Cases from cite.case.law:

A. CRAPO, v. GAINESVILLE AREA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INC. a, 274 So. 3d 453 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . . § 194.171, Fla. Stat. . . . . §§ 194.036(2), 194.171, Fla. Stat. . . .

SOWELL, v. FAITH CHRISTIAN FAMILY CHURCH OF PANAMA CITY BEACH, INC., 249 So. 3d 1323 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . subject matter jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the 2015 and 2016 years pursuant to section 194.171 . . . Section 194.171 provides in relevant part: (5) No action to contest a tax assessment may be maintained . . . As the Florida Supreme Court has observed: Although subsections 194.171(5) and (6) appear to be somewhat . . . Subsection 194.171(5) plainly states that a taxpayer may not maintain a suit contesting a tax assessment . . . Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes, requires a taxpayer to contest a tax assessment within "60 days . . .

GENESIS MINISTRIES, INC. a v. S. BROWN, M., 250 So. 3d 865 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . failed to file suit within 60 days after the certification of the tax rolls as required under section 194.171 . . . We held that the 60-day period in section 194.171(2) does not apply to actions challenging a tax lien . . .

STATE v. M. CHANTILOUPE,, 248 So. 3d 1191 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See, e.g. , § 194.171(2), Fla. Stat. (2017). . . .

A. CRAPO, v. PROVIDENT GROUP- CONTINUUM PROPERTIES, L. L. C. a, 238 So. 3d 869 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . trustee, has standing to contest the tax assessment and is not barred by the time limit of section 194.171 . . .

J. GARCIA, v. DADELAND STATION ASSOCIATES, LTD., 218 So. 3d 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Dadeland Station paid the taxes under protest and filed a suit to recover the payment under section 194.171 . . .

CITY OF MIAMI, v. NW STREET, LLC,, 217 So. 3d 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . The City argues that the sixty-day non-claim provision of section 194.171(2) bars the action below and . . . Section 194.171(2) provides: No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from . . . Section 194.171(6) provides that the “requirements of subseetion[ ] (2) ... are jurisdictional” and that . . . While we are doubtful that section 194.171(2) applies to the instant case, we need not decide that issue . . . Even if section 194.171(2) does apply, the City’s position is nevertheless unavailing, because the City . . .

S. MILES, v. PARRISH,, 199 So. 3d 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . jurisdiction, ruling that it had been filed beyond the sixty-day statute of non-claim under section 194.171 . . . Appraiser sent the notice on February 20 — well beyond the sixty-day statute of nonclaim under section 194.171 . . . period: the certification of the assessment pursuant to section 193.122(2). § 194.171(2). . . . There, the court stated: Section 194.171(2), by its clear and unambiguous terms, applies only to actions . . . Accordingly, if section 194.171(2)-was construed to apply to tax liens, the only opportunity a property . . .

FOREST BROOKE HILLSBOROUGH, LLC, a v. HENRIQUEZ,, 194 So. 3d 1091 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . the court had jurisdiction when the action was filed, it subsequently lost jurisdiction under section 194.171 . . . Brooke argues, among other things, that the trial court departed from the plain meaning of section 194.171 . . . See § 194.171(8). . . . There is no mistaking the clear language of section 194.171(5): a taxpayer may not maintain an action . . . See Marshall, 494 So.2d at 507 (recognizing that the legislative objective of section 194.171 is “the . . .

AMERICAN HERITAGE WINDOW FASHIONS, LLC, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 191 So. 3d 516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, 527 So.2d 814, 816 (Fla.1988) (holding that analogous language in section 194.171 . . .

GENESIS MINISTRIES, INC. v. S. BROWN, As As As, 186 So. 3d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Genesis argues that the trial court erred in finding that its challenge was barred by section 194.171 . . . Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, 527 So.2d 814, 816 (Fla.1988); see also § 194.171(6), Fla. Stat. . . . However, we have previously held that the 60— day period in section 194.171(2) does not begin to run . . . Section 194.171 does not refer to section 196.0ll(9)(a) nor does it mention tax liens. . . . The Court rejected this “semantic argument” and -held that taxpayers are bound by section 194.171(2) . . .

CITY OF MIAMI, v. NW STREET, LLC,, 184 So. 3d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . On the City of Miami’s acknowledgement that the application of section 194.171 of the Florida Statutes . . . address the trial court’s factual or legal determinations as to the applicability of either section 194.171 . . .

R. NIKOLITS, v. B. NEFF, a k a B. a k a B., 184 So. 3d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2012), is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim that precludes . . . any challenge to the 2012 just value assessment of the former homestead was time barred by section 194.171 . . . moved for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that Neffs action was time barred by section 194.171 . . . Section 194.171(2) is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim. See § 194.171(6), Fla. . . . The strict jurisdictional time limit of section 194.171(2) cannot be circumvented by embedding a challenge . . .

MILAN INVESTMENT GROUP, INC. v. CITY OF MIAMI,, 172 So. 3d 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . inter alia, that its claims were barred by: (1) the sixty-day non-claim statute pursuant to section 194.171 . . .

PROVIDENT GROUP- CONTINUUM PROPERTIES, L. L. C. a v. Ed CRAPO,, 157 So. 3d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction under section 194.171(2), . . . Department of Management Services, 944 So.2d 306 (Fla.2006) (the 60-day jurisdictional time limit in section 194.171 . . . trustee, has standing to contest the tax assessment and is not barred by the time limit of section 194.171 . . .

In READ, v., 692 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 194.171(2) (2009). . . . Section 194.171(2), Fla. . . . Section 194.171(6), Fla. . . .

In READ, v., 692 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 194.171(2) (2009). . . . Section 194.171(2), Fla. . . . Section 194.171(6), Fla. . . .

R. NIKOLITS, v. HANNA,, 92 So. 3d 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . and II of the third amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to subsections 194.171 . . . They argue that because they do not pose a challenge to a tax assessment, the provisions of section 194.171 . . . It does not matter whether the challenge is brought under section 196.151 or 194.171. See Ward v. . . . rejecting taxpayers’ semantic argument that they were not subject to sixty-day time limit of section 194.171 . . . Pursuant to the clear language of subsections 194.171(5) & (6), the petition is granted. . . .

WILKINSON, n k a v. L. CLARKE,, 91 So. 3d 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . 2011, deadline and, consequently, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to section 194.171 . . . Section 194.171(5) provides in full: “No action to contest a tax assessment may be maintained, and any . . . Therefore, once taxes become delinquent, dismissal is required pursuant to section 194.171. . . . Once the Trustee’s taxes became delinquent on April 1, 2011, section 194.171 divested the trial court . . .

ARIOLA, LLC, v. JONES,, 71 So. 3d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Indeed, tax liens could not have been placed on any of the property since section 194.171, Florida Statutes . . .

MITCHELL, v. HIGGS,, 61 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . This is so because a taxpayer is barred by sections 194.171(2) and (6), Florida Statutes (2010), from . . .

SOUTH POINTE FAMILY CHILDREN CENTER, INC. a v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY,, 57 So. 3d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Also, South Pointe claimed it was exempt from the jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171, Florida . . . Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2007), states (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment . . . received final action by the value adjustment board prior to extension of the roll under s. 197.323. § 194.171 . . . (5) and 194.171(6), Florida Statutes. . . . (5), 194.171(6), Fla. . . .

D. BENNETT, v. WELLS,, 55 So. 3d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Bennett filed his lawsuit pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (2008), challenging the denial . . . Section 194.171 governs suits against the property appraiser contesting tax assessments and provides . . . collection or within sixty days from the date a decision is rendered by the VAB as to such assessment. § 194.171 . . . The court expressly granted the property appraiser’s motion based upon section 194.171 but denied it . . . jurisdiction in such cases until after the requirements of both subsections (2) and (8) [of section 194.171 . . .

WILLENS, v. J. GARCIA,, 53 So. 3d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 194.171(1), Fla. Stat. (2008); Deluccio v. Havill, 25 So.3d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). . . .

In READ,, 442 B.R. 839 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . . § 194.171(2) (2009). . . . . Stat. § 194.171(2). . Fla. Stat. § 194.171(1). . . .

DE LA MORA, v. ANDONIE,, 51 So. 3d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 194.171(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .

MILAN INVESTMENT GROUP, INC. v. CITY OF MIAMI,, 50 So. 3d 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . In doing so, we confirm the applicability of the non-claim statute, § 194.171, to that challenge. . . . imposition of the special DDA levy also required compli-anee with the non-claim statute, section § 194.171 . . .

AULET, v. M. CASTRO f k a M., 44 So. 3d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Further, subsection (2) of section 194.171 sets forth a sixty-day limit for challenging tax assessments . . .

TARPON SPRINGS HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, INC. d b a A. R. N. P. C. N. M. v. ANDERSON J. a H. M. D. M. D. A. M. D. M. D., 34 So. 3d 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . 944 So.2d 306, 308 (Fla.2006), the supreme court interpreted the term “taxpayer” as used in section 194.171 . . . Because section 194.171 did not define “taxpayer,” the supreme court looked at the definition of “taxpayer . . .

DELUCCIO, B. L. Jr. M. D. E. v. Ed HAVILL, a a De La a a Jr. a a a, 25 So. 3d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . erroneously concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction when appellants did not comply with section 194.171 . . .

BRUNER S. E. C. v. HARTSFIELD, a L. a M. a a, 23 So. 3d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . had subject matter jurisdiction despite appellants/cross-appellees’ failure to comply with section 194.171 . . .

VILLAGE OF DORAL PLACE ASSOCIATION, INC. v. REAL, INC. W., 22 So. 3d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 194.171(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . . The County argues, and the trial court agreed, that the Association’s action is barred by subsection 194.171 . . . The claim is not barred by subsection 194.171(2). . . . assessment of the property which was time-barred under the sixty-day limit established by subsection 194.171 . . .

K. LANNING A. C. v. P. PILCHER, a a a a, 16 So. 3d 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . contend that the trial-court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, because section 194.171 . . . There we held that the sixty-day time period in section 194.171 applies only to an action to contest . . . Section 194.171, Florida Statutes states in material part: 194.171 Circuit court to have original jurisdiction . . . the assessment made on any particular property in Florida, and so the sixty-day provision in section 194.171 . . . the trial court had properly dismissed the case for failure to file within sixty days under section 194.171 . . .

J. SHANK v. Ed HAVILL,, 6 So. 3d 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . court found that the Shanks had failed to comply with the conditions precedent set forth in section 194.171 . . . Section 194.171(6) provides that the requirements of subsections (2), (3), and (5) are jurisdictional . . . We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of section 194.171. . . . Section 194.171(6) provides that no court shall have jurisdiction in a case challenging a property tax . . . day of the sixty-day time period, and otherwise complied with the requirements set forth in section 194.171 . . .

CROSSINGS AT FLEMING ISLAND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT, v. ECHEVERRI,, 991 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2008)

. . . before the board of tax adjustment would not preclude an action in the circuit court pursuant to section 194.171 . . . subsection 194.032(6) provided that a taxpayer could file an action in the circuit court pursuant to section 194.171 . . . 194.036(2) provides that a taxpayer could bring an action to contest a tax assessment pursuant to section 194.171 . . . aggrieved taxpayer from contesting [in circuit court] his or her assessment in the manner provided by s. 194.171 . . .

BELDEN, v. TAMPA WESTSHORE ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a, 982 So. 2d 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 194.171(3), Fla. Stat. (2002-2005). . . .

L. BLACK, Jr. v. JACOBS,, 974 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 194.171(2), (6), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

Ed CRAPO, v. HCA, INC. a, 968 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . See § 194.171(1), Fla. . . .

TAYLOR, v. CITY OF LAKE WORTH,, 964 So. 2d 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . complaint was not attached to the motion to amend and that the sixty-day filing period specified in section 194.171 . . . Second, subsection (2) of 194.171, Florida Statutes, provides that “[n]o action shall be brought to contest . . .

ALVAREZ, N. A. v. WHISPERING OAKS HOUSING PARTNERS, II, LTD., 963 So. 2d 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Alvarez moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely under the provisions of section 194.171(2), Florida . . .

O. MILLER, v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER,, 959 So. 2d 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . See §§ 194.171(5), (6), Fla. Stat. (2003); Bystrom v. Diaz, 514 So.2d 1072, 1075 (Fla.1987). . . .

P. CASON, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES,, 944 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2006)

. . . on the application of section 194.171 to actions filed by the State. . . . Section 194.171(2) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought” beyond the sixty-day period. . . . “Taxpayer” is not defined in section 194.171 or elsewhere in chapter 194. . . . In short, a “taxpayer” under section 194.171 is a taxable entity. . . . Rather, we simply determine that sections 194.171(2) and 194.171(6) do not deprive the trial court of . . .

HIDDEN BAY MASTER ASSOCIATION, INC. v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PROPERTY APPRAISAL, MTAG LLC, V LLC,, 938 So. 2d 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . to dismiss and for summary judgment, on the ground that the sixty-day statute of non-claim, section 194.171 . . . Hidden Bay contends that its claims are not governed by section 194.171 because the Property Appraiser . . . In Ward, the Florida Supreme Court held that “the mandatory sixty-day provision of section 194.171(1) . . . The Ward court, guided by legislative intent and public policy, held that section 194.171 was adopted . . . Section 194.171, Florida Statutes, states, in relevant part: (2) No action shall be brought to contest . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, v. P. CASON, COLUMBIA COUNTY, W. a k a W. a k a O., 909 So. 2d 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . the property within 60 days from the date of its certification for collection, as required by section 194.171 . . . failure to challenge the assessments on the property within the limitation period required by section 194.171 . . . issue before us in that the lower court’s decision turned primarily upon an interpretation of section 194.171 . . . Nor do we find any provision in section 194.171, or elsewhere, reasonably implying that the nonclaim . . . This section, as section 194.171, is placed under Part II of chapter 194, Florida Statutes, pertaining . . .

In CABLE WIRELESS USA, INC., 331 B.R. 568 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005)

. . . proof of claim and highlights the dilemma of the estate, where the response states that under section 194.171 . . .

HIGGS, Co. v. ARMADA KEY WEST LTD. PARTNERSHIP,, 903 So. 2d 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Section 194.171 of the Florida Statutes confers jurisdiction on the circuit courts to hear ad valorem . . . Section 194.171 also makes clear that jurisdiction to entertain an assessment contest is conditioned . . . Friedman, 625 So.2d 83, 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (“[i]t is now settled beyond any doubt that [section 194.171 . . . Although section 194.171 suspends these deadlines while an assessment is being contested, it does so . . . Wright, 687 So.2d 1374, 1374-75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (emphasis added); § 194.171(5), (6), Fla. . . .

In FLORIDA FURNITURE INDUSTRIES, INC. a a v. CFC, W. L. Jr. CFA,, 342 B.R. 838 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005)

. . . with the statutory conditions precedent for challenging an excessive assessment pursuant to Section 194.171 . . .

H. W. SUBER, v. E. PULTZ,, 889 So. 2d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . dismiss the complaint on the ground that the taxpayer failed to comply with the requirements of section 194.171 . . . The taxpayers contended that section 194.171 did not apply to them because they were challenging the . . . Like the taxpayers in Ward, Pultz did not comply with the requirements of section 194.171. . . . In this case, the taxpayer did not comply with section 194.171(3), which requires the taxpayer to pay . . . Section 194.171(6) expressly states that “[t]he requirements of subsections (2), (3) ... are jurisdictional . . .

TODORA, v. SILVERSTEIN,, 889 So. 2d 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . jurisdiction because the action had not been filed within the sixty-day window provided by section 194.171 . . . The supreme court recently disapproved our Pepperidge Farm decision and held that section 194.171(2) . . .

WARD, v. BROWN,, 894 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2004)

. . . We hold that the mandatory sixty-day provision of section 194.171(1), Florida Statutes, applies broadly . . . Leesburg Regional Medical Center, 651 So.2d 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (rejecting argument that 194.171 . . . In a petition for review in this Court the petitioners contend that section 194.171(2) does not apply . . . to their action. § 194.171(2), Fla. . . . Stat. (2001) This Court has held that the sixty-day filing period in section 194.171 is jurisdictional . . .

A. ZINGALE, v. O. POWELL,, 885 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 2004)

. . . Statutes (2001), assure sufficient notice to property appraisers, and the sixty-day deadline in section 194.171 . . .

A. THOMAS S. v. SMITH,, 882 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . 2000, and 2001, the refunds sought by the Taxpayers were barred by the nonclaim statute in section 194.171 . . . the Taxpayers’ claims for relief for those years are barred by the statute of non-claim in section 194.171 . . .

A. HIGGS, v. P. KLOCK, Jr. A., 873 So. 2d 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . matter jurisdiction because the taxpayer did not pay the 2000 and 2001 taxes as required by section 194.171 . . .

Ed A. CRAPO, v. CITY OF GAINESVILLE,, 855 So. 2d 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . because the complaint had not been filed within the 60 day statute of nonclaim set forth in section 194.171 . . . appraiser’s tax classification of the property at issue, rather than to a tax assessment, and that section 194.171 . . .

LEE, v. HARTSFIELD F., 848 So. 2d 430 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Patricia Lee appeal a final summary judgment in which the trial court ruled that, pursuant to section 194.171 . . . See § 194.171(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). As the court explained in Department of Revenue v. . . . , capricious, arbitrary and illegal,” the action is cognizable only under the strictures of section 194.171 . . . made in violation of section 193.155 is an action to contest an assessment and is governed by section 194.171 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, G. a v. PEPPERIDGE FARM, INC. a, 847 So. 2d 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Pep-peridge Farm’s complaint was a challenge to the assessment of property which, under subsection 194.171 . . . See § 194.171(6). . . . determination that Pepperidge Farm’s lawsuit was not one barred by the sixty-day time limit in section 194.171 . . .

TODORA, v. VENICE GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., 847 So. 2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . alleged that VGA had failed to file its complaint within the sixty-day period prescribed by section 194.171 . . .

PAGE, v. F. McMULLAN M., 849 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . other things, that the challenge to the 2001 assessment was not timely filed in accordance with section 194.171 . . . This same rule of law should apply in the instant matter, which involves section 194.171(2), a statute . . . involves reclassification of property, and therefore they are not bound by the time limit of section 194.171 . . .

WARD, E. Jr. v. S. BROWN, G., 892 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . certain members of the proposed class were time barred from bringing an action pursuant to section 194.171 . . . Appellants argue they were not subject to the 60 day time limits contained in section 194.171, Florida . . . Denial of exemptions are “assessments” subject to the requirements of section 194.171, Florida Statutes . . . Leesburg Regional Medical Center, 651 So.2d 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (rejecting argument that 194.171 . . . There, respondents failed to file action in court within sixty days, as mandated by section 194.171(2 . . .

PRIMECO PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS, L. P. a d b a v. MASTROIANNI, ARC IV, LLC, a v., 837 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Friedman, 625 So.2d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); § 194.171(6), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . defendant taxpayers moved to dismiss, contending that the claims were time barred pursuant to section 194.171 . . . Petitioners argue that section 194.171(2) should be given its plain meaning because it provides that . . . They also note that section 194.171(2) is the more recent expression of the Florida Legislature, having . . . Read in pari materia, 194.171(2) has no bearing on appeals by the property appraiser to the circuit court . . .

TODORA, v. VENICE GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB INC., 826 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . assessment of its property for the years 1999 and 2000, Venice Golf filed suit pursuant to section 194.171 . . .

TURNER, v. CONCORDE PROPERTIES, a, 823 So. 2d 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . exemption for the tax years 1997 and 1998, and Concorde filed suit in circuit court pursuant to section 194.171 . . .

FUCHS, v. W. ROBBINS, v. W. v., 818 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 2002)

. . . final judicial decision to file an action to contest such altered or changed assessment pursuant to s. 194.171 . . . (1), and the provisions of s. 194.171(2) shall not bar such action. (2) Any taxpayer may bring an action . . . to contest a tax assessment pursuant to s. 194.171. (3) The circuit court proceeding shall be de novo . . .

BARRETT TOOL RENTAL, INC. v. METROPOLITAN MIAMI DADE,, 802 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1999); Markham v. . . . Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, 527 So.2d 814 (Fla.1988) (holding that section 194.171(2) is a jurisdictional . . . As it is clear the court lacked jurisdiction under subsection 194.171(2), we need not address whether . . . the court was correct in ruling thal subsection 194.171(5) also operated to deprive the courL of jurisdiction . . .

PREWITT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, v. R. NIKOLITS,, 795 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 194.171, Fla. Stat. (1997); Nikolits v. . . . Delaney, 719 So.2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(subsection 194.171(2)’s time limit provides for subject matter . . .

FLORIDA GOVERNMENTAL UTILITY AUTHORITY, v. DAY,, 784 So. 2d 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . Heffner and Day filed motions for summary judgment, alleging the complaint was untimely based on section 194.171 . . . jurisdictional, and no court has jurisdiction in tax cases until subsections (1) and (2) are met. § 194.171 . . . A classification claim is not governed under section 194.171; a claim challenging a tax assessment is . . . ad valorem tax assessment as excessive, untimely where not filed within sixty-day period of section 194.171 . . . It is therefore not subject to the sixty-day period of section 194.171(2). Sartori; Sohn. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, v. EASTERN AMERICAN TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION,, 762 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Adjustment Board to contest the assessment of ad valorem taxes within sixty days, as mandated by section 194.171 . . . Further, respondents are also barred by section 194.171 by their failure to contest the yearly assessments . . . Section 194.171, Florida Statutes, provides: (1) The circuit courts have original jurisdiction at law . . .

REINISH v. K. CLARK, L. H., 765 So. 2d 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . defendants argued 1). that the Reinishes could not circumvent the jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171 . . . days from the date the assessment was certified for collection in any of the tax years in question. § 194.171 . . . On that basis, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. § 194.171(6), . . .

ALLEN, v. A. BUTTERWORTH, v. A. v., 756 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2000)

. . . The circuit court also concluded that section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1975), which provided a sixty-day . . . The Court stated that the sixty-day limit set forth in section 194.171(2) “constitutes a statute of limitations . . .

GILREATH, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,, 751 So. 2d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Case No. 92-10367 was thereafter commenced in accordance with Section 194.171, Florida Statutes. E. . . .

PALM BEACH GARDENS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC. a v. NIKOLITS, K. H., 754 So. 2d 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . Appellees answered asserting the affirmative defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction under section 194.171 . . . Appellees thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that under section 194.171, Florida . . . that it had petitioned the value adjustment board contesting the assessment in compliance with section 194.171 . . . Section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1997), provides in pertinent part: (1) The circuit courts have original . . . See § 194.171(2) Fla. . . .

BANKUNITED FINANCIAL CORP. T D v. MARKHAM s, 763 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . rolls and was not filed within sixty days of the certification of the tax rolls as required by section 194.171 . . . The revenue collector filed an answer also raising the jurisdictional bar of section 194.171. . . . judgment as one challenging the property assessment and therefore argue it is untimely pursuant to section 194.171 . . . Thus, correction of these types of errors is not limited by section 194.171. . . . alleging an error in classification in property which would change its value was not governed by section 194.171 . . .

WAL- MART STORES, INC. v. M. DAY,, 742 So. 2d 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . 1997 tax assessment of property in two stores located in Osceola County was untimely under section 194.171 . . . Section 194.171 provides a 60-day time period in which to file ad valorem eases. . . . Section 194.171 is a jurisdictional non-claim statute. . . . Thus, Walker recognized the interrelationship of sections 197.323, 193.122, and 194.171(2). . . . That case involved the 1981 version of section 193.122 and section 194.171. . . .

R. NIKOLITS, K. H. v. S. BALLINGER, A. THE WYNNE, 736 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1997) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought to contest a . . . Section 194.171(6) states that the requirements of subsection (2) are “jurisdictional.” . . . 646 So.2d 803, 805 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), this court observed that the 60 day requirement of subsection 194.171 . . . 1997 tax assessment, or whether it was part of the 1996 “tax assessment” within the meaning of section 194.171 . . . to contest the denial, so long as the taxpayer fulfills the jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171 . . .

In NANA S PETROLEUM, INC. s v. K. CFC, R., 234 B.R. 838 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999)

. . . Furthermore, DOR asserts that by failing to comply with § 194.171, Florida Statutes, which requires timely . . .

L. MOORE, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY, a P. A. P. A. P. A. v. a, 731 So. 2d 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . unlawful taxation claims, because the Moore appellants failed to timely contest taxes pursuant to section 194.171 . . .

NIKOLITS, v. H. DELANEY M. K. H., 719 So. 2d 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . section 193.155, Florida Statutes (1997), is an action to contest a tax assessment governed by section 194.171 . . . Since respondents’ action was filed beyond the sixty-day time limit prescribed by subsection 194.171( . . .

SARTORI d b a v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 714 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . moved to dismiss Sartori’s complaint arguing it was not timely filed because, pursuant to subsection 194.171 . . . Section 194.171 provides, in relevant part: 194.171 Circuit court to have original jurisdiction in tax . . . court concluded that Sartori’s lawsuit was untimely filed because this matter was governed by section 194.171 . . . Sartori argues that his declaratory judgment action was not subject to section 194.171’s sixty-day deadline . . . because, inter alia, the complaint was not filed within the sixty-day time period provided in section 194.171 . . .

In HOME AND HOUSING OF DADE COUNTY, INC. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, v. SONEET KAPILA,, 220 B.R. 492 (S.D. Fla. 1998)

. . . However, the time limit to contest a tax assessment, set forth in Section 194.171(2), Fla.Stat., is not . . .

PALM BAY TOWERS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. v. W. ROBBINS,, 705 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . . § 194.171(2), (6), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . .

J. POGGE, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, STATE OF FLORIDA,, 703 So. 2d 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . The Department analogizes to section 194.171, Florida Statutes. In Markham v. . . . could not exercise jurisdiction over an ad valorem tax case because the 60-day time period in section 194.171 . . . The Department’s attempted analogy to section 194.171 fails because that statute expressly includes refund . . .

In PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS OF FLORIDA INC. d b a, 217 B.R. 645 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997)

. . . Florida Statutes § 194.171 provides for a judicial review of the determination by the Board as to the . . . Stat. § 194.171(1). . . .

WASHINGTON SQUARE CORPORATION, a v. WRIGHT,, 687 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1995), provides: (3) Before an action to contest a tax assessment . . . In this regard, section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1995), provides: (5) No action to contest a tax assessment . . . assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection.” § 194.171 . . . could no longer be deemed payment of amounts “which the taxpayer in good faith admits to be owing.” § 194.171 . . . dismissal of Washington Square’s complaint challenging its assessment for the taxable year 1993. § 194.171 . . .

KEENAN, v. CITY OF EDGEWATER,, 684 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . . § 194.171(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . .

PALMER TRINITY PRIVATE SCHOOL, INC. v. W. ROBBINS,, 681 So. 2d 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . The circuit court held that pursuant to Florida Statute section 194.171(2) (1993), it did not have jurisdiction . . . Florida Statute section 194.171 (1988) provided that: (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax . . .

CITY OF FERNANDINA BEACH, v. PAGE, L. H., 682 So. 2d 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . had not been filed within 60 days of the rendering of the Board’s decision, as required by section 194.171 . . . strictly comply with the statutory notice procedures may toll the running of the 60-day period in section 194.171 . . . Rule 1.090(e) clearly does not apply to the computation of the time periods under section 194.171(2), . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, v. RAY CONSTRUCTION OF OKALOOSA COUNTY,, 667 So. 2d 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . In Chihocky, the pertinent statutory provision, section 194.171, barred any action to contest an assessment . . .

STATE Of DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, v. GERALD SOHN, P. A. a k a P. A., 654 So. 2d 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . more than a contest of a tax assessment, and that such an action was time barred pursuant to section 194.171 . . . unjust, capricious, arbitrary and illegal,” an action cognizable only under the strictures of section 194.171 . . . In maintaining that this action is also governed by the 60-day period provided in section 194.171(2), . . .

M. WILKINSON, v. KIRBY,, 654 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . Thereafter, the trust filed suit in circuit court pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1991 . . .

T. HALL, v. LEESBURG REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,, 651 So. 2d 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . They argue that LRMC’s action was barred by section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1987) because neither . . . LRMC, nor its predecessor owner of the property, brought a timely action within the limits of section 194.171 . . . Section 194.171 provides in pertinent part as follows: (1) The circuit courts have original jurisdiction . . . We find no merit in LRMC’s argument that section 194.171 applies only to actions contesting tax assessments . . . the complaint filed by LRMC was not filed within the jurisdictional time limit set forth in section 194.171 . . .

O. ZIPPERER, Jr. v. CITY OF FORT MYERS, a No. No. No. No. No. No. a, 41 F.3d 619 (11th Cir. 1995)

. . . Florida Statutes §§ 194.171-194.231 (1993) provide a scheme to contest the imposition of taxes. . . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE E. v. L. STAFFORD,, 646 So. 2d 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . prohibition because respondent FDIC did not comply with the jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171 . . . The sixty-day requirement of subsection 194.171(2) has been strictly enforced as a jurisdictional statute . . . Recognizing the clear and strict limitations of subsection 194.171(2), respondent FDIC has attempted . . . Section 194.171 is located in the chapter on administrative and judicial review of property taxes. . . . The jurisdictional limitations on challenges by a taxpayer to an assessment found in section 194.171 . . .

A. JOYNER v. ROBERTS,, 642 So. 2d 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . The trial court concluded that the sixty-day statutory filing period under section 194.171(2), Florida . . . Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1991) provides: (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax . . . Section 194.171(6), Florida Statutes (1991) specifies that the “requirements of subsection (2) ... are . . .

In PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,, 171 B.R. 415 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994)

. . . . § 194.171(2). . . . Section 194.171(2) of the Florida Statutes requires all actions contesting a tax assessment to be brought . . . Fla.Stat. § 194.171(6). . . .

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, v. CANAVERAL PORT AUTHORITY,, 642 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . CPA challenged the assessment by filing suit pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1991), against . . .

HORIZONS CONDOMINIUM MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, a v. SALVATO, 641 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . See § 194.171(2), Fla.Stat. . . .

J. DAVIS, v. MACEDONIA HOUSING AUTHORITY,, 641 So. 2d 131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . contest the board’s action, so long as the taxpayer fulfills the jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171 . . . Alternatively, the taxpayer may directly seek a judicial remedy under section 194.171, so long as the . . . tax roll had been certified for collection, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. § 194.171 . . . The court also concluded that section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes, did not allow a challenge to the . . . denial of an application for exemption is not contesting a tax assessment within the meaning of section 194.171 . . . legislative intent and public policy behind adoption of the nonelaim provision contained in sections 194.171 . . . contest the board’s action, so long as the taxpayer fulfills the jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171 . . . Alternatively, the taxpayer may directly seek a judicial remedy under section 194.171, so long as the . . .

E. SANTANA v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY,, 641 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . However, the cited portion of section 194.171 relates to a challenge to a tax assessment. . . . Metropolitan Dade County, 231 So.2d 197 (Fla.1970) (construing predecessor to § 194.171); Millstream . . .

A. CHIHOCKY, v. Ed CRAPO,, 632 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . the statutory notice provisions which trigger the running of the 60-day period contained in section 194.171 . . . Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the challenge was untimely under section 194.171 . . . Sections 194.171(2) and (6), Florida Statutes, state in pertinent part: (2) No action shall be brought . . . Section 194.171(2), however, states that no action shall be brought “after 60 days from the date the . . . legislative intent and public policy behind the adoption of the nonclaim provision contained in sections 194.171 . . .

SECTION PROPERTY CORP. v. W. ROBBINS,, 632 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1993)

. . . . § 194.171, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . . The mere fact that section 194.171 proclaims that the circuit courts have original jurisdiction at law . . .