The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXV
AVIATION

Chapter 330
REGULATION OF AIRCRAFT, PILOTS, AND AIRPORTS

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CHAPTER 330

REGULATION OF AIRCRAFT, PILOTS, AND AIRPORTS

330.04 Possession of pilot’s license; inspection on demand.

330.27 Definitions, when used in ss. 330.29-330.39.

330.29 Administration and enforcement; rules; requirements for airport sites and airports.

330.30 Approval of airport sites; registration and licensure of airports.

330.31 Federal-state joint hearings, reciprocal services.

330.325 Injunctive relief.

330.33 Penalties.

330.35 Airport zoning protection.

330.36 Prohibition against county or municipal licensing of airports; regulation of seaplane landings.

330.38 Construction of this law.

330.39 Short title.

330.40 Aircraft fuel tanks.

330.401 Diesel exhaust fluid safety mitigation and exclusion plan.

330.41 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act.

330.411 Prohibited possession or operation of unmanned aircraft.

330.04 Possession of pilot’s license; inspection on demand.—The pilot’s license required shall be kept in the personal possession of the licensee when he or she is operating aircraft within this state, and must be presented for inspection upon the demand of any passenger, any peace officer of this state, or any official, manager, or person in charge of any airport or landing field in this state upon which the licensee shall land.

History.—s. 4, ch. 14642, 1931; CGL 1936 Supp. 4109(4); s. 474, ch. 95-148.

330.27 Definitions, when used in ss. 330.29-330.39.—

(1) “Aircraft” means a powered or unpowered machine or device capable of atmospheric flight, except a parachute or other such device used primarily as safety equipment.

(2) “Airport” means an area of land or water used for, or intended to be used for, landing and takeoff of aircraft, including appurtenant areas, buildings, facilities, or rights-of-way necessary to facilitate such use or intended use.

(3) “Department” means the Department of Transportation.

(4) “Limited airport” means any airport limited exclusively to the specific conditions stated on the site approval order or license.

(5) “Private airport” means an airport, publicly or privately owned, which is not open or available for use by the public, but may be made available to others by invitation of the owner or manager.

(6) “Public airport” means an airport, publicly or privately owned, which is open for use by the public.

(7) “Temporary airport” means an airport at which flight operations are conducted under visual flight rules established by the Federal Aviation Administration and which is used for less than 30 consecutive days with no more than 10 operations per day.

(8) “Ultralight aircraft” means any aircraft meeting the criteria established by part 103 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.

History.—s. 1, ch. 24046, 1947; s. 24, ch. 57-1; s. 2, ch. 65-178; ss. 23, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 103, ch. 71-377; s. 2, ch. 73-326; s. 1, ch. 75-16; s. 1, ch. 77-273; s. 1, ch. 84-205; s. 12, ch. 95-146; s. 475, ch. 95-148; s. 22, ch. 2003-286; s. 6, ch. 2023-70.

330.29 Administration and enforcement; rules; requirements for airport sites and airports.—It is the duty of the department to:

(1) Administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter.

(2) Establish requirements for airport site approval, licensure, and registration.

(3) Establish and maintain a state aviation facility data system to facilitate licensing and registration of all airports.

(4) Adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement the provisions of this chapter.

History.—s. 3, ch. 24046, 1947; s. 11, ch. 25035, 1949; s. 2, ch. 65-178; ss. 10, 23, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 56, ch. 78-95; s. 2, ch. 84-205; s. 68, ch. 98-200; s. 23, ch. 2003-286.

330.30 Approval of airport sites; registration and licensure of airports.—

(1) SITE APPROVALS; REQUIREMENTS, EFFECTIVE PERIOD, REVOCATION.—

(a) Except as provided in subsection (3), the owner or lessee of a proposed airport shall, before site acquisition or construction or establishment of the proposed airport, obtain approval of the airport site from the department. Applications for approval of a site shall be made in a form and manner prescribed by the department. The department shall grant the site approval if it is satisfied:

1. That the site has adequate area allocated for the airport as proposed.

2. That the proposed airport will conform to licensing or registration requirements and will comply with the applicable local government land development regulations or zoning requirements.

3. That all affected airports, local governments, and property owners have been notified and any comments submitted by them have been given adequate consideration.

4. That safe air-traffic patterns can be established for the proposed airport with all existing airports and approved airport sites in its vicinity.

(b) Site approval shall be granted for a public airport only after a favorable department inspection of the proposed site.

(c) Site approval shall be granted for a private airport only after receipt of documentation in a form and manner the department deems necessary to satisfy the conditions in paragraph (a).

(d) Site approval shall be granted for a temporary airport only after receipt of documentation in a form and manner the department deems necessary to satisfy the conditions in paragraph (a). Such documentation must be included with the application for a temporary airport registration.

(e) For the purpose of granting site approval, the department may not require an applicant to provide a written memorandum of understanding or letter of agreement with other airport sites regarding air traffic pattern separation procedures unless such memorandum or letter is required by the Federal Aviation Administration or is deemed necessary by the department.

(f) Site approval may be granted subject to any reasonable conditions the department deems necessary to protect the public health, safety, or welfare.

(g) Approval as a public airport or a private airport shall remain valid for 2 years after the date of issue unless revoked by the department or unless a public airport license is issued or a private airport registration is completed pursuant to subsection (2) before the expiration date.

(h) The department may extend a public airport or private airport site approval for subsequent periods of 2 years per extension for good cause.

(i) The department may revoke an airport site approval if it determines:

1. That the site has been abandoned as an airport site;

2. That the site has not been developed as an airport within a reasonable time period or development does not comply with the conditions of the site approval;

3. That, except as required for in-flight emergencies, aircraft have operated on the site; or

4. That the site is no longer usable for aviation purposes due to physical or legal changes in conditions that were the subject of the approval granted.

(2) LICENSES AND REGISTRATIONS; REQUIREMENTS, RENEWAL, REVOCATION.—

(a) Except as provided in subsection (3), the owner or lessee of an airport in this state shall have a public airport license, private airport registration, or temporary airport registration before the operation of aircraft to or from the airport. Application for a license or registration shall be made in a form and manner prescribed by the department.

1. For a public airport, upon granting site approval, the department shall issue a license after a final airport inspection finds the airport to be in compliance with all requirements for the license. The license may be subject to any reasonable conditions the department deems necessary to protect the public health, safety, or welfare.

2. For a private airport, upon granting site approval, the department shall provide controlled electronic access to the state aviation facility data system to permit the applicant to complete the registration process. Registration shall be completed upon self-certification by the registrant of operational and configuration data deemed necessary by the department.

3. For a temporary airport, the department must publish notice of receipt of a completed registration application in the next available publication of the Florida Administrative Register and may not approve a registration application less than 14 days after the date of publication of the notice. The department must approve or deny a registration application within 30 days after receipt of a completed application and must issue the temporary airport registration concurrent with the airport site approval. A completed registration application that is not approved or denied within 30 days after the department receives the completed application is considered approved and shall be issued, subject to such reasonable conditions as are authorized by law. An applicant seeking to claim registration by default under this subparagraph must notify the agency clerk of the department, in writing, of the intent to rely upon the default registration provision of this subparagraph and may not take any action based upon the default registration until after receipt of such notice by the agency clerk.

(b) The department may license a public airport that does not meet standards only if it determines that such exception is justified by unusual circumstances or is in the interest of public convenience and does not endanger the public health, safety, or welfare. Such a license shall bear the designation “special” and shall state the conditions subject to which the license is granted.

(c) A temporary airport license or registration shall be valid for less than 30 days and is not renewable. The department may not approve a subsequent temporary airport registration application for the same general location if the purpose or effect is to evade otherwise applicable airport permitting or licensure requirements.

(d)1. Each public airport license shall expire no later than 1 year after the effective date of the license, except that the expiration date of a license may be adjusted to provide a maximum license period of 18 months to facilitate airport inspections, recognize seasonal airport operations, or improve administrative efficiency.

2. Registration for private airports shall remain valid provided specific elements of airport data, established by the department, are periodically recertified by the airport registrant. The ability to recertify private airport registration data shall be available at all times by electronic submittal. A private airport registration that has not been recertified in the 24-month period following the last certification shall expire, unless the registration period has been adjusted by the department for purposes of informing private airport owners of their registration responsibilities or promoting administrative efficiency. The expiration date of the current registration period will be clearly identifiable from the state aviation facility data system.

3. The effective date and expiration date shall be shown on public airport licenses. Upon receiving an application for renewal of an airport license in a form and manner prescribed by the department and receiving a favorable inspection report indicating compliance with all applicable requirements and conditions, the department shall renew the license, subject to any conditions deemed necessary to protect the public health, safety, or welfare.

4. The department may require a new site approval for any airport if the license or registration has expired.

5. If the renewal application for a public airport license has not been received by the department or no private airport registration recertification has been accomplished within 15 days after the date of expiration, the department may revoke the airport license or registration.

(e) The department may revoke, or refuse to allow or issue, any airport registration or recertification, or any license or license renewal, if it determines:

1. That the site has been abandoned as an airport;

2. That the airport does not comply with the conditions of the license, license renewal, or site approval;

3. That the airport has become either unsafe or unusable for flight operation due to physical or legal changes in conditions that were the subject of approval; or

4. That an airport required to file or update a security plan pursuant to paragraph (f) has failed to do so.

(f)1. After initial licensure, a license of a publicly or privately owned general aviation airport that is open to the public, that has at least one runway greater than 4,999 feet in length, and that does not host scheduled passenger-carrying commercial service operations regulated under 14 C.F.R. part 139 shall not be renewed or reissued unless an approved security plan has been filed with the department, except when the department determines that the airport is working in good faith toward completion and filing of the plan.

2. Security plans required by this paragraph must be developed in accordance with the 2004 Security Planning for General Aviation Airports guidelines published by the Florida Airports Council. Certain administrative data from the approved security plan shall be submitted to the Department of Law Enforcement, in a format prescribed by the Department of Law Enforcement, for use in protecting critical infrastructure of the state.

3. The department shall not approve a security plan for filing unless it is consistent with Florida Airports Council guidelines.

4. An airport required to file a security plan pursuant to this paragraph shall update its plan at least once every 2 years after the initial filing date and file the updated plan with the department. The department shall review the updated plan prior to approving it for filing to determine whether it is consistent with Florida Airports Council guidelines. No renewal license shall be issued to the airport unless the department approves the updated security plan or determines that the airport is working in good faith to update it.

(3) EXEMPTIONS.—The provisions of this section do not apply to:

(a) An airport owned or operated by the United States.

(b) An ultralight aircraft landing area located more than 5 nautical miles from a public or military airport, except any ultralight landing area with more than 10 ultralight aircraft operating at the site.

(c) A helistop used solely in conjunction with a construction project undertaken pursuant to the performance of a state contract if the purpose of the helicopter operations at the site is to expedite construction.

(d) A helistop used by mosquito control or emergency services, not to include areas where permanent facilities are installed, such as hospital landing sites.

(e) An airport used exclusively for aerial application or spraying of crops on a seasonal basis, not to include any licensed airport where permanent crop aerial application or spraying facilities are installed, if the period of operation does not exceed 30 days per calendar year and the frequency of operations does not exceed 10 operations per day. Such proposed airports, which will be located within 3 miles of existing airports or approved airport sites, shall establish safe air-traffic patterns with such existing airports or approved airport sites, by memoranda of understanding, or by letters of agreement between the parties representing the airports or sites.

(f) Any body of water used for the takeoff and landing of aircraft, including any land, building, structure, or any other contrivance that facilitates private use or intended private use.

(4) EXCEPTIONS.—Private airports with 10 or more based aircraft may request to be inspected and licensed by the department. Private airports licensed according to this subsection shall be considered private airports as defined in s. 330.27(5) in all other respects.

History.—s. 4, ch. 24046, 1947; s. 1, ch. 61-215; s. 2, ch. 65-178; ss. 23, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 3, ch. 76-168; s. 1, ch. 77-457; s. 56, ch. 78-95; ss. 2, 3, ch. 81-318; ss. 3, 9, 10, ch. 84-205; s. 24, ch. 86-243; s. 14, ch. 87-225; s. 4, ch. 91-429; s. 19, ch. 94-237; s. 15, ch. 95-257; s. 1, ch. 95-412; s. 1, ch. 98-17; s. 1, ch. 99-256; s. 9, ch. 2002-183; s. 24, ch. 2003-286; s. 1, ch. 2005-145; s. 7, ch. 2023-70.

330.31 Federal-state joint hearings, reciprocal services.—

(1) JOINT HEARINGS.—The department is authorized to confer with or to hold joint hearings with any agency of the United States in connection with any matter arising under ss. 330.27-330.39 or relating to the safe development of airports.

(2) RECIPROCAL SERVICES.—The department is authorized to avail itself of the cooperation, services, records, and facilities of the agencies of the United States as fully as may be practicable in the administration and enforcement of ss. 330.27-330.39. The department shall furnish to the agencies of the United States its cooperation, services, records, and facilities, insofar as may be practicable.

History.—s. 5, ch. 24046, 1947; s. 2, ch. 65-178; s. 23, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 4, ch. 84-205.

330.325 Injunctive relief.—The department may institute a civil action for injunctive relief in the appropriate circuit court to prevent the violation of any provision of this chapter.

History.—s. 5, ch. 84-205.

330.33 Penalties.—Any person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter or any of the rules or orders issued pursuant thereto is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

History.—s. 7, ch. 24046, 1947; s. 230, ch. 71-136; s. 5, ch. 84-205.

330.35 Airport zoning protection.—

(1) Nothing in ss. 330.29-330.39 shall be construed to limit any right, power, or authority of the state or a political subdivision to regulate airport hazards by zoning.

(2) Airports licensed for public use under the provisions of s. 330.30 are eligible for airport zoning protection, as prescribed in chapter 333.

(3) The department is granted all powers conferred upon political subdivisions of this state by chapter 333 to regulate airport hazards at state-owned public airports. The procedure shall be to form a joint zoning board with the political subdivision of the state in which the state-owned public airport is located as prescribed in chapter 333.

History.—s. 9, ch. 24046, 1947; s. 2, ch. 65-178; ss. 23, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 6, ch. 84-205; s. 14, ch. 85-81; s. 25, ch. 2003-286.

330.36 Prohibition against county or municipal licensing of airports; regulation of seaplane landings.—

(1) No county or municipality of this state shall license airports or control their location except by zoning requirements. The determination of suitable sites and standards of safety for airports shall be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted as prohibiting a county or municipality from issuing occupational licenses to operators of airports.

(2) Upon adoption of zoning requirements in compliance with subsection (1), a municipality may prohibit or otherwise regulate, for specified public health and safety purposes, the landing of seaplanes in and upon any public waters of the state which are located within the limits or jurisdiction of, or bordering on, the municipality.

History.—s. 10, ch. 24046, 1947; s. 7, ch. 84-205; s. 10, ch. 87-392; s. 16, ch. 95-257; s. 2, ch. 95-412; s. 26, ch. 2003-286.

330.38 Construction of this law.—Nothing in this chapter shall apply to, or confer on the department, jurisdiction or control over any county or municipal aviation authority or county or municipal port authority or any airport under the control of such an authority.

History.—s. 11a, ch. 24046, 1947; s. 2, ch. 65-178; ss. 23, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 8, ch. 84-205; s. 15, ch. 87-225.

330.39 Short title.—Sections 330.27-330.39 may be cited as the “State Airport Licensing Law.”

History.—s. 13, ch. 24046, 1947.

330.40 Aircraft fuel tanks.—In the interests of the public welfare, it is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or association to install, maintain, or possess any aircraft which has been equipped with, or had installed in its wings or fuselage, fuel tanks, bladders, drums, or other containers which will hold fuel if such fuel tanks, bladders, drums, or other containers do not conform to federal aviation regulations or have not been approved by the Federal Aviation Administration by inspection or special permit. This provision also includes any pipes, hoses, or auxiliary pumps which when present in the aircraft could be used to introduce fuel into the primary fuel system of the aircraft from such tanks, bladders, drums, or containers. Any person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

History.—s. 4, ch. 83-272; s. 15, ch. 85-81; s. 22, ch. 87-243; s. 1, ch. 93-258.

330.401 Diesel exhaust fluid safety mitigation and exclusion plan.—

(1)(a) Each public airport as defined in s. 330.27 at which:

1. Aviation fuels receive onsite treatment with fuel system icing inhibitors;

2. Aviation fuel is delivered by a publicly or privately owned fixed-base operator; and

3. Any aircraft fuel delivery vehicle or ground service equipment that uses diesel exhaust fluid is operated within 150 feet of any aircraft,

shall require a diesel exhaust fluid safety mitigation and exclusion plan for each fixed-base operator that performs onsite treatment of aviation fuel with a fuel system icing inhibitor.

(b) The plan must include, at a minimum:

1. A full inventory of all the fixed-base operator’s diesel exhaust fluid on the premises of the airport.

2. Designation of specific areas where the fixed-base operator’s diesel exhaust fluid may be stored on the premises of the airport. To the extent practicable, such areas may not be located within or on a vehicle operated for the fueling or servicing of aircraft or at any aviation fuel transfer facility or bulk aviation fuel storage facility.

3. Designation of specific areas where diesel exhaust fluid may be added to vehicles. Such areas may not be located in aircraft operating areas.

4. Incorporation of best practices for ensuring the proper labeling and storage of diesel exhaust fluid.

5. Incorporation of training in the proper use and storage of diesel exhaust fluid for all employees of the fixed-base operator who may come in contact with such fluid in the ordinary course of their duties.

6. Designation of specific areas where the fixed-base operator’s fuel system icing inhibitor may be stored on the premises of the airport.

7. Incorporation of best practices for ensuring the proper labeling and storage of the fixed-base operator’s fuel system icing inhibitor.

8. Incorporation of training in the proper use and storage of fuel system icing inhibitors for all employees of the fixed-base operator who may come in contact with fuel system icing inhibitors in the ordinary course of their duties.

9. Specification of physical security features for locking fuel system icing inhibitor fill points on the fixed-base operator’s aircraft fuel delivery vehicles. Such features must prevent the addition of any fluid other than icing inhibitors, and the specification must require that only properly trained and authorized individuals may access such features.

(2) Each public airport must, by January 1, 2022, make the diesel exhaust fluid safety mitigation and exclusion plan for each fixed-based operator available for review during inspections by the Department of Transportation.

(3) The Department of Transportation shall, by November 1, 2021, convene a workgroup of public airport representatives to develop uniform industry standards based upon the requirements of paragraph (1)(b) and NATA Operational Best Practice No. 36, DEF Handling and Contamination, to ensure consistency of industry standards.

(4) The Department of Transportation may adopt rules to develop a uniform industry standards form for the diesel exhaust fluid safety mitigation and exclusion plan based upon the recommendations provided by the workgroup pursuant to subsection (3).

History.—s. 1, ch. 2021-61.

330.41 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act.—

(1) SHORT TITLE.—This act may be cited as the “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act.”

(2) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this act, the term:

(a) “Critical infrastructure facility” means any of the following, if completely enclosed by a fence or other physical barrier that is obviously designed to exclude intruders, or if clearly marked with a sign or signs which indicate that entry is forbidden and which are posted on the property in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders:

1. A power generation or transmission facility, substation, switching station, or electrical control center.

2. A chemical or rubber manufacturing or storage facility.

3. A water intake structure, water treatment facility, wastewater treatment plant, or pump station.

4. A mining facility.

5. A natural gas or compressed gas compressor station, storage facility, or natural gas or compressed gas pipeline.

6. A liquid natural gas or propane gas terminal or storage facility.

7. Any portion of an aboveground oil or gas pipeline.

8. A refinery.

9. A gas processing plant, including a plant used in the processing, treatment, or fractionation of natural gas.

10. A wireless communications facility, including the tower, antennae, support structures, and all associated ground-based equipment.

11. A seaport as listed in s. 311.09(1), which need not be completely enclosed by a fence or other physical barrier and need not be marked with a sign or signs indicating that entry is forbidden.

12. An inland port or other facility or group of facilities serving as a point of intermodal transfer of freight in a specific area physically separated from a seaport.

13. An airport as defined in s. 330.27.

14. A spaceport territory as defined in s. 331.303(18).

15. A military installation as defined in 10 U.S.C. s. 2801(c)(4) and an armory as defined in s. 250.01.

16. A dam as defined in s. 373.403(1) or other structures, such as locks, floodgates, or dikes, which are designed to maintain or control the level of navigable waterways.

17. A state correctional institution as defined in s. 944.02 or a private correctional facility authorized under chapter 957.

18. A secure detention center or facility as defined in s. 985.03, or a nonsecure residential facility, a high-risk residential facility, or a maximum-risk residential facility as those terms are described in s. 985.03(44).

19. A county detention facility as defined in s. 951.23.

20. A critical infrastructure facility as defined in s. 692.201.

(b) “Drone” has the same meaning as s. 934.50(2).

(c) “Drone delivery service” means a person or entity engaged in a business or profession of delivering goods via drone and who is governed by Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

(d) “Drone port” means a stand-alone building that does not exceed 1,500 square feet in area or 36 feet in height; is located in a nonresidential area; is used or intended for use by a drone delivery service for the storage, launch, landing, and observation of drones; was constructed using Type I or Type II construction as described in the Florida Building Code; and, if greater than one story in height, includes at least one stairwell that is compliant with the Florida Building Code.

(e) “Unmanned aircraft system” means a drone and its associated elements, including communication links and the components used to control the drone which are required for the pilot in command to operate the drone safely and efficiently.

(3) REGULATION.—

(a) The authority to regulate the operation of unmanned aircraft systems is vested in the state except as provided in federal regulations, authorizations, or exemptions.

(b) Except as otherwise expressly provided, a political subdivision may not enact or enforce an ordinance or resolution relating to the design, manufacture, testing, maintenance, licensing, registration, certification, or operation of an unmanned aircraft system, including airspace, altitude, flight paths, equipment or technology requirements; the purpose of operations; and pilot, operator, or observer qualifications, training, and certification.

(c) Except as otherwise expressly provided, a political subdivision may not withhold issuance of a business tax receipt, development permit, or other use approval to a drone delivery service or enact or enforce an ordinance or resolution that prohibits a drone delivery service’s operation based on the location of its drone port, notwithstanding part II of chapter 163 and chapter 205. A political subdivision may enforce minimum setback and landscaping regulations that are generally applicable to permitted uses in the drone port site’s zoning district. This paragraph may not be construed to authorize a political subdivision to require additional landscaping as a condition of approval of a drone port.

(d) This subsection does not limit the authority of a local government to enact or enforce local ordinances relating to nuisances, voyeurism, harassment, reckless endangerment, property damage, or other illegal acts arising from the use of unmanned aircraft systems if such laws or ordinances are not specifically related to the use of an unmanned aircraft system for those illegal acts.

(4) PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES.—

(a) A person may not knowingly or willfully:

1. Operate a drone over a critical infrastructure facility;

2. Allow a drone to make contact with a critical infrastructure facility, including any person or object on the premises of or within the facility; or

3. Allow a drone to come within a distance of a critical infrastructure facility that is close enough to interfere with the operations of or cause a disturbance to the facility.

(b) A person who violates paragraph (a) commits a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. A person who commits a second or subsequent violation commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

1. A federal, state, or other governmental entity, or a person under contract or otherwise acting under the direction of a federal, state, or other governmental entity.

2. A law enforcement agency that is in compliance with s. 934.50, or a person under contract with or otherwise acting under the direction of such law enforcement agency.

3. An owner, operator, or occupant of the critical infrastructure facility, or a person who has prior written consent of such owner, operator, or occupant.

(d) This subsection and paragraph (2)(a) shall sunset 60 days after the date that a process pursuant to s. 2209 of the FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016 becomes effective.

(5) CONSTRUCTION.—This section shall be construed in accordance with standards imposed by federal statutes, regulations, and Federal Aviation Administration guidance on unmanned aircraft systems.

History.—s. 8, ch. 2017-150; s. 1, ch. 2019-113; s. 2, ch. 2021-165; s. 1, ch. 2023-137; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2023-147.

330.411 Prohibited possession or operation of unmanned aircraft.—A person may not possess or operate an unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system as defined in s. 330.41 with an attached weapon, firearm, explosive, destructive device, or ammunition as defined in s. 790.001.

History.—s. 9, ch. 2017-150.

F.S. 330 on Google Scholar

F.S. 330 on Casetext

Amendments to 330

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 330

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S330.04 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - FLY WO PILOTS LICENSE - M: S

S330.04 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - FAIL TO PRESENT PILOTS LICENSE UPON DEMAND - M: S

S330.30 1 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - FAIL TO OBT PRIOR APPR OF AIRPRT SITE FROM DEP - M: S

S330.30 2 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - FAILURE TO OBT LIC PRIOR TO OPER OF AIRCRAFT - M: S

S330.33 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - VIOLATE AIRCRAFT PILOT AIRPORT REGULATIONS - M: S

S330.40 - HEALTH-SAFETY - AIRCRAFT FUEL TANKS VIOLATION - F: T

S330.41 4a1 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - OPER DRONE OVER CRITICAL INFASTRUCTRE FACILITY - M: S

S330.41 4a1 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9045 - M: F

S330.41 4a1 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - OPER DRONE OVER CRIT INFASTRUCT FACIL 2ND SUB - M: F

S330.41 4a2 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - DRONE MAKE CONTACT W CRIT INFASTRUCT FACILITY - M: S

S330.41 4a2 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9046 - M: F

S330.41 4a2 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - DRONE MAKE CONTACT CRIT INFSTRCT FACIL 2ND SUB - M: F

S330.41 4a3 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - DRONE INTERF OPERATNS DISTURB CRIT INFAS FACIL - M: S

S330.41 4a3 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9047 - M: F

S330.41 4a3 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - DRON INTERF OPER DISB CRIT INFAS FACIL 2ND SUB - M: F

S330.41 4b - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - RENUMBERED. SEE REC #8698 - M: S

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

J. TRUMP, v. R. VANCE, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 2412 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Belmont , 301 U.S. 324, 330-331, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937). . . .

ESPINOZA, v. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Board of Ed. of Ewing , 330 U.S. 1, 16, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) ). . . . A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, reprinted in Everson , 330 U.S . . . Church & St. 427, 436 (1983); Everson , 330 U.S. at 12, 67 S.Ct. 504. . . . A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, reprinted in Everson , 330 U.S . . . Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted in Everson , 330 U.S. at 69, 67 S.Ct. 504. . . . Board of Ed. of Ewing , 330 U.S. 1, 16, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) (a State "cannot exclude individual . . . Board of Ed. of Ewing , 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) ; see also post , at 2282 - . . . Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, Art. 4, reprinted in Everson , 330 U.S. at 66 . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . App. 1050; see id ., at 194, 330-332, 1059. • The "standard protocol" when a patient experiences a complication . . .

SEILA LAW LLC, v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States , 167 U.S. 324, 330, 17 S.Ct. 880, 42 L.Ed. 185 (1897) ). . . .

C. LIU, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Exceptional Child Center, Inc. , 575 U.S. 320, 330, 135 S.Ct. 1378, 191 L.Ed.2d 471 (2015). . . .

KANSAS v. C. BOETTGER v., 140 S. Ct. 1956 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Taupier , 330 Conn. 149, 193 A.3d 1 (2018) ; Major v. State , 301 Ga. 147, 800 S.E.2d 348 (2017). . . . Taupier , 330 Conn., at 173, 193 A.3d, at 18-19. . . .

BOSTOCK, v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA v. Jr. Co- R. G. G. R. v., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Co. , 608 F.2d 327, 329-330 (CA9 1979) ; Medina v. Income Support Div., N. . . . Co. , 608 F.2d 327, 329-330 (CA9 1979) ; Blum v. . . .

ROGERS, v. GREWAL,, 140 S. Ct. 1865 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Rep. 330 (1686). . . .

J. THOLE, v. U. S. BANK N. A, 140 S. Ct. 1615 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Commissioner , 300 U.S. 5, 13, 57 S.Ct. 330, 81 L.Ed. 465 (1937). . . . See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) ; App. 60; see also n. 2, supra ; Blair , 300 U.S. at 13, 57 S.Ct. 330 ; Bogert . . .

NASRALLAH, v. P. BARR,, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Cyr , 533 U.S. 289, 328-330, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). . . .

GEORGIA, v. PUBLIC. RESOURCE. ORG, INC., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Code Revision Comm'n , 244 Ga. 325, 330, 260 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1979). . . . Harrison Co. , 244 Ga. at 330, 260 S.E.2d at 34 (emphasis added). . . . of the annotations is under Georgia law an act of "legislative authority," Harrison Co. , 244 Ga. at 330 . . . Sonotone Corp. , 442 U.S. 330, 341, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). . . . Code Revision Comm'n , 244 Ga. 325, 330, 260 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1979), does not resolve the federal Copyright . . .

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, v. A. CHRISTIAN,, 140 S. Ct. 1335 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Sonotone Corp. , 442 U.S. 330, 341, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). . . .

RAMOS, v. LOUISIANA, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Louisiana , 447 U.S. 323, 330-331, 100 S.Ct. 2214, 65 L.Ed.2d 159 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he . . .

KANSAS, v. GLOVER, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (U.S. 2020)

. . . White , 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). . . . Prouse , 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391 ; see White , 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412. . . .

VF JEANSWEAR LP v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 140 S. Ct. 1202 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Walton , 535 U.S. 212, 222, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002). . . .

K. KAHLER, v. KANSAS, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Massachusetts , 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) ). . . .

MCKINNEY, v. ARIZONA, 140 S. Ct. 702 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302, 329-330, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). . . .

SHAH, v. UNITED STATES., 140 S. Ct. 933 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 19-330 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

UNITED STATES, v. ROMERO, Jr., 935 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). . . . Id. at 111-12, 98 S.Ct. 330. . . . and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer." 434 U.S. at 112, 98 S.Ct. 330 . . . Mimms , 434 U.S. at 112, 98 S.Ct. 330. . . . July 11, 2019) (quoting Mimms , 434 U.S. at 112, 98 S.Ct. 330 ) (emphasis added). . . .

REYNA, v. P. BARR,, 935 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dec. 330, 333 (B.I.A. 1973) ). . . .

BIRD, v. i DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES DHS, R., 935 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Henderson , 330 F.3d 1243, 1246 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he Supreme Court's analysis of the continuing . . . time-barred acts, not-withstanding that those acts are related to timely-filed claims."); Cherosky , 330 . . . limitations period as long as those acts had been conducted pursuant to a discriminatory company policy. 330 . . . were undertaken pursuant to a discriminatory policy does not extend the statutory limitations period." 330 . . .

EDMO, v. CORIZON, INC. Al v. Al, 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . McIntosh , 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) )). . . .

GALDERMA LABORATORIES L. P. S. A. S. A. v. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., 390 F. Supp. 3d 582 (D. Del. 2019)

. . . asserted patent in Atofina claimed a method of synthesizing a composition at a narrow temperature range of 330 . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. JOHNSON,, 934 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Massachusetts , 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) ). . . .

STONE, v. TROY CONSTRUCTION, LLC, 935 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Nabors Drilling USA, Inc. , 330 F.3d 379, 391 (5th Cir. 2003) (declining to read that Circuit's precedent . . .

REGAN v. CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA,, 934 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Auth. , 550 U.S. 330, 338-39, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1793, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) ; Or. . . .

SENNE v. KANSAS CITY ROYALS BASEBALL CORP. LLC LLC LP St. LLC LLC LLC LLC L. P. L. P. LLC LLC L. P. AZPB L. P. P LLC LLC LP LLP LLC LLC,, 934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. of San Mateo Cty. , 3 Cal. 4th 459, 465, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 330, 834 P.2d 1148 (1992). . . . See Nedlloyd , 3 Cal. 4th at 465, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 330, 834 P.2d 1148. . . . i.e., New York) in the governmental law analysis under Nedlloyd , 3 Cal. 4th at 466, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 . . . See id. at 465, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 330, 834 P.2d 1148. . . .

LEWIS, v. CITY OF UNION CITY, GEORGIA,, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Monroe Cty. , 330 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hitt v. . . . that the Board's decision approved any improper motive that Barrett or Younger may have had"); Quinn , 330 . . .

UNITED STATES v. PAWLAK,, 935 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . App'x 330, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam), in which we rejected an outrageous-conduct defense in . . .

DEJORIA, v. MAGHREB PETROLEUM EXPLORATION, S. A., 935 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Turner , 303 F.3d at 330. . . .

GOLDEN v. NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY v., 934 F.3d 302 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Cty. of Middlesex , 379 N.J.Super. 205, 877 A.2d 330, 335 (App. . . .

IN RE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE S SUNDAY TICKET ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Jr. v. LLC LLC NFL LLC LLC LP LLC LLC NFL LP LLC LP LLC LP Co. LLC LP LLC, 933 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 330. . . .

HIGGS, v. UNITED STATES PARK POLICE,, 933 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . to other federal agencies and, based on their advice, it concluded that it might be able to release 330 . . .

DAWSON, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION PAC-, 932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Portland Terminal Co ., 330 U.S. 148, 150, 67 S.Ct. 639, 91 L.Ed. 809 (1947) ). . . . relevant in evaluating economic reality, including: (1) expectation of compensation, Portland Terminal , 330 . . . and evidence that an arrangement was "conceived or carried out" to evade the law, Portland Terminal , 330 . . .

SHIRLEY v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., 392 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (S.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . Id. at 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548. . . .

ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, v. HOSPIRA, INC. v. Dr. s Dr. s, 933 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Denmead , [56 U.S. 330, 15 How. 330, 14 L.Ed. 717 (1853) ] ... . . .

J. AVENA, v. CHAPPELL,, 932 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mississippi , 472 U.S. 320, 330-31, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) ("When we held that a defendant . . .

PARENT PROFESSIONAL ADVOCACY LEAGUE M. W. a F. D. S. S. a S. Y. v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS J., 934 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d 321, 330 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (addressing "systemic deficiencies"); L.M.P. ex rel. E.P. v. . . .

CHAVEZ, De E. De De De v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a, 933 F.3d 186 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Dole Food Co., Inc. , 133 Hawai'i 451, 330 P.3d 389 (Haw. Ct. App. 2014). . . .

LOCAL COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL- CIO v. CITY OF NEW YORK, 392 F. Supp. 3d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . See Noble v. 93 University Place Corp. , 224 F.R.D. 330, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (where "the gravamen of . . .

KORTRIGHT CAPITAL PARTNERS LP, TY v. INVESTCORP INVESTMENT ADVISERS LIMITED,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . See Kortright Capital Partners, 330 F.R.D. at 140. . . . Kortright Capital Partners, 330 F.R.D. at 136. . . . Kortright Capital Partners, 330 F.R.D. at 137. . . . Kortright Capital Partners, 330 F.R.D. at 139. . . . Kortright Capital Partners, 330 F.R.D. at 140. . . .

IN RE W. PASLEY, W. v. W., 603 B.R. 6 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Sicherman (In re Bonner ), 330 B.R. 880 (unpublished table decision), available at 2005 WL 2136204, at . . .

KODIAK OIL GAS USA INC. HRC LLC v. BURR S. EOG S., 932 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Plains Commerce Bank , 554 U.S. at 330, 128 S.Ct. 2709 (citations omitted) (first quoting Atkinson Trading . . .

FRYE, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., 933 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . McKay , 441 Mich. 96, 490 N.W.2d 330, 332 n.1 (1992) ("Imposition of a legal duty on a retailer on the . . .

BENAVIDEZ v. HOWARD,, 931 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . LaHue , 460 U.S. 325, 330-31, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). . . .

ORDUNO, v. PIETRZAK, v., 932 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hydrolevel Corp. , 456 U.S. 556, 565-66, 102 S.Ct. 1935, 72 L.Ed.2d 330 (1982). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BOSYK,, 933 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ante at 330. . . . Ante at 330. Again, I disagree. . . .

VIEIRA, v. MENTOR WORLDWIDE, LLC LLC LLC, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . Id. at 330, 128 S.Ct. 999 ; see also Stengel v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BUCHANAN,, 933 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Martinez , 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). . . .

FORCE, A. H. H. F. A. L. F. N. E. F, N. S. F. S. R. F. A. H. H. F. A. L. F. N. E. F. N. S. F. S. R. F. A. H. H. F. A. L. F. N. E. F, N. S. F. S. R. F. TZVI S. S. R. M. M. R. R. M. R. S. Z. R. S. S. R. M. M. R. R. M. R. S. Z. R. S. S. R. M. M. R. R. M. R. S. Z. R. v. FACEBOOK, INC., 934 F.3d 53 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . , Inc. , 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) ; Zeran , 129 F.3d at 330 ; see Klayman v. . . . Online, Inc. , 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) ); see ante , at 63. . . . Online , Inc. , 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) ). . . . (citation omitted); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Congress recognized the threat that tort-based . . .

J. GILLIAM, C. Ad v. SEALEY, E. C. T. A. Sr. C. T. A. WTVD LLC J. C. Ad v. C. T. A. E. C. T. A. Sr. WTVD LLC, 932 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . See J.A. 330 ("In light of plaintiffs' allegations that the defendants worked in concert to deny plaintiffs . . .

YEARWOOD, v. BARR,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . the petitioner the opportunity to exhaust his right to pursue a provisional unlawful presence waiver. 330 . . .

DILLON BOILER SERVICES, CO. INC. v. SOUNDVIEW VERMONT HOLDINGS, LLC,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 187 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Punchh, Inc. , 478 Mass. 324, 330, 85 N.E.3d 50 (2017). . . .

UNITED STATES v. DOE,, 932 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Sinclair , 1 F.3d 329, 330 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) ("A district court's ruling under Rule . . . See 1 F.3d at 330 (denying relief). . . .

LUGO, v. A. BERRYHILL,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002). . . .

HUPP R. H. a v. COOK C. R., 931 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Packaging Corp. of Am. , 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012) ). . . .

FACIANE, v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA,, 931 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Beckham , 138 F.3d 325, 330 (8th Cir. 1998) ; Daill v. . . . Health Care Plan , 426 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 2005). . . . Co. , 138 F.3d at 330 ; see also Rotella v. . . . Co. , 138 F.3d at 330-31 (same). Consequently, BMHD does not help Faciane's accrual argument. . . . Co. , 138 F.3d at 330-31. . . .

PLANNED PARENTHOOD SOUTHWEST OHIO REGION v. DEWINE, 931 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Found. , 330 F.3d 486, 493 (D.C. . . .

CARVAJAL VASQUEZ, v. GAMBA ACEVEDO,, 931 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lee , 329 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2003) ). . . .

DOE, v. TRUMP CORPORATION,, 385 F. Supp. 3d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Supp. 2d 317, 330-31 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("The 'direct relationship' standard under RICO is stricter than . . .

RODRIGUEZ v. CITY OF SAN JOSE, 930 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 330. . . .

KELLER, v. FLEMING,, 930 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (analyzing the reasonableness of a traffic . . .

DIAZ- QUIRAZCO, v. P. BARR,, 931 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Sonotone Corp. , 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) ("In construing a statute we . . .

MATSON, v. SANDERSON FARMS, INC., 388 F. Supp. 3d 853 (S.D. Tex. 2019)

. . . App'x 330, 334 (5th Cir. 2011) ("With an interference claim, an employee must show that he was denied . . . Marathon Cheese Corp. , 119 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1997) ("To establish pretext, a plaintiff cannot . . .

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, v. AMAZON. COM, INC., 390 F. Supp. 3d 964 (W.D. Wis. 2019)

. . . Gran-Aire, Inc. , 182 Wis. 2d 330, 513 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Wis. Ct. . . .

UNITED STATES v. MIXON,, 930 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Heavrin , 330 F.3d 723, 731 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding Hyde Amendment requires a single holistic analysis . . .

PRESQUE ISLE COLON AND RECTAL SURGERY, v. HIGHMARK HEALTH, f k a f k a, 391 F. Supp. 3d 485 (W.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Freed , No. 330 C.D. 2014, 2014 WL 10298875, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. . . .

TRUE HEALTH DIAGNOSTICS, LLC, v. M. AZAR, II,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 656 (E.D. Tex. 2019)

. . . Id. at 330, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . . Eldridge , 424 U.S. at 330-32, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . .

TRUE HEALTH DIAGNOSTICS, LLC, v. M. AZAR, II,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 666 (E.D. Tex. 2019)

. . . Id. at 330, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . . Eldridge , 424 U.S. at 330-32, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . .

IN RE A. STEWART, P., 603 B.R. 138 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2019)

. . . In re Coram Healthcare Corp. , 315 B.R. 321, 330 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004). . . .

IN RE LICKING RIVER MINING, LLC, v. LLC,, 603 B.R. 336 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2019)

. . . Eiseman (In re Forbes) , 372 B.R. 321, 330 (6th Cir. BAP 2007) (citations omitted). . . . App'x 879, 882 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Forbes , 372 B.R. at 330 ). . . . App'x at 882 (quoting Forbes , 372 B.R. at 330 ). . . .

IN RE HANNA, DMM s, v., 603 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019)

. . . Kirk (In re Kirk), 525 B.R. 325, 330 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2015) (footnote omitted). . . .

WONGUS, v. CORRECTIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM CERT CERT s, 389 F. Supp. 3d 294 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) ; Hudson v. . . .

ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY AFFILIATED PLANS, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 22 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Norton, 330 F.3d 478, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ). . . .

SAID, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . juror to conclude that "the plaintiff's conduct did not violate the letter of [CBA] Rule 24," id. at 330 . . . Supp. 3d at 330. . . .

G. BROWN, v. SERENITY C C, INC., 391 F. Supp. 3d 546 (E.D. Va. 2019)

. . . Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). . . .

CHACOTY, v. POMPEO, U. S., 392 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Walton , 535 U.S. 212, 221, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002). . . .

IN RE J. ELMS, D. W., 603 B.R. 11 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2019)

. . . . §§ 330(a), 503(b)(2), 507(a)(2), and 1322(a)(2). . . .

R. BRADLEY, v. VILLAGE OF UNIVERSITY PARK, ILLINOIS,, 929 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Schwartz , 330 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2003) (actions of the Illinois Secretary of State and the Director . . .

GRAVES, I. Y. M. Y. A. Y. v. A. LIOI L. Jr. I. Y. M. Y. A. Y. v. A. L. Jr., 930 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Op. at 330 (emphasis omitted). . . . Op. at 330 ("[N]o evidence shows that Mrs. . . . Id. at 330 (citation omitted). To that question, I believe the answer is a resounding "yes." . . .

HENRY, a v. HULETT,, 930 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Danberg , 833 F.3d 313, 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2016) ; King v. . . .

SHOCKLEY, v. PRIMELENDING, a, 929 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jack-In-The-Box, Inc. , 330 S.W.3d 476, 484 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) ). . . . Shockley] to [PrimeLending] objectively manifest [Shockley's] intent to be presently bound.' " Kunzie , 330 . . .

UNITED STATES v. GURULE,, 929 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (citing Terry v. . . . Id. at 109, 98 S.Ct. 330. (quoting United States v. . . . Id. at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330. . . . Id. at 111, 98 S.Ct. 330. . . . and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer." 434 U.S. at 112, 98 S.Ct. 330 . . .

UNITED STATES v. GURULE,, 935 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (citing Terry v. . . . Id . at 109, 98 S.Ct. 330. (quoting United States v. . . . Id . at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330. . . . Id . at 111, 98 S.Ct. 330. . . . and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer." 434 U.S. at 112, 98 S.Ct. 330 . . .

JETTE, v. UNITED OF OMAHA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 387 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Bonavita, 330 F. Supp. 3d 797, 807-808 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) ; Schiavone v. Prudential Ins. . . .

C. MALCOLM, v. ASSOCIATION OF SUPERVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS OF ROCHESTER ASAR, 388 F. Supp. 3d 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Supp. 2d 330 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (complaint dismissed with prejudice), aff'd in part, vacated in part 339 . . .

CARDIONET, LLC, v. SCOTTCARE CORPORATION,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 442 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . FIG.3 shows the biological signal200 having a series of events305, 310, 315, 320, 325, 330, 335, 340, . . . Events305, 310, 315, 320, 325, 330, 335, 340, 345 generally are periods in time210 when the information . . . Events305, 310, 315, 320, 325, 330, 335, 340, 345 need not be of equal or predetermined duration. . . . The increased relevance of events305, 310, 315, 320, 325, 330, 335, 340, 345 can be determined using . . . Events305, 310, 315, 320, 325, 330, 335, 340, 345 also can be identified based on characteristics of . . .

SIMON, v. GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, 929 F.3d 118 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Chinery , 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003), we decline to apply it here without further analysis. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BULUC,, 930 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Sonotone Corp. , 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (internal marks omitted)) . . .

MUNICIPALITY OF CABO ROJO, v. POWERSECURE, INC. v., 390 F. Supp. 3d 327 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Chambers, 333 F.3d 322, 330 (1st Cir. 2003) ("When the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, judicial . . .

WILLIAMSON, v. BREVARD COUNTY,, 928 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) (incorporating the clause . . . religion' or that 'prefer one religion over another.' " Id. at 246, 102 S.Ct. 1673 (quoting Everson, 330 . . .

UNITED STATES v. BOLEYN v. v. v. v., 929 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States, 330 U.S. 160, 67 S.Ct. 645, 91 L.Ed. 818 (1947). . . .

MERCK CO. INC. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 385 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Walton , 535 U.S. 212, 222, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002). . . .

IN RE PLATINUM- BEECHWOOD LITIGATION v. Re v. B L. P. v., 390 F. Supp. 3d 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Id. at 330, 2019 WL 2093914, at *9. . . . In re Platinum-Beechwood Litig., 378 F.Supp.3d at 330, 2019 WL 2093914, at *9. . . .

UNITED STATES v. FLUTE,, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rep. at 330. . . .

UNITED STATES v. B. LEDBETTER A. A. L., 929 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 112, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam)). . . .

UNITED STATES v. GAWRON,, 929 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Seifer , 800 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2015). . . .

SIERRA CLUB v. J. TRUMP, T. K., 929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Walton , 535 U.S. 212, 222, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002). . . .

FORTUNE SOCIETY, v. SANDCASTLE TOWERS HOUSING DEVELOPMENT FUND CORP. LLC, LLC, E M LLC,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 145 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Ex. 2, ECF No. 94-4 at 260-63, 330; Ex. 10, ECF No. 94-5 at 701. . . .

LARSON, v. CITY OF ALGOOD, TENNESSEE, v. v., 390 F. Supp. 3d 874 (M.D. Tenn. 2019)

. . . Stockstill, 869 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn. 1994) (accord Woods v. Metro. Dev. & Hous. Auth. . . . Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330, 46 S.Ct. 521, 70 L.Ed. 969 (1926). . . .