

SLADE, v. LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY,, 418 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1969)

. . . See also 3A Moore, Federal Practice, (2d ed., 1969) ¶17.26. . . .

S. GARVEY, v. L. FREEMAN, W. F. H. E. Jr., 397 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1968)

. . . computations of a Garvey representative this resulted in a 1965 average normal yield for his farms of 17.26 . . .

MAGUIRE, v. UNITED STATES, 396 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968)

. . . See Orfield, Federal Criminal Rules, § 17.26; cf. Barber v. . . .

R. WILLIAMS v. PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION, 384 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1967)

. . . and the decision of the Area Arbitrator shall be final and conclusive except as otherwise provided in 17.26 . . . (Emphasis added.) ‘17.26 The Joint Coast Labor Relations Committee has jurisdiction to consider issues . . .

J. DiSTEFANO, A. v. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD CO., 258 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Pa. 1966)

. . . Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure, §§ 486, 488; 3 Moore, Federal Practice §§ 17.18, 17.19, 17.26 . . .

UNITED STATES v. ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, IN DICKENSON COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,, 254 F. Supp. 209 (W.D. Va. 1966)

. . . the left ascending side of Cane Branch and along the edge of the 581 acre “leasehold,” and comprise 17.26 . . .

TIDEWATER OIL COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES, 168 Ct. Cl. 457 (Ct. Cl. 1964)

. . . They showed the daily average production of well No. 3 was 17.26 barrels of oil and 342.74 barrels of . . .

ROBERTS v. OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,, 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958)

. . . controlled by Rule 17(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, Section 17.26 . . .

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, v. KNIGHT MORLEY CORPORATION,, 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957)

. . . Sections 17.26 and 17.36 to 17.39, Comp.Laws 1948, §§ 408.66, 408.77-408.80, respondent was required . . .

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY v. W. BENGTSON, W., 231 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1956)

. . . Supp. 417; Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d Ed., § 17.26, pages 1417, 1419. In C. J. Peck Oil Co. v. . . .

RUSSICK v. HICKS, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949)

. . . See also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d Ed., § 17.26, pages 1417-1422. . . .

ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RY. CO. v. HENWOOD SOUTHERN PAC. CO. v. SAME DAVIS v. SAME MEYER v. SAME, 157 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1946)

. . . of the total of all Texas & New Orleans interchange tonnage in 1929, to 14.26 percent in 1936, and 17.26 . . . Connection— 1929 1932 1935 1937 Percent Percent Percent Percent Debtor ................. 8.37 11.95 13.99 17.26 . . .

CREECH v. UNITED STATES THOMAS v. SAME SHORE ACRES PLANTATION, v. SAME, 60 F. Supp. 885 (Ct. Cl. 1944)

. . . existing facts and data; in this it succeeded, and the calm water level did not rise above elevation 17.26 . . . their claim on the fact that the maximum calm water lake elevation at the time of the damage was 17 or 17.26 . . .

ROBERT Y. CREECH v. UNITED STATES C. A. THOMAS AND INMAN W. WEEKS, AS ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES E. THOMAS, DECEASED, v. UNITED STATES SHORE ACRES PLANTATION, INC. A FLORIDA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES, 102 Ct. Cl. 301 (Ct. Cl. 1944)

HELVERING, v. JARVIS, 123 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1941)

. . . extent of such earnings, that is, 82.74 per cent of the distribution was taxable, while the residue, 17.26 . . .

PROPRIETORS OF SOCIAL LAW LIBRARY v. UNITED STATES, 21 F. Supp. 462 (D. Mass. 1937)

. . . plaintiff the sum of $200 as a so-called capital stock tax for the year ending June 30, 1934, and $17.26 . . .